or water, 400,000 spindles at 25 cents, 100,000 dollars." The various manufactures of leather are calculated to consume 18 million pounds; and even the manufacture of goat and sheep skins to resemble Spanish leather, appears to be so far advanced as to be able to bear a tax. The next class of manufactures taxed are those of iron; viz. 300,000 tons of pig-iron, 100,000 tons of castiron, 100,000 tons of bar-iron. The quantity of beer, ale, and porter, manufactured and taxed, is estimated at 6,000,000 dollars. The next article of taxation is a singular one: it is called the furniture tax; excluding beds, kitchen furniture, carpets and curtains of domestic manufacture; and also all furniture which on the whole is not of the value of 200 dollars. The estimate of this tax is made on a supposition that the United States contain 800,000 families; of which there are 259,000 exempt, as possessing less than 200 dollars worth; 300,000 families who possess between 200 and 400 dollars; 100,000 who possess between 400 and 500: 75,000 who possess between 600 and 1000; 25,000 who possess between 1000 and 1500: 15,000 who possess between 1500 and 2000; 10,000 who possess between 2000 and 3000; 10,000 who possess between 3000 and 4000; the same number who possess between 4000 and 6000; 5000 who possess between 6000 and 9000; and 1000 who possess furniture worth above 9000 dollars. The next important article is paper, which however is taxed only to the amount of 30,000 dollars. The number of vats is estimated at 2000. Nails made by machinery appear to be of considerable consequence, as their weight is estimated at 20 million pounds, and they are taxed at one cent per pound. The number of gold watches is estimated at 250,000: of silver ones at the same number; and of playing cards at 400,000 packs.

After the finances, the next object which engaged the attention of the American government was the state of the army; a military committee was formed for this purpose, and on the 17th of October the secretary at war addressed a letter to them respecting the defects of the military establishment; in which he proposed that the military establishment then existing, amounting to 62,448 men,

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should be preserved and made complete with the least possible delay; that a permanent force, consisting at least of 40,000 men, in addition, should be raised for the defence of the cities and frontiers; that the corps of engineers be enlarged; and that the ordnance department be amended. This letter was accompanied with explanatory observations, which detailed a plan of a still more formidable description, for augmenting the military force of the United States. In these observations there were several remarkable passages it was distinctly stated, that if the United States sacrificed any right, or made any dishonourable concession to Britain, the spirit of the nation would be broken. The United States must relinquish no rights, or perish in the struggle: there is no intermediate ground to rest on. A concession on one point leads directly to the surrender of every other." "To bring the war to an honourable termination, we must not be content with defending ourselves. Different feelings must be touched and apprehensions excited in the British government." "It cannot be doubted that it is in the power of the United States to expel the British forces from this continent." From this view of the subject, the secretary at war concluded it would be necessary to bring into the field next campaign not less than 100,000 regular troops.

For this purpose a bill was brought into congress, entitled, "An act to provide for filling the ranks of the regular army, by classifying the free white male population of the United States:" the first section of this act directs, that all the white male inhabitants between 18 and 45 be classed-classes of 25 in each to be made under the authority of the assessors of the United States; where there are no assessors, under marshals; both of whom are to be bound under penalty to complete the classification in a given time; each class to furnish one able-bodied man between 18 and 45, to serve during the war; to be delivered over to the assessor or marshals, and by them to be delivered over to the United States' officers authorized to receive him: the marshals and assessors were to determine the precincts of each class, so that the property in each division shall be as

nearly equal as possible: in case of failure, each class to pay a penalty; and if this was not paid in a certain number of days, it was to be collected from the taxable inhabitants of the district, in proportion to property real and personal: the marshals and assessors were to act under the direction of the president of the United States. Any person aggrieved by excessive valuations may appeal in the manner as with respect to the direct taxes: the money accruing from the penalties to be employed by the secretary of war to recruit the armies. The last section provides that any five white male inhabitants, being liable to military duty, who shall furnish a soldier between 18 and 45 during the war, shall be exempt from military duty during the war.

Whatever objections may be made to this bill, as enacting regulations for raising men, which very strongly resembled the conscription of France, it must be acknowledged that the very proposing it was a proof that the president felt himself strong, and that his popularity, instead of having been diminished, had been increased by the events of the war. Still, if this war had been in accordance with the sincere and zealous opinion of the inhabitants of the United States, it seems reasonable to suppose that they would have stepped forward as volunteers in defence of their country: the whole number proposed to be raised by this bill was only 100,000, not more than one-fourth of the volunteers who in Great Britain offered their services during the revolutionary war with France.

But events were taking place at Ghent, which rendered it extremely probable that there would be no necessity for carrying into effect the regulations of this bill. On the 8th of August the British and American commissioners met at this city: the former were lord Gambier, Mr. Goulbourn, one of the under secretaries of state for the colonial department, and Dr. Adams. The American commissioners were John Quincy Adams, J. A. Baynard, H. Clay, John Russel, and Albert Gallatin. At their first meeting the British commissioners gave in a list of the subjects in which it appeared to them that difference of opinion would arise between the

American commissioners and themselves : these were,

1. The forcible seizure of mariners from on board merchant ships on the high seas, and in connection with it the right of the king of Great Britain to the allegiance of all his native subjects.

