Life Ins. Co., 25 Conn. 207. (2) A condition of the policy is that any interest in property insured not absolute, or that is less than a perfect title, must be represented to the company and expressed in the policy. The insured has the fee simple estate in the building, conveyed by deed reserving a lien for the purchasemoney, about $350; the house worth $1,700. The con dition has reference to the quantity of the interest or estate, which is measured by its duration. Or if not, the words used cannot have been intended to guard against mere incumbrances. (3) The provision in a ium, but the right of recovery was made to turn upon the ground that the jury was justified in inferring from the practice of the company an authorization of the agent to extend the time of payment. There was no pretense that the agent, by virtue of his power to make the contract of insurance and collect premiums, could extend the time of payment. There is a class of cases where a receipt of premium by an agent, paid when due, has been held to be a waiver of a forfeiture incurred by a violation of a condition of the policy. See Walsh v. Etna Life Ins. Co., 30 Iowa, 133. But where an agent, who is authorized to receive prem-policy requiring "immediate notice," in case of loss, iums, receives a premium paid when due, he is acting within the scope of his general authority. The assured has a right to suppose that the payment is valid; that it becomes a payment to the company, and that the company by receiving it, if it receives it with knowledge of the forfeiture, waives the forfeiture. We have been unable to discover any rule in the law of insurance which would justify us in holding that an agent can bind the company by his consent to a postponement of│(Appearing in 31 Grattan's Reports.) a payment of a renewal premium, and keep a policy in force contrary to its provisions, unless he is expressly authorized to do so. Iowa Sup. Ct., April 22, 1880. Critchett v. American Insurance Co. Opinion by Adams, C. J.; Beck, J., dissented. -- LOSS AFTER PREMIUM PAID BUT BEFORE ISSUE OF POLICY EQUITY MAY ENFORCE PAYMENT — MIS REPRESENTATION-TITLE-NOTICE OF LOSS. (1) Where a contract for the insurance of a building has been made with the agent of an insurance company having authority to issue policies, and the premium has been paid, but before the policy is issued the building is consumed by fire, a court of equity has jurisdiction to enforce the payment of the policy at the suit of the assured against the insurance company. Tayloe v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co., 9 How. (U. S.) 390; Com. Mut. Marine Ins. Co. v. Union Mut. Ins. Co., 19 id. 318; Post v. Etna Ins. Co., 43 Barb. 351; Angell on Ins., § 34; Wood on F. Ins., § 12. The terms of the insurance having been agreed upon by the applicant for insurance and the agent of the insurance company, the applicant tenders to the agent the money for the premium; but the agent living in the house, and being indebted to the applicant for rent, tells him he has in his hands money belonging to him for rent, and will credit him for that amount. This was a valid payment of the premium. Hallock v. Commercial Ins. Co., 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 298. Here plaintiff tendered to an agent, who was applied to for insurance, the premium, and the agent declined it, and said he would consider it paid, and leave it with plaintiff, who was a banker with whom the agent kept his accounts. The application was sent by the agent to the company, the risk was accepted to commence from a previous day, and the policy signed was forwarded by mail to the agent: but it turned out that the building insured was destroyed by fire on the very day the policy was signed, and two hours before it was so signed. The company, being ignorant of the fire when the policy was signed. countermanded the policy. The company was held estopped from denying that it had received the premium. See, also, New York Cent. Ins. Co. v. National Protection Ins. Co., 20 Barb. 468: Chickering v. Globe Mut. Life Ins. Co., 116 Mass. 321; Goit v. National Protection Ins. Co., 25 Barb. 189. In Bouton v. American Mut. Life Ins. Co., 25 Conn. 542, it was decided that an agreement, made in good faith between an insurance agent having authority to receive an insurance premium and the insured, that the agent shall become personally responsible to his principals for the amount of such premium, and the insured his personal debtor therefor, constitutes a payment of the premium as between the insured and the insurance company. The same principle was affirmed in Sheldon v. Conn. Mut. or as in some policies, what is equivalent, notice FALSE CRIMINAL LAW. PRETENSES-EVIDENCE- INTENT PROOF OF OTHER ACTS OF LIKE CHARACTER.