selves a respectable and influential party by clubbing with men of like sentiment in other towns. In fact, any two thousand electors might unite together so as to form a separate constituency entitled to a representative. This method of voting would so completely revolutionise our electoral system, that we have not heard of any practical statesman giving it his sanction. We mention it here merely to show how thoughts are tending, and how imperious are the difficulties which we have to face.

The solution proposed by Lord John Russell is much more practicable; and although it is far from being satisfactory, yet we are unwilling to reject it peremptorily. His object was to get the opinion of a respectable minority represented. If the working classes are to be admitted to the exercise of the franchise, it is clear that they will outnumber the other electors, who will practically have no voice in the choice of a representative, and might as well not vote at all. In order

to meet this disadvantage, Lord John Russell proposed to diminish the number of votes at the disposal of each elector. In a town represented by three members, each elector would have, under the existing arrangement, a vote for each member, and the dominant class in the township might elect all three. It was therefore proposed to give to each elector a vote for only two of the representatives, so that other electors, who held opinions different from those of the majority, might, if they were influential and strong enough, unite to secure the election of the third member. The merit of this proposal is, that it does to a certain extent what it professes to do. It would no doubt secure, in a good number of cases, the election of a member acceptable to an influential section of the constituency, who, under a system where mere numbers prevail, would otherwise have no voice in the selection of a candidate. Its demerit is that it is not enough that it would be a very partial remedy for the evils introduced into our constitution by handing over the election of our representatives to the

mob. The mob would, by the help of a little organisation, learn to manage the third representative as well as the other two. Still, the measure is something, if it is not everything; and it is especially valuable as the recognition by Lord John Russell of a principle, a principle which we cannot think that Mr Disraeli disposed of when he stated, in disparagement of Lord John's plan, that there is no method of giving a voice to the minority known to the constitution except that of making the minority a majority. When we are revolutionising the constitution by force of numbers, a statesman may be pardoned for devising a new method of voting, which may counteract the effects of our hazardous reforms. But in point of fact Mr Disraeli's objection, in so far as we have been able to apprehend it, is a phrase rather than an argument. The 500 electors of some small nomination borough are called a majority, and are therefore entitled to a member; the 5000 Conservative electors, in some more populous constituency in which they are swamped by numbers, are a minority, and are entitled to nothing. It is surely hard to say that these 5000 are entitled to nothing until they can outnumber the mob, and turn their minority into a majority. If Lord John Russell's scheme does not fully meet the necessities of the case, it at all events shows a consideration of it, for which we are anxious to give him all the credit which is consistent with the fact of his having quietly dropped all reference to it in the Reform Bill of the present session.

Lastly, we come to the suggestion of Mr John Stuart Mill, a man who cannot be accused of deficient sympathy with the lower classes. Mr John Mill is the ablest and most philosophical of the Radical politicians, but he stands aghast at the idea of handing over the government of the country to a Parliament elected by universal suffrage. When universal suffrage comes, depend upon it we shall not be able to devise any checks against it; and whatever checks we can impose upon it must be established now, in anticipation, or neverг. We have admitted so

to the privileges of the franchise. What has happened in London will sooner or later happen in every town in the kingdom. Rents will rise, or, what is the same thing, money will fall, so that every householder in the land will have the benefit of the franchise. Then it will be time for the lodgers to fight for their privileges. At first their qualification may be set down at a good round figure, which will be reduced by agitation until at last it becomes so small as to include every lodger, and to be equivalent to universal suffrage. So far, however, universal suffrage would be restrained by the formalities of registration. But it would speedily be discovered that a system of annual registration is a hardship to the great majority of electors-namely, those who frequently shift their lodgings. By degrees we should come to keep the registers constantly open, and such confusion would ensue, such brawling and such loss of time, that in self-defence the populace would abolish registration, or, rendering it a farce, fall back on the American model, and vote wholesale, by ticket, by ballot, and by bullet. Of course, we all regard such a state of things with unmingled horror; but is it not the logical result to which we are tending? Lord John Russell's Bill, so far from being a final settlement of the question, would but pave the way, first for household, then for universal suffrage; and it is because they clearly see this that our legislature felt the necessity of pausing in the downward course, and calmly measuring the difficulties of the situation.

