perialist aims were abandoned (see the speeches and documents in Current History), and in his address of January 5, 1918, Mr. Lloyd George declared:

While we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race with its capital at Constantinople, the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being internationalized and neutralized, Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine, are, in our judgment, entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions.

What would have been the probable attitude of the United States if Russia had continued to claim Constantinople?

For the suggestion that the United States might undertake the administration of the Straits, see Toynbee, Nationality and the War (Dutton); Woolf, The Future of Constantinople (Allen and Unwin); and Buxton (Noel), "The Destiny of the Turkish Straits', Contemporary Review, June, 1917. For a history of previous attempts at international administration, see Woolf, International Government (Brentano), and for the interesting case of Shanghai, Moore, Digest of International Law (Government Printing Office), Vol. II, p. 648 ff.

On the whole problem of backward states see Lippmann, The Stakes of Diplomacy (Holt).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

GIBBONS, The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East (Century). LIPPMANN, The Stakes of Diplomacy (Holt).

TOYNBEE, Nationality and the War (Dutton).

TOYNBEE, Turkey: A Past and Future (Doran).

URQUHART, The Eastern Question (Oxford Pamphlets).

Turkey in Europe and Asia (Oxford Pamphlets). WOOLF, The Future of Constantinople (Allen and Unwin).

Contemporary Review.

Current History.

The New Europe.

The New York Evening Post.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access

to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

Illustrate from the case of the Poles the difficulties (a) strategic, (b) economic, (c) due to mixture of population, that may stand in the way of reconstructing a nationality as an independent state.

Do the Poles look upon Prussia or Russia as the deadlier enemy?

What conditions or compensations, short of extinction as a military power, would suffice to persuade Germany to give up the greater part of the Duchy of Posen to create an independent state or an autonomous unit within Russia?

Would it be possible to give an independent Poland access to the sea without violating the principle of nationality?

See Phillips, Poland (Holt: Home University Library); Gibbons, The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East (Century); Lewinski-Corwin, The Political History of Poland (Polish Book Importing Co.); The War and Democracy (Macmillan); Fayle, The Great Settlement (Duffield); Toynbee, Nationality and the War (Dutton); Ehrlich, Poland, Prussia, and Culture (Oxford Pamphlets); Rose, 'The Polish Problem: Past and Present', Contemporary Review, December, 1916.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

A very full bibliography on a League of Nations will be found in Goldsmith, A League to Enforce Peace (Macmillan). This book, however, as has been said, does not attempt to apply the principles which it easily establishes in theory to the vexing problems of mid-European politics. The student, therefore; will find of more service the following books: Brailsford, A League of Nations (Macmillan); Woolf, International Government (Brentano); Woolf, The Framework of a Lasting Peace (Allen and Unwin); Hobson, Towards International Government (Macmillan) and Dickinson, The Choice

Before Us (Dodd, Mead). Many valuable articles have appeared in the reviews. Some of these have been reprinted by the World Peace Foundation and the League to Enforce Peace. Others that may be mentioned are Macdonell, 'Armed Pacifism', Contemporary Review, March, 1917; Dickinson, ‘A League of Nations and Its Critics', Contemporary Review, June, 1917. More elaborate outlines of proposed Leagues than the programme of the American organization are given by Mr. Brailsford and Mr. Woolf.

How far is it true that America does not need a League to Enforce Peace for her own protection?

Should a League of Nations be formed when the war ends, or would it be better to wait until hatred between the belligerents has become less bitter?

How far do you think the various war aims outlined by Mr. Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, British Labor, Count Hertling, the Bolsheviki, etc., should be modified (a) if in the future there are no safeguards against aggression other than those existing when the war began, or (b) if there is mutual protection by a League of Nations?

How far should sea-power be an instrument of a League of Nations? (See Norman Angell's The World's Highway and the references given above under freedom of the seas.)

How great is the danger that nations will make secret, reinsurance agreements with each other? Is a successful League of Nations dependent upon open diplomacy?

