the origin of our Monroe Doctrine to satisfy himself as to this fact.

Despite the strength of the peoples' revolutions of 1830 and 1848, which came so near overthrowing once for all this medieval tyranny, enough of it remained on the continent of Europe to make possible the next great step in violation of the rights of man,-the crime of Bismarck and the Prussian war-lords in their wars for the union of the German peoples in a great empire. This story is too well known to warrant its repetition here. But what was the consequence of this type of unification? That is what is all-pertinent to our subject in hand. It was simply this: Bismarck's imperialistic and "blood and iron" policy soon arrayed a group of nations in bitter, distrustful and hostile feeling against himself, his sovereign and the new German Empire. To meet this menace to his dream of a "Deutschland über Alles" the greater part of the remaining years of his life were spent. The astute Imperial Chancellor sought constantly an alliance to meet this growing hostility with another threat, or application, of "blood and iron." He would sow discord (divide et impera),—as has frequently been practiced by Germany since, and bring in jealous rivalry, if possible, his threatening opponents, while he would seek an alliance with one or more of them. And this alliance would safeguard the interests of Germany in the future. Thus arose the Triple Alliance, Bismarck's famous "Dreibund" of Germany, Austria and Italy, in 1881. Italy, contrary to her natural interests and past experience, was induced to join in this "unholy" alliance with the Teutonic powers because of France's aggressive movements at this time in Algeria, northern Africa, which territory was coveted by Italy and was adjacent to Tunis, which had already been appropriated by France and which in turn adjoined Tripoli which the Italians in 1911 fought with Turkey for. The Italian people, however, soon became aware that their age-long enemies, Austria and Germany,

were more of a menace to them than was France. Hence, at an early date Italy showed that she could not be depended upon in an offensive war as a partner of the Teutonic countries, as many German writers pointed out years before the fateful outbreak of war in 1914.

And now, to go back for another thread of our narrative. After the humiliation of France in 1871 Bismarck had hoped that his neighbor to the west had been so completely crushed that she could never again be a real obstacle to the ambitions of Germany. He was therefore astonished, and not a little alarmed, to witness the rapid recovery of France from her losses in this war. By 1875 he was planning another war with France, one of the "sperlos versenkt" kind. But he had already sown the dragon's teeth. Great Britain and Russia both called a halt upon him. He was constrained to forego this war; but he must make up for this failure in some way. Then followed his constant effort until he secured the Triple Alliance referred to above.

But before the "Dreibund" was accomplished the warcloud had lowered over the Balkans, and in this both Germany and Austria were deeply interested. The Balkan provinces (as we bring out in Chapter VII of this work), stung to madness by the "Bulgarian Massacres" and other atrocities, led by Bulgaria, were planning a revolution and war to drive the abominable Turk out of Europe. And they looked to Russia for aid. The Czar was more than willing, since he had his heart set on Constantinople and the Mediterranean trade. Upon the pretext of interfering in behalf of persecuted Christians he joined the Balkans, marched upon the Turk, and soon won a complete victory over the Sultan. In this Russo-Turkish war of 1878 the Ottoman rule in Europe would have ended, but for the jealous intervention of the other great powers of Europe, led by Austria and Great Britain. This time they feared that Russia, rather than Germany (and Germany was with them, strongly seconding Austria) would break the "balance of

power" and threaten their expansion, if not their empires. Then, upon the close of this war, which only partly emancipated the Balkans from the Turk, came the famous Congress of Berlin. Bismarck was playing a grand rôle in securing this congress for Berlin, and he was the dominating figure in it. But the real significance of this Treaty of Berlin for our purposes is, that Russia considered Germany as one of the chief nations that had robbed her of her conquests of the war, and hence Russia was later willing to listen to the overtures of Germany's most watchful adversary, France.

After the movements described in the preceding paragraphs had culminated for Bismarck and Germany in the Triple Alliance of 1881, France was the first to sense the larger meaning of it all, and sought an alliance to counteract the "Dreibund." This led to the Dual Alliance between France and Russia; for Russia, as we have just seen, had had a forecast of Bismarckian diplomacy in the Congress of Berlin, and next to France, was most endangered by the new militant Germany.

