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strued. We are now asked to go further, and hold that the section applies where the defendant has done nothing but simply remain passive when he ought to have been more vigilant and active to guard against a possible danger. If the statute was intended to apply to such a case, the language used❘ to express the intention was badly chosen; for certainly an injury resulting from a mere omission to act would not ordinarily be described as an injury inflicted by a wrongful act.

ever, that it is impossible so to construe the section, nor indeed that we should not so construe it if it were the only section on the subject. It is not the only section. The same chapter contains another section (§ 16), applicable to common carriers and to the proprietors of railroads and steamboats, which makes them answerable for the life of any person lost by reason of their carelessness or negligence, or by the carelessness or negligence of their agents or servants. The two sections are to be construed together, and being so construed, they lead to the conclusion that common carriers and proprietors of railroads and steamboats were intended to be put on a different footing from other persons, and to be held to answer for loss of life when other persons would not be held. This being so, the question is, what difference was intended; and the obvious answer is, that common carriers and proprietors of railroads and steamboats were intended to be subjected to a stricter liability than other persons, and to be held for their negligence or carelessness, even though it were merely passive, whereas other persons are to be held only when death ensues from injury inflicted by their wrongful acts." Our own statute is quite different, giving the right of action in case of "wrongful act, neglect, or default."

interest in the realty of his wife, on the wife by attaching her realty, and on both by attaching the wife's share of an intestate estate in the hands of an administrator. Pending the suit the husband was adjudged a bankrupt and subsequently died. Held, that the wife being legally incapable in Rhode Island to make a promissory note, the action against her could not be maintained. The court said: "As a general rule the validity of a contract is to be deWe will not say, how-termined by the law of the place of contract. Story's Confl. of Laws, §§ 242, 280; Whart. Confl. of Laws, 88 401, 419; Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65. So with the forms of execution and solemnization. Whart. Confl. of Laws, §§ 401, 606, 676; see, also, Savigny and Felix, quoted by Lawrence, Commentaires, tome iii, 265. But there is much contrariety of decision and many exceptions made by the cases, the courts generally trying to carry into effect the intention of the parties, and sometimes to protect their own citizens from imposition, especially in the case of married women and persons under age." "Every State has full control over property within it and over the process of its courts. It has the right to regulate the transfer of real property, stocks, and personal property within its limits; and it will not permit a foreign law to be intruded or to interfere with its own laws on those subjects. See Whart. Confl. of Laws, §§ 278, 297, 304, 334–5, 339, 353. And a contract valid by the laws of one State cannot be enforced in another, unless such a contract made between its own citizens could be enforced there, or in other words, it depends on the lex fori. On any other doctrine we should have a confusion of laws in the community, some persons and acts being regulated by the local laws and some by the laws of foreign States; and we should be in the situation of some countries in the Middle Ages, where different nationalities had been intermingled by immigration, or oftener by conquest, each retaining its ancient laws." "It may further illustrate the case to inquire whether she, remaining married, could, either while resident abroad or on coming here, sue in this State. Evidently not except in the cases where our law allows it. She can have no greater right in this State than a married woman residing here, and our law has provided no remedies, nor mode of suing or being sued, for foreigners, different from those applicable to our own citizens in similar cases.” This is distinguishable from Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374; S. C., 28 Am. Rep. 241, and Bell v. Packard, 69 Me. 105; S. C., 31 Am. Rep. 251. In the former case, a wife domiciled in Massachusetts made a contract in Maine, valid there but invalid in Massachusetts when made, for coverture; but the contract subsequently becoming valid by law in Massachusetts, it was held that it might be enforced there. In the latter, a wife, in Massachusetts, signed a note dated and written in Maine, and sent it there; held enforceable in Maine, although void in Massachusetts.

