457-471 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. the requisition of the proper authorities of such | of error, and many of the orders and decisions made by the commissioner at the hearing which took place before him become unimportant in the examination of the sufficiency of the proceedings under which he ordered the the prisoner into custody. The main question to be considered upon such a writ of haThere is no evidence in this record, at least beas corpus must be, Had the commissioner there is no copy of any demand or requisition jurisdiction to hear and decide upon the commade by the Mexican authorities upon our gov-plaint made by the Mexican consul; and also, ernment, for the extradition of this prisoner. was there sufficient legal ground for his action The proceedings, therefore, up to this time rest in committing the prisoner to await the requiupon the initiative authorized by the statutes sition of the Mexican authorities? upon that subject; the Mexican Government, however, being represented by counsel, and the correspondence with its officers, which was introduced into the record, showing their interest in the matter and their purpose to have this prisoner brought to that country for trial. In regard to the jurisdiction of the commissioner to hear the complaint no doubt can be entertained. The offense set out in three or four different forms in the petition of Navarro, the Mexican consul-general, is distinctly that of forgery on the part of Benson; the particular forgery charged is that of the name of Henry E. Abbey, and the time, place and circumstances are detailed with sufficient particularity to comply with the language of the treaty. The Revised Statutes, after providing for the hearing before the justice, or other officer to whom that duty is, committed, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered, proceed to enact, that if, on such The treaty under which this right to arrest the prisoner and detain him for extradition is asserted was concluded at Mexico, December 11, 1861, and proclaimed by the President of the United States June 20, 1862. 12 U. S. Stat. at L. 1199. It has the usual provisions, that the contracting parties shall on requisitions made in their name deliver up to justice persons who, being accused of the crimes enumerated in article 3, committed within the juris-hearing, such officer "deems the evidence sufdiction of the requiring party, shall seek an asylum, or shall be found within the territories of the other. The enumeration of crimes in that article is as follows: ficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of the proper authorities of such foreign government, for the surrender of such person, according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention." "Murder (including assassination, parricide, infanticide, and poisoning); assault with intent to commit murder; mutilation; piracy; arson; rape; kidnapping, defining the same to be the taking and carrying away of a free person by The subject of what proof shall be required force or deception; forgery, including the forging or making, or knowingly passing or putting for the delivery upon requisition of parties in circulation, counterfeit coin or bank notes, or charged with crime is considered in article I of other paper current as money, with intent to the treaty, in regard to which it is provided defraud any person or persons; the introduc-"that this shall be done only when the fact of tion or making of instruments for the fabrication of counterfeit coin or bank notes, or other paper current as money; embezzlement of public moneys; robbery, defining the same to be the felonious and forcible taking from the person of another of goods or money to any value, by violence, or putting him in fear; burglary, defining the same to be breaking and entering into the house of another with intent to commit felony; and the crime of larceny, of cattle or other goods and chattels, of the value of twenty-five dollars or more, when the same is committed within the frontier States or Territories of the contracting parties." the commission of the crime shall be so established as that the laws of the country in which the fugitive or the person so accused shall be found would justify his or her apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime had been there committed." Taking this provision of the treaty, and that of the Revised Statutes above recited, we are of opinion that the proceeding before the commissioner is not to be regarded as in the nature of a final trial by which the prisoner could be convicted or acquitted of the crime charged against him, but rather of the character of those preliminary examinations which take place every As the case appears before us on the trans- day in this country before an examining or cript of the evidence produced before Commis- committing magistrate for the purpose of detersioner Lyman, and before the circuit court on mining whether a case is made out which will the writ of habeas corpus, it is considerably con- justify the holding of the accused, either by fused but very full and elaborate. Several imprisonment or under bail, to ultimately anquestions in regard to the introduction of evi-swer to an indictment, or other proceeding, in dence which were raised before the commis- which he shall be finally tried upon the charge sioner, some of them concerning the suffi- made against him. The language of the treaty, ciency of the authentication of papers and dep- which we have cited, above quoted, explicitly ositions taken in Mexico, and as to the testi- provides that "the commission of the crime shall mony of persons supposed to be expert in the be so established as that the laws of the counlaw