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a great variation in both the crop adaptability and the crop productivity of the various soils in the Helmand Valley the farm unit sizes should be based upon the soil classifications. The crop adaptability and crop production work done by Mr. F. O. Youngs could be used as a guide for determining the farm unit sizes on lands now being developed under the Boghra Canal system. Agricultural investigational work such as was carried out by Mr. Youngs in the Boghra area should be extended to other potentially irrigable areas as soon as possible so that a similar basis for farm unit size determination can be used when these lands are ready for settlement.

The Government has initiated a village-construction plan in the Boghra area, and I presume it may consider a similar plan in some of the other areas that are to be irrigated for the first time by water from the Arghandab and Kajakai Reservoirs. Here again consideration should be given to the soils in the vicinity of the proposed townsites and also to the natural ground-drainage conditions. The boundaries between the several soils on the Boghra project are very irregular, and the acreage of the class I soil is relatively small. Every effort should be made to locate the villages on the poorer soils so as to keep a maximum of the class I soils free for agricultural use, even though it might require village gardens to be near rather than in the villages. Since the Government has complete control of the planning and establishment of the farm villages, they will have the opportunity to install simple domestic water and sanitation facilities which can be used as models for other villages in Afghanistan.

LAND-USE PROGRAM

Because of a wide variation in the physical characteristics and in the productivity of the soils under the Boghra Canal, it appears that it will be advisable to establish a controlled land-use program in this area. The shallow Boghra clay loam soils seem to have a low productivity and the experimental work done on these soils indicates they will have a limited crop use. If the farmers raise adapted crops such as shallow-rooted hay, grain, and irrigated pasture, they should, with a sufficient number of jiribes, be able to farm the land successfully. If they try to raise many of the other crops it appears the yields would be too low for satisfactory cropping in comparison to the returns that could be obtained from better adapted crops.

On any other soils with a limited crop use such as is mentioned above, the Government should have some control over the land use. This will result in a direct benefit to both the farmers and the Government. Without such a program, the lands would not be producing to their maximum potentialities and the returns per acre could be reduced seriously from what they should be capable of doing. With the introduction of industrialization in the Helmand Valley in the form of textile plants, sugar refineries, evaporated-milk plants, etc., utilization of the various soils for the group of crops they are best adapted will establish and maintain the best returns for both the farmer and the industrialist.

WATER STORAGE IN KAJAKAI RESERVOIR

Water storage will be started behind Kajakai Dam about March 1953 and during the storage period, Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan, Inc., representatives will have control of the river flow below the dam. It will be necessary for your Government to instruct Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan, Inc., about the amount of water they should allow to pass down the river for use in Iran. Similarly, after their technicians have completed the soils surveys in the Helmand Valley, they will need to know, how much of the Kajakai storage water should be considered available for use on the lands in the Helmand Valley. This is necessary because they must relate the water supply to the available irrigable soils so they can determine the various potential acreages that could be brought into irrigation.

Serious consideration should be given to the initiation of snow surveys in the Helmand River watershed. It requires a number of years of correlation of the snow-pack measurements in the watershed to the river-yield records before annual predictions can be made about the amount of irrigation water that will be available for use during a season. When Kajakai waters are being utilized completely, the runoff predictions will be invaluable for crop and power planning.

SUBSURFACE DRAINAGE

When I visited Nad-I-Ali last spring the watertable in the local well had risen 2 meters and was within 3 meters of the ground surface. This year the

watertable was less than a meter from the ground surface. In a benchland area such as the Bohgra, the accumulation of ground water on the benchlands can also have a detrimental effect on the lower lying river bottom soils.

Drainage problems can be anticipated on both the newly irrigated soils and the lands that have been under irrigation for many years but which will now receive additional water. Subsurface drains will be necessary to hold the watertable down and to prevent the accumulation of damaging saline and alkaline salts.

