situation ought to be known, probed and corrected, even if they rose out of the constitution. But, Mr. C. said, it is an assertion that ought not to be lightly made. The effects are dangerous; for what man hereafter, with such consequences before his eyes, would venture to propose a war? If such were the admitted fact, a future enemy would persist in war, expecting the country to sink before his efforts: his arms would be steeled, his exertions nerved against us. The position was in every view, one of that dangerous bearing on the future relations of the country, that it ought not to be admitted without the strongest proof. What, said Mr. C., was the fact? What had been the progress of events for a few months preceding the termination of the war? At Baltimore, at Plattsburg, at New Orleans, the invaders had been signally defeated; a new spirit was diffused through the whole mass of the community. Can it be believed then, that the government was on the verge of dissolution? No, sir; it never stood firmer on its basis than at that moment. It was true, indeed, we labored under great difficulties; but it is an observation made by a statesman of great sagacity, Edmund Burke, when Pitt was anticipating the downfall of France through her finances, that an instance is not to be found of a highminded nation sinking under financial difficulties-and it would have been exemplified in our country had the war continued. Men on all sides began to unite in defence of the country; parties in this house began to rally on this point, and if the gentleman from Pennsylvania had been a member at that time, he also, from what he has said, would have taken that ground. The gentleman had taken a position on this point as erroneous as it was dangerous; and, Mr. C. said, he had thought proper thus to notice it.

As a proof, said Mr. C., that the situation of the country naturally inclines us to too much feebleness rather than too much violence, I refer to the fact, that there are on this floor, men who are entirely opposed to armies, to navies, to every means of defence. Sir, if their politics prevail, the country will be disarmed, at the mercy of any foreign power. On the other side, sir, there is no excess of military fervor, no party inclining to military despotism: for, though a charge of such a disposition has been made by a gentleman in debate, it is without the shadow of foundation. What is the fact in regard to the army? Does it bear out his assertion? Is it even preportionally larger now than it was in 1801-2, the period which the gentleman considers as the standard of political perfection? It was then about 4000 men; it was

larger in proportion than an army of 10,000 men would now be. The charge of a disposition to make this a military governinent, exists only in the imaginations of gentlemen; it cannot be supported by facts; it is contrary to proof and to evidence.

Having dismissed this part of the subject, Mr. C. proceeded to consider another part of it, in his opinion equally important, viz.: What will be the probable policy of other nations? With the world at large, said he, we are now at peace. I know of no nation with which we shall probably come into collision, unless it be with Great Britain and Spain. With both of these nations we have considerable points of collision: I hope this country will maintain, in regard to both of them, the strictest justice: but with both these nations there is a possibility, sooner or later, of our being engaged in war. As to Spain, I will say nothing, because she is the inferior of the two, and those measures which apply to the superior power, will include also the inferior. I shall consider our relations then with England only. Peace now exists between the two countries. As to its duration, I will give no opinion, except that I believe the peace will last the longer for the war which has just ended. Evidences have been furnished dur ing the war of the capacity and character of this nation, which will make her indisposed to try her strength with us on slight grounds. But, what is the probable course of events respecting the future relations between the two countries? England is the most formidable power in the world: she has the most numerous army and navy at her command. We, on the contrary, are the most growing nation on earth; most rapidly improving in those very particulars, in which she excels. This question then presents itself: will the greater power permit the less to attain its destined greatness by natural growth, or will she take measures to disturb it? Those who know the history of nations, will not believe that a rival will look unmoved on this prosperity. It has been said, that nations have heads, but no hearts. Every statesman, every one who loves his country, who wishes to maintain the dignity of that country, to see it attain the summit of greatness and prosperity, regards the progress of other nations with a jealous eye. The English statesmen have always so acted. I find no fault with them on that account, but rather to point it out as a principle which ought also to govern our conduct in regard to them. Will Great Britain permit us to go on in an uninterrupted march to the height of national greatness and prosperity? I fear not. But, admitting the councils on that

side of the water to be governed by a degree of magnanimity and justice, the world has never experienced from them, and I am warranted in saying never will, may not some unforeseen collision involve you in hostilities with Great Britain? Gentlemen on the other side have said, that there are points of difference with that nation (existing prior to the war) which are yet unsettled. I grant it. If such, then, be the fact, does it not show that points of collision remain-that whenever the same condition of the world that existed before the war shall recur, the same collisions will probably take place? If Great Britain sees the opportunity of enforcing the same doctrines we have already contested, will she not seize it? Admitting this country to maintain that policy which it ought; that its councils be governed by the most perfect justice and moderation, we yet see, said Mr. Calhoun, that by a difference of views on essential points, the peace between the two nations is liable to be jeopardized. I am sure, that future wars with England are not only possible; but, I will say more, that they are highly probable-nay, that they will certainly take place. Future wars, I fear, with the honorable Speaker, future wars, long and bloody, will exist between this country and Great Britain: I lament it—but I will not close my eyes on future events; I will not betray the high trust reposed in me; I will speak what I believe to be true. You will have to encounter British jealousy and hostility in every shape, not immediately manifested by open force or violence, perhaps, but by indirect attempts to check your growth and prosperity. As far as they can, they will disgrace everything connected with you; her reviewers, paragraphists and travellers will assail you and your institutions, and no means will be left untried to bring you to contemn yourselves, and be contemned by others. I thank my God, they have not now the means of effecting it which they once had. No; the late war has given you a mode of feeling and thinking which forbids the acknowledgment of national inferiority, that first of political evils. Had we not encountered Great Britain, we should not have had the brilliant points to rest on which we now have. We, too, have now our heroes and illustrious actions. If Britain has her Wellington, we have our Jacksons, Browns and Scotts. If she has her naval heroes, we have them not less renowned, for they have snatched the laurel from her brows It is impossible that we can now be degraded by comparisons; I trust we are equally above corruption and intrigue: it only remains then to try the contest by force of arms.

