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Second. A universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war, begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence. (Current History, July, 1916, p. 736.)

Mr. Wilson had previously made a formal offer of mediation (August 5, 1914) that was courteously declined. In September, 1914, Ambassador Gerard reported to President Wilson the views of the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, that

Germany was appreciative of the American Government's interest and offer of services in trying to make peace,

but that in view of the treaty pledging the Allies against any separate cessation of hostilities,

The United States ought to get proposals of peace from the Allies. Germany could accept only a lasting peace, one that would make her people secure against future attacks. To accept mediation now would be interpreted by the Allies as a sign of weakness on the part of Germany and would be misunderstood by the German people, who, having made great sacrifices, had the right to demand guarantees of security. (Current History, December, 1914, p. 273),

but so far as ever disclosed the overtures had no more definite result.

The real discussion of peace terms began with Germany's offer of December 12, 1916, the Allied reply to it, and the interchanges over President Wilson's note of December 18, 1916, calling for a statement of war aims. These communications are published in Current History, in International Conciliation, Nos. 110 and III, and with supplementary documents by the Division of International Law of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Official Communications and Speeches Relating to Peace Proposals, 1916-1917. Pamphlet No. 23). President Wilson's address to the Senate on January 22, 1917, and his address to Congress (February 3), on the breaking of diplomatic relations, will be found in this last named collection, while the armed neutrality address (February 26), that of April 2 asking for a declaration of war, the Flag Day Address

(June 14), and the communications to Russia in May and June have either been issued by the Committee on Public Information, or are in Current History. (See also, "The Entry of the United States', International Conciliation, No. 114). The Pope's peace proposal and the replies are printed in International Conciliation No. 119. During the year, of course, there were a number of important speeches by British and French statesmen.

In December, 1917, there began another important "peace offensive" brought about by the negotiations with Russia; the declaration of British Labor's War Aims (December 28); Mr. Lloyd George's speech (January 5); President Wilson's message to Congress (January 8); the replies of Count Hertling and Count Czernin (January 24); the President's rejoinder addressed principally to Austria (February 11), and Mr. Lloyd George's and Mr. Asquith's speeches the next day. This enumeration does not include such important communications as those of President Eliot or Lord Lansdowne's letters to the Daily Telegraph. All of these can be found in Current History. (See also, International Conciliation, Nos. 122 and 123.)

B. WHY DISCUSS WAR AIMS?

An argument for a full disclosure of the purposes for which armaments will be used is to be found in Norman Angell's The Dangers of Half-Preparedness (Putnam, 1916); and the best case for a diplomatic as well as a military offensive is made out in Mr. Angell's last book, War Aims: The Need for a Parliament of the Allies (Headley Bros., 1917) some of which appeared in The New Republic and the argument of which is substantially similar to the position taken editorially by The New Republic and The Nation (London).

Mr. Angell says:

The recommendations of the Paris Conference constitute an admission that, however complete our military victory, Germany will remain a great potential military, political, and economic factor in international relations.

Have we, then, any clear picture of the conditions which we are trying to establish? Does the "destruction of Prussian Militarism" mean that Germany is to have no army as well as no navy? If she is to have an army, is its size to bear some relation to the size of other armies? If so, what is to be the ratio? And, when we demand the destruction of her military forces, are we to offer Germany no guarantee against outrageous demand, or attacks upon her by other Powers?

Until we have some notion, at least, of these things, we cannot pretend to know what the destruction of German Militarism

means

The announcement of a plan of guarantees by a new Paris Conference, which would truly represent all the great nations of the world, outside of Germany and Austria, if made during the war, would be a powerful, perhaps determining, factor in undermining the military resistance of the German people to the aims of the Allies, since it would make it apparent that those aims offer the best security for the rights and existence of the Germans themselves; and such an announcement would constitute the best means of aiding a revolt of German sentiment against militarist philosophy and German Militarism. (Angell, War Aims, pp. 55, 118-119.)

As illustrating Mr. Angell's contentions, the following incident may be cited:

On December 14, Mr. Lloyd George in an address at Gray's Inn, made a strong speech in which little was said about any war aims except victory. Count Hertling, the Imperial Chancellor, immediately granted an interview to the Wolff Bureau, the German semi-official news agency, in which he declared:

In his last speech Mr. Lloyd George calls us criminals and bandits. As it has already once been declared in the Reichstag, we do not intend to join in this renewal of the customs of the Homeric heroes. Modern wars are not won by invective, but are rather, perhaps, prolonged, because after this abuse by the English Prime Minister it is out of the question for us to negotiate with men of such temper .

Just over a year has passed since we and our Allies offered the enemy the hand of peace. It was rejected. Meanwhile our reply to the Papal Note has again set forth our standpoint. At this moment when I have just received news that the truce which already existed between us and our Eastern neighbors has passed into a formal armistice, the speech of the British Prime Minister is before me. It is the answer of the present British Cabinet to the Papal Note. Our way in the West is accordingly clear. (London Times [weekly edition], December

21, 1917.)

A view contrary to that of Mr. Angell:

The truth is that all discussion of war aims, in advance of the salvation of the world from the German menace, amounts merely to words. If Germany wins the war, her aims will prevail and we know what they are. The Bolsheviki, who have long thundered against Allied war aims, have reduced Russia to impotence only to discover that Germany demands of them all the Russian territory she has conquered by force of arms during the war, and a mortgage on the economic future of Russia in addition. Those who are seeking to promote the same disorder in Allied nations would find Germany demanding · Belgium and the North of France, once France and Britain were weakened by internal dissensions.

When real peace terms are to be made, we in the United States will be able to speak a powerful word for justice and against aggrandizements which promise not real peace but new wars. But until there is prospect of any but German terms, which we must all fight, there is no object and there is real danger in the discussion, which is encouraged and induced in no small measure by German agents all over the world. (Frank H. Simonds, 'The Fifth Campaign'. Review of Reviews, January, 1918.)

Is the interchange of views of statesmen in the war (very free in comparison with previous discussions) to be attributed to an acceptance of Mr. Angell's position or to a desire to secure the support of public opinion?

How far should the Allies go in stating publicly the terms that they will insist upon at the settlement?

Is there danger in inconsistency between peace terms as expressed by the Allied statesmen? (e. g., President Wilson's address to Congress, February 11, 1918, on Austria and the position taken by Mr. Lloyd George?)

How far should the disclosure and discussion of peace terms be checked because it serves to divide the Allies and hearten pacifists?

Can Prussian militarism ever be finally destroyed until the German people have experienced a change of heart and have rebelled against its philosophy?

Can this change of heart come so long as the German people believe that they must fight for this philosophy in order to protect themselves, or be ready to fight in order to protect themselves after the settlement?

How far should the people through Parliamentary representatives, Socialist and Labor organizations, participate in a discussion of the settlement?

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