part of the river, which, fo far as we can comprehend the account, feems to have been nearly parallel to Bender; from which it was diftant about 120 miles. In the mean time a confiderable army of Turks and Tartars marched along on the fanie fide of the river to meet June 25th. them. When the two armies came in fight, the Turks immediately, and with great judgment, changed their polition, and took poffeffion of a most advantageous camp, which they as fuddenly fortified in the strongest man

ner.

This army was commanded by Capian Ghieri, Kan of the Crimea; a mark to him of the greatest honour, and of uncommon confidence in the Porte; for as thefe Kans are heirs to the empire, in failure of iffue in the Ottoman line, it has been the conftant policy of that family, not to entruft them with the fupreme command of a Turkish army. This prince had three baha's under his command, and the army was faid to confift of about 80,000 men. The ground on which they encamped, was a steep, rocky, and almoft inacceffible eminence, which the Ruffian account calls a mountain, covered on one fide by the Pruth, and on the other by the little river Larga.

This camp was fo well chofen, and the ground fo difficult, that notwithstanding the repeated efforts of General Romanzow to bring on an engagement, it was above three weeks before he could hazard a general attack. The Turks not being inured to that ftrict difcipline, nor tempered by that long fervice, which enables veteran foldiers to bear with patience, the fight and continued infults of an enemy,

twenty thousand of their braveft par tizans defcended from their trong camp, and attacked the Ruffians with great refolution; but were repulled, and beaten back to their camp with confiderable lofs.

At length, fome difficulties having been probably removed, or fome favourable circumstances occurred, with which we are not acquainted, the Ruffians, three days after this engagement, mounted the hills at the dawn July 18th. of the morning, where they found four great and strong entrenchments, covered with a numerous artillery; these they attacked with great refolution, and met with as cbftinate a defence. The Ruffians however triumphed over all oppofition, and beat them fucceffively cut of the four entrenchments, after which the Turks abandoned their camp, and fled in the greateft diforder. The victors became poffeffed of a great booty upon this occafion, beñides thirtyeight pieces of brafs cannon, and feveral other trophies.

No account is given of the lofs on either fide, in killed, wounded, or prifoners, in this engagement; it is only faid that of the Rubians was moderate, confidering the length and importance of the action. We are as much in the dark as to the

anner in which the retreat was conducted, and whether there was any purfuit; even the route which the Turks took after the battle, is only to be difcovered by comparing other circumftances, which had no immediate relation to this action. In a word, the account given of this battle, though attributed to General Romanzow, is fo inaccurate, that it is only by deduction, from the former and fubfequent fonduct

conduct of the campaign, that the fide of the Pruth on which it happened could be ascertained, as by one part of it the Turkish camp feems to have been upon the right, and by another on the left of that river.

The victory at the river Larga was only a prelude to, and contributed to accelerate one much greater; which at the fame time that it does the greatest honour to the military abilities of General Romanzow, establishes the infinite fuperiority of the Ruffian troops beyond a doubt; and evinces almoft to a demonftration, that in the prefent ftile of arms, and difcipline among the Turks, there is fcarce a poffibility of their being able to cope with them.

The Kan of the Tartars having retreated towards the Danube, the Grand Vizir thought proper to crofs that river at Ifatfka, at the head of the grand army to fupport him. General Romanzow in the mean time purfued his march along the Pruth, towards its confluence with the Danube. The two armies came in light of each other in the evening, and at eight o'clock the Turks encamped at about 4 miles diftance from the Ruffians, both armies lying between the Pruth and the river Cahul. The Tartars formed a separate corps on the left of the Ruffians, but afterwards fpread themselves in their rear, to cut off a great detachment which General Romanzow had made for the efcort of a convoy of provifions. In certain fituations boldness is prudence; it is in these that great genius is diftinguished from common abilities; the prefent was one of them, and General Romanzow did not want difcernment to perceive it. A more VOL, XIII.

cautious commander might have hefitated till he had loft his army.

