reasons based on experience. Officers who duties are an essential part of the business to be done, whose action is a necessary part of cooperative labor in rendering further services are made independent. Under the present constitution there is no head. The governor, in whom the executive power is solemnly vested, does not possess the means and authority necessary to exercise it. Five of the heads of department are made independent through election. With respect to these the governor has no power to appoint or remove. He may suspend temporarily one officer who is elected by popular vote, but he cannot remove without the consent of the senate many officers whom he appoints with the approval of that body. In short, by reason of the method prescribed for selection, personal responsibility for the conduct of government is so broken up that it is beyond the powers of man to discover it either in individuals. or the collective body. (See below, pp. 89-100, for a treatment of the

executive department.)

METHODS OF APPOINTMENT

When it is decided that certain officers shall be appointed, the method of appointment becomes of prime importance. The underlying reason for appointing instead of electing administrative officers is to locate responsibility and make it enforcible; it is a method adapted to the choice of subordinates. The adoption of the method implies that the appointing officer assumes responsibility for the proper conduct of the appointee. The location of responsibility for appointments depends on placing the power to select with the officer who is to be held to account for the acts of the appointee. Discipline and efficiency are impossible unless adequate power to maintain them is vested in those whom the constitution and public opinion inake responsible for securing them.

Present Legal Provisions Governing

Tried by such standards, the present constitution and the system of government created under it, are devoid of plan and principle alike. To the end that this constitutional and statutory confusion of responsibility may be brought home to the reader, a chart giving the exact picture of the methods prescribed by statute for appointing officers is printed on page 34. As is graphically shown by Chart I, there are at least sixteen different ways of appointing the heads of state departments, bureaus and offices and members of commissions, viz.:

1. By joint action of both houses of the legislature.

2. Partly by joint action by both houses of the legislature and partly by action of the law (ex officio).

3. By joint action of both houses of the legislature and approval

of the governor.

4. By separate action of the senate, assembly and the governor.

5. Partly by separate action by the senate, assembly and the
governor and partly by operation of the law (ex officio).
By the governor with the advice and consent of the senate.
7. Partly by the governor with the advice and consent of the
senate and partly by operation of law (ex officio).

6.

9. Partly by the governor and partly by law (ex officio).

10. Partly by the governor and the mayor of the City of New York and partly by the operation of law (ex officio).

11. Partly by the governor, the state board of charities and the prison commission and partly by operation of law (ex officio).

12. Wholly ex-officio

13. By the fiscal supervisor and one of his appointees and by superintendents who are not his appointees

14. By self-perpetuating bodies

15. By the court of appeals

16. By the supreme court

Purpose-to Prevent Responsible Leadership

If there was any doubt as to the lack of plan or purpose in developing methods of appointment, no further evidence is necessary to carry conviction. Moreover it is clear that the responsibility for this chaos rests largely upon the legislature in the absence of constitutional treatment. It is clear that the controlling consideration in the legislature in prescribing methods of appointment has not been to make the government responsible directly to public opinion or to make anyone responsible for leadership, for fidelity, or for efficiency and economy in carrying on the business of the state. It is equally clear that the dominant motives have been to prevent responsible leadership, to diffuse authority and to set one officer up against another so that no agent could have any power to do harm. However useful the constitution and the laws governing appointment may be as instruments of negation, there can be no doubt that they are wholly unadapted to meeting the increasing and changed demands made upon the government for service and for rendering efficiently the duties undertaken.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS DETERMINING QUALIFICATIONS AND FITNESS

As in private employments, the determination of the qualifications and relative merits of persons who are available for employment or already in the service is a matter of primary importance. The difficulty of forming any genuinely helpful rules for guidance is great owing to the subtle human elements involved. Nevertheless there are certain general principles that may serve to guide. The first of these is that any

methods devised for determining ability and fitness must be adapted to the methods of choice imposed upon those who make the selection. A second is that it is necessary to differentiate between offices which are technical or routine in character and those which involve managerial discretion and the settlement of important matters of policy. A third is that facilities should be afforded for prompt removal of persons who show infidelity or who by a practical test or record of work done have shown incapacity.

Requirements of Elective Officers Fortuitous

Where officers are made elective, it is only natural that political considerations should determine the chief qualifications imposed. If offices requiring technical or professional training are filled by popular vote it sometimes happens that other considerations are entertained by constitution makers. In New York the following constitutional provisions govern the qualification and fitness of elected officers:

1. Citizenship and age-applicable to the governor and the lieutenant governor

2. Training and experience-applicable to the state engineer and surveyor (and to judges)

3. Residence--applicable to the governor and the lieutenant gov

ernor

The constitutional requirements are either unnecessary or are inadequate. For example, what reason can be advanced for prescribing in the constitution the qualifications of the state engineer, and omitting all mention of the qualifications of the attorney general and other officers who, to perform efficient service, must have professional training and experience?

Requirements of Appointed Officers and Employees Inadequate

Adopting the grouping above suggested, viz.: officers who have confi-dential, managerial or important discretionary powers and those whose duties are merely technical, professional, or routine in character, only two officers of the first group are named by the constitution-the superintendent of public works and the superintendent of prisons. In neither case are any qualifications prescribed. Although the constitution stipulates that the state engineer and surveyor who is elected by popular vote must be a practical civil engineer, it does not prescribe qualifications for the superintendent of public works, whose duties call for high technical and professional skill. When offices falling within the first group are created by legislative action, it is commonly the practice to leave the determination of qualifications and fitness of incumbents wholly to the officer empowered to select them.

CHART II.-SHOWING THE DIFFERENT METHODS PRESCRIBED BY LAW FOR REMOVING HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, OFFICES, BOARDS AND

THE NEW YORK BUREAU OF MUNICIPAL RESEARCH

KEY TO CHART II.-SHOWING THE DIFFERENT METHODS OF REMOVAL PRESCRIBED BY LAW, ROMAN NUMERALS