-Upon the prosecution of T. for obtaining goods from M. & Co. upon false pretenses, evidence that the accused, in the same city and at or about the same time, purchased goods from other parties, B. & O., upon the same false pretenses, is admissible to show the intent of the accused in making the representations to M. & Co., but not as proof that the accused had committed other offenses not charged in the indictment. And this, though the statute has made the obtaining goods on false pretenses larceny. Whenever the intent or guilty knowledge of a party charged with crime is a material ingredient in the issue of the case, other acts and declarations of a similar character tending to establish such intent or knowledge are proper evidence to be admitted, provided they are not too remotely connected with the offense charged; and what are the limits as to the time and circumstances is for the court, in its discretion, to determine. Upon an indictment for maliciously shooting at the prosecutor, it has been held proper to show that the accused had twice shot at the prosecutor the same day, for the purpose of rebutting the idea of accident, and of establishing the willful inteut. Reg. v. Voke, Russ. & Ry. 531. And so, upon a prosecution for administering sulphuric acid to horses, with intent to kill them, evidence is admissible that the prisoner had frequently mixed sulphuric acid with horses' corn. Reg. v. Mogg, 4 C. & P. 364. Upon an indictment for libel, the publication of other libels not laid in the indictment may be given in evidence to show the quo animo the defendant made the publication in question. 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 53. Indeed, the cases upon this subject are almost innumerable, as may be seen upon examination of the books on criminal law. 3 Russ. on Crimes, §§ 285, 287, 288; Roscoe on Cr. Ev. 86, 94; Bottomley v. United States, 1 Story, 135; Cook v. Moore, 11 Cush. 213. In such cases it has been held that even the admission of the accused that the act was done with a fraudulent intent did not preclude the prosecution from proving it. Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 119 Mass. 354; Priest v. Groton, 103 id. 530. In civil cases the decisions are abundant which hold that on the question of intent to defraud by false pretenses, other acts or representations of a like character done at or about the same time with that in issue are admissible with a view to the quo animo. McKinney v. Dingley, 4 Greenl. 172, is an example. There the suit was to avoid a sale on the ground of the false and fraudulent conduct of the purchaser in representing himself to be a man of good property and credit when he was not; and it was held proper for the vendor to give evidence of similar false pretexts successfully used to other persons in the same town about the same time to show a general scheme to amass property by fraud. In Hennequin v. Naylor, 24 N. Y. 139, for the purpose of proving the fraud the vendor relied in part upon the fact that the defendant had purchased of several persons large bills of goods, the plaintiff, among the rest, just on the eve of suspension. See, also, Whittier v. Varney, 10 N. H. 291, 477; Murfey v. Brace, 23 Barb. 561; Allison v. Matthieu, 3 Johns. 234; Olmsted v. Hotailing, 1 Hill, 317; 1 Phillips' Ev. 653, 773. In In criminal cases the same rule has been followed. Commonwealth v. Eastman, 1 Cush. 189, an indictment for obtaining goods or money under false pretenses, evidence of other purchasers about the time of the alleged offense was held admissible to prove intent. This case was followed in Commonwealth v. Tuckerman, 10 Gray, 173: Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 7 Allen, 548. See, also, Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342; Bielschofsky v. People, 3 Hun, 40; Reg. v. Roebuck, 2 D. & B. 24; Queen v. Frances, L. R., 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 128. Sup. Ct. of Appeals, Virginia. Trogden v. Commonwealth. Opinion by Staples, J. (Appearing in 31 Grattan's Reports.) NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. THE1 KERR ON INJUNCTIONS. A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Injunction. By William Williamson Kerr, A. M. Second American, from the second English edition. Edited, with notes and references to American cases, by Wm. A. Herrick. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1880. Pp. lxiv, 644. » THE former American edition of this work was published in 1871, and contained 736 pages. The editor of the present edition has wisely omitted some matter having exclusive reference to English statutes, and has inserted about one hundred pages on injunctions in equity to restrain proceedings at law. The subject is of the first importance, and has received a great deal of adjudication in modern days. The equitable power of the court is a variable and elastic one, incapable of fixed and strict bounds, but dependent on times, places, and the differing characteristics of magistrates. There is no branch of the law less dry, or appealing more to the inventive and metaphysical faculties. Mr. Kerr's work was founded on English authorities, and its