FUEL

There is a fuel problem now in the Boghra area and it will become more critical as the population increases with the land development. Consideration should be given to the introduction of quick-growing varieties of fuel trees that can be irrigated on the poorer soils where it is possible for them to root and in places where waste water can be utilized. The development of an economic fuel growing program in the Boghra area might result in the spread of this practice to many other parts of Afghanistan.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO AGRICULTURISTS

Many agricultural problems will arise with the settlement of people on soils and under-cropping conditions strange to their experience. Similar problems will be present in the older agricultural areas when new crops or new varieties are introduced. These problems can be met most advantageously through assistance given the farmers by technically trained men who will actually work with the farmers on their fields.

From the cropping standpoint the assistance should be started by basing land use on soil capability. Then, through the use of crop rotations, fertilizers, proper varieties, proper cultural methods and similar practices, the farmers could be helped to bring their yields up toward the optimum.

Irrigation water application assistance should be given farmers who have not had irrigation experience and also to experienced irrigationists who are irrigating new crops or soils strange to their previous farming experience. It has been found in the United States that even farmers who have had years of irrigation experience can improve the efficiency of the irrigation through guidance from technicians who have a thorough understanding of soil and plant reactions to irrigation.

Present farm implements and tools should be studied in view of making adaptations or modifications along with the possibility of the introduction of new types that would improve the farmers' cultural operations. Consideration should also be given to the introduction of additional types of animal-drawn equipment and the possibility of a place for the feasible use of the simpler kinds of mechanized farming methods.

Irrigated pastures can have a big place in the cropping program on the shallow Boghra soils. Careful control of the pasture establishment and management is necessary if the practice is to be initiated successfully in competition with other crops, so close technical supervision will be required during the initiation of the irrigated pasture program. If the pasture utilization could be related to the range grazing program it could result in a definite improvement in the range cover conditions.

Technical guidance in the agricultural field is a never-ending work. It should be tied directly to a strong agriculture experiment station program so the resulting experimental work will be applied directly on the farm. The experimental farms have a big responsibility in determining crop adaptations, variety selection, cultural practices, livestock trials and many other studies and problem applications that can be applied to the farmers' efforts.

Your Government is planning to obtain foreign experts to help with the technical assistance program in the Helmand Valley. Here again there is the critical need for a strong training program with young Afghans who will ultimately fill these needs in the valley.

TENTATIVE CONSTRUCTION AND PLANNING PROJECTS IN THE HELMAND VALLEY

With the completion of the Kajakai and Arghandab Dams, storage water will be made available for many jiribes of new agricultural land in both the Arghandab and main Helmand River Valleys. It will also assure a satisfactory water supply to thousands of jiribes that have had insufficient irrigation water for many years. The repayment of your country's investment in the stored waters must come

Old irrigation systems

through the use of these waters for irrigation and power. should be rehabilitated and extended as needed and new lands should be brought under development as rapidly as is feasible.

In considering a plan for the full utilization of the water storage at Kajakai and Arghandab the following construction and planning operations appear to fit into a complete development program.

1. The completion of the Kajakai and Arghandab Dams and the Boghra Canal system. This construction should be practically completed by the end of 1952. 2. The irrigable area under the Boghra Canal system.-This development is under way and could continue to completion in a continuous operation program. It will include:

(a) The construction of laterals, farm ditches, on project roads, surface drains, and necessary structures.

(b) Subsurface drains.

(c) Village construction, including necessary domestic and sanitation installations.

3. The irrigable area under the Arghandab Reservoir.-Approximately 170,000 jiribes are now irrigated in the Arghandab Valley. Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan, Inc., has recently made a new water use analysis for this valley, including the water required for the Arghandab powerplant and the analysis indicated that there would be water available in the Arghandab Reservoir for approximately 130,000 jiribes of additional land. Possible irrigated lands in the Arghandab and Tarnak Valleys are now being investigated by Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan, Inc., technicians to determine which lands will be best suited for the use of this water. Proposed construction here is:

(a) Diversions and possible additions to the present canal systems;

(b) Canal and main lateral systems on the new lands;

(c) Laterals, farm ditches on project roads, surface drains and necessary structures on the new lands;

(d) Subsurface drains;

(e) On project roads on lands now irrigated.

