Right of public officers or employees to patent. Acts of Government employee held, independently of this section an abandonment of his rights to the public. Selden Co. v. National Aniline & Chemical Co. (D.C. 1930) 48 F. (2d) 270.

United States held not entitled to patents on inventions conceived by employees in Radio Section of Bureau of Standards. U.S. 2. Dubilier Condenser Corporation (D.C. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 306.

Where Government employee's invention is made at Government expense, his personal interest in invention belongs to Government. Selden Co. v. National Aniline & Chemical Co., Inc. (D.C. 1930) 48 F. (2d) 270.

Government, as employer, has no greater right to inventions made by its employees than other employers. U.S. v. Dubilier Condenser Corporation (D.C. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 306.

381, affirming (D.C. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 306, and affirmed, Supreme Court of U.S., April 10, 1933.

Assignment.-Where Government chemists under statute were granted patents without paying fees, no assignable interests were retained, except rights to foreign patents, and rights of Government and public became vested on ruling of applications. Selden Co. v. National Aniline & Chemical Co., Inc. (D.C. 1930) 48 F. (2d) 270.

Where an invention by an employee of the United States, patented under the first paragraph of the original text of this section, has been assigned to the Secretary of the Interior as trustee for the use and benefit of the people of the United States, the Secretary of the Interior as trustee holds the entire right, title, and interest in such patent and has power to grant licenses to commercial interests to use the patented invention. MSS. Op. Atty. Gen. July 11,

1933.

Construction and effect of statute in general. This section does not apply unless Rodman Chema patent has been issued. ical Co. v. U.S. (1928) 65 Ct. Cl. 39, certiorari denied (1927) 277 U.S. 592.

Assignment of claims.-Under this section, prior to the amendment of 1918, where a patented article was made for the United States by a contractor, unauthorized by the patent owner, and used by the United States, the patent owner had an assignable right of action for infringement against the contractor; and a claim against the United States for reasonable compensation for the use, assertable in the Court of Claims, but subject to the provisions of 701, ante, forbidding assignments. But under the amendment of 1918, which did away with the remedy against the contractor in such cases, and confined the patent owner to a suit against the United 66 recovStates in the Court of Claims for ery of his reasonable and entire compensa

Under special act permitting employee to recover from United States for patent infringement, manufacturer's profits, not reasonable royalty, were revocable. Van Meter v. U.S. (C.C.A. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 192, modifying (D.C. 1930) 37 F. (2d) 111.

This section depriving patent owner of remedy against infringing Government contractor secured to owner exact equivalent of what it took away. Van Meter v. U.S. (C.C.A. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 192, modifying

(D.C. 1930) 37 F. (2d) 111.

Review.-District Court judgment adjudicating employee's claim for infringement of patent against United States under special act held reviewable by appellate court. Van Meter v. U.S. (C.C.A. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 192, modifying (D.C. 1930) 37 F. (2d) 111.

Rights of Government.-Government held entitled to irrevocable license to use naval officer's patented method and apparatus for delivering submarine torpedoes from airships. Moffett v. Fiske (1931) 51 F. (2d) 868, 60 App. D.C. 281, certiorari denied (1931) 284 U.S. 662.

In general.-Where statute fixes Army officer's pay, compensation rests on statute and not on contract. Emmons v. U.S. (1927) 63 Ct. Cl. 121.

Army officer's acceptance of less than statutory compensation does not estop him from claiming full amount. Id.

Grade of first appointment.-A captain of the Army who on November 10, 1917, had been appointed a second lieutenant of Infantry in the Regular Army was thereby given an appointment in the "permanent " service, notwithstanding under the terms of the act such appointment was "provisional" only, and where this was accordingly his first appointment in the permanent service and he had neither on July 1, 1922, completed seven years' service nor been promoted to the rank of captain on or before July 1, 1920, he was under the joint service pay act of June 10, 1922, entitled to pay of the second period only. His voluntary resignation from the permanent service September 23, 1919, while still holding a provisional appointment, did not serve to make his subsequent appointment as a first lieutenant November 25, 1920, a "First appointment in the permanent service."

Webb v. U.S. (1930) 69 Ct. Cl. 46. The provision in the joint service pay act of June 10, 1922, with reference to the "first appointment in the permanent service" intended that a temporary appointment to the "temporary increased strength of the Marine Corps, under the act of May 22, 1917, should not be treated as a "first appointment in the permanent service." Furey v. U.S., 70 Ct. Cls. 299; Armstead v. U.S. (1931) 74 Ct. Cls. 591.

Pay periods.-Lieutenant of Navy Staff Corps, whose commissioned service did not equal that of lieutenant commander, held not entitled to fourth period pay. U.S. v. Lenson (1928) 279 U.S. 60.

A chief machinist of the Navy, so commissioned February 5, 1923, under the act of March 3, 1909, having been warranted a machinist six years prior thereto, who had commissioned service during a part only of 1375. Same; service counted.

said six years, was not entitled on date of his commission as chief machinist to pay of the second period. Chinnis v. U.S. (1929) 67 Ct. Cl. 262, certiorari denied (1929) 280 U.S. 593

A lieutenant of the Staff Corps of the Navy, who has served for fifteen years as enlisted man, warrant officer and commissioned officer, and whose first appointment to the permanent service was as a lieutenant, junior grade, of the Staff Corps, corresponding to a first lieutenant in the Army, is not entitled to pay of the fourth period if his total commissioned service does not equal that of a lieutenant commander of the line of the Navy drawing the pay of that period. U.S. v. Lenson (1928) 278 U.S. 60, reversing (1927) 63 Ct. Cl. 420.

Marine Corps major retired September 30, 1911, and thereafter rendering service, making total active service 17 years, 11 months, 25 days, held entitled to base pay of fourth period only. Leonard v. U.S. (1929) 279 U.S. 40, affirming (1928) 64 Ct. Cl. 384.

Where a lieutenant of the Staff Corps of the Navy, commissioned with that rank before July 1, 1922, held a commission in the Organized Militia between January 21, 1903, and July 1, 1916 (Sec. 1, par. 11, act of June 10, 1922), he was entitled to have included 75 percent of the period during which he held his commission in the militia, for the purpose of making his total commissioned service equal that of a lieutenant commander of the line drawing pay of the fourth period. Gibbs v. U.S. (1931) 72 Ct. Cl. 301.

Recovery for overpayment.-United States by long-continued overpayment does not estop itself to recover same from officer. Heidt v. U.S. (C.C.A. 1932) 56 F. (2d) 559.

Officers discharged and recommissioned.Provision that discharge and recommission of officers in next lower grade should not reduce pay or allowances does not give increased pay for future services. Eagle v. U.S. (1927) 63 Ct. Cl. 157.