value for the American lawyer must in large degree depend on the editor. The original work was a sound, judicious and well-written one, and the citations by the editor seem to be copious, but by no means exhaustive. Perhaps it is impracticable to exhaust the subject, for it trenches on many other topics of the law, which have been separately and elaborately treated, as for example, copyright, nuisance, patents, trade-marks, etc. In describing the editor's labors we use the word citations rather than annotations, as the more correct designation. With this work, and Mr. High's, the practitioner cannot go astray, and he will probably not be safe without both. WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. In this volume Dr. Wharton completes at once his grand works on Evidence and Criminal Law, both of which we have so fully spoken of that detailed comment on this is unnecessary. It is sufficient to say that in our opinion it is quite unrivalled; uniting philosophy with common sense in treatment; couched in an exact and felicitous style; and so comprehensive and exhaustive as to embrace all important decisions, from the earliest days of our law to the present year in its examinations. The volume contains 334 pages, with independent tables of contents and cases, and index, and is published by Kay & Brother, Philadelphia. THROOP'S JUSTICES' MANUAL. The New York Justices' Manual, containing all the Laws of the State, relating to the official tenure and duties of a Justice of the Peace, and the Proceedings in Civil Cases before him, in force on the first of September, 1880; with Explanatory Notes and an Appendix of Forms, by Montgomery H. Throop, late one of the Commissioners to revise the Statutes. Albany: John D. Parsons, Jr., 1880. Pp. xvi, 624. The enactment of the nine chapters Code bill has made an entirely new body of law appertaining to justices' courts. The design of this book is to lay before the justice of the peace and practitioners in his court every law concerning every subject in respect to The which the latter may call on the former to act. result of our examination is a conviction that it is admirably planned and faithfully executed. No man in the State can be better qualified by experienceprobably none so well-than the author for this particular task. There seems to be no omission, so far as we can judge, and with this manual before him the justice can be satisfied that he has the whole body of the law. An excellent index and 160 forms will enable him and practitioners to find and apply these laws. The work should be in the hands of every person who has any interest in the courts of our justices of the peace and the enormous mass of litigation which is there disposed of. KENNY'S ENDOWED CHARITIES. The true Principles of Legislation with regard to Property given for Charitable or other Public Uses. By Courtney Stanhope Kenny, LL. M., of Lincoln's Inn, Fellow and Law Lecturer of Downing College, Cambridge, England. Pp. 274. London: Reeves & Turner, Chancery Lane, 1880. The matter of this book was written as an essay for the Yorke Prize of the University of Cambridge, England. This is one of a class of books that we think, and are glad to think, is becoming larger. It is not the result of the desire to make a book so much as of a desire to express the thoughts and conclusions of study of the author upon a subject that has attracted and interested him and led him to reflection. It treats of property given for charitable or other public uses. It was written as a contribution to the discussion on the question of charity reform, and from the position that endowed charities have done more good than harm; that they should be protected and encouraged; but at the same time superintended and controlled. Of course from the situation of the author it is ad dressed to the British public, and deals with the question mostly as it is of practical importance in Great Britain. Yet it is a work of interest to us in this country, where as wealth accumulates and men decease, large and still larger sums are left for public uses. Nor is it without discussion of the question as we are concerned with it, and there are in it important suggestions worthy of consideration by the lawyer and legislator of these States, notably as to the connection of the subject with the growth of ecclesiastical wealth and power. The essay starts with stating three peculiarities of charitable endowments, viz., indefiniteness, meritoriousness, and perpetuity, and therefrom deduces that there is the need of supervision, restriction and revision, by governmental power. It discusses the question whether those endowments should be prohibited by law, and answers it in the negative. It points out the measures that the lawgiver should take for restriction, supervision and revision. It claims that there should be restriction by law upon the purposes; the nature and extent of the subject-matter; the persons who may give and take; the time