4. Seraj, Garnsel, and Chakhansur areas.-Surveys have not been made in these areas but preliminary investigations are underway. Possible work here would include:

(a) Rehabilitation and extension of present irrigation systems;

(b) Canal construction on new lands;

(c) Laterals, farm ditches on project roads, surface drains and necessary structures on new lands;

(d) Subsurface drains;

(e) Possible village construction.

5. Interproject roads. As the agricultural areas are developed, interproject roads will probably have to be improved to allow all season travel and easy access to Kandahar.

6. Kandahar-Kabul Road. This road will ultimately have to become an allseason road to keep pace with the developments in the Holmand Valley.

7. Arghandab power development.-Plans are now underway for the design and construction of this project.

8. Girishk power development. The foundation for this plant is installed and the project can be developed as soon as the power need is justified.

9. Development survey of the Holmand Valley.-Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan, Inc., has this survey underway and when it is completed it will include a plan for the full utilization of the soil and water resources in the Holmand Valley.

10. Completion of Kajakai Dam for power development and installation of the Kajakai powerplant and transmission lines.-This development will come when it is justified by the power demand.

It should be understood that surveys have not been completed for much of the proposed work and any cost estimates made at this time would have to be of a very general nature. However, to help develop an appreciation of the approximate annual costs for such a program over a period of years, the Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan, Inc., engineering staff has made up tentative construction estimates. Mr. T. Y. Johnston and Mr. W. A. Hohlweg will have these estimates in Kabul on May 24.

I would appreciate the opportunity of having representatives of your Government meet with Mr. Sidney Sherwood, Mr. William Gates, and myself on May 25 or May 26 to discuss Afghanistan plans for the cevelopment of the Helmand Valley. Following this meeting, it would appear advisable for both groups of representatives to meet with Mr. Johnston and Mr. Hohlweg to discuss the cost

estimates for the development operations your Government will plan on carrying

out.

Mr. Sherwood, Mr. Gates, and I plan on leaving Kabul on May 28, but we will be free at any time during our stay in Kabul for consultations on Helmand Valley matters. If satisfactory, appointments can be arranged for meetings with the Government representatives. I would appreciate having Mr. Sherwood notified of the plans.

Five copies of this letter are being enclosed with the original.

K. KOHLER, Jr., Engineer, Export-Import Bank.

[Restricted]

Mr. T. Y. JOHNSTON,

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF WASHINGTON,
Kandahar, Afghanistan, May 14, 1952.

Project Manager, Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan, Inc.,

Kandahar, Afghanistan.

DEAR MR. JOHNSTON: You have requested a clarification of Mr. H. E. Gaston's letter of June 28, 1951, to Mr. H. W. Morrison regarding the use of Export-Import Bank funds for the extension of wasteways. You also asked about the use of Export-Import Bank funds for structural work on the Boghra Canal outside of schedules IV, V, VI, and VII.

Mr. Gaston's letter states, "under and over pass wasteways were necessary integral parts of the canal system and therefore included in the approved project for financing under the credit." Therefore, Export-Import Bank funds can be used for their installation, including the construction of necessary ditches and structures for the distances from the canal necessary to make them function. However, as is pointed out in Mr. Gaston's letter, the extension of these ditches beyond that point, for the prevention of damage to lower lying lands, is not necessary for protection to the main canal and such construction would be "incident to the lateral and wasteway system required for land development." The term "over and under pass wasteways" is considered to be the protective installations for the prevention of runoff damage to the canal. This interpretation would also apply to canal wasteways necessary for the protective control of water in the main canal.

The agreement between the Royal Government of Afghanistan and the ExportImport Bank, dated April 21, 1950, states that funds would be advanced from time to time for the completion of the Boghra Canal system. You have explained that it will be necessary to install more canal drops and turnouts than had been anticipated at the time the target estimate was made and you wish to know whether these structures can be included under bank credit. Since Export-Import Bank funds are being advanced for the completion of the Boghra Canal system, my interpretation of the answer to this question would be that whatever structures are necessary to make the canal function properly can be included under the bank credit even though the number of structures was not the same as those shown in the target estimate. I understand that these structures are of a type that was approved in the original project.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Export-Import Bank in Washington and if my interpretation of the use of Export-Import Bank funds for structural work on the Boghra Canal outside of schedules IV, V, VI, and VII is not consistent with the bank's thinking, you will be so notified.