The question is nothing less than this, How is the constitution to be saved? For the constitution is gone if the balance on which it depends is overset. Most clearly it is overset, if the dominant power in the State is given to the working classes, which outnumber all the others put together. Where are we to stop? On what principle are we to stop? Are we to concede so much to-day and so much to-morrow, and give up little by little, until we lose all? Is it the principle of Conservatives to conserve what cannot be conserved It must be confessed that in this

dallying with reform we are treading a very dangerous path; and in the breathing-time which is given to us, we would seriously ask the Tory leaders, committed as they are to an extension of the franchise, whether it is not possible to feel our way to a final solution of the question, and to some means of guarding the constitution from utter destruction. The prerogatives of the Crown have been gradually diminished; the powers of the House of Lords have been curtailed to little more than those of a Court of Review, and in the present session it has been even proposed to take from them the right of reviewing financial measures; and while the House of Commons has become almost absolute in the State, we are entertained with the suggestion that it should be filled with the delegates of a single class, and that the lowest in the country. How are we to avert such a calamity? As yet the only intelligible remedies have been proposed by that party which has most immediate reason to dread the degradation of our constituencies. Lord John Russell proposed a scheme by which minorities should be represented, and Mr John Stuart Mill proposed a method by which the evils of universal suffrage might be nullified. There was also a third scheme, suggested by Mr Hare, in accordance with which our whole electoral system would be disturbed, and our present geographical system of voting would be displaced by one that would admit of a small band in Edinburgh uniting with small bands and little flocks in various other cities, to elect a representative who would have no chance of receiving the confidence of any single constituency. Practically, all the electors of the United Kingdom would put their votes into a single urn. He who might have the greatest number of votes, wherever these votes came from, would be at the head of the poll; he who might have the next greatest number would stand next; and so we might go on with the whole 656 members, the calculation being, that in this way men who find themselves in a small minority in separate towns, would find them

selves a respectable and influential party by clubbing with men of like sentiment in other towns. In fact, any two thousand electors might unite together so as to form a separate constituency entitled to a representative. This method of voting would so completely revolutionise our electoral system, that we have not heard of any practical statesman giving it his sanction. We mention it here merely to show how thoughts are tending, and how imperious are the difficulties which we have to face.

The solution proposed by Lord John Russell is much more practicable; and although it is far from being satisfactory, yet we are unwilling to reject it peremptorily. His object was to get the opinion of a respectable minority represented. If the working classes are to be admitted to the exercise of the franchise, it is clear that they will outnumber the other electors, who will practically have no voice in the choice of a representative, and might as well not vote at all. In order to meet this disadvantage, Lord John Russell proposed to diminish the number of votes at the disposal of each elector. In a town represented by three members, each elector would have, under the existing arrangement, a vote for each member, and the dominant class in the township might elect all three. It was therefore proposed to give to each elector a vote for only two of the representatives, so that other electors, who held opinions different from those of the majority, might, if they were influential and strong enough, unite to secure the election of the third member. The merit of this proposal is, that it does to a certain extent what it professes to do. It would no doubt secure, in a good number of cases, the election of a member acceptable to an influential section of the constituency, who, under a system where mere numbers prevail, would otherwise have no voice in the selection of a candidate. Its demerit is that it is not enoughthat it would be a very partial remedy for the evils introduced into our constitution by handing over the election of our representatives to the

