for some system by which the government could be carried on without interruption. It was to meet these wants that the conventions appointed committees of safety during the earlier years of the revolution. They served as the chief executive * ** in the transition period from colonial to state government." Under the same circumstances the “Confederation and Perpetual Union of the United States of America " was organized. The "Articles of Confederation" of the original thirteen states provided that "the United States in congress assembled" should have the sole and exclusive right of directing the land and naval forces; and that the business of the confederation should be administered by Congress, or in their recess by a "Committee of the States," to consist of one delegate from each state.

The Failure of Committee Systems

Such forms of organization where used as state and federal agencies, have in every instance broken down. While they have been adapted to making the government responsive, they have not been adapted to making it responsible for leadership, for fidelity, efficiency and economy. Their failure in New York is virtually admitted in the first sentence of the preamble of the first constitution of the state adopted in 1777, which runs as follows:

"Whereas, many tyrannical and oppressive usurpations of the King and parliament of Great Britain on the rights and liberties of the people of the American colonies had reduced them to the necessity of introducing a government by congresses and committees

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** * * * *

"And, whereas, many and great inconveniences attend the said mode of government by congresses and committees, as of necessity, in many instances, legislative, judicial, and executive powers have been vested therein * * * * * * * *

"This convention, therefore, in the name and by the authority of the good people of this State, doth ordain, determine and declare that no authority shall, on any pretence whatever, be exercised over the people or members of this State but such as shall be derived from and granted by them * * *

It is clear that the legislative committee system of administration was originally a mere expedient of revolutionary times. Nevertheless, it has exercised a profound influence on the course of our constitutional and legislative development, although it was avowedly a temporary device resorted to at a time when executive power had been thrown into confusion by armed resistance. Domination of the administration by legislative committees is to-day a conspicuous and disastrous feature in American government.

The Commission Form of Government

The "commission form of government" as the term is now understood differs from the revolutionary expedients in this, that the represen

tative body is made extremely small, the thought being that when there are only a few members in a legislature, responsibility for the exercise of executive and administrative functions, may be safely entrusted to them. Although several hundred cities have recently adopted this form, there is grave apprehension that the venture will not prove permanently satisfactory, because it deprives the community of an independent representative agency or branch of government charged with responsibility for review and criticism. Discontent with the system is becoming manifest in many places where movements are on foot to reintroduce the separate executive by providing for what is called a "city manager.”

A few private institutions have been successfully managed without a separately organized chief executive, but in each such case the president or chairman of the board has become, in fact, the chief executive thereby providing for responsible leadership and personal direction and control of the several heads of administration.

ADMINISTRATION UNDER A RESPONSIBLE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

The second general group of governmental agencies which employ a representative system is characterized above as a type "in which both a representative branch and an executive branch appear, the chief executive being looked to for leadership, and both branches being made responsive through provisions for submitting irreconcilable differences directly. to the people."

Distinguishing Characteristics of Type

This type has as many local adaptations as there are institutions within the type, but each has the following distinguishing characteristics. In each case provision is made for executive direction and control over the personnel in the conduct of public business. In each case the constitution provides for institutional loyalty and co-operation through the principle of "solidarity" in executive responsibility or agreement between administrative heads before any plan or proposal is submitted as a government measure. In each case provision is made for prompt reference to the electorate of irreconcilable issues arising between the executive and a majority of the official representative body, thereby making both branches responsive to public opinion.

All Responsible, but Differing Degrees of Success in Development of Efficiency

The degree to which the different governments of this type have become responsive and responsible has varied according to the expedients used. In England, for example, there can be no doubt as to the responsiveness of the government to popular demand, except in so

far as the permanent tenure of the members of the House of Lords and the long tenure of members of the House of Commons have interfered. But in case of continued controversy the Lords may be overruled by the House of Commons, and the life of the House of Commons may be brought to an end at any moment by dissolution. In England there can be no doubt as to responsibility for leadership; on the other hand, there has been a certain indifference to the need for adopting expedients that are essential to efficiency and economy, a fact perhaps explicable by taking into account the contentment of the British with long established customs and their regard for the conventions that have grown up around a hereditary ruling class in a highly stratified society. In France the government is also responsive. Responsible executive leadership has also been established both in the election of the president and the prompt retirement of the cabinet in case of failure to retain the support of a majority of representatives. There the ancient social stratification has in a measure given way to expedients for making the administration more efficient and economical. In Germany adaptations for responsiveness to public opinion have not been as completely developed as in France and England. Leadership there is also made responsible; but in last analysis this does not rest so directly on a vote in the representative branch, but depends on the ability of the Kaiser and the Chancellor to sense the public opinion. There the best known expedients which make for efficiency and economy have been developed and applied to a degree unknown outside of privately organized establishments, with the possible exception of Japan. Without suggestion of invidious comparison, these references to experience are made to call attention to the fact that the second general type of organization for management has proved adjustable to the most varying political conditions, and that this type is adapted to securing effective popular control, responsible leadership, and honest, efficient and economical transaction of public business.