To what extent must a League of Peace demand from its members adherence at all times, on pain of expulsion, or some other penalty, to certain fundamental principles, such as the principle of nationality and commercial freedom, including questions of tariffs at home and in the colonies, and guarantees for fair opportunities all round over questions of export of capital, access to raw materials, etc.? This question may be discussed in connection with the more general one: To what extent should a League of Peace aim simply at preventing the outbreak of actual wars, and how far might it venture to embark upon an attempt to remove the causes of mutual hostility among its members eventually to an open breach between them?

How far should Parliaments as well as Foreign Offices be represented on the International Bodies which are to function for the League of Nations?

Germany is ready at all times to join a League of Nations and even to place herself at the head of a League which will restrain the disturber of peace. (Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg to the Committee of the Reichstag, November 9, 1916.)

What should be the attitude of a League of Nations toward the Central Powers?

The following quotations are from Muir, 'The Difficulties of a League of Peace', The New Europe, February 1, 1917:

I. The first and most obvious condition for the successful organization of a League of Peace is that there must be no single Power, or group of Powers, dominated by a single will, so strong as to be able to defy the rest of the world, and, therefore, to be tempted by the prospect of worldsupremacy.

Is this a valid condition?

Would the British Commonwealth alone, or with the United States in a union of the English-speaking peoples, be strong enough to defy the rest of the world?

Does this condition mean that Germany's "Mittel-Europa" scheme must be completely destroyed?

II. The second preliminary condition of the organization of a League of Peace is that the political distribution of Europe and (as far as possible) of the whole world, must be drawn upon lines which promise permanence, by being based, not on the mere accidents of conquest or dynastic inheritance, but on clear and defensible principles, on reason, and on justice.

Is this condition valid?

Should a League of Nations guarantee the status quo (a) except as altered by peaceful agreement? or (b) except as altered by international council? See the books by Woolf cited above and Phillips, The Confederation of Europe (Longmans), which discusses the Holy Alliance and is not hopeful of the success of a League of Nations.

III. Suppose these preliminary conditions to be satisfactorily met, we are faced at the outset by a difficulty which affects the membership of the League. If the nations are to have confidence in it as a means

of preserving peace, it must include no States which cannot be trusted to fulfill the responsibilities of membership. Every State must have reasonable ground for certainty that, if it is attacked or if any of the principles of international law are infringed, all the other members of the League will take such active steps as may be required by the League's constitution.

Is this condition valid? (See the suggestions and questions above under B and D and Norman Angell's War Aims: The Need for a Parliament of the Allies [ Headley ].)

Would it be safe to include in the League a government like the United States where the treaty-making authority cannot commit the country to war as a means of coercing a recalcitrant state?

Would the danger be greater than in England where the Parliament, although having no formal control over foreign policy, holds the purse strings?

IV. Assuming that some sort of League of Peace is to be established, we are next brought up against the difficulty of devising for it a system of direction. Not long since I listened to a lecture by an eminent lawyer,1 in which he commended the idea of the League as a sure safeguard against war, and proved, to his own satisfaction, that, if such a League had existed in 1914, the present war would not have broken out; and, indeed, we may very readily agree that if the conditions which would make a League of Peace a practical proposal had existed in 1914 there would have been no war. Having said so much, the lecturer went on to observe: "Of course, the League must have a common executive and a general staff;" and, saying that, he passed on to other topics, as if the establishment of a common executive and a general staff presented no difficulties at all. Now it is plain that the constitution of the League must depend upon the character of its component members. If they trust and understand one another, its system may be simple and unelaborate. But if, as seems to be assumed by many of its advocates, it is to include all the civilized States of the world, it will require a very carefully-worked-out system of administration: a sort of federal council of civilization.

Is this difficulty insurmountable?

How is it worked out in the schemes suggested by Mr. Woolf and Mr. Brailsford?

1 Sir Frederick Pollock, whose lecture was partly published in the Fortnightly Review, December, 1916.