explained by the fact that there was in this country the fear that the freedom of slaves in Cuba, following her independence from Spain, would set the South on fire;—which, indeed it would have done. To quote Berrien, of Georgia, in a debate in Congress at this time: "When we look to the situation of those islands, to the commanding position they occupy with reference to the commerce of the West Indies, we cannot be indifferent to a change in their condition. But when we reflect that they are in juxtaposition to a portion of the Union where slavery exists-that the principle of universal emancipation must march in the van of the invading force, and that all the horrors of a servile war will too surely follow in its train-these merely commercial considerations sink into insignificance. We cannot allow their (European) principle of universal emancipation to be called into activity in a situation where its contagion from our neighborhood would be dangerous to our quiet and safety." And Chadwick sums up the situation in these words: "American slavery was thus the bulwark of what remained of Spanish dominion in the Americas." Henry Cabot Lodge goes so far as to say that "the War of 1898 was the price the United States paid for having kept Cuba in bondage at the dictates of our own slave power."

8

Far be it from us to underestimate the high and noble purposes of the people of this country, and their sympathy for the suffering Cubans; yet, it is not altogether without justice that Europeans look upon this war as one of aggression on the part of the United States, with the ultimate end in view of annexing Cuba, or at least, of so controlling her government and destiny as to best secure the interests of the United States. We are not prepared to say nor do we believe, that the action of our government and people was due mainly to a motive of self-interest. But let us re

See Benton, Abridgement of Debates, VIII, 421 & ff. 7 Chadwick, p.

'Lodge, "War with Spain," p. 6.

count a bit of American history, with the opinions of some noted Americans on this subject, and let them speak for themselves. J. Q. Adams, than whose opinions on such subjects no American's are more important, once said: "There are laws of political as well as physical gravitation and if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cart her off from its bosom." The View of Jefferson in his time is very interesting: "Do we wish to acquire to our own confederacy any one or more of the Spanish provinces? I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of states yet, as I am sensible that this can never be obtained, but by war,... I have no hesitation in abandoning my first wish to future chances.'

...

9

Buchanan, Secretary of State, made this statement in 1848: "If Cuba were annexed to the United States, we should be relieved from the apprehensions which we can never cease to feel for our own safety and the security of our commerce. Human foresight cannot anticipate the beneficial consequences which would result to every portion of the Union.” 10 This was in the administration of Polk. "Successive later administrations pushed the project of purchase to the very eve of the Civil War." Buchanan was the chief advocate.11 In 1875 (President Grant) the situation was similar to that of 1898. Had Grant yielded to Congress, there would have been war 12 (due largely to Spanish outrages such as Virginius affair). And in 1876: "The President . . . desires

to express the desire of the United States to maintain a firm, solid and enduring peace with Spain and to remove 'Jefferson's writings, X, 315.

10 See Chadwick, p. 221.

11 Chadwick, p. 233.

12 See Chadwick, p. 80.

every disturbing question . . . desires to disabuse the mind of the Government and people of Spain of the existence of any desire on the part of the government of the United States for the acquisition of Cuba." 13

Several wrote that the United States "have constantly indulged in the belief that they might hope some day to acquire those Islands (Cuba and Porto Rico) by just and lawful means, with the consent of their sovereign." Thus we see that the annexation of Cuba to the United States has been looked upon as an ultimate probability by most prominent American statesmen; but they have been content to wait for its realization. Jefferson believed Cuba would finally "give herself to us." Popular disapproval of the "Ostend Manifesto," however, proved that Cuba was not to be taken by force of arms with the will and consent of the American people as a whole.14

The incapable administration of the government by the Spanish officials in Cuba was the cause of most of the friction between the United States and Spain with regard to Cuba. If Spain had granted Cuba a liberal government, all the moral support that the Cubans got from the United States would have been much more difficult, if not impossible to secure. The Spanish government, at home, however, came at least to see the futility of the officials' arbitrary means of punishment. But the officials in Cuba could never be brought to that realization. "It was their tenacious holding to this view of sudden and severe vengeance 15 which . . . more than all else—the effects of reconcentration excepted, finally brought on war in 1898.” 16 The Spanish govern

18 See Chadwick, p. 389.

"The United States government, in the course of the 19th century, repeatedly made it understood that this nation would intervene to prevent Spain transferring Cuba to any other European power. See Moores Digest of Int. Law, VI, p. 450. Also p. 464, on the American opinion on annexation of Cuba to U. S. and p. 83, Vol. VI, on unselfish motives of U. S.