AN INDEPENDENTLY ORGANIZED ADMINISTRATION WITHOUT LEADERSHIP The third type of government in which separate executive and legislative branches appear without any provision being made for responsible leadership or for submitting irreconcilable differences to the electorate is to be found in all of the American states, and is, in a somewhat modified form, the basis of the federal system. It may be said with safety that of all the countries of the world in which democracy has made any considerable advances, the United States is the only one that retains this type. It is true that the governments of the South American republics are modelled on this form, but at times they have not been representative, that is, have not always succeeded in preventing executive usurpation. In the United States the essential advantages of a strong executive held to responsible leadership have been destroyed, whereas in countries pos

sessing the second type the executive department has been conquered, not destroyed, and it has been made both responsible and efficient.

The Mechanism for Making Management Responsible Recent in Its Development

The predominance of this third type of representative government in the United States may be ascribed to historical accident rather than to any reasoned consideration and rejection of the second type. At the time of the establishment of American independence, when statesmen were forming state governments and creating a union, the principle of popular representation was accepted in the United States and in England but the technique for the enforcement of executive responsibility had not been worked out and applied. While the Revolutionary War was a part of the struggle for the general principle of popular control, it occurred before a mechanism for making the executive responsible had been devised and installed. At this very time George III was resisting and resenting popular interference with his executive prerogatives-he was trying to defeat the efforts of politically organized constituencies to determine what the executive should do. He did not openly attack the representative system, but sought to destroy all sense of solidarity among the members of his own cabinet as the responsible heads of the administration, and destroy their leadership as popular representatives. When George III came to the throne this policy was relatively easy to carry out, because the idea of responsible leadership was only hazily grasped. A considerable number of the members of the cabinet were not regarded as having any responsibility. "In the Grenville Ministry, which lasted from the spring of 1763 to the summer of 1765," says Anson, "the business of the government was settled at weekly dinners, at which only five or six ministers were present * *. The cabinet of Lord Buckingham in 1782 would seem to be the first in which there were no non-official members. It consisted of 11 persons, each holding high political office." Lord Buckingham himself is reported to have said of his fellow members, when discussing the ability of the cabinet: "I could chase the hare with a pack of hounds but not with a lot of lobsters."

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The English Rule Limiting the Cabinet Personnel to Responsible Officers Not Adopted till 1801

It was not till 1801 that the rule was established in England which limited members of the cabinet to persons holding responsible offices, and England at that time was the most advanced of all nations in the development of methods for making the executive responsible. Responsibility then came to mean also liability of executive heads to lose their official positions in case they as a cabinet could not join in every administration proposal submitted. If a minister differed from his colleagues he was

expected to resign or to be held responsible for what the cabinet did as a group. Responsibility was made collective and leadership was made responsible by providing that the cabinet should present a solid front in dealing with the legislature.

A Single Responsible Head Not Recognized in England till after the American Revolution

The necessity for a prime minister or head of the administration was not recognized until after the American Revolution, and it was not. until after 1832 that the prime minister came in fact to be the choice of a body acting as an electoral college-persons chosen by the electorate who had delegated to them the power to select a chief executive.* That is, it was not until after the passage of the Reform Bill that the Commons came to be fairly representative, and the cabinet was made wholly dependent on retaining the support of a majority of the representatives of the people.†

The Mechanism for Carrying Issues before the Electorate Not Perfected until after 1832

After responsible and collective leadership was firmly established in the cabinet, the final step in the development of the system was the adoption of the expedient of submitting irreconcilable differences between the executive and the legislature to the decision of the electorate. This step was not firmly taken until about the middle of the nineteenth century. Speaking on this point, Anson says: "There was no instance. before 1830 of a ministry retiring because it was beaten on any question. of legislation or even of taxation. So late as 1841 Macaulay maintained in the House of Commons, speaking as a cabinet minister, that the government were not bound to resign because they could not carry legislative changes, except in particular cases where they were convinced that without such and such a law they could not carry on the public service.” Means for Making Control through Representatives Effective, Not Generally Adopted in Europe till after 1848

It is also a matter of peculiar interest that the Revolution of 1848 and other political disturbances in Europe which occurred in the middle of the last century had very largely to do with the establishment of the principle of executive responsibility in the continental governments of

*In establishing our federal constitution, a separate electoral college was provided for. In some countries, the regular representative body is used for this purpose. Our electoral college meets once, casts a vote and that is the end of it; the parliamentary electoral college is a continuing body, always available to perform the electoral function.

Before the passage of the Reform Bill the Commons was largely under the domination of the executive, through his ability to control the "rotten boroughs" and the use of other questionable means.