« ПретходнаНастави »
Bank of New York under the provisions of section 522 (c), Tariff Act of 1930, during the period from August 26 to September 1, 1938, inclusive, is published for the information of collectors of customs and others concerned. (103512.)
H. A. BENNER, Acting Commissioner of Customs.
Values of foreign currencies certified to the Secretary of the Treasury by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York under provisions of section 522 (c), Tariff Act of 1930
PERIOD AUGUST 26 TO SEPTEMBER 1, 1938, INCLUSIVE
Lev. Czechoslovakia Koruna.. Denmark..
Pound sterling.. Finland...
Chefoo dollar (Yuan)-
Hankow dollar (Yuan) -
Shanghai dollar (Yuan).
Tientsin dollar (Yuan).
Straits Settlements. Dollar
New Zealand... ----do.
1 Nominal rate. ' (Official.) Inclusion in this list of a rate for Chilean pesos is only for information in connection with T. D. 49278, particularly the following statement therefrom: "* * * collectors of customs are hereby directed, in connection with entries of merchandise exported on or after November 30, 1937, and pending the receipt of further instructions from the Department, to require the deposit of estimated duties in an amount determined by the use of the value appearing opposite the word 'oficial' .. "
(T. D. 49698)
Forfeiture of vehicle for illegal transportation of merchandise imported
contrary to law-Decision of court
Decision of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
in the case of United States v. One Ford Sedan, Motor No. 18–3364904, holding that:
(1) Unexplained presence of unstamped narcotics is probable cause for seizure of vehicle and institution of forfeiture proceedings for unlawful transportation of merchandise imported contrary to law within the meaning of section 3062, Revised Statutes, as amended (U. S. C., Sup. III, title 19, sec. 483);
(2) Narcotics on the person of a party in the vehicle are "on", "in" or “about" the vehicle;
(3) Forfeiture accrues at the time the offense is committed and seizure subsequently made is valid;
(4) Innocence and good faith of the owner of the vehicle constitute no defense to the condemnation proceedings.
Washington, D. C., August 30, 1938. To Collectors of Customs and Others Concerned:
The following decision of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota in the case of United States v. One Ford Sedan, Motor No. 18–3364904, is published for the information of customs officers and others concerned. (91-5/2b.)
H. A. BENNER, Acting Commissioner of Customs.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
FOURTH DIVISION (No. 3941 Law] A proceeding to condemn and forfeit to the United States that certain Ford sedan, 1937 model, engine No. 18–3364904, Minn. 1937 license No. 165–870
The above libel proceeding came before this court on a stipulation of facts. Mr. Victor E. Anderson, United States Attorney, and Mr. George A. Heişey, Assistant United States Attorney, appeared in behalf of the libelant.
Mr. Neil Hughes, Mr. S. J. Kroman, and Mr. Don E. Morgan appeared in behalf of the claimant, Virginia Cree.
The claimant demurred to the agreed statement of facts on the general ground that the same were insufficient to warrant a decree of condemnation and forfeiture on the following grounds: (1) That the seizure of said automobile on October 11, 1937, at a time when it was not offending against the customs or revenue laws of the United States in any way, was unlawful; (2) that the narcotic officers having failed to seize said automobile on May 12, 1937, thereby waived right of seizure and thereafter could not seize said automobile because of the use to which it was put on May 12, 1937; (3) that the stipulated and agreed facts do not show to the degree required by law in this case that the heroin hydrochloride figuring in the transactions described ever was introduced into the United States contrary to law; (4) that claimant is the innocent and good faith owner of said automobile and cannot be penalized for and on account of any illegal use to which the said William Hildebrandt may have put the same without her knowledge and consent; (5) that there was insufficient proof that the car ever contained any narcotics or contraband drugs, either on the 12th day of May 1937, or any other time; and (6) that no proof has been advanced that the alleged contraband was fraudulently concealed in or about the offending vehicle and not upon the person of the offender.
A lengthy recital of the stipulated facts pertaining to the use of the car for the transportation of heroin on May 12, 1937, is not necessary. Suffice it to say that the agreed facts fairly establish that, on the night in question, Hildebrandt was driving the car which is the subject of these proceedings, and by pre-arrangement met one Katz at Seventh and Nicollet in the city of Minneapolis, the latter having agreed to make a delivery of heroin to one of the Government agents. The evidentiary circumstances impel the finding that, while Hildebrandt was sitting in the car at Seventh and Nicollet, he handed to Katz a package of heroin, which package did not contain any of the required stamps, and that it was this package that Katz intended to deliver to the Government agent who was waiting for his return, but which was not delivered for the reason that he apparently feared apprehension.
