authority, room, and place of Christ: We are ambassadors for Christ, and we preach in Christ's stead, 2 Cor. v. 20. This he doth not nor cannot deny (which makes good my argument). Why did he not show us the like concerning magistracy? I suppose he would, if he could this is the very point which he had to speak to, but hath not done it.

My fourth argument against the magistrate's holding of his office of, and under, and for Christ; that is, in Christ's room and stead as Mediator, shall be that which was drawn from Luke xii. 14. The Jews were of the same opinion, which Mr Coleman and Mr Hussey have followed, namely, that civil government should be put in the hands of Christ, which they collected from Jer. xxiii. 5, "He shall execute justice and judgment in the earth;" and such other prophecies, by them misunderstood. And hence it was that one said to Christ, "Master, speak to my brother, that he divide the inheritance with me." Our Lord's answer was, "Man, who made me a judge or a divider over you." Whatsoever act of authority is done by a deputy or vicegerent, as representing his master and sovereign, may be done by the king himself when personally present. If, therefore, the magistrate judge civil causes, and divide inheritances, as the vicegerent of Christ, and of Christ as Mediator, then Christ himself, when present in the days of his flesh, had power, as Mediator, to judge such causes. But this Christ himself plainly denieth. Let us hear Mr Hussey's answer, p. 24 (it is the very same with that which Azorius, Instit. Mor., part 2, lib. 4, cap. 19, pleading for the Pope's temporal dominion, answereth concerning the point now in hand), "It doth not follow that because Christ was not a judge actu exercito, therefore the original right of government was not in him. And this objection may be answered thus: Christ doth not say he was not a judge, but, Who made me a judge? How dost thou know that I am judge? And thus Christ, in the time of his humiliation, did often hide the manifestation of his power." What

1 Jo. Brentius Hom. in Luc. tom. 1, hom. 106.Quis me constituit judicem aut divisorem super vos ? hoc est, alia est civilis magistratus vocatio, alia mea vocatio. Ad illum pertinet ut dijudicet controversias de hæreditatibus, et id genus aliis rebus. Ad me autem pertinet ut doceam evangelion de remissione peccatorum, et vita æterna. Ut igitur nollem quod magistratus meum officium temere usurparet, ita et mea interest, ne temere usurpem mihi vocationem magistratus. Observanda doctrina, qua non

greater violence could be offered to the text? For the verb karéσtŋoe, constituit, is purposely used to deny the power or right, as well as the exercise, and proveth that he was not a judge actu signato, having no such power nor authority given him. It is the same phrase which is used, Acts vii. 35, τίς σε κατέστησεν, " Who made thee a ruler and a judge ?" Moses was then beginning to do the part of a ruler and a judge actu exercito, but they refuse him as having no warrant, power, nor authority. Acts vi. 3, the apostles bid choose seven deacons, ous Karaorhooμer, whom we may appoint,' say they, "over this business.” Tit. i. 5, kai καταστήσης κατὰ πόλιν πρεσβυτέρους, “ and ordain elders in every city." Yet neither can that of the deacons, nor this of the elders, be understood otherwise than of the right, power, and authority given them. See the like, Heb. vii. 28; Luke xii. 42; Matt. xxiv. 47. The scope therefore of Christ's answer was this (as Aretius upon the place), Non debeo aliena munia invadere, I ought not to invade such offices as belong to others, not to me.

Some of the Jesuits (as forward as they are to defend the temporal power of the Pope as Christ's vicar on earth, yet) cannot shut their eyes against the light of this text, "Who made me a judge or a divider over you?" but they are forced to acknowledge that Christ denies that he had any right or authority to be a civil judge; for how can he who is authorised to be a judge say, "Who made me a judge?"1

The fifth argument I take from John xviii. 36, "My kingdom is not of this world." The great jealousy and fear which both Herod and Pilate had of Christ was, that they understood he was a king. Christ

solum erudimur, quod sic proprium et legitimum etiam admonemur exemplo Christi, ne quis alienam officium Christi in hoc externo mundo, verum vocationem illegitime invadat. Jo. Winckelmannus in Luke xii. 14.-Negat se esse politicum judicem herciscundæ familiæ, sicut nec adulterum damnat, John viii. Ostendit enim esse discrimen inter politicum magistratum, et munus ecclesiasticum.

