8 7 and usage, although it does, indeed, render the privilege granted universal. The American delegation, therefore, refrained from signing the convention. The seventh convention deals with the transformation of merchant ships into ships of war, and it must be said that the positive results of this convention are of little or no practical value. The burning question was whether merchant ships might be transformed into men-of-war upon the high seas. As the transformation of merchant vessels into war vessels upon the high seas caused an international commotion during the recent Russo-Japanese War, Great Britain and the United States insisted that the transfer should only be allowed within the territorial jurisdiction of the transforming power. Some of the continental states, on the contrary, refused to renounce the exercise of the alleged right. The great maritime states were thus divided, and as the question was too simple and too plain to admit of compromise, it was agreed to drop it entirely for the present. In order, however, that something might remain of the careful and elaborate discussions of the subject, a series of regulations was drawn up regarding the transformation of merchant ships into vessels of war, declaratory of international custom. For example: The vessel transformed should be placed under the direct and immediate control and responsibility of the power whose flag it bears; that the vessel must bear the outward signs of a man-of-war; that the commander should be in the service of the state and duly commissioned; that his name should appear upon the list of officers of the navy; that the crew should be submitted to military discipline; that the vessel in its operations should conform itself to the customs of war; and that the transforming nation should notify, as soon as possible, the transformation of the merchant vessel. It will be seen that all reference to the place of transformation was thus carefully eliminated and a series of unobjectionable and unquestionable resolutions declaratory of the international custom and practice was adopted. Indirectly, the rightfulness or wrongfulness of privateering was concerned, and inasmuch as the United States would not consent to abolish privateering unless the immunity of private property be safeguarded, the American delegation abstained from signing the convention. The eighth convention relates to the placing of submarine automatic mines of contact, a subject of present and special interest to belligerents; while the interest of the neutral is very general. Warfare permits belligerents to attack and to destroy each other in order to bring about a state of calm and repose which we call peace, but the action of the belligerent should be confined to the belligerents themselves. Neutrals should be, as far as possible, unaffected. Mines break from their moorings and endanger neutral life and property. The conference, therefore, desires to regulate the use of mines in such a way as not to deprive the belligerents of a recognized and legitimate means of warfare, but to restrict, as far as possible, the damage to the immediate belligerents. The following articles were therefore agreed to: Article 1. It is forbidden: 1. to use unanchored automatic contact mines, unless they are so constructed as to become innocuous at the latest one hour after control over them has been lost; 2. to place anchored automatic contact mines which do not become innocuous on carrying away their moorings; 3. to use torpedoes which do not become innocuous when they have missed their target. Article 2. It is forbidden to place automatic contact mines in front of the coasts and ports of the adversary with the sole object of intercepting commercial navigation. Article 3. When anchored automatic contact mines are used, all possible precautions should be taken for the safety of public navigation. The belligerents engage, as far as possible, to provide that these mines shall become innocuous after a limited period of time, and in case they cease to be guarded, to give notice of the dangerous localities, as soon as military exigencies permit, by a notice to shipping which will also be communicated to the governments through diplomatic channels. Article 4. Any neutral power which places automatic contact mines in front of its coasts must observe the same rules and take the same precautions as those which are imposed upon belligerents. The neutral powers must make known to shipping, by previous notice, the regions where automatic contact mines are to be moored. This notice must be communicated speedily, as urgent, to the governments through diplomatic channels. Article 5. At the close of the war, the contracting powers engage to do everything in their power to remove, each for himself, the mines which it has placed. As to anchored automatic contact mines which one of the belligerents has placed along the coast of the other, their situation shall be indicated by the power that has placed them to the other party and each power shall proceed in the shortest possible time to remove the mines which are found in its waters. Article 6. The signatory states which are not yet provided with improved mines, such as are required by this regulation, and which consequently can not actually conform to the rules established by Articles 1 and 3, agree to transform, as soon as possible, their mines, so as to comply with the prescriptions mentioned above. Article 7. The stipulations of the present regulation are concluded for the 9 duration of seven years or until the end of the Third Peace Conference, if this date is prior. The contracting powers engage to consider again the question of the use of submarine automatic contact mines six months before the expiration of the period of the seven years, in case it has not been again taken up and decided by the Third Conference of Peace at a previous date. In the absence of the stipulations of a new convention, the present regulation shall continue in force, unless