inopportune time. Nevertheless, in the long run the world will take care to find ways of living its own life without the United States of America.1

After discussing the probable effect of the United States tariff on exchange, this paper concludes:

Retaliation against the American tariff will not be necessary. The abnormal dollar exchange artificially produced will work more effectively than any other means which might be used.

The President himself confessed in the above-quoted address that "we recognize the necessity of buying wherever we sell, and the permanency of trade lies in its acceptable exchanges."

A point of view differing somewhat from the Scandinavian is expressed in the December 1, 1922, number of the monthly review issued by the Royal Bank of Canada:

It is not the intention of this article to offer advice or criticism relative to measures which should quite properly be dictated only by the interests within the United States, but one is forced to the conclusion that the view which seems to be quite generally held, namely, that the Fordney-McCumber Tariff is, and will continue to be, detrimental to the best interests of other countries, as against those of the United States, is not well founded. If the present protection is continued for a considerable length of time, business will adjust itself accordingly, but if - and this seems probable the increased duties will, within the next few years, be reduced or done away with, it would seem that the effects of the bill will have operated distinctly against the business interests of the United States, and correspondingly, to the advantage of other countries. A return to the tariff which was in operation before the Emergency Bill was enacted, would mean that

1Norges Handels og Sjofartstidende (Norwegian Mercantile and Shipping Gazette) Oct. 9, 1922. Translation.

other countries will resume trade in the United States on the same basis as formerly, and in the meantime will have obtained substantial, and probably permanent, benefits, in competition with the United States, in other markets.1

A former Australian Commissioner in the United States, after a trip around the world, is reported to have said:

The protectionist influence of the Farmers' party in America had produced activity in home markets, but was severely curtailing her foreign markets. America was receding from the pre-eminent position she had held in trade and commerce immediately after the armistice. Inflated war figures had made her appear to be in a more stable condition than she was in fact, and exports were falling off, partly for this reason and partly because of the high tariff.2

The New York Journal of Commerce referred to

the fact that foreign countries, with practically one accord, regard the tariff as an instrument designed to damage them and certain to cripple their trade with the United States. The Germans are loud in their expressions of belief that only disaster can come from it. British and French authorities have expressed themselves to much the same effect. There is a general feeling throughout the world that our duties are selfish and unfair.3

The debates in the Congress, preceding the enactment of the Fordney-McCumber bill, did not fail seriously to reflect the adverse opinions of the commercial world. In a lighter vein, one opposition Senator, quoting classical historians in regard to the "troglodytes cavemen, persons who seek exclusion, isolation, and separation from others'

-

1 Foreign Tariff Files, Dept. of Commerce, Despatch from American Consulate General, Montreal, Dec. 7, 1922.

'Melbourne Argus, Mar. 29, 1923, quoting Sir Mark Sheldon.

Editorial, "The Executive and the Tariff ", Dec. 12, 1922.

-felt moved to aver that the bill declared a "troglodytian policy" and that we were "to become a nation of troglodytes ".1

1

If the foregoing statements, taken as a whole, represent a reasonably accurate estimate of the general character of the Tariff Act of 1922-and additional evidence indicates that there is much truth in it-Section 317 is faced with an enemy in the very law that created it that may go far toward nullifying its effect not only as respects its practical purpose of selling more American goods abroad, but also with reference to the possibility of eliminating discriminations against American commerce. Such acts and policies of the United States as create in other countries. an impression of commercial aloofness and desire on the part of this country to take undue advantage of its preeminent economic strength, at the expense of the rest of the world, will impede the success of the new American commercial policy.

27. PARTICULAR CLAUSES OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1922 The most obvious of the inconsistencies between Section 317 and other portions of the Tariff Act of 1922 are contained in eleven clauses the effect of which is to make the duty to be levied upon imports entering the United States dependent upon laws or regulations of other nations, which laws or regulations need not be discriminatory. These clauses resemble the penalty-duty provisions of the Acts of 1890 and 18972 in so far as they undertake to penalize other countries for levying import duties that are higher than the United States sees fit to approve. They differ from the predecessors named in certain other respects:

1 Congressional Record, vol. 62, pt. vi, 67th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 6121, 6368.

2 Supra, ch. ii.

1

(a) four of them provide for penalty duties upon articles that are not on the free list; 1 (b) the object at which two of them are aimed is not import, but non-discriminatory export duties (or restrictions); (c) when the penalty is directed against a foreign import duty the American import duty is to become equal to the foreign; 2 (d) nine of the clauses are automatic and mandatory in their operation; the operation of the other two is merely permissive, and then only after the failure of negotiations which the President is authorized to institute for the purpose of removing the displeasing foreign duty. Analogous clauses are found in the Tariff Act of 1890 and in every general tariff law since that date. An attempt was made to generalize the principle involved when the House of Representatives adopted Section 302 of the original Fordney Bill.

The same inconsistency with the principle expressed in Section 317 is found in every case: the United States seeks from countries which impose certain burdens upon commerce duties lower than they charge upon the commerce of third countries and threatens to impose discriminating duties upon countries which do not discriminate against American commerce. More serious than the inconsistency is the violation of solemn promises to certain countries contained in treaties to which the United States is a party. 28. THE INCONSISTENT PROVISOS AND THE TREATY OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

While discussing Section 302 and certain of the abovementioned clauses as they appeared in the then pending Fordney Bill, Senator Smoot remarked:

1A fifth, paragraph 401, nominally offers a concession to a dutiable article, but really imposes a penalty upon an article normally free.

2 Subject in two instances to a maximum of fifty per centum ad valorem.

Our lowest rates are to be given to certain countries without their making any concessions and are to be extended to other countries only if the latter reduce their rates, either to us or generally by varying amounts. The enactment of these provisions would therefore be followed immediately by protests from foreign countries. These protests would be armed with precedents from the history not alone of European States but of the United States as well, for the United States has hitherto maintained that such clauses in our treaties prohibited foreign countries from levying, as the result of general legislation, diverse rates of duties-except, of course, as the lowest rates were applied to American products and American ships. The State Department has not changed its views and considers the provisions under discussion clearly contrary to the most-favored-nation clause of our commercial treaties.1

2

Senator Smoot appears to have had excellent reasons for his assertions. The United States is party to a score of treaties which contain the mutual promise of mostfavored-nation treatment. treatment. According to the conditional interpretation of most-favored-nation treatment, reciprocal concessions to third countries, while not accruing automatically to the other party, must be extended to such party upon the tender of equivalent compensation. If the concessions are made freely, that is, without the receipt of concessions in return, the other party to the treaty has the right to have them extended freely to its commerce. the absence of concessions granted for compensation, conditional no less than unconditional most-favored-nation treatment connotes equality of treatment.

3

In

1Congressional Record, vol. 62, part 6, 67th Congress, 2d Session, p. 5880. April 24, 1922. It should be remembered that the Senate Finance Committee struck out Sec. 302; also several provisos.

'See infra, subdivision 36 and Appendix 3.

'The language in the several treaties varies considerably; the above