1 Greg. de Valentia comment. Theol. tom. 4, disp. 1, quæst. 22, punct. 6, Homo, quis me constituit judicem aut divisorem inter vos ?-Quasi diceret: Nemo plane, neque homo, et multo minus Deus. Si enim a Deo habuisset Dominium jurisdictionis politicæ, multo verius fuisset constitutus judex politicus, quam si eam jurisdictionem habuisset ab homine. Et tamen negat omnino se fuisse talem judicem constitutum. Unde per hoc quod addit, Quis me constituit judicem? etc. Eum remisit ad alium qui haberet eam potestatem, qua ipsi careret. See the like in Bellarmine de Pontif., lib. 5, cap. 4.

clears himself in this point: his kingdom was such as they needed not be afraid of; for though it be "in the world," it is not "of the world;" though it be here, it is not from hence it is heterogeneous to temporal monarchy and civil government. Mr Hussey, p. 24, tells us, he knows not how those governments that should be executed by church officers, should savour less of the world than the civil government. For this I remit him to those many and great differences which I have shown between the civil and the ecclesiastical power. In the meanwhile, my argument stands in force; for if all civil government were put in Christ's hand, as he is Mediator, and he to depute and substitute others whom he will under him, then what is there in that answer of his to Pilate which could convincingly answer those mistakes and misapprehensions of the nature of his kingdom? That which is now taught by Mr Hussey is the very thing which Herod and Pilate were afraid of; but Christ denieth that which they were afraid of, and ver. 36 is an answer to the question asked, ver. 33, "Art thou the King of the Jews?" " My kingdom is not of this world," saith he. To the same sense (as Grotius upon the place noteth out of Eusebius) Christ's kinsmen, when they were asked concerning his kingdom, did answer to Domitian, that his kingdom was not worldly but heavenly.1

Sixthly, I prove the point from Luke xvii. 20, 21, "And when he was demanded of the Pharisees when the kingdom of God should come, he answered them, and said, The kingdom of God cometh not with observation. Neither shall they say, Lo here! or, lo there! for, behold, the kingdom of God is within you." By the kingdom of God is meant, in this place, the kingdom of the Messiah, as interpreters do unanimously agree. Both John Baptist and Christ himself had preached that the kingdom of God was at hand; and the Jews themselves were in expectation of the Messiah to make them free from the Roman yoke, and to restore a temporal or earthly monarchy to Israel. Hereupon they ask when this kingdom should come. His answer is, "The kingdom of God cometh not μετὰ παρατηρήσεως, with observation," or "outward show and pomp ;" but

1 'Ns i ȧvrov Baoiλeía où кooμun pèv οὐδ ̓ ἐπίγειος, ἐπουράνιος δὲ καὶ ἀγγελική τυγχάνει.

it is within you, it is spiritual, it belongs to the inward man. But if the magistrate be Christ's vicegerent, and hold his office of and under Christ as Mediator; and if Christ, as Mediator, reign in, through, and by the magistrate, then the kingdom of the Messiah doth come with observation and pomp, with a crown, a sceptre, a sword, and μerà Tоλλns Davraσias, with princely splenπολλῆς Φαντασίας, dour, riches, triumph, such as the Pharisees then, and the Jews now, do expect; which, saith Grotius, is the thing that Christ here denieth; for all the outward pomp, observation, splendour, majesty, power, and authority, which a vicegerent hath, doth principally redound unto his master and sovereign; so that, by our opposites' principles, the kingdom of Christ must come with observation, because the dominion of the magistrate (whom they hold to be his vicegerent) cometh with observation.

Seventhly, That government and authority which hath a foundation in the law of nature and nations (yea, might and should have had place and been of use, though man had not sinned) cannot be held of, and under, and managed for Christ, as he is Mediator. But magistracy or civil government hath a foundation in the law of nature and nations (yea, might and should have had place, and been of use, though man had not sinned); therefore, the reason of the proposition is because the law of nature and nations, and the law which was written in man's heart, in his first creation, doth not flow from Christ as Mediator, but from God as Creator. Neither can it be said that Christ, as Mediator, ruleth and governeth all nations by the law of nature and nations, or that Christ should have reigned as Mediator though man had not sinned. The assumption is proved by Gerhard, Loc. Com., tom. 6, p. 459, 460, 474. In the state of innocency there had been no such use of magistracy as now there is; for there had been no evil-doers to be punished, no unruly persons to be restrained, yet, as the wife had been subject to the husband, and the son to the father, so, no doubt, there had been an union of divers families under one head, man being naturally wov Toλrikòr, as Aristotle calls him. He is for society and policy, and how can it be imagined that mankind, multiplying upon the earth, should have been without headship, superiority, order, society, government? And what wonder that the law of nature teach all nations some government?