mob. The mob would, by the help of a little organisation, learn to manage the third representative as well as the other two. Still, the measure is something, if it is not everything; and it is especially valuable as the recognition by Lord John Russell of a principle, a principle which we cannot think that Mr Disraeli disposed of when he stated, in disparagement of Lord John's plan, that there is no method of giving a voice to the minority known to the constitution except that of making the minority a majority. When we are revolutionising the constitution by force of numbers, a statesman may be pardoned for devising a new method of voting, which may counteract the effects of our hazardous_reforms. But in point of fact Mr Disraeli's objection, in so far as we have been able to apprehend it, is a phrase rather than an argument. The 500 electors of some small nomination borough are called a majority, and are therefore entitled to a member; the 5000 Conservative electors, in some more populous constituency in which they are swamped by numbers, are a minority, and are entitled to nothing. It is surely hard to say that these 5000 are entitled to nothing until they can outnumber the mob, and turn their minority into a majority. If Lord John Russell's scheme does not fully meet the necessities of the case, it at all events shows a consideration of it, for which we are anxious to give him all the credit which is consistent with the fact of his having quietly dropped all reference to it in the Reform Bill of the present session.

Lastly, we come to the suggestion of Mr John Stuart Mill, a man who cannot be accused of deficient sympathy with the lower classes. Mr John Mill is the ablest and most philosophical of the Radical politicians, but he stands aghast at the idea of handing over the government of the country to a Parliament elected by universal suffrage. When universal suffrage comes, depend upon it we shall not be able to devise any checks against it; and whatever checks we can impose upon it must be established now, in anticipation, or never. We have admitted so

much, that Mr Mill, as a logician, sees the propriety of giving to every householder, and indeed to every man, the suffrage. We have gone so far that he sees no possibility of our stopping short of this. And, watching the course of political agitation, he anticipates the triumph, sooner or later, of the mob, who will give to every man his vote. But he says that the cure lies in our own hands. We can give every man his logical demand, provided we give no more than logic requires. Let every man have his vote. There is no reason why we should withhold from any man the right of voting. But, on the other hand, there is no reason why every man should have an equal vote. Every man can claim to have a share, but he cannot claim to have an equal share, in the government of the country. We are not surprised that Jones the bricklayer, who pays taxes as we do, wishes to have the privilege of voting for a parliamentary representative; but we are very much astonished if we discover that he regards the votes of thirty bricklayers to be of equal importance with the votes of thirty men who have passed through the university, and who pay, it may be, fifty times the amount of taxes to the State for which our friends the bricklayers are responsible. If it be a principle of our constitution, says Mr Mill, that taxation should go with representation, carry out that principle to its logical conclusion. There is a logic in this principle which ought to sweeten the logic of that other principle so much dreaded. Let us not be logical in one direction only; let us be wholly logical. If the logical consequence of our constitutional theory be, that every man should have a vote, it is also the logical consequence of that theory that his vote should have some adequate relation to the taxes which he pays. Nor is this a mere theory; it is the practice of our constitution to some extent. The rate-payers elect the board of guardians for the poor. In some parts of the country, the rate-payers have votes in proportion to the amounts which they pay in rates, one rate-payer having but one vote, another two, this one three,

that four, or five, or six. And Mr Mill urges, why not apply the same rule to the election of our parliamentary representatives? Even Mr Bright admits that members should represent not mere numbers, but property also; for in mapping out his electoral districts, and allotting delegates to various boroughs, he goes upon a double calculation of wealth and of population. But if the principle be worth anything, it is worthy of being carried out to its legitimate results. If Manchester deserves so many members more than another city because of its extraordinary wealth, then those householders of Manchester who have extraordinary wealth deserve a greater number of votes than those who can only boast of extraordinary poverty. There is very little gained by talking of abstract rights, and pushing partial theories to their extreme limit; but if people will talk of reforming the constitution on the principle of abstract right, then let us carry out that principle fairly, and let us avoid, above all things, a onesided view of the theory. It is not we who demand universal suffrage as a concession to abstract right. We are quite content with the practical liberty which we enjoy, with all its anomalies and all its compromises. But if we are to have universal suffrage because of abstract right, then let us also, by the same law and for the same reason, have proportionate suffrage. The bricklayer says that he ought to have a voice in the election of the House of Commons, because he pays taxes, and contributes to the expenses of the country. Very good; but let the master - builder, who pays fifty or a hundred times the amount of taxes for which the bricklayer is liable, have, we do not say fifty or a hundred times as many votes, but four or five times as many. It is neither fair, nor is it the custom of the constitution, that numbers, irrespective of property, should impose the taxes, and regulate the expenses of the country. The hackneyed answers of Mr Bright and his party to such a conclusion are, that the man of property, paying fifty or a hundred times as much as the poor man, has fifty or