of that country regarding the subject, are try in which the fugitive or the person so acfound in the record, which we do not think re- cused shall be found would justify his or her quire notice here. The writ of habeas corpus, apprehension and commitment for trial if the directed to the Marshal of the Southern Dis- crime had been there committed." This de127 U. S. trict of New York, does not operate as a writ scribes the proceedings in these preliminary ex aminations as accurately as language can well | of Mexico, in the month of December, 1886. do it. The Act of Congress conferring jurisdiction upon the commissioner, or other examining officer, it may be noted in this connection, says that if he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the treaty he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony, and issue his warrant for the commitment of the person so charged. We are not sitting in this court on the trial of the prisoner, with power to pronounce him guilty and punish him or declare him innocent and acquit him. We are now engaged simply in an inquiry as to whether, under the construction of the Act of Congress and the treaty entered into between this country and Mexico, there was legal evidence before the commissioner to justify him in exercising his power to commit the person accused to custody to await the requisition of the Mexican Government. Omitting much, therefore, that under this view of the case is immaterial, both in the argument of counsel and in the record of the case as it comes before us, the following facts appear to be well established: Mr. Henry E. Abbey, a noted theatrical manager in this country, had brought Adelina Patti, the wonderful songstress, from Europe to the United States under an arrangement that she would also sing in Mexico. Benson made the acquaintance of Abbey here, and also became intimate with his agent, whose name was Marcus Meyer. Through the latter he learned that arrangements had been made for the appearance of Patti at the Teatro Nacional in the City COPY OF TICKETS PRODUCED, After obtaining the particulars of the engagement and contract for the use of that theater from Abbey's agent, Benson hastened to the City of Mexico, where he represented himself as Meyer and as the agent of Mr. Abbey. He succeeded in imposing upon the parties having control of the theater so far as to make them believe that he had full authority to conduct the arrangements for the concerts and operas in which Patti was to appear, which were advertised in the newpapers of that city. He accordingly proceeded to fix the date of such performances, to arrange the prices and issue the tickets therefor, which he sold and obtained the money for to the amount of some twenty-five or thirty thousand dollars. He escaped with this money, fled from Mexico, and went to Europe. Of course all the persons who had bought the tickets, so issued by him, were defrauded of the amount paid for them, as well as great injury done to Mr. Abbey and the owners of the theater in regard to the performances to be held there. The specific offense charged against Benson arising out of this transaction is the forgery of these tickets of admission, of which the originals are produced before us with their translations. [Copies of these tickets are given below.] About the only contest made by the counsel for the prisoner is, that these are not forgeries, mainly because they are printed matter and are not in writing, and because neither the name of Mr. Abbey, nor of anybody purporting to be responsible therefor, is found in writing upon them, using the word "writing," as deEXCEPT AS TO STAMP COLOR. AND EMPRESA HENRY E. ABBEY Adelina Patti. Palcos 2os. y 30s. 457-471 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. fendant's counsel does, as meaning script or | blance of some man's genuine signature which was produced with a pen. This view of the subject would exclude from the definition of this crime all such instruments as government bonds, bank notes, and other obligations of great value, as well as railroad tickets, where the signature of the officer which makes them binding and effectual is impressed upon them by means of a plate or other device representing his genuine signature. It would also exclude from its definition all such instruments charged as forgeries where the similitude of the signer's name is produced by a plate used The first idea that occurs to the mind in ref-by the forger. It can hardly be possible that erence to this suggestion is, that the common these are not forgeries within the definition of law of England can hardly be said to be the only the common law; and if they are, they show criterion by which to construe the language of that it is not necessary that the name which a treaty between Mexico and the United States. appears upon the false instrument shall be The former government cannot be supposed to placed thereon by means of a pen or by the have had that common law exclusively in mind actual writing of it in script, but that the as governing the true construction of a treaty crime may be committed as effectually if it is concluded between itself and this country, nei-done by an engraved plate or type so arranged ther of which owes any allegiance to England. as to represent or forge the name as made by Another circumstance in connection with this the actual use of a pen. It is difficult to permatter is, that this court has frequently decided ceive how the question as to whether the forthat there are no common-law crimes of the gery was committed by printing, or by stampUnited States. In very few of the States were ing, or with an engraved plate, or by writing there common-law crimes remaining as subjects with a