In Von Storch v. Winslow, 20, it is held that a sewing machine and a piano are "household furniture," exempt from attachment. The court remarked: "We have no doubt whatever that a sewing machine is a domestic implement of such a character that it ought to be so regarded. There is more question in regard to the piano. It appears by cases cited for the defendant, that in Vermont and Wisconsin a piano is not deemed to be an article of household furniture. Dunlap v. Edgerton, 30 Vt. 224; Tanner v. Billings, 18 Wis. 163. We think, however, that the question may be decided differently according as the habits and usages of society differ in different States. Moreover, the provision of the statute referred to appears to be intended as a restraint on both husband and wife, for the common benefit of the family, and ought to be liberally construed." A music teacher's piano is exempt as an implement of business. Amend v. Murphy, 69 Ill.

337.

In Hayden v. Stone, 91, A and B his wife made and delivered their negotiable promissory note to the plaintiff. The note was made in Massachusetts where the parties resided, and was valid there. Suit on this note was brought in Rhode Island, the writ being served on the husband by attaching his

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In King v. Batterson, 101, the defendant wrote to A that if B contracted with him for certain goods, to be paid for out of certain moneys, he would guar

antee the faithful performance of the contract. The goods were furnished not by A, but by the plaintiff. Held, (1) that the offer was conditional, and did not take effect without notice of acceptance; (2) that the plaintiff could not maintain an action on a transfer of the guaranty. The court said: "The instrument or writing relied on is not an absolute undertaking to pay for certain goods if the buyer does not. It is an offer made to the seller to be bound if the purchaser will comply with a certain condition. We think that being an offer, the defendant was entitled to notice at any rate that the condition had been complied with, on which condition he was to become liable. It is not an absolute promise to pay for such advances as a person may make to another, where the only condition, if it can be called a condition, is that the guarantee shall furnish the goods; but there is another condition, that a certain promise was to be made by the purchaser to pay out of certain funds, and the guarantor had a right to know that this promise was made in a manner to be available to him. See cases cited in Brandt on Suretyship,

159, 161-3. There must always be | an acceptance, but this may be express or implied. And if the guaranty be by letter for a future operation, especially of uncertain amount, then there should be distinct notice of acceptance. The guarantor should have an opportunity to know his liability and provide for it. 'And unless the transaction is such that it of itself gives him all the knowledge he needs at a proper time,' then he should have distinct notice. 2 Pars. on Cont. *14. And the relations of the parties, nearness of residence, are often mentioned as circumstances to be considered. And see 1 Chit. on Cont. (11th ed.) 742, note; Whitney v. Groot, 24 Wend. 82, 84; 2 Am. Lead. Cas. 75." "Ordinarily, a guaranty is not negotiable. It may indeed be made so, if such appears to be the intention of the guarantor. It may not be addressed to any particular person. It may be an offer addressed to all the world, as in the case of a reward offered. But if addressed to a particular person, as in this case, we think it cannot be transferred so as to enable another to sue upon it in his own name. There may be good reasons why the guarantor should be willing to deal with one person and not with another; and there may be equities, or other dealings, between the guarantor and the guarantee which the former may desire to provide for, and has a right to provide for. Brandt on Suretyship, §§ 96, 97; Taylor v. Wetmore, 10 Ohio, 490; Bleeker v. Hyde, 3 McLean, 279." As to the latter holding, see note, 28 Am. Rep. 347.

INSURANCE ON STOCK OF GOODS — PAR

TICULAR EXCEPTION.

consent written on the policy. The insurance clause was written; the exempting clause was printed. The insured kept for sale both turpentine and benzine, without such consent. Held, that the policy was avoided, although those articles might be part of the merchandise usually kept in such stores. The court said: "There is certainly no repugnancy in agreeing to insure a general stock of merchandise subject to the condition that gunpowder, petroleum, turpentine, and benzine, shall not form part of such stock. Surely there is nothing so unusual in reservations and conditions in contracts as to make them the subjects of unusual construction or of extraordinary consideration. Surely, without repugnancy, one may contract for the sale of a plantation of one hundred acres of land reserving thereout ten acres. Or suppose the contract in controversy to be for the sale of this general stock of merchandise, excepting the articles above mentioned, could any doubt but that the exception was good?"