Jerome observeth, that nature guideth the very reasonless creatures to a kind of magistracy.1

Eighthly, If the Scripture hold forth the same derivation or origination of magistracy in the Christian magistrate and in the heathen magistrate, then it is not safe to us to hold that the Christian magistrate holds his office of and under Christ as Mediator; but the Scripture doth hold forth the same derivation or origination of magistracy in the Christian magistrate and in the heathen magistrate; therefore the proposition hath this reason for it, because the heathen magistrate doth not hold his office of and under Christ as Mediator. Neither doth Mr Hussey herein contradict me, only he holds the heathen magistrate and his government to be unlawful, wherein he is anabaptistical, and is confuted by my first argument. As for the assumption, it is proved from divers scriptures, and namely these, Rom. xiii. 1, "The powers that be are ordained of God," which is spoken of heathen magistrates; Dan. ii. 37, "Thou, O King, art a King of kings; for the God of heaven hath given thee a kingdom, power, and strength, and glory" so saith Daniel to Nebuchadnezzar, an idolatrous and heathen king. See the like, Jer. xxvii. 6; Isa. xlv. 1. God sent his servant the prophet to anoint Hazael king over Syria, 1 Kings xix. 15. Read to this purpose Augustine, de Civit. Dei, lib. 5, cap. 21, where he saith, that the same God gave a kingdom and authority both to the Romans, Assyrians, Persians, Hebrews; and that he who gave the kingdom to the best emperors, gave it also to the worst emperors; yea, he that gave it to Constantine a Christian, did also give it, saith he, to Julian the apostate. Tertullian, Apol., cap. 30, speaking of the heathen emperors of that time, saith, that they were from God, à quo sunt secundi, post quem primi ante omnes: that he who had made them men, did also make them emperors, and give them their power. Ibid., cap. 33, Ut merito dixerim noster est magis Caesar, ut a nostra Deo constitutus: So that I may justly say, Cæsar is rather

1 Hier. Rustico Monacho.-Etiam muta animantia et ferarum greges ductores sequuntur suos. In apibus principes sunt.

Qui Mario, ipse Caio Cæsari: qui Augusto, ipse et Neroni; qui Vespasianis vel patri vel filio, suavissimis imperatoribus, ipse et Domitiano crudelisEt ne per singulos ire necesse sit, qui Constantino Christiano, ipse apostatæ Juliano.

simo.

ours, as being placed by our God, saith he, speaking to the pagans in the behalf of Christians; wherefore, though there be huge and vast differences between the Christian magistrate and the heathen magistrate, the former excelling the latter as much as light doth darkness, yet, in this point of the derivation and tenure of magistracy, they both are equally interested, and the Scripture showeth no difference as to that point.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE POWER AND PRIVILEGE OF THE MAGISTRATE IN THINGS AND CAUSES ECCLESIASTICAL; WHAT IT IS NOT, AND WHAT IT IS.

The new notion that the Christian magistrate is a church officer, and magistracy an ecclesiastical as well as a civil administration, calls to mind that of the wise man, "Is there anything whereof it may be said, See, this is new? it hath been already of old time, which was before us." Plato, in his Politicus (a little after the middle of that book), tells me, that the kings of Egypt were also priests, and that, in many cities of the Grecians, the supreme magistrate had the administration of the holy things. Notwithstanding, even in this particular there still appeareth some new thing under the sun. For Plato tells me again, epist. 8, that those supreme magistrates who were priests, might not be present, nor join in criminal nor capital judgments, lest they (being priests) should be defiled. If you look after some other precedent for the union of civil and ecclesiastical government, secular and spiritual administrations in one and the same person or persons, perhaps it were not hard to find such precedents as our opposites will be ashamed to own.