Great Britain so far, had kept aloof from both alliances. Relying upon her great fleet and upon her isolation by water from the Continent, she, like the United States for a century, felt for a time that she could steer an independent course. Both nations have since been disillusioned. (This, by the way, is a strong argument in favor of some sort of a league of nations, to take the place for a time at least, if not to develop finally into a permanent one,—of the "Balance of Power," which will never remain "balanced"). It was the immense increase of standing armies on the Continent, as against Britain's "contemptible little army" of volunteers, and the German feverish rush to build a great navy, that opened the eyes of Englishmen and, coupled with the reapproachment efforts of King Edward VII, led Great Britain about 1905 into the "friendly understanding-Entente Cordiale-with France, and then with Russia. This

Triple Entente amounted to a three-fold alliance against the Triple Alliance of the Teutonic powers and Italy, with the distinct advantage that England was able secretly to cultivate a friendly feeling with Italy, for reasons that we have already stated.

It is significant that this Triple Entente was consummated in spite of the Fashoda incident of 1898, which had threatened war between England and France, and in spite of some conflicting interests of these two nations in the Near East. Moreover, this Entente was maintained throughout the next decade (1905-1915) despite the difficulties that Great Britain and Russia encountered over "spheres of influence" in Persia and boundaries in the Himalayas. These facts serve to show that Great Britain, France and Russia all distrusted the bold and unscrupulous policy of Germany, and would compromise their own differences in order to have each other's aid against this common danger, whenever the test should come. This explains the continuance of the Triple Entente to the very hour of war in 1914.

Meanwhile Germany and Austria-Hungary were showing unmistakable signs of a determination to control all central Europe and also the Gateways to the East, by their Mittel-Europa-Berlin to Bagdad railway scheme, and Austria's aggressiveness in the Balkans. Let us not forget that Austria had been instrumental in robbing Russia of the Balkan victories, 1878, and now (1908), while Russia as a result of the Russo-Japanese war and internal conflict was powerless to aid her Balkan kindred, annexed the Serbian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This she did without any nations' consent except her own (and encouragement of her ally Germany), and contrary to the wishes of her own inhabitants.

The German Emperor had urged Austria to proceed with this seizure of the two Balkan provinces, promising her that with his "shining sword" he would stand by her side. Thus had Austria, at the risk of a great war in Europe, changed

by main force the status of a couple of Balkan provinces that had been assigned to her for protection at the Congress of Berlin, from a weak protectorate for administrative purposes, into a part and parcel of her empire. This is one of the five instances in which Germany and Austria in the decade 1905-1915, by their "brazen aggressions" threatened the peace of Europe and the world. These five instances the author has referred to in another chapter. But a little explanation is in place here. The first instance was when the Kaiser, after announcing that no changes of territory must be made anywhere in the world without his consent, in the first Moroccan crisis in 1905, after France, backed by Great Britain and Spain had informed the sultan of that country that he must submit to order and decency,—made a personal visit to this sultan and informed him that he did not have to do anything of the kind. Although the Kaiser was finally obliged to retreat from this position through the international finding of the Algeciras conference, the French minister Delcassé, to assuage the wrath of Germany and the Kaiser's wounded pride, was forced to resign, to keep the peace. The second instance was the annexation of BosniaHerzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908, just mentioned above. The third crisis was precipitated by the Kaiser sending his warship the Panther to the Moroccan port of Agidir, on the occasion of violent disorder breaking out there and France's sending troops, upon the advice of Spain and with the backing of England to restore order in that country. France was now upheld by the powerful assurance of Great Britain and Russia, which had recovered considerably from the results of the Russo-Japanese war. Yet, France yielded sufficiently to grant the Kaiser considerable territory on the Congo, as a counterpoise for what she was getting in Morocco, and thus again she helped to avoid a war with Germany. It was with very ill grace, however, that Germany acceded to peace at all on this occasion. Her great army expansion was not yet completed, else she would not