Battistini v. Belaval. claimed to be a citizen of France, but has resided in Porto Rico for over thirty years, returning to France occasionally, and having stayed there once as long as a year with his family. The condition of the child, follows that of the parent as to citizenship. The plaintiff has always resided in Porto Rico, save some eight or nine years in France, and a while in the United States, but has always claimed to be a French subject, and is registered for military service as such. There is evidence tending to show that the officers of both the French and the Spanish governments have treated and recognized him as a French subject. Under the French law, a citizen of that country may denationalize himself by acquiring a domicil in a foreign country; and under the Spanish law, a person may become a citizen of Spain by acquiring a domicil within its dominions. It is urged that the plaintiff has acquired this by his long residence in Porto Rico; and that, having become a Spanish subject, upon the acquisition of Porto Rico by the United States, the plaintiff, having failed to retain his Spanish citizenship by the proper steps to do so, in accordance with the treaty of peace, has become and is a Porto Rican; and therefore cannot maintain this action. Many definitions may be found of a domicil. One may have a civil and also a commercial domicil. One writer defines a civil domicil as the place where one has resided, and as to which he retains the intention of residence, though he in fact no longer lives there. It is mainly a question of intention. The declaration of the person must control unless overthrown by his acts. To work a change of domicil there must be a residence in a new locality with an intention to permanently remain there. It is shown that neither the plaintiff nor his father has ever Battistini v. Belaval. exercised any political rights in Porto Rico, and that both have always claimed French citizenship. The truth of this is strongly confirmed by the action of both the French and Spanish governmental officers. The law favors the presumption of a continuance of the domicil of a person; and my conclusion, from all the circumstances shown, is that the plea should not be sustained. It is, therefore, overruled. In the Matter of Carlo. IN THE MATTER OF RAMON QUINTIN CARLO. OPINION ON PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPus. United States courts will not interfere by writ of habeas corpus with prisoners held by local authority except in the cases enumerated in $ 753 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 592. December 3, 1901. Mr. H. E. Smith, attorney for petitioner. HOLT, Judge, delivered the following opinion: The petitioner, Ramon Quintin Carlo, presents his petition, and asks for a writ of habeas corpus. It appears from it that he is confined in the municipal jail of the city of Mayaguez, under Habeas corpus. The authorities dealing with the power of the Federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus are presented in editorial note to Tinsley v. Anderson, 43 L. ed. U. S. 92. As to when habeas corpus will issue, and, what may be inquired into upon such writ, see editorial notes to Pearce v. Texas, 39 L. ed. U. S. 164; Oteizay Cortes v. Jacobus, 34 L. ed. U. S. 464; Re Carll, 27 L. ed. U. S. 288; as to issuance of the writ in extradition cases, see editorial note to Oteiza y Cortes v. Jacobus, 34 L. ed. U. S. 464; as to the suspension of writ of habeas corpus, see editorial notes to Luther v. Borden, 12 L. ed. U. S. 581; Re Boyle, 45 L. R. A. 832; as to issuance of writ for purpose of reviewing excessive sentence, see editorial note to Re Taylor, 45 L. R. A. 136; as to presumption of innocence in habeas corpus proceedings, see editorial note to North Carolina v. Jones, 22 L. R. A. 678. In the Matter of Carlo. a judgment of the district court of Mayaguez. It is only in an exceptional case that the United States court will interpose by this writ to release prisoners held in custody by the local authorities. Matters of mere error, if any exist, are to be cured upon appeal. Where a prisoner is in jail, the right to the writ is limited to certain cases by § 753 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 592), and this application does not fall within it. The application for the writ is, therefore, refused. Compania Anonyma de la Luz Electrica v. Ponce R. & L. Co. COMPANIA ANONYMA DE LA LUZ ELECTRICA DE PONCE v. PONCE RAILWAY & LIGHT COMPANY. INJUNCTION-DEMURRER TO JURISDICTION. 1. The act of Congress of March 2d, 1901, extends the jurisdiction of this court to controversies where the parties, or either of them, are citi zens of the United States or a foreign state. 2. An electric light company acquiring under proper authority a reasonably sufficient space for its lines along a street is entitled thereto, which another must not invade; but it cannot claim more than a reasonable space to the exclusion of another company. March 20, 1903. Mr. J. R. F. Savage, solicitor for complainant. Highways—erection of wires and poles. The authorities relating to rights of telegraph and telephone companies to use public streets and erect poles therein are presented in editorial note to St. Louis v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 37 L. ed. U. S. 810; electric wires in a street as constituting a nuisance subject to municipal regulation, note to Louisiana v. New Orleans City & L. R. Co. 39 L. R. A. 621. Electric companies. In the following editorial notes the authorities dealing with various liabilities of electric companies are presented: Negligence as to electric wires on or in buildings, note to Griffin v. United Electric Light Co. 32 L. R. A. 400; Liability for injuries by electric wires in highways, note to Denver Consol. Electric Co. v. Simpson, 31 L. R. A. 566; Regulation of electric companies under the police power of the state, note to Missouri ex rel. Laclede Gaslight Co. v. Murphy, 31 L. R. A. 798; Elestric wires as constituting a nuisance subject to municipal control, note to Harrington v. Providence, 38 L. R. A. 306. |