I am sure heathens themselves have known the difference between the office of priests and the office of magistrates. Aristotle, de Repub., lib. 4, cap. 15, speaking of priests, saith, Touтo yàp erepov ri #apà ràs noλiriκàs apyàs: For this is another thing than civil magistrates. He had said before, woλλῶν γὰρ ἐπιστατῶν ἡ πολιτική κοινωνία deira: For a civil society hath need of many rulers, but every ériorárns who is made by election or lot, is not a civil magistrate; and the first instance he giveth is that of the priests; and so Aristotle would

have the priest to be ériorárns a ruler, but not a civil magistrate. So, de Repub., lib. 7, cap. 8, he distinguisheth between the priests and the judges in a city.

But to the matter. I will here endeavour to make these two things appear: 1. That no administration, formally and properly ecclesiastical (and, namely, the dispensing of church censures), doth belong unto the magistrate, nor may (according to the word of God) be assumed and exercised by him. 2. That Christ hath not made the magistrate head of the church, to receive appeals (properly so called) from all ecclesiastical assemblies. Touching the first of these, it is no other than is held forth in the Irish Articles of Faith (famous among orthodox and learned men in these kingdoms), which do plainly exclude the magistrate from the administration of the word and sacraments, and from the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven. It is the unhappiness of this time, that this and other truths, formerly out of controversy, should be so much stuck at and doubted of by some.

Now, that the corrective part of church government, or the censure of scandalous persons, in reference to the purging of the church and keeping pure of the ordinances, is no part of the magistrate's office, but is a distinct charge belonging of right to ministers and elders; as it may fully appear by the arguments brought afterwards to prove a government in the church distinct from magistracy (which arguments will necessarily carry the power of church censures, and the administration of the keys of the kingdom of heaven, into other hands than the magistrate's); so I shall here strengthen it by these confirmations :

First, Church censures must needs be dispensed by ministers and elders, because they are heterogeneous to magistracy: For, first, The magistrate by the power which is in his hand, ought to punish any of his subjects that do evil, and he ought to punish like sins with like punishments. But if the power of church censures be in the magistrate's hands, he cannot walk by that rule; for church censures are only for church members, not for all subjects; 1 Cor. v. 10, 12. Secondly, Church censures are to be executed in the name of Christ, Matt. xviii. 20, with ver. 17, 18; 1 Cor. v. 4; and this cannot be done in his name, by any other but such as have commission from him to bind and loose, forgive and retain sins. But where

is any such commission given to the civil magistrate, Christian more than heathen? Thirdly, Church censures are for impenitent, contumacious offenders; but the magistrate doth and must punish offenders (when the course of justice and law so requireth), whether they appear penitent or impenitent. Fourthly, The magistrate's power of punishing offenders is bounded by the law

of the land. What then shall become of such scandals as are not crimes punishable by the law of the land? such as obscene rotten talking, adulterous and vile behaviour, or the most scandalous conversing and companying together (though the crime of adultery cannot be proved by witnesses), living in known malice and envy, refusing to be reconciled, and thereupon lying off (it may be for a long time) from the sacrament, and the like, which are not proper to be taken notice of by the civil judge. So that, in this case, either there must be church censures and discipline exercised by church officers, or the magistrate must go beyond his limits. Or, lastly, Scandals shall spread in the church, and no remedy against them. Far be it from the thoughts of Christian magistrates, that scandals of this kind shall be tolerated, to the dishonour of God, the laying of the stumbling-blocks of bad examples before others, and to the violation and pollution of the ordinances of Jesus Christ, who hath commanded to keep his ordinances pure.

A second argument may be this, In the Old Testament God did not command the magistrates, but the priests, to put a difference betwixt the profane and the holy, the unclean and the clean; Lev. x. 10; Ezek. xxii. 26; Ezek, xliv. 23, 24; Deut. xxi. 5; 2 Chron. xxiii. 18, 19. And, in the New Testament, the keys of the kingdom of heaven are given to the ministers of the church: Matt. xvi. 19; xviii. 18; John xx. 23, but no where to the civil magistrate. It belongeth to church officers to censure false doctrine, Rev. ii. 2, 14, 15; to decide controversies, Acts xvi. 4; and to examine and censure scandals, Ezek. xliv. 23, 24, which is a prophecy concerning the ministry of the New Testament; and elders judge an elder, 1 Tim. v. 19, or any other church member, 1 Cor. v. 12.

