have, as our German authorities tell us. This occurred in 1910-1911. The fourth came in connection with the Balkan wars, 1911-13, when the German and Austro-Hungarian governments backed the Turks (German officers had been drilling Turkish troops since 1888, and in 1896 Wilhelm II had visited Turkey, sealed a strong bond of friendship with the Turkish government, and joined with the Turks as a promoter of their "holy religion," and trade with Germany) and were upon the point of going to war with the Balkan states. Great Britain more than any other European nation sought to prevent this threatened general European war, and should be given credit for the same. Had the Entente been as aggressive as Germany and Austria, no doubt the World War would have broken out two or three years sooner. The fifth and last instance was the German Imperial Government's deliberately launching the greatest tragedy of history, in 1914. Since the precipitation of this fatal crisis is quite extensively treated in other portions of this book a further exposition of it here is unnecessary.1

For a further treatment of the above five crises the reader is referred to the International Year Book, 1914 to 1918 numbers.

CHAPTER VII

TH

CAUSES OF THE PRESENT WAR

HE writer has been encouraged by friends to make a separate statement of the causes of the present World War, before concluding the series of articles on the Causes of War. Such a statement is all the more pertinent at this time, since teachers and students, as well as the public generally, are more vitally interested in the conflict so recently raging than in any former war, as is natural they should be; moreover, a good deal of the opposition in this country to the war has been due to ignorance of its causes, of why America is in it, and of the issues at stake. Still another reason for the following treatise is, that nowhere have we found anything that approaches a complete and accurate statement of the vital causes as they have affected all the powers engaged, either collectively or individually. And finally now that the war is over, if we are to be of service to the bringing of a just peace that we have been in waging a just war, we must understand the causes in order to help intelligently in applying the remedy for war.

Two distinctions made in a former chapter I wish to repeat at the outset,—namely, (1) that remote and fundamental causes must be carefully distinguished from immediate causes and from pretexts; and (2) that there are different causes for different nations, or groups of nations, and usually as many causes at least as there are peoples engaged in conflict. In this connection it is well to repeat that it is difficult to classify the causes fully and accurately, to do which requires great pains, as well as familiarity with every important detail of the life, government and ambitions

of each State. The treatment which follows, however, the author feels, is essentially just and reasonably accurate,

We need spend but little time with the mere pretexts for this war, such as the Austrian forty-eight-hour ultimatum to Serbia for the assassination of the Austrian archduke and wife, the twenty-four-hour demands and the ultimatums of Germany to France and England, together with her demand that Russia immediately demobilize her vast army;

or Germany's excuse in the case of her invasion of Belgium, that England or France, or both, would have invaded that country, and thus broken their solemn treaties, as Germany did, if the Germans had not gone first. Most of the above excuses were premeditated lies as the facts have since shown, and all were mystified, presumptuous, and wholly selfish pretexts for war. It is worse than stupidity for a person to believe that England or France would have invaved Belgium, no matter what irresponsible individuals may have said or imagined,—in order to break through into Germany, when England had only 50,000 troops ready in those first days, as against the vast army of a million superbly equipped men which Germany had ready for instant action on the Belgian frontier, to say nothing of Belgium's army of defense, also, in face of the fact that it took England two years to raise an army large enough to have the slightest hope of striking through Belgium, against Germany, had the British even desired it. It is equal folly to claim that France would have invaded Belgium, since she had practically all her army concentrated on the Alsace-Lorraine border, at the other extremity of the country, a fact which proves that even after the German ultimatum (which amounted to a declaration of war)-France did not expect such dishonorable conduct by Germany; and without the aid of England's little army, she would not have been able to save her own capital, Paris, in the battle of the Marne, in her extremity, throwing in, as she did, tens of thousands of young men, unarmed, to face certain death, in order to

fill up the lines and check the onrush of the Germans. These are the facts of history. The German government's persistent falsifying to the German people and to the world constitutes another of the long list of its atrocities and barbarous crimes, that are prolonging the suffering and horrors of war, even now.

We shall now proceed to the consideration of the vital causes of the conflict. We shall take (1) those of the Entente allies and (2) those of the Central Powers. This general and natural separation of the causes into two groups is necessary because, as stated above, there are different causes for different countries, and as many causes (or more), as there are nations engaged in combat. Let us take the individual States of the allies first.

England's Causes for Going to War

(1) Protection of her colonial possessions and maintenance of her supremacy on the sea and in commerce.

(2) Democratic principles vs. autocracy, and opposition to the militarism of the German imperial government. (3) Germany's invasion of Belgium and England's treaty obligation in guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality. (The same solemn treaty that Germany violated.)

(4) Maintenance of the "balance of power" in Europe, threatened by the rapid development and the ambitions of Germany.

France

(1) Maintenance of treaty obligations and their protection (Russia and England in particular).

(2) Fear of Pan-German dominance and conquests in Europe, with their dangers to France.

(3) Revenge, for Germany's taking Alsace and Lorraine in 1871, with race-hatred engendered by that act.

(4) Democracy (France a republic) vs. military autoc

racy.

(5) Distrust (as in England) of the colonial policy and ambitions of Germany.

(6) German invasion compelled France to fight, in selfdefense.

Russia

(1) Desire for control in Balkans and possession of Constantinople, with access to the Mediterranean, as against Austria-Hungary's ambitions in the same region (involving conquest).

(2) Racial sympathy with Serbia and other Slavic States.

(3) Distrust and hatred of Germany (by the Russian people especially).

(4) Democracy vs. power of kings (recent factor).

Italy

(1) Hatred of Austria, an enemy of Italian freedom and unity.

(2) Spirit of nationality-completion of unification of Italy, by securing Italian provinces still held by Austria.

(3) Fear of the growing power and ambition of Germany, i. e., Italy wished to maintain the "Balance of Power" in Europe, which Germany was about to overthrow.

(4) Desire for more Italian influence and commercial advantages in the Balkans.

The Balkan States-Serbia, Montenegro, Roumania, Greece (1) Desire to work out their own destinies (spirit of nationality) and be free from Turkish and Austro-Hungarian menaces-a sequel to the Balkan wars of 1912-13.

(2) Securing of natural and national boundaries (race cohesion) as fruits of their conquests of 1911-13, which Austria deprived them of in the moment of victory.

(3) Growth of spirit of democracy (resulting in recent action of Greece).