pen, can change the nature of the crime of punishment at the time when this treaty was charged. made. Almost every State in the Union has recast her criminal law by the enactment of statutes in such a mode that the common law "Sec. 525. Looking at the writing as a repis now only appealed to as an aid in the definition of crimes. By the Roman civil law, which perhaps pervades or did pervade the jurispru-resentation addressed to the eye, reason teaches dence of the larger portion of the civilized na- us that whether it is made with the pen, with a tions of the earth at the time of the making of brush, with printers' type and ink, with any this treaty, forgery was looked upon as one of other instrument, or by any other device whatthe subdivisions of the crimen falsi, which in- ever-whether it is in characters which stand cluded forgery, perjury, the alteration of the for words or in characters which stand for current coin, dealing with false weights and ideas, in the English language, or in any other 1 Bouv. L. Dict. 411. In sup- language, is quite immaterial, provided the measures, etc. port of this view it may be noted that the term representation conveys to any mind the subcorresponding to the word "forgery" which is stance of what the law requires to constitute This statement of the doctrine is in broader used in the Spanish draft of the treaty is "la the writing whereof forgery may be committed. falsificacion.' terms than are to be found in the books, yet there is no decision contrary to what is thus said; and, beyond doubt, the tribunals will hold the law as thus stated whenever the oc Mr. Bishop in the second volume of his He work on criminal law discusses this subject with his usual philosophical acumen. says: "Sec. 526. Thus Mr. Hammond remarks: "The question upon this branch of the inquiry remains, whether seals, or rather their impressions, with other similar subjects, are upon a similar footing with writings [here employing the word in its restricted sense]; and in all probability it will be found that they are, though no positive authority has sanctioned this notion."" It certainly does not appear from this that the Mexican authorities intended to be bound in the treaty by any very restricted use of the word "forgery" when the question concerned an offense of that character committed in Mex-casion requires. ico. It is for an offense against Mexican law As he is that the prisoner is held to answer. not now upon final trial, but the only question is whether he has committed an offense for which, according to this treaty, he should be extradited to that country and there tried, we do not see that in this application to set the prisoner at large, after he has been once committed by an examining court having competent authority, and after having been held to answer in Mexico for the offense charged, that this court is bound to examine with very critical accuracy into the question as to whether or not the act committed by the prisoner is technically a forgery under the common law. Especially is this so when the wickedness of the act, the fraudulent intent with which it was committed and the final success by which the fraud was perpetrated, are undoubted. But we are not satisfied that the crime of forgery, even at common law, is limited to the production by means of a pen of the resem This author also quotes from the fifth report of the English Criminal Law Commission, made in 1840, p. 69 et seq., in which is found the following language, speaking of forgery: "The offense extends to every writing used for the purpose of authentication; as in the case of a will, by which a testator signifies his intentions as to the disposition of his property, or of a certificate by which an officer or other authorized person assures others of the truth of any fact, or of a warrant by which a magisThe crime is not confined to the falsificatrate signifies his authority to arrest an offend er. 127 U. S. tion of mere writings; it plainly extends to seals, stamps, and all other visible marks of distinction by which the truth of any fact is authenticated, or the quality or genuineness of any article is warranted; and, consequently, where a party may be deceived and defrauded from having been, by false signs, induced to give credit where none was due." While the views of counsel for the prisoner are unsupported by any well considered judicial decision, there is high authority for holding the contrary. The great increase in the use of printing for all forms of instruments, such as deeds, bonds, tickets, tokens for the payment of goods, etc., have seemed to demand that where, either by the common law or by statute, such instruments are required to be in writing, the term "writing" should be held to include printing as well as script. natures; but if shown, the effect is the same. Such being the effect of such form of execu ting like contracts, it would seem to follow that any counterfeit of it, in the similitude of it, would be making a false writing purporting to be that of another, with the intent to defraud." It was, therefore, held in that case that, al though he did not personally aid in the man. ual operation of engraving or lithographing the spurious instrument, yet it being conceded that it was done by his procuration, the defendant was responsible. That was the case of a railroad ticket, and the applicability of the decision to the matter now before us is unques tionable. a The case of People v. Rhoner, 4 Park. Cr. Rep. 166, is strikingly like the present one in almost every particular. There the prisoner In Henshaw v. Foster, 9 Pick. 312, reference had been committed by a justice of the peace was made to the provision of the Constitution on the preliminary