The judgment of the circuit court of Cook county is reversed and the case remanded, with directions to that court to sustain the demurrer and dismiss the bill.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

CARTER and DUNN, JJ., dissenting.

CHARLES T. PRESTON, Plaintiff in Error, vs. THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al. Defendants in Error.

Opinion filed June 29, 1910-Rehearing denied October 12, 1910.

This case is controlled by the decisions in Stott v. City of Chicago, 205 Ill. 281, McNeill v. City of Chicago, 212 id. 481, Kenneally v. City of Chicago, 220 id. 485, People v. City of Chicago, 242 id. 561, Bullis v. City of Chicago, 235 id. 472, Moon v. Mayor, 214 id. 40, Donahue v. County of Will, 100 id. 94, and Schultheis v. City of Chicago, 240 id. 167.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. WILLARD M. MCEWEN, Judge, presiding.

A. B. CHILCOAT, for plaintiff in error.

EDWARD J. BRUNDAGE, Corporation Counsel, and ROвERT R. JAMPOLIS, for defendants in error.

Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court: This is a petition for a writ of mandamus, filed by the plaintiff in error in the superior court of Cook county against defendants in error for the purpose of having his name restored to the police pay-roll, from which it was dropped March 14, 1898. The petition avers the petitioner was appointed police patrolman by the superintendent of police of the city of Chicago on June 1, 1886, took the oath of office, entered upon the discharge of his duties and continued in the discharge thereof until March 14, 1898,

when, by order of the superintendent of police, his name was dropped from the pay-roll of police patrolmen. The original petition was filed March 11, 1903, five years, lacking three days, after petitioner's name was dropped from the pay-roll. A general demurrer to the petition was filed by defendants. No other steps appear to have been taken in the case until December 2, 1908, when petitioner filed an amended petition. The demurrer to the original petition was upon motion of the defendants ordered by the court to stand as a demurrer to the amended petition. The demurrer was sustained and judgment rendered dismissing the petition and against petitioner for costs. A writ of error was sued out of this court to review the judgment of the superior court, on the theory that it involves a construction of the State and Federal constitutions.

The original petition is not in the record. Counsel for petitioner says the original petition was similar to those passed upon by this court in other cases brought by other parties whose names had been dropped from the pay-roll at the same time as that of petitioner, and by the amended petition it was sought to avoid objections pointed out in the decisions of this court to the petitions in those cases. While the amended petition is more lengthy than those in the cases heretofore brought before us and some of the objections made to those petitions are obviated by the amended petition now before us, this petition raises no question that has not heretofore been decided by this court adversely to petitioner's contention. We shall not, therefore, take up a consideration of the various averments of the petition nor again enter upon a discussion of questions raised thereby. The material and vital questions raised on this record are:

First, the petitioner being in office as a police patrolman at the time of the classification of offices by the civil service commission, after the Civil Service act went into effect became thereby an officer of the classified service and

entitled to the protection against removal conferred by that act. This was decided to the contrary in Stott v. City of Chicago, 205 Ill. 281, McNeill v. City of Chicago, 212 id. 481, Kenneally v. City of Chicago, 220 id. 485, and People v. City of Chicago, 242 id. 561.

Second, that the office of police patrolman in the police department of the city of Chicago was created by the legislature in enacting the charter of the city and subsequent amendments thereto, and that the office was not abolished or affected by the adoption by the city of Chicago of the Cities and Villages act in 1875. The law was held otherwise in Bullis v. City of Chicago, 235 Ill. 472, People v. City of Chicago, supra, and Moon v. Mayor, 214 id. 40.

Third, that the removal of petitioner without notice of written charges preferred against him and being afforded an opportunity to be heard was a denial to him of due process of law, in violation of section 2 of article 2 of the constitution of the State of Illinois and section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. This question was passed upon and decided contrary to petitioner's contention in People v. City of Chicago, supra, McNeill v. City of Chicago, supra, Kenneally v. City of Chicago, supra, and Donahue v. County of Will, 100 Ill. 94.

Fourth, that the writ of mandamus is a writ of right; that the time limited for commencing the action is five years; that nothing short of that time can be urged or considered against the right to maintain it; that a defense based upon a lapse of time must be pleaded and that laches is not applicable. We held otherwise in Kenneally v. City of Chicago, supra, and Schultheis v. City of Chicago, 240 Ill. 167. We could not reverse the judgment in this case without overruling our decisions in those cases, and we are not convinced that we would be justified by the law in overruling them.

The judgment of the superior court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant, vs. THE DUNHAM TOWING AND WRECKING COMPANY, Appellee.

Opinion filed June 29, 1910-Rehearing denied October 11, 1910.

LIMITATIONS-statute runs against right of city to recover for damage to a bridge. While a city holds the title to its streets and bridges in trust for the public, yet it must maintain them at its own expense, and in attempting to recover against a towing company for damage to a bridge caused by a boat colliding with it, the city is seeking to enforce a mere private right and the Statute of Limitations is a defense to the action.

APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on writ of error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. WILLIAM N. COTTRELL, Judge, presiding.

EDWARD J. BRUNDAGE, Corporation Counsel, (Charles M. HAFT, of counsel,) for appellant.

MICHAEL F. SULLIVAN, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE COOKE delivered the opinion of the court: On November 18, 1907, the city of Chicago brought suit in the municipal court of Chicago against the Dunham Towing and Wrecking Company to recover damages, amounting to $108, resulting from an injury to certain piles supporting a part of the bridge structure of a bridge across the Chicago river at Fullerton avenue, caused on August 17, 1901, by a schooner coming in contact with them while being towed by one of appellee's tugs. The municipal court held that the action was barred by the Statute of Limitations and rendered judgment for the defend

ant.

The Appellate Court for the First District affirmed that judgment and granted a certificate of importance, whereupon the city prosecuted an appeal to this court.

The case was decided by the municipal court upon an agreed statement of facts, from which it appears that the city of Chicago extended one of its streets, known as Fullerton avenue, across the Chicago river by the construction of a bridge, which was paid for and is maintained out of funds derived solely from general taxation of property lying within the city of Chicago, and that the city of Chicago, in its corporate or private capacity, derives no income or benefit of any nature, kind or description from the said bridge or the use thereof, but that the people residing in the city of Chicago are benefited and convenienced by the use of said bridge as a part of the street. It was a portion of this bridge that was injured by the schooner colliding with it.

The only question presented to this court for determination is whether the Statute of Limitations can be interposed as a defense to the action by the city to recover damages for injuries to the bridge. The rule in this State is, that the statute may be interposed to all actions by municipal corporations to enforce mere private rights but that it is no defense to those involving public rights. (Board of Supervisors of Logan County v. City of Lincoln, 81 Ill. 156; Ramsay v. County of Clinton, 92 id. 225; County of Piatt v. Goodell, 97 id. 84; School Directors v. School Directors, 105 id. 653; People v. Town of Oran, 121 id. 650; Greenwood v. Town of LaSalle, 137 id. 225; Brown v. Trustees of Schools, 224 id. 184.) Whether or not the Statute of Limitations can be interposed in defense of this action therefore depends upon whether the appellant is seeking to enforce a public or a private right. The contention of the appellant is that the right sought to be enforced is a public right; that while the title to the street in question, of which this bridge is a part, is in the city, it holds that title in trust for the entire public, and is the agent of the State, discharging a governmental duty, when suing with reference to the damage done to the