The Ruffian army was greatly weakened by making this detach. ment; and the inequality of numbers was fuch, as in common cafes would have made it inexcufable to have risked a battle. The General however having duly weighed the goodness of his troops, the confidence with which they were infpired from a long courfe of fuccefs, and the confequences that might refult from the dangerous defign, formed by the Tartars, refolved. boldly to attack the enemy next morning. The Ruffian army was accordingly in motion before light, and began its march at the break of day. An unexpected incident which took place in the night, would have ftaggered a mind of lefs firmness, and damped the courage of any but Veteran troops. As foon as the morning had cleared up, the General perceived to his great aftonishment, that the Turks, notwithstanding their prodigious numbers, and the daring countenance they bore in the evening,. had fortified their camp during the night with no lefs than three great and ftrong entrenchments, fuperior to thofe which he had lately forced in the Kan's camp, and defended by a hoft, which as to number and appearance, fhould have defpifed any other protection than what their arms and their va-, Jour gave them.

The die was however caft, and the General bravely perfevered in his refolution. His fituation was truly critical, for a defeat muft have been attended with the total lofs of the army; nor would Count Panin have found it easy, in that cafe, to have retired in fafety from [B]

Bender

Bender, even with the lofs of his artillery and ftores. In Aug. 2d. a word, the whole fate of the war feemed to hang upon this day.

The Turks did not however wait to be attacked in their entrenchments, thefe were only intended as the laft refort, and the Ruffians found themfelves almoft furroanded, at a confiderable diftance from the camp, by feveral large bodies of troops, who attacked them in front and flank with the greatest bravery. A defperate engagement enfued, in which the clofe order and excellent difcipline of the Ruffians ftill prevailed, and they continually gained ground on the enemy. As they advanced nearer the entrenchments, which were covered with a prodigious artillery, the battle grew every inftant more terrible; at length the Grand Vizir made a fally in perfon, at the head of the Janizaries and all the braveft troops in the army. The conflict now became dreadful, and was fupported with the most determined refolution and obstinacy on both fides. After a continued fire of artillery and small arms, which lafted for five hours without intermiffion, the Ruffians, by the united force of their bayonets, penetrated to the firft entrenchment, which they carried by a defperate affault.

A pause then enfued, which was only preparatory to a new engagement, between the entrenchments, if poffible more furious than the first. In this the Turks ufed every poffible effort to retrieve the fortune of the day; one body ftill coming on and renewing the engagement with freth ardor, as another was defeated. At length fee

ing that the braveft corps of their Janizaries, and all the other beft bodies of their infantry were fucceffively defeated, and unable to withstand the clofeness of the Ruffian array, the continued weight of their fire, and the irrefiftible force of their bayonets, they loft all hope and courage, and the fecond and third entrenchments were fucceffively carried. The rout then became general; and the Grand Vizir feeing every thing loft, made the beft of his way, together with his principal officers and the celebrated Count Potocki, to the Danube, which was about twenty miles from the field of battle.

The whole camp, tents, equipage, a vast quantity of ammunition, 143 pieces of brafs cannon, and above 7,000 carriages loaded with provifions, became a prey to the conquerors. The fugitives were purfued to the Danube, where the crowds were fo great as to render the paffage very difficult and dangerous, and fome bodies of horse, it is faid, were obliged to fwim over; others croffed the Pruth, and directed their courfe to Ibrailow, and other parts of Walachia. It is faid that above 7,000 Turks were killed on the field of battle, and that the roads to the Danube were covered with dead bodies; a great number of prisoners, among whom were many of confiderable rank, were also taken. Some açcounts make the lofs amount to 40,000 men, and fay that the Grand Vizir's army confitted of 150,000: General Romanzow, in his letter to the Emprefs, does not give the numbers that engaged, nor the lofs on either fide; he however takes notice of the great inferiority of his own army. The lofs

