INTRODUCTION ONE is accustomed to say of those who have erroneously been reported dead that they enjoy unusually long lives. Perhaps one may, therefore, also say of international law, which during this war has more than once been prematurely laid aside as dead, that there is still a fine future in store for it. It is not alone the fact that one extreme usually calls forth another, and that, therefore, the derision that has been heaped upon international law during these years may perhaps of itself bring about a reaction after the war, which attests to this. But there is still another thing that to-day more than ever might strengthen the belief in the future of international law, and that is the fact that this whole great war has really been nothing less than one great lesson for mankind, namely, that those have erred who believed they might trust solely in force, and have scorned the legal and moral factors in international life.1 The war has shown that nothing can be achieved by force, that in the end it has only a destructive effect. The symptoms bearing witness to the increasing recognition of the fact that the future of mankind must be built upon something higher-if its course is to be upward, not downward—are on the increase. This higher element can be nothing else than law. The international legal order must be the guiding star toward which humanity must turn in these dark days and to which are attached its hopes for the future. The recognition of this fact is gaining ground more and more, and the hope that this knowledge will also bring about practical results is all the more justified when one 1 Max Huber in 'Der Wert des Völkerrechts' (Neue Zürcher Zeitung of November 20, 1916) correctly observes: It were simpler to speak of a bankruptcy of the policy of might founded upon the ruthless egotism of states, of a policy directed toward the present catastrophe and which for more than two years has been consuming the physical and economic powers of Europe without any visible success, of a policy whose mental war preparedness has turned out so well that, with the present mental condition of nations, peace has become extraordinarily more difficult than the continuation of the war.' Cf. especially Zitelmann, Haben wir noch ein Völkerrecht? 1914. Triepel, Die Zukunft des Völkerrechts, 1916, p. 7, also points out that at the most only a part of international law could be destroyed and not even the most important, since the international law of peace is not considered at all. takes note of the fact that leading statesmen of widely different countries have already expressed the view that after this war one of the most essential tasks of nations will be the future development of international law. The war has taught them that it would be foolhardy to recognize in the formation of national frontiers alone the security of the future, and to look upon the aim of this war as more or less a problem of geography. They have come to recognize that they will never be able to reach a state of real security in this way alone, and that one must therefore dig more deeply if one really wishes to lay the foundations of the state structure securely.1 Consequently, I believe that an examination of the future possibilities for the reconstruction of international law is to-day no longer such an idle beginning as the belittlers of international law in the press and elsewhere would perhaps imagine. To determine what form it should actually take after the war will of course be a matter for the statesmen. It is to be assumed that upon the conclusion of peace they will consider it one of their first and most important tasks to give form and content to future international law, and that to this end they will call together one or several conferences, whose task it will be to draw new conclusions from the lessons of the war and to call into life the new form of international law. In the solution of this problem, the statesmen will have to depend upon the material they possess concerning the experiences this war has produced for international law. It is, however, the business of science to make available this material for the statesmen. The science of international law is therefore not allowed to fold its hands idly, as it only too often has done. Instead of wearying itself with the Sisyphean labour of cleansing its own country of all guilt for violations of international law that may have occurred or instead of criticizing violations of international law on the part of enemies of its country even in instances where the facts have not as yet been objectively proved,2 and by so doing only assisting constantly in the incitement of nations against each other, it will above all have to find its task in the deduction of useful applications from the lessons of this war for 1 Cf. with this Zoller, Das Völkerrecht und der Krieg, 1914–1915, 1915, pp. 141 ff. 2 I wish in no wise to say thereby that the breaches of international law which have actually taken place should not be ascertained. I shall myself consider this subject in greater detail in my book which is to appear at the end of the war, as I deem it of the greatest importance. |