Yours very truly,

KARL O. KOHLer, Jr.

COST-CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE (GENERAL PLAN PROPOSED BY MKA)

PROJECT AND PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTION DATES

1. Area under Boghra Canal system (July 1952-July 1954):

(a) Laterals, farm ditches, on-project roads, surface drains, and necessary structures.

(b) Subsurface drains.

(c) Village construction, including necessary water developments, electricity, and sanitation.

2. Area under Arghandab Canal system (July 1952-July 1955):
(a) Diversions and possible additions to present canal system.
(b) Canal system for new lands.

(c) Laterals, farm ditches, on-project roads, surface drains, and necessary structures on new lands.

(d) Subsurface drainage.

(e) On-project roads on lands now irrigated.

3. Saraj, Garmsel, and Chakansur areas (January 1955-

-):

(a) Possible additions and controls on present irrigation system.

(b) Possible canal construction on additional lands.

(c) Laterals, farm ditches, on-project roads, surface drains, and necessary structures if additional lands put under cultivation.

(d) Subsurface drainage.

(e) Diversions and canal system.

(f) Village construction, including necessary water developments, electricity, and sanitation.

4. Inter-project roads (July 1952

5. Kandahar-Kabul road (January 1953

-).

6. Arghandab power development (July 1952

7. Girishk power development (indefinite).

8. Development survey of Helmand watershed (March 1952-January 1955).

9. Completion Kajakai Dam for power development (indefinite).

10. Kajakai power development (indefinite).

11. Completion Kajakai and Arghandab Dam, Boghra Canal (

to December

1953). Total cost approximately $60 million. United States dollar cost approximately $50 million. (Includes approximately $7 million Export-Import Bank funds.) If this work would all be completed by 1960, with the exception of the Kajakai power development, it would cost an average of about US$5 million a year, ranging from a maximum of $9 million in 1953 to $1,150,000 in 1959. This is proposed purely for general guidance; it is not based on detailed surveys or studies, or concurred in by the Afghan Government.

APPENDIX E

JUNE 26, 1953.

MEMORANDUM TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RE CREDIT No. 470, AFGHANISTAN. REQUEST FOR USE OF $726,757 OF AFGHANISTAN LOAN FOR PROJECTS IN HELMAND VALLEY

The agreement for the loan of $21 million to Afghanistan, executed on April 21, 1950, was made for "financing the United States dollar costs of equipment, materials and services required in connection with the construction of the Kajakai Dam and the completion of the Boghra Canal system in the Helmand River Valley, the construction of the Arghandab Dam in the Arghandab Valley, and, to the extent that any balance of the credit is not required for the completion of the aforesaid project, to finance the United States dollar costs of equipment, materials and services required in connection with such supplemental and additional river developments and irrigation projects in the Helmand River Valley and in the Arghandab Valley as may be approved by Export-Import Bank.

STATUS OF THE PRIME CONTRACT WORK AND SURPLUS FUNDS

The Arghandab Dam was completed in May 1953. Kajakai Dam is complete with the exception of the installation of the valves in the irrigation outlets and some small clean-up jobs. The Boghra Canal system will require installation of 16 checks in the Shamalan Canal and some riprap before it is completed. The valves at Kajakai will not be available for installation until October, and the work should be completed in December. The checks in the Shamalan Canal will be put in during the summer and fall irrigation season, and this work should also be completed in December.

The San Francisco office of Morrison-Knudsen Co. of Afghanistan, the contractor under the prime contract, has been furnishing Export-Import Bank with a monthly budgetary control of Export-Import Bank funds since December 1952. These monthly reports have been showing a surplus of funds above the needs of the three prime contract jobs at about $1,500,000. The bank must necessarily rely on MKA's estimates; however, they appear to be reasonably accurate.

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