bring about a marriage. These are all void as against public policy, the law considering that unions so brought about are unlikely to be happy ones. This class of cases is founded upon Hall v. Potter, 3 Levinz. 411., in which Thomas Thinne gave an obligation of 1000l. to Mrs. Potter, conditioned to pay her 500l. within three months after he should be married to Lady Oyle, "a widow," the reporter says, "of great fortune "and honour, for she was the daughter and heir of "Jocelyn Percy, Earl of Northumberland." The Master of the Rolls decreed this bond to be void; the Lord Keeper reversed the decree; whereupon there was an appeal to the House of Peers, and, upon hearing the cause there, all the Lords but three or four were of opinion that all such contracts are of dangerous consequences, and ought not to be allowed; and they reversed the decree of dismissal made by the Lord Keeper, and decreed the obligation to be void.

Another, and an extensive class of cases is that in which the contract has a tendency to obstruct the course of public justice. The time, however, will not permit me to enter upon that this evening.

As a considerable time has intervened since the last lecture, and as it is quite necessary in order to the thorough understanding of a subject, particularly so complex a one as the present, to bear the arrangement of its parts clearly in mind, I shall commence this lecture by recapitulating the topics which I have already discussed, and pointing out how much of the subject remains to be considered.

of past

I stated in the first lecture the general divi- Recapitulation sion of Contracts into Contracts of Record by Lectures. specialty and Simple Contracts. I then enumerated the differences by which these classes of contract are distinguished from one another, and the peculiarities of each of them; I then touched on the practical distinction which exists between a simple contract by mere words and one reduced to writing, and the further distinction between those cases in which the adoption of a writing is optional, and those in which its adoption is rendered necessary by the provisions. of some Act of Parliament, and particularly of the statute of Frauds, in the cases to which it

applies. I then proceeded to explain the nature of the consideration which the law requires in order to support a simple contract, and to touch on the distinction which exists between executed and executory considerations. Then, leaving the separate consideration of simple contracts, and turning to those points which apply to all contracts whatever, I arrived, in the last lecture, at the effect of illegality upon the contract. I pointed out the principle upon which illegality tainting either the consideration or the promise is held to vitiate every description of contract, and I then stated to you the subdivision of illegal contracts into two classes; 1st, those which are so at common law; 2dly, those which are rendered so by the provisions of some statute. With regard to the former of these two classes, namely, contracts illegal at common law, I explained that a contract illegal at common law is so on one of three grounds; 1st, that it violates the rules of morality; 2dly, that it is opposed to public policy; or, 3dly, that it is tainted by fraud.

I exemplified the first of these three classes by the case of Fores v. Jones, 4 Esp., in which the print-seller was not permitted to recover on a contract for the sale of libellous publications; and I adduced several instances of the second class of contracts illegal at common law, those which are so because opposed to public policy, in cases, namely, where the contract is in general

illegal at com

mon law, as

obstructing

restraint of trade, or creates a restraint of trade which, though not general, is unreasonable in its extent, as being larger than the protection of the person who imposes it requires. Contracts in general restraint of marriage, contracts tending to facilitate the future separation of husband and wife, and contracts to bring about marriage for a reward, or as they are called, for Brocage of Marriage. There is another remarkable instance of contracts falling under this class, namely, of illegality created by the rules of common law, which it will be right to specify before proceeding to the next branch of the subject. It Contracts consists of contracts, void, because having a tendency to obstruct the administration of justice. Such was the very contract in Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wels. 341.; the case which first esta- Blantern. blished that the person who has executed a deed is not estopped from shewing, by way of defence, that it was so executed for an illegal consideration, although he would have been allowed to defend himself on the ground that there was no consideration for it at all. In that case, five persons were indicted for perjury, and it was agreed that Collins, who was their friend, should buy off the prosecutor's evidence by giving him a note for 350l., in consideration of which he undertook not to appear at the Assizes. And it was further agreed that, in order to indemnify Collins against the consequences of his being

the course

of justice.

Collins v.

Illegal indemnities and releases.

called upon to pay the note, Blantern should give Collins his bond conditioned for the payment of 350l., the same sum for which the note was made. In an action brought upon the bond the Court of Common Pleas held that it was void, and that a plea shewing the consideration in which it was given was a good answer to the action (a). There is a late case of Unwin v. Leader, 1 M. & Gr. 747., which involves the same principle. So does the case of Coppock v. Bower, 4 M. & W. 361., in which an agreement to withdraw an election petition in consideration of a sum of money was held void. So does Ark

(a) Agreements to indem- of compounding any criminify persons against the con- nal proceedings, are void; sequences of illegal acts fall but when they relate to of within this category. (Shackel fences which may be made v.Rosier, 2 Bing. N. C. 634.) the subject of an action as So also do all promises which well as an indictment, agreeare made to obtain relcase ments to pay the costs of the from duresse of person on action on its being stopped, illegal arrest, or under com- are valid; and also in cases pulsion of colourable legal of misdemeanours not of a process, whereby it is made public nature, such as asthe instrument of oppression saults, &c., a defendant is or extortion, but not where permitted "to speak with the the arrest was legal. (Smith prosecutor," i. e. compound v. Monteith, 13 M. & W. the offence, after conviction 427.; see also The Duke de and before judgment, with Cadaval v. Collins, 4 Ad. & the sanction of the Court. Ell. 858.; Gas Light Com- (See 1 Greaves, Russell on pany v. Turner, 5 Bing. Crimes, 132. ; see also Beeley N. C. 675.; and Skeate v. v. Wingfield, 11 East, 46.; Beale, 11 Ad. & Ell. 983.) and Baker v. Townshend, Agreements in consideration 7 Taunt. 422.)