should not be settled in bankruptcy when the firm is declared
bankrupt. In case the partnership assets should pay the partner-
ship debts, and leave a surplus, his portion would be paid over to
him. In the event they do not pay the partnership debts in toto,
he and his individual property would be liable for the balance.
This is so because each partner is liable in solido for the firm's
debts. Re Doria y Anguera, 353.
15. Under the bankrupt law any natural person, except a wage earner or
one engaged chiefly in farming, owing $1,000 or over, may be ad-
judged an involuntary bankrupt; also any unincorporated company,
and any corporation mainly engaged in manufacturing, trading,
printing, publishing, or mercantile pursuits. Re Sucesores De José
Hernais, 385.
Discharge; grounds for refusing.
16. A referee in bankruptcy aids the court like a master in chancery. He,
however, has no jurisdiction to determine an application for a dis-
charge. Re Rauchenplat, 471.
17. A bankrupt is not guilty of having sworn falsely or of fraudulent in-
tent in failing to enumerate in his schedule of assets two life in-
surance policies on his own life, payable only after proof of his
death, to his wife and children, which are not subject to assignment
or cash surrender value, and on which nothing is payable to him in
his lifetime, and in which he has no transferable or actual pecuniary
interest, or any that could be reached by judicial process. Id.
18. An omission, fraudulently made, from a sworn schedule of property,
constitutes a false oath, and is ground for refusing a discharge. Re
Rauchenplat, 461.
19. It is not required that the bankrupt's books shall be kept in the most
scientific manner, but only in such a way that his condition may be
substantially ascertained; even if badly kept, it is no ground for
refusing a discharge unless fraudulent purpose on the part of the
bankrupt appears. Re Rauchenplat, 471.
20. Failure to keep books of account from which a bankrupt's true condi-
tion may be ascertained, must have been with a fraudulent intent to
conceal his true financial condition and in contemplation of bank-
ruptcy. Re Rauchenplat, 461.
21. The law does not contemplate that his books must be kept in the
most scientific manner, but only so the condition of his affairs
may be ascertained. Id.
Specifications opposing discharge.
22. Specifications must be clear and definite, and not vague and general.
Great latitude is allowed in evidence in endeavoring to find a
bankrupt's assets; but the court or referee has a discretion as
to how far this should proceed. Re Rauchenplat, 471.
23. Specifications should be so concise, definite, and specific as to inform
the bankrupt of the grounds of opposition to his discharge. It
is not sufficient to merely follow the language of the statute.
Re Rauchenplat, 468.
24. A general specification of failure to keep proper books of account
is, however, sufficient to raise the question whether books were
kept showing the condition of the bankrupt's business. Id.
BILL OF PARTICULARS. See PLEADING, 13, 14.
BILL OF REVIEW. See REVIEW.
BILLS AND NOTES. See also PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.
1. If one be an accommodation maker of a note, then, as between him
and the principal, he is but a surety; and this is true as to
the creditor, if he knows it. Bank of Porto Rico v. Argueso, 49.
2. A section of the Political Code of Porto Rico, providing that notes
sued upon which have never been listed as provided by the insular
revenue law, and upon which no taxes have been paid, shall not
be recoverable in any court of the island until these requisites
are complied with, does not destroy the validity of the contract,
but merely suspends the remedy. It applies only to the courts
of Porto Rico, and not to this court. Id.
BONDS. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 4; INJUNCTION, 9.
See BANKRUPTCY, 19-21, 24.
BURDEN OF PROOF. See BANKRUPTCY, 4, 5; EVIDENCE, 7.
CARRIERS. See also CASE, 1; RAILROADS, 4.
It is negligence for an employee of a railway company to compel a
person to jump from a moving car. Garcia y Davila v. American
1. An action on the case lies against a common carrier or a warehouse-
man for a violation of the duty imposed by a contract express
or implied; and in such a case it is proper to set forth the contract
as an inducement and basis for the tort. Villar & Co. v. New York
& P. R. S. Co. 265.
2. In such a case negligence may be charged in general terms. Id.
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 2.
CITIZENSHIP. See also ALIENS, 3; CORPORATIONS; COURTS, 2; Ex-
PATRIATION; PLEADING, 6.
The status of a woman as to citizenship is governed by that of her
husband, and follows it. His nationality determines hers. Ortiz
de Rodriguez v. Vivoni, 493.
CLOUD ON TITLE. See PLEading, 12, 24.
COMITY. See CONFLICT OF LAWS.
COMMERCIAL PAPER. See BILLS AND NOTES, 2.