2. That the peace be extended to the Indian allies of Great Britain; and that the boundary of their territory be definitely marked out, as a permanent barrier between the dominions of Great Britain and the United States. An arrangement on this subject to be a sine qua non of a treaty of peace.

3. A revision of the boundary line between the British and American territories, with the view to prevent future uncertainty and dispute.

The British commissioners requested in-formation whether the American commissioners were instructed to enter into negotiation on the above points? But before they desired any answer, they felt it right to communicate the intentions of their government as to the North American fisheries, viz. that the British government did not intend to grant to the United States gratuitously, the privileges formerly granted by treaty to them, of fishing within the limits of the British sovereignty, and of using the shores of the British territories for purposes connected with the fisheries.

At their next meeting, the American commissioners stated, that upon the 1st and 3d points they were provided with instructions: but not on the 2nd and 4th: that the American government had appointed separate commissioners to treat with the Indians for peace. They then presented further subjects considered by their government as suitable for discussion: these were,

1. A definition of blockade, and, as far as may be agreed, of other neutral and belligerent rights.

2. Certain claims of indemnity to individuals for captures and seizures preceding and subsequent to the war.

3. They further stated, that there were various other points to which their instructions extended, which might with propriety be objects of discussion, either in the nego tiation of the peace, or in that of a treaty of

commerce, which, in the case of a propitious termination of the present conferences, they were likewise authorised to conclude. That for the purpose of facilitating the first and most essential object of peace, they had discarded every subject which was not considered as peculiarly connected with that, and presented only those points which appeared to be immediately relevant to this negotia

tion.

At a subsequent meeting on the 10th of August, the British commissioners endeavoured to persuade the American commissioners, that it would be desirable that the American government should give up many places, of which they were still in possession, for the purpose of rendering the limits of Canada more precise and secure: but on this point the American commissioners were immoveable:-the British commissioners also expressed their surprise that no instructions had been given by the government of the United States, to treat at the congress of Ghent with respect to peace with the Indians.

The most important as well as the most difficult points in dispute between Great Britain and the United States were undoubtedly those relating to the impressment of seamen out of American ships, and the practice of blockade. With respect to the first, it was alleged on the part of Britain, that every state had a right to the allegiance and services of its own subjects; and that such services and allegiance could not be alienated by the individual. It was a well known fact, that many British seamen entered on board American ships. To these the British government claimed a right; and if they were not given up by the American government, it claimed a right to search for them, and take them out of the American ships on board of which they were. The American government, on the other hand, did not directly deny that a state had a right to the allegiance and services of its subjects; but they virtually denied that such allegiance and services could not be alienated; since they considered as citizens of the United States, and of course as ceasing to be subjects of the country in which they were born, all who had lived a certain number of years in those

states. But they also complained that seamen, bona fide, and, according to the laws of all countries, American citizens, were taken out of American ships; and that they would not suffer their national flag to be insulted by searching their vessels on any pretext.In order to settle the difference with respect to impressment, the president expressed his willingness to exclude all British seamen from the vessels of the United States; and even to exclude all British subjects, except those already naturalized; and also to surrender all British seamen deserting from British vessels. This was certainly a fair proposition, if it could have been followed up with efficient practice; but it was well known that certificates of citizenship were easily obtained in the United States; and where these were shown, how was it to be determined whether they were genuine or not? The admission of the president, however, was important in another point of view; as it distinctly involved an acknowledgment that every state has a right to the service and allegiance of its subjects, and that such allegiance and services cannot be alienated.

The question respecting blockade was equally difficult: it appears to us that we have stretched this right beyond what justice and common sense, as well as the usages of nations will warrant, and even beyond our own acknowledged principle: we admit that no blockade is legal, except where it is supported by a sufficient force :-but were even all the ships of the British navy adequate to the efficient blockade of the immense extent of the sea coast of the United States? Certainly not; and to call that a blockade, where the ports are only occasionally and partially blocked up, seems to us a gross misapplication of words! In fact, instead of issuing a proclamation, intimating to neutrals that we had blockaded all the coast of America, we ought to have expressly declared, what was our intention and our practice, that we did not mean to permit neutrals to trade with the United States.

It would probably, therefore, have been impossible to have brought together the opinions of the British and American commissioners on these subjects, had not the peace which had taken place in Europe fortunately

rendered their further discussion of no importance. Both governments, therefore, very wisely agreed to forego points of dispute which could no longer be acted upon, and which, by the return of peace, had become mere abstract principles.

The other subjects, of any importance, were the admission of the Indians to the treaty, and the fixing a new frontier to Canada. We certainly asked a very improper thing, when we asked, that the United States should not transgress on the Indian territory: in the course of events, the Indians must give place to the inhabitants of the United States; and it is desirable on every account that it should be so.