a hundred times as much security for his possessions; and that over and above his individual vote he has an influence on those around him which is equivalent to the enjoyment of several votes. These are transparent fallacies, or rather they are arguments which cut two ways. They are arguments that tell as much against the poor man's claim to the suffrage, as against the rich man's claim to proportionate suffrage. In point of fact, the poor man is denied the franchise on these two amongst other grounds, that he is already virtually represented through the influence which he and his numerous comrades exert upon the society around them; and that, in return for his taxes, he has the benefit of security and law. If the working classes are not content with individual security and virtual representation, why should the wealthier classes be expected to rest satisfied with their social influence and their sense of safety? No, says Mr Mill; turn the question which way we will, we still arrive at the same result. If there is logic in Universal, there is logic also in Proportionate Suffrage; and the one is absolutely required to redress the flagrant injustice of the other. Separate they are wrong; together they are right.

Now, with regard to this view, which has been maintained not only by Mr Mill, but also by the Economist newspaper with great ability, we have no hesitation in saying that logically it is irrefragable, and that practically it would preserve the balance of classes in the poll-books. If we are asked, however, whether we are willing to adopt and advocate the scheme, this is a very different question. To the opinion of no man on any question of politics can we pay more deference than to Sir E. B. Lytton's; but we find that in his great speech on reform he brushed Mr Mill's scheme aside, without even paying it the compliment of stating his objections. Not only so, but hitherto the scheme has been treated very much as Sir E. B. Lytton has treated it-it has not even been discussed. Be its merits or demerits what they may, we are pretty certain that they do not

VOL. LXXXVIII.-NO. DXXXVII.

deserve such indifference. If the scheme is not satisfactory, it is at all events the best that has yet been propounded as a remedy for the evils with which we are threatened, and it deserves consideration. Why has it not received that consideration? Partly, we believe, because a great many people in this country are fatalists on the subject of democracy, and imagine that it is as impossible to resist its encroachments as to stop the waves on the shore. It is supposed that there is no use in these expedients for regulating the influence of mobs. Mob-rule is coming certain as the grave, and there is nothing for it but to put off the evil day as long as possible. Let us shut our eyes, and, seeing that we must die, let us die by inches. A more reasonable objection to the scheme of Mr Mill is a sentimental dislike on the part of English gentlemen to raise the question of equality between man and man. It is forgotten, however, that it is not the gentlemen of England who raise the question. We are unequal by nature, and our inequalities are recognised in the constitution as it stands at present. Mr Bright desires not only to do away with these inequalities, but to reverse them; and so far from attempting to create inequalities which do not at present exist, Mr Mill proposes merely to recognise the actual state of things in a new formula. It is to be remembered that here we have but a choice of evils. If proportionate suffrage be an evil, it is simply proposed as an antidote to the still greater evil of universal suffrage. We do not advocate Mr Mill's scheme; we demand for it a fair hearing, because it is the only thoroughgoing attempt that we have seen to grapple with the dangers that beset the constitution of the country. We resist a £6 franchise, but we resist with a sort of despondency, knowing that we are drifting surely, though slowly, to the surrender of the government to the force of numbers. It strikes us as possible that if the principle of proportionate suffrage were once recognised, there would be no occasion to enforce it; that our demagogues would see in the light of it the hopelessness of insist

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