Howe v. Stevens. It appeared that at the time of the committing of the acts complained of, the plaintiff owned one pew in said house in his own right, and one undivided fifth part of five other pews therein in the right of his wife, unless the facts hereinafter stated show that the plaintiff had a different interest in said pews. In 1824, George Howe, and other persons, formed and organized an association called the "Brick Meeting-House Society of Jericho," for the purpose of building a meeting-house, and supporting the Gospel, under the act for the support of the Gospel, passed October 26, 1798; and said society in the years of 1824 and 1825, built said house upon the land of said Howe, in Jericho. On the 3d of April, 1834, said Howe conveyed to Oliver Lowry, Luther Prouty, and William A. Prentiss, and to the survivor of them, their heirs and assigns, in joint tenancy, "about one acre of land now enclosed as a meeting-house green, on which the brick meeting-house, or church, now stands at Jericho Corners, so called, in Jericho ; meaning to include the whole of the ground now occupied by said brick meeting-house, or church, with the sheds attached, and also the whole of the ground enclosed for a common, or green." Habendum "to the use above named, and for the owners and proprietors of the said brick meeting-house, or church, upon the special trust and confidence, and for no other purpose whatever, that is to say, that the said Oliver Lowry, Luther Prouty, and William A. Prentiss, their heirs and assigns, and the survivor of them and his heirs and assigns, shall and will, from henceforth, permit the owners, proprietors, and their successors, of said brick meeting-house, or church, to occupy the said land herein before granted, for the purpose of continuing a brick meetinghouse thereon, and for a common, or green, subject to the following reservations and conditions, viz: that if the owners and proprietors of said brick meeting-house or church, shall neglect or omit to occupy the said land herein before granted, for the purpose aforesaid, and by continuing a meeting-house, or church, on said land, then said granted land shall revert to me and my heirs." Said house was occupied as a house of public worship, till 1865, when it became ruinous and in a dilapidated condition, and meetings ceased, and have not been held therein since that time; Howe v. Stevens. and it still remains unfit for a place of public worship. The said Howe died in 1857, and by his last will and testament, duly proved and established, devised all his property to his widow, Mary P. Howe, who survived him. It appeared that the said Mary conveyed said meeting-house, and the same property conveyed by her husband's deed aforesaid, to C. M. Spaulding, James Hutchinson, and Hiram Booth, by deed bearing date March 14th, 1868; that said Spaulding, Hutchinson, and Booth, conveyed eleven fourteenths of said house and property to L. B. Howe and ten other persons, by deed bearing date April 23d, 1868; that the grantors and grantees in the last-mentioned deed, conveyed said house, premises, and property, by deed bearing date March 5th, 1869, to school-district No. 3 in Jericho; that said Lowry and Prouty deceased before 1865, and that the said Prentiss conveyed said house and premises to said district, on the 4th of May, 1869. At the time said Spaulding, Hutchinson, and Booth took their deed from the said Mary, they supposed said house and premises had reverted to her, and that she was the owner thereof in fee. The grantors and grantees in said deed from Spaulding, Hutchinson, and Booth, held possession of said house, property, and premises, under their claim of title, and their respective deeds, in good faith; and said district took possession of said house, pews, and premises, at the time it purchased and took said deed of March 5th, 1869, and continued in possession of the same under its deeds and claim of title, and in good faith, claiming to own said house, pews, and premises, down to the present time. It appeared that said district purchased said house, pews, and premises, pursuant to a legal vote for that purpose; and that, after the district had obtained its deed of March 5th, 1869, the defendant and H. M. Field and J. H. Hutchinson, were, at a school meeting legally warned and held, duly appointed a building and repairing committee, and directed to remodel and repair said house for a district school-house; and that the defendant, as one of such committee, proceeded to remodel and repair said house, as directed by said vote, and in so doing did tear up, destroy, and remove said pews, which were the acts complained of. Howe y. Stevens. It was conceded for the purposes of trial, that five pews were owned by Truman Galusha, at his death; that said Galusha died intestate, previous to 1864, leaving T. C. Galusha, R. L. Galusha, R. M. Galusha, the wife of said L. B. Howe, and the wife of the plaintiff, his children, surviving him, but left no widow; that David Fish was duly appointed administrator of his estate, but that the administrator never had any license from the probate court to sell said pews, or any of the meeting-house property, and never did convey them to any one; that the said children and heirs of said Galusha, verbally agreed that the plaintiff might have their interest in said pews, house, and premises, for $30, and that the plaintiff should pay to the administrator of said estate that sum; that pursuant to that agreement the plaintiff accounted to said Galusha's estate for said $30, but that the children of Galusha never conveyed said pew property, nor their interest in said house and premises, to the plaintiff, or