when the gift may be made and when it may take effect the solemnities and the publicity that should go with it. That there should be supervision, general and periodical, individual and occasional, to counteract the principle of caducity; that there should be revision to counteract the principle of obsolescense, and that revision is neither dishonest, nor inexpedient nor unprecedented; that the revising power of a court is unfit and inexpedient; that there is need of special boards of revision, and that obsolete charities may be converted into more suitable form, and directed against evils more suitable for relief. It considers the question whether the State should especially favor charitable endowments, by pecuniary assistance through grants directly to them, and grants for supervision, and by remission of taxation upon them; by relaxation of legal rules affecting the constitution of them, the acquisition of property by them, the protection of their property, and the administration of it. It concludes with a statement of the reforms still 469. Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, p. 514.- On the extinction of a town and the division of its territory among others, the latter are proportionally liable for its debts. People v. Weaver, p. 539; Williams v. Weaver, p. 547.-National bank taxation cases. See 21 Alb. L. J. 210. Kidd v. Johnson, p. 617.—A trade-mark is assignable on a sale of the manufactory of the article to which it has been affixed. National Bank v. Graham, p. 699.- A National bank is liable for the grossly negligent loss of special deposits received with the acquiescence of its officers. See 21 Alb. L. J. 311. Cox v. National Bank, p. 704.- A bill of exchange accepted without specifying any place of payment is payable at the address of the drawee as named in the bill. needed in England, in the laws relating to charities, in THE the way of supervision, central and local, restriction and revision. From this synopsis of the plan of the essay and of its contents it is seen that it is both practical and interesting. It is well written, and seems to come from a study of the subject and thorough acquaintance with it. The subject is philosophically treated. The book may be read with profit by all concerned in the care and administration of endowed charities, whether public or private, or in the framing or executing of laws affecting those matters. We commend it to the attention of the student of social science, and suggest that the leisure of the lawyer will find interest in it. 100 UNITED STATES REPORTS. This volume, containing decisions of the October term, 1879, is perhaps the most important ever issued in this country. The following is a summary of the cases of general interest: Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, p. 24. Concerning passengers' baggage; the Russian lady's lace case, where a recovery of $10,000 was sustained, three judges dissenting. See 20 Alb. L. J. 409. Cowell v. Springs Co., p. 55.- A condition in a deed avoiding it if intoxicating liquors are retailed as a beverage on the premises is valid. See 20 Alb. L. J. 487 Holden v. Trust Co., p. 72.- After maturity of a contract for payment of money, interest follows the statutory and not the conventional rate. Trade-Mark Cases, p. 82.- Holding the Federal trade-mark registration law unconstitutional. See 20 Alb. L. J. 447. Dow v. Johnson, p. 158.-Jurisdiction of State courts as to official acts of Federal military officers. See 21 Alb. L. J. 188. Savings Bank v. Ward, p. 195.-Liability of attorney to vendee upon certificate of title to vendor. See 21 Alb. L. J. 206. Hough v. Railway Co., p. 213.Servant not liable for contributory negligence in working with defective machinery which master has promised to repair. See 21 Alb. L. J. 129. Oates v. National Bank, p. 239.-Note transferred as collateral security for antecedent debt, in consideration of extension of time of payment, held for value. Tennessee v. Davis, p. 257.― Jurisdiction of Federal courts over criminal acts by Federal revenue collectors. See 21 Alb. L. J. 271. Strauder v. West Virginia, p. 303; Virginia v. Rives, p. 313; Ex parte Virginia, 339; the colored jurors' cases. See 21 Alb. L. J. 309, 332, 329. Ex parte Seibold, p. 372; Ex parte Clarke, p. 399.-The Federal marshals' election cases. See 21 Alb. L. J. 247, 256. Packet Co. v. St. Louis, p. 423; Vicksburg v. Tobin, p. 430.- A municipal corporation may rent wharves on public waters. Guy v. Baltimore, p. 434.- Discrimination in city wharfage against products of other States. See 21 Alb. L. J. 371. Removal Cases, p. 457.-Hauenstein v. Lynham, p. 483.-The case of Swiss alienage. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, p. 491.