examination, upon of the State of Massachusetts which declared charge of having in his possession, knowingly, that "every member of the House of Represen-counterfeited notes of the Austrian National tatives shall be chosen by written votes." A Bank, with intent to defraud. He was party offered his ballot, which was rejected, brought before the Supreme Court in the State and he thereupon sued the inspectors of the of New York by a writ of habeas corpus, and election for their refusal to receive his vote. the same question which is raised here was there They declined to accept it upon the ground that presented. It was said that every part of the ballot was printed, and was not therefore these bank notes upon which the charge was "written" within the meaning of the Constitu- founded, which appeared to be complete and tion. The court however, in a very well con- entirely filled up, including the signature of sidered opinion, decided that the printed vote the cashier or director, was evidently a print or came within the meaning of the law requiring impression from an engraved plate. The ar votes to be in writing. gument was there pressed, as in this case, that these notes could not be forgeries for that reason, nor could they be the subject of forgery. The whole question was very fully reviewed by Judge Sutherland in his opinion, in which he held that "the word 'instrument' includes not only 'written instruments' and 'writings,' but also engraved or printed instruments, being or purporting to be the act of another; indeed, all and every kind of instrument by the forging of which any person may be affected, bound, or in any way injured in his person or property. I do not see why an engraved or printed instrument, or an engraved or printed name, affixed to an instrument by a person is not his act, and may not purport to be the act of another." In the subsequent case of Commonwealth v. Ray, 3 Gray, 441, the defendant was indicted for forgery, and the question was whether the instrument which he presented constituted a forgery at common law. The court said: "It is objected that the crime of forgery cannot be committed by counterfeiting an instrument wholly printed or engraved, and on which there is no written signature personally made by those to be bound. The question is whether the writing, the counterfeiting of which is forgery, may not be wholly made by means of printing or engraving, or must be written by the pen by the party who executes the contract. In the opinion of the court, such an instrument may be the subject of forgery, when the entire contract, including the signature of the party, has been printed or engraved. The cases of forgery generally are cases of forged handwriting. The course of business, and the necessities of greater facilities for dispatch, have introduced, to some extent, the practice of having contracts and other instruments wholly printed or engraved, even including the name of the party to be bound, *** It has never been considered any objection to contracts required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing that they were printed." Then after speaking of the cases in which a signature made by the pen is necessary to the execution of a contract, the court proceeds: "But if an individual or a corporation do in fact elect to put into circulation contracts or bonds in which the names of the contracting parties are printed or lithographed, as a substitute for being written with the pen, and so intended, the signatures are to all intents and purposes the same as if written. It may be more difficult to establish the fact of their sig. The same principle is reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the case of Wheeler v. Lynde, 1 Allen, 402. We are of opinion that the decision of Commissioner Lyman, committing the prisoner to the custody of the Marshal to await the requisition of the Mexican Government, was justified, and the judgment of the Circuit Court dismissing the writ of habeas corpus is accordingly affirmed. STATE OF WISCONSIN, Piff., v. PELICAN INSURANCE COMPANY OF (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 265-300.) Jurisdiction of supreme court-corporation is a citizen-suit by State-judicial power-suits for penalties-effect of judgments-nature of action-extent of jurisdiction-action for penalty for failure of insurance company to file report. zens of another State, and of controversies between two States. 2. A corporation created by a State is a citizen of the State, within the meaning of the provisions of the Constitution and Statutes of the United States which define the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 3. The mere fact that a State is the plaintiff is not a conclusive test that the controversy is one in which this court is authorized to grant relief against 4. The grant of judicial power was not intended to confer upon the courts of the United States jurisdiction of a suit or prosecution by one State, of such a nature that it could not, on the settled principles of public and international law, be entertained by the judiciary of the other State. another State or her citizens. 