15 An immediate cause.

10 Chadwick, p. 473.

ment could not control these officials. Conditions were in quite as deplorable a state at home as in Cuba. In the incompetence of Spain to deal with revolted Cuba and her own officials there undoubtedly was one of the causes of the war. The distracted and anarchical condition of Spain for sixty years made efficient government in Cuba impossible. The United States had been on the point of intervention in 1875, as we have seen. The Spanish character, however, had much to do with this. It is characteristic of the Spaniard to proceed to immediate and summary punishment without a resort to trial or jury.1

17

We all know the story of the blowing up of the Maine. It cannot be denied that this incident was one of the immediate causes of the war, and that the American people were inflamed against Spain as never before. But it cannot justly be claimed that the Spanish government was responsible for or connived at, this deed of horror. It is more likely that it was the work of irresponsible Spanish individuals incited perhaps, by Spanish officials in Cuba.18 The Spanish government expressed deep sympathy for this disaster, as also did the Spanish navy department. We have no valid reason to question the sincerity of this action.

There was unquestionably an uncontrollable desire for war in the United States. (But it was Congress which really forced the country into war.) 19 The Spanish government

"Admiral Chadwick takes the position that the suffering in Cuba (1896-8) was due as much to the insurgents themselves as to the Spaniards. He says that especially was unemployment due to the Cubans themselves; that the great error of the Spanish government in connection with the reconcentration was its "disregarding precautions which should have been taken to feed the people thus herded together," that it was this that caused the rapid growth in the United States of a hostile feeling to Spain. That, "there is no denying the force of the Spanish argument" (charging responsibility for the suffering mainly to the insurgents) -and adds, "nor could mere injury to commerce be made a just ground for intervention." Dr. Hershey, in his review of this book, takes exception to this statement, and says that there is no question but that the Spanish were far more to blame for these sufferings than were the insurgent forces of the island.

18 See Benton, Int. Law & Diplomacy. Spanish-American War, p. 76, and Chadwick's "Diplomacy" on this.

19

" Benton, pp. 92-3 for the stated causes for going to war.

was slowly but surely receding from her hostile position and war would have been averted but for the Maine disaster and the publication of the letter of the Spanish minister.

Woodford, the United States minister in Spain, was confident that we could have peace if the United States would wait a little, that all her and Cuba's demands would be granted. Every reason leads to the belief that all just claims could have been readily adjusted. . yet "this (blowing up of the Maine) was without doubt the very event which was regarded by the masses of the Americans as justifying a resort to war out of pure revenge.'

99 20

The United States' grounds for intervention were:

1. In the cause of humanity.

2. For the protection of the lives and property of American citizens in Cuba.

3. In defense of commercial and financial interests involved.

4. For self-preservation.

5. For the Maine disaster.

The movement of the American squadron gave the Spanish government much concern. "The display and concentration of naval forces near Havana in the waters of the Peninsula (Spain) and the persistency with which the Maine and the Montgomery remained in the Greater Antilles are causing increasing anxiety and might, through some mischance, bring about a conflict," are the words of Senor Gullon of the Spanish government, to Senor Duprey de Leme, Spanish Minister to the United States. (Feb. 8, 1898).21

The more distant and remote causes are summed up by Lebrand as follows:22

1.

Cuban's desire for freedom, autonomy, like the other Latin-American countries.

2. The desire of the United States to own or control Cuba a natural desire.

20 Benton, p. 106.

21 See Chadwick, p. 538.

22 Le Brand's "Spanish-American War and the Law of Nations," p. 19.