a contract. You will see two remarkable instances of this in the late cases of Bainbridge v. Firmston (a), 1 Perr. & Dav. 2., and Wilkinson v. Olivièra, 1 Bing. N. C. 490., in which the defendant promised to give the plaintiff 1000l. for the use of a letter which contained matters explanatory of a controversy in which he was engaged, and the consideration was held not to be inadequate to support the promise. (b) Foolish bets may be good contracts. There is an old case upon this subject involving so singular a state of facts that I cannot forbear mentioning it. It is called Thornborow Thornborow v. Whiteacre, and is reported 2 Ld. Raym. 1164. It was an action in which the plaintiff declared that the defendant, in consideration of 2s. 6d. paid down, and 4l. 17s. 6d. to be paid on the performance of the agreement, promised (a) 10 Ad. & Ell. 309. (b) The consideration must nevertheless be of some value in contemplation of the law; for instance, if a man make an estate at will in favour of another, this is an insufficient consideration, for he may immediately determine his will, (1 Roll. Abr. 23. pl. 29.); neither is the termination of disputes about debts an adequate consideration, for there may be no debt actually due. (Edwards v. Baugh, 11 M. & W. 641.) Mere moral considerations, and cases such as Harris v. Watson, already H cited, (p. 86.) are also insuf- v. Whiteacre. to give the plaintiff two grains of rye corn on Monday the 29th of March, 4 on the next Monday, 8 on the next, 16 on the next, 32 on the next, 64 on the next, 128 on the next, and so on for a year, doubling, on every successive Monday, the quantity delivered on the last Monday. The defendant demurred to the declaration, and, upon calculation, it was found that, supposing the contract to have been performed, the whole quantity of rye to be delivered would be 524,288,000 quarters, so that, as Salkeld the reporter, who argued the demurrer, remarked, all the rye grown in the world would not come to so much. But the Court said, that though the contract was a foolish one, it would hold at law, and that the defendant ought to pay something for his folly. The case was ultimately compromised. I presume, however, that if, instead of demurring, the defendant had pleaded that he had been induced to enter into the contract by fraud, he would have been able to sustain his plea since it seems obvious, on the face of the thing, that the plaintiff was a good arithmetician, who, by a sort of catch, took in a man unable to reckon so well. Probably the plaintiff had taken his hint from the old story regarding the invention of the game of chess. But, by demurring, the defendant admitted that there was no fraud, and, consequently, the only question was on the validity of the contract in the absence of fraud, so that the case presents a strong example of This This rule illustrated by cases of partial trade. the reluctance of the Courts to enter into a question as to the adequacy of consideration. reluctance is also very strongly exemplified by some late cases turning on contracts in restraint restraint of of trade. By the law of England, a contract in general restraint of trade is void; but if in partial restraint of trade only, it may be supported, provided the restraint be reasonable, and the contract founded on a consideration. And it was once laid down that the consideration must be adequate, and that the Court would enter into the question of adequacy. However, they have lately decided that they will not do so. These cases are particularly strong, for they are cases in which, contrary to the general rule of law, a consideration is required, even though the contract be by deed. I shall have occasion to mention them again in a subsequent lecture. At present I will only say that the recent decisions to which I refer are, Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Ad. & Ell. 439. (a), Archer v. Marsh, 6 A. & E. 966., and Leighton v. Wales, 5 M. & W. 551. I think that I have now sufficiently explained what it is that the law recognises as a consideration sufficient to support a promise without deed. I must not, however, conclude without noticing one class of cases which form a species of exception to the rule that a simple contract requires a consideration to support it. I allude (a) Confirmed by Proctor v. Sargent, 2 M. & Gr. 20., and Green v. Price, 13 M. & Bills of exexceptions to change are the rule. to the case of a negotiable security, a bill of exchange, or promissory note. These, not being under seal, are simple contracts; but there is this marked distinction between the situation in which they and that in which any other simple contract stands, namely, that they are always presumed to have been given for a good and sufficient consideration, until the contrary is shown. And even if the contrary be shown, still, if the holder for the time being have given value for the instrument, his right to sue on it cannot be taken away by showing that the person to whom it was originally given could not have sued, unless, indeed, it be further shown that he had notice of the circumstances, or that he took the security when overdue, which is a sort of constructive notice, and places him in the same situation as the party from whom he took it. But so long as nothing of that sort appears, every note and acceptance is primâ facie taken to have been given for good consideration, and every indorsement to have been made on good consideration. See the cases collected (Byles on Bills, last ed. p. 72.). MEA 101 LECTURE V. CONSIDERATION OF SIMPLE CONTRACTS. EXECUTED CONSIDERATIONS. WHERE EXPRESS REQUESTS AND PROMISES ARE OF AVAIL. MORAL CONSIDERATIONS.-ILLEGAL CONTRACTS. - RESTRAINTS OF TRADE. The definition of a consider ation restated. I ENDEAVOURED to explain in the last lecture what it is that the law of England recognises as a consideration sufficient to support a promise without deed. I stated that any benefit to the person who makes the promise, or any loss, trouble, or disadvantage undergone by, or charge imposed upon the person to whom it is made, will satisfy the rule of law in this respect. In order to render this as clear as possible, I am about, before proceeding to the next branch of the subject, to illustrate it by mentioning one or two decided cases, in which certain consider- sideration. ations have been held sufficient to support the promises founded on them. Instances of sufficient con of suit. It has been frequently decided that, if one man Forbearance have a legal or an equitable right of suit against another, his forbearance to enforce that legal or equitable right of suit is a sufficient consideration for a promise either by the person liable to him, or any third person, either to satisfy the claim on which that right of suit is founded, or to do some other and collateral act. Thus, in the case of Morton v. Burn, 7 Ad. & Ell. 19., the Morton v. Burn. |