Thirdly, The Scripture holdeth forth the civil and ecclesiastical power as most distinct; insomuch that it condemneth the spiritualising of the civil power, as well as the secu

larising of the ecclesiastical power; state papacy, as well as papal state. Church officers may not take the civil sword, nor judge civil causes, Luke xii. 13, 14; xxii. 25; Matt. xxvi. 52; 2 Cor. x. 4; 2 Tim. ii. 4. So Uzzah might not touch the ark; nor Saul offer burnt-offerings; nor Uzziah burn incense. I wish we may not have cause to revive the proverb which was used in Ambrose's time: "That emperors did more covet the priesthood than the priests did. covet the empire." Shall it be a sin to church officers to exercise any act of civil government, and shall it be no sin to the civil magistrate to engross the whole and sole power of church government? Are not the two powers formally and specifically distinct? Of which before, chap. 4.

It is to be well noted, that Maccovius and Vedelius, who ascribe a sort of papal power to the civil magistrate, to the great scandal of the reformed church, do notwithstanding acknowledge that Christ hath appointed church discipline and censures, and the same to be dispensed by church officers only; and that the magistrate, as he may not preach the word and administer the sacraments, so he may not exercise church discipline, nor inflict spiritual censures, such as excommunication. Though Erastus, p. 175, hath not spared to say, that the magistrate may, in the New Testament (though he might not in the old), exercise the ministerial function, if he can have so much leisure from his other employments.

Fourthly, The power of church discipline is intrinsical to the church; that is, both they who censure, and they who are censured, must be of the church, 1 Cor. v. 12, 13; they must be of one and the same corporation; the one must not be in the body, and the other out of the body. But if this power were in the magistrate, it were extrinsical to the church; for the magistrate, quatenus a magistrate, is not so much as a church member; far less can the magistrate, as magistrate, have jurisdiction over church members, as church members; even as the minister, as minister, is not a member of the commonwealth or state, far less can he, as minister, exercise jurisdiction over the subjects, as subjects.

The Christian magistrate in England is not a member of the church as a magistrate, but as a Christian; and the minister of Jesus Christ in England, is not subject to the magistrate as he is a minister of Christ,

but as he is a member of the commonwealth of England. He was both a learned man and a great royalist in Scotland, who held that all kings, infidel as well as Christian, have equal authority and jurisdiction in the church, though all be not alike qualified or able to exercise it. John Weymes, de Reg. primat., p. 123. Let our opposites loose this knot among themselves; for they are not of one opinion about it.

Fifthly, Church officers might, and did freely, and by themselves, dispense church censures, under pagan and unbelieving magistrates, as is by all confessed. Now the church ought not to be in a worse condition under the Christian magistrate than under an infidel; for the power of the Christian magistrate is cumulative, not privative to the church; he is a nursing-father, Isa. xlix. 23, not a step-father. He is keeper, defender and guardian of both tables, but neither judge nor interpreter of Scripture.

Sixthly, I shall shut up this argumentation with a convincing dilemma. The assemblies of church officers being to exercise discipline, and censure offences (which is supposed, and must be granted in regard of the ordinances of parliament), either they have power to do this jure proprio, and virtute officii, or only jure devoluto, and virtute delegationis, such authority being derived from the magistrate. If the former, I have what I would; if the latter, then it followeth, 1. That where presbyteries and synods do exercise spiritual jurisdiction, not by any power derived from, or dependent upon, the civil magistrate, but in the name and authority of Jesus Christ, and by the power received from him, as in Scotland, France, and the Low Countries, &c., there all ecclesiastical censures, such as deposition of ministers, and excommunication of scandalous and obstinate persons, have been, are, and shall be, void, null, and of no effect; even as when the prelatical party did hold, that the power of ordination and jurisdiction pertaineth only to prelates, or such as are delegated with commission and authority from them, thereupon they were so put to it by the arguments of the anti-episcopal party, that they were forced to say, that presbyters, ordained by presbyters in other reformed churches, are no presbyters, and their excommunication was no excommunication. 2. It will follow, that the magistrate himself may excommunicate, for nemo potest aliis delegare plus juris quam ipse