to his wife, by deed. The said L. B. Howe, T. C. Galusha, R. L. Galusha, and R. M. Galusha, conveyed their interest in said house, premises, and pews, by joining in said deed of March 5th, 1869, to said school district, but the district, at the time of the purchase and the taking of said deed, did not know that the plaintiff had verbally purchased or agreed to purchase, any interest in said house, pews, and premises, but the said district purchased the same in good faith. It appeared that at the time the defendant and the other two committee were doing the acts complained of, the plaintiff and W. H. H. Wood, and eight other persons, brought their bill in chancery against said district and the defendant and the other two committee, to enjoin said district, its officers and said committee, from proceeding further to repair and remodel said house. The answer to said bill was filed, and testimony taken, and the case finally heard in the supreme court, and reported in 43 Vt. 282; and that case was made a part of these exceptions. It was conceded for the purpose of this trial, that the plaintiff was a member of the said society. The defendant offered evidence tending to show, that said house, pews, property, and prem Howe r. Stevens. ises, had reverted to the said Mary P. Howe, and that the reversionary right was conveyed to said district by said deeds, in chain of title from her; but the court decided that said evidence was immaterial and not admissible, on the ground that the decision in said chancery suit on the question of the reversion of the property, was conclusive between the parties in this case; to which the defendant excepted. Upon the foregoing facts and concessions, the court decided that the plaintiff was entitled to recover nominal damages only, and directed a verdict accordingly; to which decision both parties excepted. R. H. Start, for the plaintiff. When the district took its deed from Prentiss, it became the assignee of the trust estate and legal title as trustees, for the use and benefit of the brick meeting-house society, of which the plaintiff was a member, just as said Prentiss held it. Howe et als. v. School District, 43 Vt. 282. When the district became such trustee, the wrongful possession taken under its deed of March 5th, 1869, became merged in the rightful and legal possession under the Prentiss deed, and the district must then be considered as holding, not adversely to said society and pew-owners, but for their use and benefit. It cannot hold one possession for and one against the society and pew-owners at the same time. After the district acquired and took the legal estate, it must be treated as holding as trustee under the said Howe deed, irrespective of its wrongful possession and acts under the deed of March 5th. The district, at the time of the committing of the alleged trespasses, being in possession of said land and church, and holding the legal title thereto in trust for the use and benefit of said society and pew-owners, and the plaintiff being the owner of said pews in his own right and individual capacity, and entitled to occupy them whenever said church should be used for public worship, he may sustain this action against the trustee or its servants, for the removal and destruction of said pews. Kellogg v. Dickinson, 18 Vt. 266; O'Hear v. De Goesbriand et al. 33 Vt. 593; Shaw v. Beverage, 3 Hill, 26. The court properly rejected the evidence offered by defendant Howe v. Stevens. tending to show a reversion of the land and buildings, as that question is settled by this court in Howe v. School District, supra. The plaintiff is entitled to full damages. L. F. Wilbur and Wales & Taft, for the defendant. The evidence offered by the defendant and rejected by the court, was admissible, to show the reversion of the house and premises to Mary P. Howe. It is insisted that the decision of the case of George P. Howe et als. v. The School District et als., is not conclusive on the question of reversion in this case. Viles et al. v. Moulton, 13 Vt. 516. The defendants pleaded that the property had reverted to Mary P. Howe, and the plaintiff, if he relied upon the decree as an estoppel, should have replied specially. Brinsmaid, admr. v. Mayo, 9 Vt. 31; Isaacs v. Clark, 12 Vt. 692. As tending to show that the plaintiff's interest in the pew property had ceased, for the reason that the house was not occupied, and had become ruinous and wholly unfit for the purpose for which it was built, and abandoned by the plaintiff, see Kellogg v. Dickinson, 18 Vt. 266; Perrin v. Granger, 33 Vt. 101, 105; Daniel v. Wood, 1 Pick. 104. It is well settled that a pew-owner has no property in the house itself, nor in the material of which the pew is composed. Kellogg v. Dickinson, supra; 1 Pick. 91. The house having ceased to be occupied as a place of worship, and become ruinous and unfit for that purpose, and the district being in possession of the property in good faith, under their claim of title, and the plaintiff not having any possession of his pew, the plaintiff has no interest left for which he can sustain his action. Ripley v. Yale, 16 Vt. 257; Kellogg v. Dickinson, supra. This would be so, even if the premises had not reverted by reason of the brick meeting-house society intending to build a new house on the same ground, or other use of the premises consistent with the deed of trust that would not render the old pews of value or serviceable for purposes consistent with the trust. The title to the property at the time of the committing of the acts complained of, was in Prentiss, the survivor of the trustees; and at the time of the commencement of the suit, and down to the |