1. By the Constitution, this court has original ju- "For that, whereas, the plaintiff, the said risdiction of suits brought by a State against citi-State of Wisconsin, on the 16th day of September, in the year 1886, at the County of Dane, in the said State of Wisconsin, and in and before the Dane County Circuit Court, in said State-such court being then and there a court of general jurisdiction under the laws of said State-and by the consideration and judgment of the said court, recovered against the said defendant, the said Pelican Insurance Company, a judgment in favor of the said plaintiff for the sum of eight thousand five hundred dollars damages, together with the further sum of forty-five dollars and thirty-nine cents for costs and disbursements, amounting in all to the sum of eight thousand five hundred and forty-five dollars and thirty-nine cents; which said judgment still remains in that court in full force and effect, and not in anywise modified, reversed, set aside, appealed from, or otherwise vacated; and the said plaintiff, the said State of Wisconsin, hath not obtained any satisfaction upon the said judgment, but, on the contrary, the whole thereof, together with interest thereon from said date of such judgment, remains wholly unpaid and owing; whereby an action hath accrued unto the said plaintiff, the said State of Wisconsin, to demand and have from and of the said defendant the said sum of 5. The rule that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another applies not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the State for the recovery of pecuniary penalties for any violations of statutes for the protection of its revenue, or other municipal laws, and to all judgments for such pen alties. 6. The provisions of the Constitution and of the Act of Congress, by which the judgments of one State are to have faith and credit given to them in another State, establish a rule of evidence, rather than of jurisdiction; they do not affect the jurisdiction of the court in which the judgment is rendered or of that in which it is offered in evidence. 7. The nature of a cause of action is not changed by recovering judgment upon it; and a court to which a judgment is presented for enforcement may ascertain whether the claim is really one that the court is authorized to enforce. 8. The original jurisdiction of this court over controversies between a State and citizens of another State, or of a foreign country does not extend to a suit by a State to recover penalties for a breach of her own municipal law, 9. This court cannot entertain an original action to compel an insurance corporation of one State to pay to another State the amount of a judgment recovered by the latter, for a penalty imposed by its statute upon such insurance corporation for doing business in such State, without having first deposited with the proper officer of the State the statement of its property and business required by such statute. [No. 3 Orig.] Argued April 25, 1887. Decided May 14, 1888. ACTION of debt by the State of Wisconsin against a corporation of Louisiana, upon a judgment recovered by said State against said corporation for a penalty imposed by the stat ute of Wisconsin upon an insurance company of another State for doing business in that State, without having deposited in the office of the State Commissioner of Insurance the annual statement of its business and property as required by such statute. The action is an original one commenced in the first instance in this court. The answer sets up that the cause of action on which the judgment was recovered was the penalty above mentioned, and alleges that this court has not jurisdiction of a controversy of this nature between a State and a citizen of another State. The plaintiff demurred to the answer, and this court gave judgment for the defendant on the demurrer. Statement by Mr. Justice Gray: This was an action of debt, commenced in this court by the State of Wisconsin against a corporation of Louisiana. The declaration was as follows: eight thousand five hundred and forty-five dollars and thirty-nine cents, with interest. "Wherefore the said plaintiff, the said State of Wisconsin, saith that the plaintiff is injured and hath sustained damage to the said amount of eight thousand five hundred and forty-five dollars and thirty-nine cents, with interest, and therefore it brings this suit. Annexed to the declaration was a copy of the record of the judgment therein described, which showed that it was rendered on default of the defendant, after service of summons on three persons, each of whom was stated in the officer's return to be a resident and a citizen of Wisconsin and an agent of the defendant, upon a complaint alleging that the defendant had done business in the State for thirty months, without having itself, or by any officer, agent or other person in its behalf, prepared or deposited in the office of the commissioner of inbusiness, as required by the provision of secsurance of the State annual statements of its tion 1920 of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin, and that the defendant had thereby become indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $15,000, according to that provision. Wisconsin, it is enacted that the president or By that section of the Revised Statutes of vice president and secretary of each fire insurance corporation doing business in the State shall, annually, within the month of January, prepare and deposit in the office of the commissioner of insurance a statement, verified by their oaths, of the business of the corporation during the year, and of the condition thereof on the 31st day of December then next preceding, exhibiting various items, enumerated in the statute, as to its capital stock, property or assets, liabilities, income and expenditures, and any other items or facts which the commission "The plaintiff, the State of Wisconsin, and one of the States of the United States, now comes and complains of the defendant, the Pel-er of insurance may require, and that "for any ican Insurance Company of New Orleans, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Louisiana, in a plea of debt: failure to make and deposit such annual statement, or to promptly reply in writing to any inquiry addressed by the commissioner of in |