- A State may tax residents for debts due by non-residents evidenced by bonds secured upon real estate in another State. See 20 Alb. L. J. ence. NOTES. HE American Law Review for August contains a long article on Homicide in Self-defense, by Seymour D. Thompson. Justice Dillard of the Supreme Court of North Carolina may serve as an example of Democratic habits and personal independIt is related that the late Judge Kerr once saw "Hi!" said Kerr, "how Dillard in a second-class car. comes it a man of your cloth is caught in a secondclass car?" Because there is no third-class," quietly replied Judge Dillard, and asked for a match to light his pipe.-Exchange. Our judges are still more democratic-they go afoot. It seems not unlawful to assault a ghost. We learn this from a Newburyport newspaper. The facts in the case appear to be as follows: One morning a company of young men thought it would be a good joke to throw a stone into the chamber window of one of the citizens of the town of West Newbury. A member of the family, however, overheard the young fellows plotting mischief, and hurrying home informed the old gentleman of the plan, and he, quickly donning a portion of his under-garments only, hastened to put himself in ambush. When the young rioters came along he sprang out, and all ran but one, who stood up and knocked the old gentleman down twice. Whereupon a warrant for assault was issued, and when brought into court the defendant pleaded that "he thought it was a ghost, and he wasn't going to run from it." Accordingly his honor discharged him. We have recently seen what the Kansas courts think of the restlessness of the small boy. Now, in State v. Prizer, 49 Iowa, 531, we find what the Iowa courts think of a certain idiosyncracy of lovely woman. The court there said: "The reputation of a man or woman does not always accord with the true character of the individual. The good and pure are often traduced by bad men and women, and suffer in reputation by reports invented and circulated through motives having their origin in enmity, malevolence and hate. The reputation of women for chastity is especially exposed to such assaults. A scandal having its origin in falsehood or imagination has no limit to its circulation, and the unfortunate subject of the slander will usually hear no voice from her own sex lifted up in her defense. A direct and confidently asserted charge of impurity is usually accepted by womankind as evidence of want of virtue, and often the poor suffering victim of slander is driven from society by the good and pure of her own sex without evidence of her guilt. This sad truth is familiar to all. It is strange, indeed, that the heart of woman, so tender toward the afflicted, so full of charity, so forgiving, and always prompting to deeds of kindness, should be closed to the victims of slander ameng her own sex. It may be that the inexorable laws of society, which banish the slandered woman, tend to protect and preserve virtue by presenting the most powerful motives for its practice, while they often inflict the most cruel injustice. The law, however, can recognize no such rules." The Albany Law ALBANY, AUGUST 21, 1880. CURRENT TOPICS. N anticipation of the meeting of the Institute of September, one of its leading members, Prof. Bluntschli, of the Heidelberg University, gives in the Berlin Gegenwart an account of what has been accomplished by the institute since its formation in September, 1873. At the meeting for organization, held in Ghent in Flemish Belgium seven years ago, it was asked: Will it be possible to unite in a compact society and in mutual labors the most eminent representatives of the science of international law from all civilized countries? If that succeeds, will The the members continue to make the needful sacrifices of time, energy and money for the common cause? Will the academy be able to come to an understanding on the vexed questions and problems of international law, or will the contrast of nations and schools increase and sharpen the uncertainty and contradictions of opinions? What will be the attitude of public opinion and of the governments to the academy? To what extent will it gain moral and intellectual authority? These questions, writes Prof. Bluntschli, can now, after seven years' existence and activity, for the most part, be answered with certainty. The experiment has been successful. number of regular members was limited to fifty at the beginning, and the membership now comprises the majority of the most eminent authors of works on international law. The labors of the members of the institute are shown in the contents of the Revue de Droit International and in the annual of the institute, the third volume of which has recently been published. The yearly meetings in Ghent, Geneva, the Hague, Zurich, Paris and Brussels have been largely attended by the members, although many have been compelled to make long and expensive journeys for the purpose. The fear that the great diversity of nationality and opinions would lead to endless confusion was soon shown to be entirely groundless. An agreement was soon reached upon nearly all questions of international law which were considered. The conflict of