Let us now, said Mr. C., consider the measures of preparation which sound policy dictates. First, then, as to extent, without reference to the kind: They ought to be graduated by a reference to the character and capacity of both countries. England excels in means all countries that now exist, or ever did exist; and has besides great moral re sources-intelligent and renowned for masculine virtues. On our part, our measures ought to correspond with that lofty policy which become freemen determined to defend our rights. Thus circumstanced on both sides, we ought to omit no preparation fairly in our means. Next, as to the species of preparation, which opens subjects of great extent and importance. The navy most certainly, in any point of view, occupies the first place. It is the most safe, most effectual, and the cheapest mode of defence. For, let the fact, be remembered, our navy cost less per man, including all the amount of extraordinary expenditures on the Lakes, than our army. This is an important fact, which ought to be fixed in the memory of the house; for, if that force be the most effi- . cient and safe, which is at the same time the cheapest, on that should be our principal reliance. We have heard much of the danger of standing armies to our liberties-the objection cannot be made to the navy. Generals, it must be acknowledged, have often advanced at the head of arms to Imperial rank and power; but in what instance had an Admiral usurped on the liberties of his country? Put our strength in the navy for foreign defence, and we shall certainly escape the whole catalogue of possible ills, painted by gentlemen on the other side. A naval power attacks that country, from whose hostility alone we have anything to dread, where she is most assailable, and defends this country where it is weakest. Where is Great Britain most vulnerable? In what point is she most accessible to attack? In her commerce-in her navigation. There she is not only exposed, but the blow is fatal. There is her strength; there is the secret of her power. Here, then, if ever it become necessary, you ought to strike. But where are you most exposed? On the Atlantic line; a line so long and so weak, that you are peculiarly liable to be assailed in it. How is it to be defended? By a navy, and by a navy alone can it be efficiently defended. Let us look back to the time when the enemy was in possession of the whole line of the sea coast, moored in your rivers, and ready to assault you at every point. The facts are too recent to require to be painted-I will only generally state that your commerce was cut up; your specie circulation destroyed; your internal communication interrupted, your

best and cheapest highway being entirely in possession of the enemy; your ports foreign, the one to the other; your treasury exhausted, in merely defensive preparations and militia requisitions, not knowing where you would be assailed, you had at the same moment, to stand prepared at every point. A recurrence of this state of things, so oppressive to the country, in the event of another war, could be prevented only by the establishment and maintenance of a sufficient naval force. Mr. C. said he had thought proper to press this point thus strongly, because, though it was generally assented to that the navy ought to be increased, he found that assent too cold, and the approbation bestowed on it too negative in its character. It ought, it is said, to be gradually increased. If the navy is to be increased at all, let its augmentation be limited only by your ability to build, officer, and man. If it is the kind of force most safe, and at the same time most efficient to guard against foreign invasion, or repel foreign aggression, you ought to put your whole force on the sea side. It is estimated that we have in our country eighty thousand sailors. This would enable us to man a considerable fleet, which, if well directed, would give us the habitual command on our own coast; an object, in every point of view, so desirable. Not that we ought, hastily, without due preparation, under present circumstances, to build a large number of vessels; but we ought to commence preparation, establish docks, collect timber and naval stores, and, as soon as the materials are prepared, we ought to commence building, to the extent which I have mentioned. If anything can preserve the country in its most imminent dangers from abroad, it is this species of armament. If we desire to be free from future wars, as I hope we may, this is the only way to effect it. We shall have peace then, and what is of still higher moment, with perfect security. In regard to our present military establishment, Mr. C. said, it was small enough. That point the honorable Speaker had fully demonstrated: it was not sufficiently large at present to occupy all our fortresses. Gentlemen had spoken in favor of the militia, and against the army. In regard to the militia, said Mr. C., I would go as far as any gentleman, and considerably farther than those would who are so violently opposed to our small army. I would not only arm the militia, but I would extend their term of service, and make them efficient. talk about the efficiency of militia called into active service for six months only, is to impose on the people; it is to ruin them with false hopes. I know the danger of large standing armies, said Mr. C. I

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