The duties of United States commissioners were at first limited to taking
acknowledgments and bail. Now he is a magistrate vested with
authority to hear preliminary investigations of charges of crime,
and to discharge or bail the accused. A district attorney cannot
control his action so as to prevent the investigation by him of
a criminal charge, no more than he can control the action of
a grand jury. United States v. Cutler, 407.
COMPROMISE. See INSURANCE, 13.
CONCESSIONS. See EVIDENCE, 1.
CONCLUSIONS. See PLEading, 7.
CONDITIONS. See INSURANCE, 7, 12; REAL PROPERTY.
CONFESSION. See JUDGMENT, 2-4; PLEADING, 26.
Proper judicial comity would dictate that one court should allow another
the use of its records, and direct its officers to obey a subpoena
duces tecum, when it is shown the original record is material in
CONFLICT OF LAWS-continued.
evidence in a cause pending in the court issuing the subpœna.
This should not, however, deprive the court in which the records
belong of their necessary use in a pending cause under consid-
eration. Martinez de Hernandez v. Bertran, 269.
CONGRESS. See UNITED STATES.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See also TAXES, 3.
Although the Constitution of the United States does not forbid all
retrospective legislation, and there is no law in Porto Rico for-
bidding it, a law impairing vested rights would, from the very
nature and spirit of our government, be void. Battistini v. Crosas,
62.
CONSUMPTION TAX. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 6.
1. To punish for contempt is the exercise of a high judicial power in-
herent in a court, to the proper transaction of its business. Re
Decker, 381.
2. The plaintiff, by a former order of court, was subrogated to the rights
of a mortgagee in a mortgage against the defendant, all parties
appearing. Later the defendant brought a bill in another court,
praying for a decree establishing that the plaintiff was never
so subrogated. This proceeding seeks to hold the defendant liable
for contempt for so doing. Van Syckle v. Montilla, 75.
3. It is a contempt of court for a party to an action to talk to witnesses
or in their presence, and especially in such a way as to intimidate
them, or prevent them from giving true testimony; he knowing
they had been put under the rule not to talk to anyone, or
suffer anyone to talk to them as to the case. Re Herencia, 207.
4. A court has the power to grant a temporary restraining order until
it can, upon a proper hearing, determine the question of juris-
diction; and disobedience of such an order is contempt of court,
independently of how the court may afterwards decide the question.
Wenar v. Pohl, 47.
5. A suit questioning the sufficiency of this decree, and even asking to
have it set aside, is not a contempt. The violation of the injunctive
order would be one. Van Syckle v. Montilla, 75.
6. An attorney, when he does not content himself with giving his advice
and opinion upon the validity of an order of the court, but urges
disobedience and takes part in acts which are forbidden by the
order, is himself liable for contempt, alike with his client. Wenar
v. Pohl, 34.
CONTINUANCE AND ADJOURNMENT. See EVIDENCE, 4; REMOVAL OF
CAUSES, 7.
CONTRACTS. See also MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 7; SPECIFIC PERFORM-
1. A written contract may be rescinded or modified by a verbal contract
upon sufficient consideration. San Juan Light & T. Co. v. Segura,
507.
2. The plaintiff may recover for what he has actually done and furnished;
and defendant cannot defeat this by an annulment of the contract
under a mere right to annul it. Janes v. People of Porto Rico,
CORPORATIONS. See also BANKRUPTCY, 15; LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, 1.
A corporation organized in a dependency or province of Spain by Spanish
authority is a creature of the Spanish government. A corporation
has the citizenship of the sovereignty that creates it, and its incor-
porators are presumed to be citizens of the state creating it.
Borrero v. Compania Anonyma de la Luz Electrica, 142.
1. The meaning of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 823 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p.
632), that no other compensation shall be taxed as an attorney's
fee except as provided in § 824 save where otherwise provided by
law, is clearly to be understood as referring to United States law.
Barbosa v. Bird, 79.
2. The local statute giving in a libel suit to the defendant, in case judg
ment is rendered in his favor, an attorney's fee in addition to
other costs, is not applicable to the Federal court.
Id.
3. No attorney's fee can be taxed as costs for the defendant, even though
in such a case he be acquitted. United States v. Rivera, 439.
Where a witness is subpoenaed and not introduced, the presumption
is he has been brought to court unnecessarily. His claims should
not be taxed as costs against the adverse party. Rodriguez y
Garcia v. North German F. Ins. Co. 233.
5. An affidavit supporting a motion to be allowed to sue without prepay-
ment of costs or giving security therefor, in addition to stating
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