opinions has mostly been over subordinate matter. It is remarkable that the only great question upon which an agreement has not been reached is that of the exemption of private property at sea from seizure in time of war. The representatives of England cling tenaciously to the right of seizure, and, in answer to the arguments of the American and ContinentalEuropean representatives that private property should be respected at sea as well as on land, they maintain that the contributions and requisitions which armies demand in hostile countries, are in reality confiscations. But some time, when England's commerce is subject to depredations like those suffered by the merchant marine of the United VOL. 22. No. 8. States during the civil war, her eyes will be likely to be opened. Public opinion has been highly favorable to the institute, and many governments have paid it marked attention. At the meeting in Brussels last September it was unanimously agreed to prepare a manual of the international laws of war for the use of the armies, and submit the same to the several governments. The articles of war given to the troops in many countries were mostly devised many years ago, and are partly antiquated. The work has been done, and the book is said to be clear, brief and pointed, and easy of comprehension by a simple corporal or private. The work will be submitted to the institute, at its meeting in Oxford, and after it has been agreed upon, it will be recommended to the governments for the use of their armies. In this way it is expected that the institute will, before the end of the year, make its first approach to the governments. The third annual meeting of the American Bar Association was held at Saratoga Springs on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, August 18, 19 and 20, 1880. We go to press too early for a report in this number. The programme announced was as follows: On Wednesday the address of the president, Benjamin H. Bristow, Esq., of New York, was to be delivered at the opening session. This was to be followed by the nominations and elections of members, election of the general council, reports of the secretary and treasurer, and report of the executive committee. Papers were to be read by Henry E. Young, Esq., of Charleston, South Carolina, on "Sunday Laws;" by George Tucker Bispham, Esq., of Philadelphia, on "Rights of Material Men and Employees of Railroad Companies as against Mortgagees;" and by Henry D. Hyde, Esq., of Boston, on "Extradition between the States." On Thursday the session was to be opened by the annual address by Cortlandt Parker. After this was to follow the consideration of the resolutions recommended by the committee on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, viz.: Resolved, That the several State and local bar associations in the United States be respectfully requested to recommend and further the enactment of laws for assimilating throughout the Union on principles of comity, the standing of members of the bar already admitted to practice in their own States, by admitting to equal rights and privileges as practitioners of law in the courts of all the other States those who have practiced for three years in the highest court of the State of which they are citizens. Resolved, That the several State and other local bar associations be respectfully requested to recommend and further in their respective States the maintenance by public authority of schools of law, provided with faculties of at least four well paid and efficient teachers, whose diploma shall, upon being unanimously granted, after a full and fair written examination, be essential as a qualification for practicing law. Resolved, That the said State and other local bar associations be respectfully requested to recommend and further in such law schools a general course of instruction, to be duly divided, for ordinary purposes, into studies and exercises of the first year, of the second year, and of the third year, including, at least, the following studies: I. Moral and Political Philosophy. II. The Elementary and Constitutional Principles of the Municipal Law of England; and herein: 1st, Of the Feudal Law; 2d, The Institutes of the Municipal Law generally; 3d, The origin and progress of the Common Law. III. The Law of Real Rights and Real Remedies. IV. The Law of Personal Rights and Personal Remedies. V. The Law of Equity. VI. The Lex Mercatoria. The Law of Crimes and their Punishments. VIII. VII. The Law of Nations. IX. The Admiralty and Maritime Law. X. The Civil or Roman Law. XI. The Constitution and Laws of the United States of America, and herein of the jurisdiction and practice of the Courts of the United States. XII. Comparative Jurisprudence, and the Constitution and Laws of the several States of the Union. XIII. Political Economy. Resolved, That the said State and other local bar associations be respectfully requested to recommend and further in such law schools the requirement