We may also say, that in the course of events Canada must fall into the possession of the United States; and we even doubt whether this would be any serious evil. To those who consider colonies as very beneficial to the parent state, and their loss as weakening and injuring it to a great degree, we would cite what was the result of the loss of our American colonies: are not both we and they better for it? Have we not less expense and more trade?—and is it not probable that the same would be the case if we lost Canada? Colonies always flourish best when independent; and as the real benefit which the parent state derives from them is derived from commerce with them, it is evident that this benefit will be increased in proportion as they flourish, while the expense of maintaining them will be done away. But to return to the immediate point in dispute between Great Britain and the United States, with regard to Canada: it was not to be expected that the latter would cede any part of its own territory, at least without an equivalent, especially if they had any design against Canada, and if this cession would make Canada more secure.

The negotiations at Ghent were very protracted, and at last terminated rather unexpectedly in a pacific manner. What brought about this termination is not well known: probably, on our side, the want of success, even after we had sent out reinforcements from the peninsula; the enormous expense of sending out troops to Canada, and keeping them there; the critical state of our finances;

and the apprehension that, if the war were not speedily terminated, some of the European powers might take the part of the United States, especially on the subject of maritime rights. On the side of the United States, their government were disposed to peace, principally on account of the unpopularity of the president, the embarrassment of their commerce and finances, and the devastation to which their coasts were exposed. The terms of the treaty of peace (which was signed at Ghent on the 24th of December, ratified immediately by the prince regent, and transmitted without delay to Washington, for the ratification of the president) were as follows:

1. All discussion of our maritime rights is waved on both sides.

2. Mr. Madison does not insist on our giving up the prizes captured in retaliation of the Berlin and Milan decrees.

3. We leave our Indian allies as we found them in 1812.

4. We give up all our conquests, and particularly the province of Maine, of which our commanders took permanent possession by solemn proclamation; requiring from the inhabitants an oath of allegiance to his majesty. We are graciously permitted, however, to retain the islands which were actually ours by the treaty of 1783.

5. Commissioners are to be appointed on both sides, to determine whether there shall be any, and what safe and practicable communication between Quebec and Upper Canada, together with all other disputed questions of territory.

6. We are to be allowed the exclusive enjoyment of the right of fishing on our own coasts at Newfoundland! and of trading to our own settlements in the East Indies.

Having thus brought to a close our account of the naval and military operations against the Americans, it is impossible not to compare the results of our hostility with the means which we possessed, and the expectations we had formed. Our disasters were rendered more disgraceful by the tone of triumphant anticipation with which we announced our designs, and the indiscretion with which we avowed our confidence of success. The glory which we had lately ob

tained against a much more celebrated foe, presented a striking contrast to the imbecility and mismanagement displayed in the American campaign. These humiliating circumstances infused into the minds of a large portion of the British people a vindictive wish that our government would not make peace with the United States till they had been

decisively beaten and conquered, and till we had thus redeemed our naval and military character. Fortunately for the honour of England, the happiness of America, and the interests of humanity at large, the British government was animated by more meritorious feelings, and more enlightened policy.

THE situation of France at the recall of Louis is thus described by the treacherous and unfortunate Labedoyere. "In 1814 neither the nation nor the army could longer support the yoke of Buonaparte. It was tired with war without motive, and exhausted by sacrifices without utility. All felt the necessity of a repairing government. Where could we flatter ourselves that we should find it but in the recall of the Bourbons, whose names reminded France of a series of good kings, and ages of prosperity." Such was the general language of the marshals and officers of France, on the first return of the Bourbon dynasty to the throne; and the flatteries which were heaped upon them in return by every member of the royal family were so gross and profuse, as at once to gratify their pride and awaken their suspicion. The line of conduct at first adopted by the court was singularly unfortunate, as it was afterwards compelled to confer its principal favours on the troops of La Vendée and of Coblentz, who formed the military strength of the royalist party, and who claimed the reward of their former sufferings. Discontent and suspicion were excited in the minds of the Buonapartean military; the remembrance of their former chief, with whom they had no rivals, was recalled, and the foundation was laid for their speedy disaffection.

The army had not submitted until the cause of their former master was desperate. They had then slowly and reluctantly tendered their allegiance. That a monarch had been forced upon them was a fruitful source of discontent. The sovereign was now surrounded by those against whom they had long and desperately fought, whom they considered as the enemies of their country, and whom they regarded with mingled contempt and aversion. The emigrant noblesse and the soldiers of the revolution, entertained the most hostile sentiments towards each other, and the professions of gratitude and confidence which the court expressed were too evidently insincere to deceive or to conciliate.

The return of the prisoners from Russia and England increased the general discontent. One hundred and fifty thousand men, destitute of subsistence or empolyment, were restored to France, with all the habits of idleness and depravity to which a long detention in prison so powerfully conduces. In war alone they possessed the means of indulging their vicious and licentious propensities, or of supporting their existence. They united therefore with the regular troops in eager and importunate demands to be conducted once more in the paths of glory.

The officers who returned from Russia had