of

of men in fuch a battle muft un doubtedly be very great, and in its confequences much greater. Nothing could be more decifive than this battle, nor more glorious to General Romanzow and to the troops that he commanded. It might be faid in the language of poetry, that the genius of Ruffia particularly predominated upon this occafion, and had chofen the Pruth as the fcene of victory, to wipe off the difgrace which Peter the Great had formerly met with on the banks of that river. The General acknowledges in his letter to the Empress, that the Turks behaved with great bravery, and fays that the Rubans were never engaged in any battle that was more obftinately difputed. The great fuperiority of the Ruffians may be attributed, to their quicknefs and dexterity in the management of the artillery, in which they are particularly excellent, and fcarcely rivalled by any other nation, to the conftant and regular fire of their small arms, in which the Turks are very deficient, and to their charging with fcrewed bayonets, against which the fabre can fcarcely be confidered as a weapon. In other refpects, there feems to have been no fault in the conduct of the Turkish Generals; and it is evident that there was no want of resolution in their troops.

The Tartars had engaged the convoy without fuccefs during the battle, the event of which perhaps had an effect upon their conduct; they were however totally feparated from the Turkish army, and being

at a great distance from the Crimea, and the Ruffians in poffeffion of the intermediate countries, it was a long time before they could make their way home, after having been reduced to great ftraits, and fuffering very confiderable loffes. We do not hear of the cavalry having been engaged on either fide in this battle; it is probable that the greater part of the Ruffian had been detached to efcort the convoy, and perhaps the nature of the ground did not admit of the Turks making ufe of theirs.

It would feem that the Turks have not known in any part of this war how to make a proper use of their cavalry. Their European horfe were long efteemed among the beft in the world: they have fill great courage, able bodies, good horfes, are excellent horsemen, and know the use of the fabre from their infancy: an army of foot without difcipline is worth nothing; but a body of horse with thefe qualifications would, if properly conducted, be at all times formidable. The extenfive plains, vast

waftes, and inexhaustible growth of herbage, in the countries that are the feat of the war, point them out as the proper fcene of action for fuch troops, and where they might undoubtedly be employed with very great effect. As to the Turkish infantry, it is evident, that unless they adopt the improvements in arms and difcipline made by the European nations, they never will be able to make any figure against them in the field."

WH

WHILE the arms of Ruffia were thus victorious on the Pruth, under General Romanzow, Count Panin was not lefs induftrious in profecuting their fuccefs on the Niefter. He had for fome time invefted Bender, and was expediting all the neceffary preparations for befieging it in form. Bender was fituated upon the Niefter, about 180 miles to the fouth-east of Chotzim, and 100 north-weft of Bialogrod or Ackirman, which lies at the mouth of the river; and was from fize, ftrength, fituation, and the number of its inhabitants, a place of the greatest confideration in these countries.

We have already feen that General Proforowski had been detached early in the campaign, to scour the country between the Niefter and the Nieper or Borifthenes, thereby to keep the Budziac Tartars in awe, and prevent their impeding the operations of Count Panin. This fervice he performed with great effect, having laid waste and ruined the country, taken a great booty in cattle, delivered feveral thou fands of the por Walachians who had been carried into flavery, and proceeded fuccessfully with his in

curfions to the very gates of Ocza kow, which lies at the mouth of the Nieper, about 130 miles to the fouth-east of Bender.

This fuccefs greatly_facilitated the operations of Count Panin, who divided his army into two parts, to befiege the fortrefs effectually; a meafure which could not have been attempted with fafety, if the enemy had any army in the field, to take advantage of the feparation made by fo large a river. Every thing being at length prepared, the trenches were July 30th. opened on both fides of the river at the fame time, and the garrifon next day fet fire to the fuburbs, after which a furious cannonade and bombardment was be. gun from all quarters, and vigoroufly returned by the town. fortrefs was very ftrong, and the garrifon very numerous; who, befides the Governor, were headed by feveral Bafhas and officers of rank, fo that the place was defended with the greatest bravery.

The

In fixteen days from the opening of the trenches, the garrifon made feven defperate fallies, in which though they loft a great number of men, they gave fufficient proofs of