The principal question submitted pertains to the right of the Government to proceed herein when the offending automobile was not seized at the time when it was offending against the laws of the United States. The stipulation indicates that, while the offense took place on May 12, 1937, the car was not seized until some time in October of that year. Seizure was not made at the time of the offense for the reason that Hildebrandt was under investigation, and an act of seizure under the circumstances would have disclosed to Hildebrandt the activities of the Government agents. However, the reason for the delay is not material if the Government is correct in its contention that the automobile was forfeited to the Government by operation of law at the time that the offense took place.
A very comprehensive brief has been filed with the court by the United States attorney setting forth in great detail the difference between the old statute and the amended statute of August 5, 1935, and I am convinced that Congress intended to frame a forfeiture statute that would operate to transfer the title of an offending vehicle to the Government at the time of the offense, regardless of the time of the actual seizure and irrespective of the ownership of the car or the intervention of equities between the offending act and the actual seizure. The words “shall be seized and forfeited,” as found in the amended act, were used by Congress advisedly as is disclosed in the Senate Committee report, and undoubtedly were used so as to be within the scope of a long line of decisions that had construed other forfeiture statutes in the manner now contended for by the Government. The question of the right of the narcotic agents to seize the car is immaterial, because the Government has adopted the seizure, and therefore this proceeding is rendered as effective as if the car was seized at the time of the offense by the proper officials. That there was probable cause for the above proceeding is free from doubt. Hildebrandt had been dealing in heroin sold in unstamped packages long prior to May 12, 1937. Heroin is an outlawed drug. The unexplained possession under the circumstances set forth in the stipulation amply sustains this proceeding. No explanation of any kind is proffered by the claimant.
It is contended that the vehicle did not offend because the evidence indicates that whatever Hildebrandt did pass to Katz came from Hildebrandt's person
rather than from some place within the car itself, but manifestly, the contraband was "on," "in" or "about”' the automobile, even though the drug may have been concealed in the pocket of the person driving the car. There cannot be any difference in the offense committed by the car, as contemplated by the statute, whether the drug is in the pocket of the car or the pocket of the driver of the car, when it satisfactorily appears that the automobile actually transported the heroin in order to make the delivery, as indicated by the stipulated facts.
The claimant's demurrer to the stipulated facts as being insufficient to warrant a decree of condemnation and forfeiture is therefore overruled, and the United States Attorney may present to the court findings and a decree of forfeiture in accordance herewith. An exception is allowed to the claimant. Dated this 20th day of July, 1938.
GUNNAR H. NORDBYE,
United States District Judge.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Fourth Division (No. 3941 Law] A proceeding to condemn and forfeit to the United States that certain Ford sedan,
· 1937 model, engine No. 18–3364904, Minnesota 1937 license No. В65–870
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER FOR DECREE Above-entitled libel proceeding, by mutual agreement of counsel for the United States and counsel for the sole claimant appearing in said proceeding, having been set down for hearing before this court on July 1, 1938, at Minneapolis, Minn., and George A. Heisey, Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Minnesota having appeared for libelant before this court at said time and place, and Neil Hughes, Samuel J. Kroman, and Don Morgan, attorneys at law of Minneapolis, Minn., having appeared for claimant Virginia Cree before this court at said time and place, there being no other appearance in said proceeding, and said attorneys for libelant and claimant having agreed, in writing, upon the facts in the case and having waived, in writing, a jury trial in said proceeding, and having filed with the court their written stipulation covering their agreement relating to the facts in the case and waiving a jury trial, and having argued the merits of the matter fully and submitted the same to the court, along with written briefs .
Now, therefore, the court, being fully advised in the premises, upon the agreed and stipulated facts and upon all the files and records in said proceeding, now makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Decree therein:
FINDINGS OF Fact
That in the early morning on May 12, 1937, that certain Ford sedan, 1937 model, engine No. 18–3364904, Minnesota 1937 license No. В65–870, while in the immediate possession of and driven by one William Hildebrandt, was used knowingly and unlawfully by the said William Hildebrandt in and for the concealment and transportation in and upon said automobile of five ounces, more or less, of heroin hydrochloride from a point unknown in the city of Minneapolis, in the county of Hennepin, in the State and district of Minnesota, to the intersection of Seventh Street on Nicollet Avenue, in said city of Minneapolis, in the county, State, and district aforesaid;
That the narcotic drugs mentioned in the foregoing paragraph which were con-
That on October 11, 1937, szid automobile was seized by United States narcotic
That said officers, making seizure as aforesaid, seasonably thereafter delivered
That within the time prescribed by, and in accordance with, section 608 of
That said automobile now is and ever since the day it was seized as aforesaid
That due publication of the notice of seizure and attachment of said auto-
That the said Virginia Cree is the wife of the said William Hildebrandt and