of attendance on at least the studies and exercises appointed for said course of three years, as a qualification for examination to be admitted to the bar. On Thursday evening, reports of the standing committees, reports of special committees, and nominations and election of officers. On Friday morning, miscellaneous business. In another column we give the result of the convention called to devise measures to relieve our overburdened courts. This problem is the most important matter of general interest now agitating our profession except the scheme of general codification. One thing must be borne in mind, namely, that we have a vast amount of necessary law business; and keeping this in mind, the question is, how to do it, and not, how not to do it. Recently we saw some comments on the comparative number of superior judges in this State and in England about 160 in this State, and some 34 in England. This is illusive reasoning, for there is a large number of county commissioners and other magistrates in England, who do a great amount of civil as well as criminal business. It must be remembered that our county judges do very little civil business. But the vital secret after all is that the amount of litigation in this State of five millions of inhabitants is much greater than in England with its thirty millions. This may seem a startling statement, but we have no doubt we can verify it. The calendars in England are amusingly small in comparison with ours, and yet the English judges are as badly in the lurch as our own, and the English law journals are full of complaints about it. It is our firm conviction that we must have a double Court of Appeals bench; must make our county judges do circuit business; must somewhat increase our present circuit judicial force; and must remodel our General Term system, adopting something like the old. But the impression that we have a sufficiently large judicial force, because it is larger than the English, will work mischief with the public interests. The all-sufficient refutation of that idea is the evident fact that our superior judges are all greatly overworked. We have received "The Special and Local Laws Affecting Public Interests in the City of New York, in force on January 1, 1880, compiled by George Bliss, Peter B. Olney, and William C. Whitney, corporation counsel, commissioners under chapter 536 of the laws of 1879," forming two volumes of 2,200 pages, in the aggregate. The Legislature at the last session passed an act repealing the laws and portions of laws contained in the second table preceding this compilation, entitled "Repealed and Superseded Laws;" but the bill was not signed by the Governor. The Legislature also passed an act, which the Governor approved, as follows: "SECTION 1. The volumes entitled 'The Special and Local Laws Affecting Public Interests in the City of New York,' and printed by order of the Legislature of 1880, may be read in evidence and cited in any court or proceeding. Said volumes shall be considered as containing presumptively all special or local laws affecting public interests in force in the city of New York, on the 1st day of January, 1880, but this presumption shall not be considered as extending to special laws relating to any corporation (other than the mayor, aldermen and commonalty), or to any association or society, nor shall the insertion or omission of any law relating to any such corporation be construed as in any manner affecting the corporate existence of any such corporation or its possession of its franchises." What effect the refusal of the Governor to approve the repealing act will have on the matter we cannot conjecture. The work is vastly important, and has been executed with commendable promptness. From the excellent abilities of the commissioners it is presumable that it has been thoroughly and accurately done. We have recently seen in one of our exchanges a communication advocating the fuller reporting of the arguments of counsel and the fuller statement of facts and pleadings. This would indeed be a step backward. That which renders some of our law reports abominable and costs lawyers a great deal of unnecessary outlay is this very padding. Law reports are designed to tell the profession what the courts have decided and their reasons for their decisions. They are not designed to instruct lawyers how to plead or argue. Any thing more than a synopsis of the arguments, and a bare statement of what the pleadings were, is an imposition on the profession. Why should we be compelled to pay for page on page of tedious common-law pleadings and page on page of evidence? As to the statement of facts, if the court has made it, that is usually enough. If it is not complete, supplement it sufficiently, but do not make it all over again. To read the facts in the head note, then in the reporter's statement, and finally in the opinion of the court, is "damnable iteration," and as senseless as the reading of a hymn |