this convention is denounced. The denunciation shall not take effect (with regard to the notifying power) until six months after the notification. It was sought, notably by Great Britain, to prevent any nation from placing submarine mines beyond its territorial waters, namely, the three-mile limit. It was objected to this that while the offensive use of mines might be limited, it was inadvisable, perhaps unreasonable, at the present time to limit the defensive use of mines. In one case the mines would be used as a means of attack; in the second place as a defense against aggression. The latter view commended itself to the conference, and, after much discussion, it was agreed not to introduce into the convention any provision upon the subject. The ninth convention forbade the bombardment by naval forces of undefended harbors, villages, towns, or buildings. The presence, however, of military stores would permit bombardment of such ports for the sole purpose of destroying the stores, provided they were not destroyed or delivered up upon request. Notice, however, should be given of the intention to bombard. In like manner, the convention permitted the bombardment of such undefended places if provisions were not supplied upon requisition to the naval force. Bombardment, however, was not allowed for the collection of mere money contributions. It should be said that unoffending property was not to be bombarded or destroyed, and buildings and institutions devoted to a religious, scientific, or charitable purpose were expressly excluded from attack. This convention will undoubtedly subserve a useful purpose and clear up a doubt which seems to have existed. The weight of opinion forbade the bombardment of undefended ports. The fear, however, that such ports might be attacked and held, in order to enforce submission, rendered a convention on this subject, even although declaratory of international usage and custom, of no little moment. We all remember the Spanish-American War and the constant fear, however unfounded, that the Atlantic Coast might be bombarded by the Spanish fleet. The tenth convention adapted to maritime warfare the principles 10 of the Geneva Convention of 1906. It is not necessary to describe this, admirable document in detail. We are familiar with the Red Cross and its work, and there exists absolute unanimity of opinion that the sick and wounded upon the battlefield or upon the high seas should be cared for, irrespective of nationality. Humanity demands it and this demand has been carefully complied with. A word of history may, however, be permitted. The first Geneva convention, dealing with land warfare, was drawn up in 1864. The additional articles of 1868, extending the principles of land warfare to naval warfare, failed of adoption. In 1899 the additional articles were made the basis of a convention dealing with this question adopted at the First Hague Convention. Warfare, however, had changed since 1864, and it was felt that the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1864 should keep pace with the changed conditions, so in 1906 the Geneva Convention of 1864 was revised and the present conference adapted the provisions of this revised convention of 1906 to naval warfare. It is not necessary to enlarge upon the importance of this convention. We understand it and are proud of the progress it marks, in succoring the sick and the wounded and mitigating in their extreme rigor the evils necessarily incident to war. The eleventh convention relates to certain restrictions in the exercise of the right of capture in maritime war. It is a modest document, but is all that was saved from the wreck of the immunity of private property. The American delegation urged the abolition of the right of capture of unoffending enemy private property upon the high seas, but great maritime powers such as Great Britain, France, Russia, and Japan were unwilling to relinquish this means of bringing the enemy to terms. A convention negotiated by powers having no great maritime interest might be a moral victory; it would not be of practical importance except as embodying in conventional form the advanced and radical views of this subject. But to return to the present convention. Chapter 1 frees from capture mail upon a vessel if not directed to or coming from a blockaded port. Chapter 2 frees from capture fishing smacks devoted solely to coastal fishing and small vessels engaged in local navigation. It is pleasing to note that the conference made the basis of its action the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the well-known case of 12 The twelfth convention sought to establish an international court It is understood that Norway intended to present a project for the establishment of a court of prize. It is a fact that both Germany and Great Britain presented a project for the establishment of a prize court at the first business session of the conference. The projects, however, were widely divergent. In one, the continental idea prevailed; in the other, the Anglo-Saxon idea dominated. It was impossible to convince either of the advantage of the other plan. Matters were at a standstill, when the American delegation, through Mr. Choate, proposed a basis of compromise which, accepted by both, resulted in the establishment of the court. The provisions of this convention are technical and detailed as must be the case in which an institution is to be created and its jurisdiction and procedure defined within the compass of a single document. It is impossible, therefore, to discuss it at any length, but it would be an unpardonable omission if mention were not made of its salient features. In the first place, national prize courts are to officiate as in times past. One appeal is allowed from a national court to a higher court of the captor's country. Thereupon, at the expiration of two years an appeal may be taken directly from the national court and the case transferred from the national court to |