The court relied on Insurance Co. v. Kroegher, 83 Penn. St. 64; S. C., 24 Am. Rep. 147. But that was not the case of an insurance of general merchandise usually kept in a country store, but of a "stock of merchandise contained in store." As counsel argued, in the principal case: "These are not words descriptive of a class of goods. It was argued that the word merchandise meant such as is usually kept in a country store, and here is where the case failed. They asked to have implied what we have expressed.

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In Citizens' Insurance Co. v. McLaughlin, 53 Penn. St. 485, the insurance was of a patent leather manufactory. The policy permitted five barrels of benzole in a detached shed, but classed oils among hazardous and prohibited risks. The court said: "The company could not have expected" the business "to be suspended, nor to be carried on in any other than the customary modes." "The words of the policy descriptive of the subject-matter of the insurance, are the buildings of their tannery and patent leather manufactory,' and it must be intended that these words included whatever, not expressly excepted, was necessary and essential in conducting such a business." Citing the Harper case, infra.

In Franklin Fire Insurance Co. v. Updegraff, 43 Penn. St. 350, the insurance was on merchandise such as is usually kept in country stores. Hardware, china, glassware, looking-glasses, etc., were classed in the policy among hazardous risks, to be inserted in the policy, or the policy would be avoided. Held, that they were covered, if usually kept in country stores, and this was a question of fact.

In Steinbach v. LaFayette Fire Insurance Co., 54 N. Y. 90, the court said, by Reynolds, C.: "The N Lancaster Fire Insurance Co. v. Lenheim, 89 plaintiff was insured for one year against fire, on

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his line of business, in his store in the city of Baltimore, in his occupancy as a German jobber and

"general merchandise of all kinds usually kept in a country retail store," "except as hereinafter provided." Immediately following this was an exemp-importer, and he was privileged to keep fire-crack

tion from liability for loss where turpentine or benzine were deposited, stored, kept or used, without

ers on sale. It was provided in the policy that if the premises should be used for the purpose of car

rying on therein any trade or occupation, or of storing or keeping therein articles, goods or merchandise denominated hazardous or extra hazardous or specially hazardous, in the second class of hazards annexed to the policy, except as therein specially provided for, or thereinafter agreed to by the defendant, in writing upon the policy, then so long as the same shall be so used the policy was to be of no effect. The policy of insurance was accepted by the plaintiff with the condition last referred to, and the privilege to keep 'fire-crackers on sale' was specially written in the policy, and added ten cents more of premium to the $100. 'Fire-works' are claimed as 'specially hazardous,' and added fifty cents or more per $100 to the rate of insurance, and it is claimed, that to be covered by the insurance, must have been specially written in the policy, which in this case was not done. The rule which prevails in the interpretation of contracts of insurance is or should be the same as in all other written contracts of whatever nature. The intent is to be ascertained and observed, and if it clearly appears by the writing, the contract must have effect according to its terms. In this case, without evidence

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aliunde, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to say what articles in fact were intended to be insured. The court cannot judicially take notice of the precise commodities which make up a stock of fancy goods, toys, and other articles in that line of business, nor can it be declared, as a legal proposition, what precise things pertain to the occupancy of a building in the city of Baltimore as a 'German jobber and importer.' In the prosecution of his business the plaintiff did keep 'fire-works,' and the loss was occasioned by their accidental ignition, and it appears to have been absolutely necessary, in order to settle the dispute between the parties, to ascertain whether the keeping of 'fire-works' for sale was in the line of the plaintiff's business.' If not, it is very clear they were not insured against, because they were not specially written in the policy,' and the fact that the privilege to keep 'fire-crackers on sale' was specially written in the policy, affords a very strong argument in favor of the defendant that 'fire-works' were not insured against, for there was no special writing in regard to them, unless included in the written words 'in the line of the business' of the plaintiff. I do not understand it was claimed by the counsel for the defendant, on the trial, that the plaintiff was not at liberty to show that keeping fire-works' for sale was in the line of the plaintiff's business. It was in fact shown, without objection, that he had always kept them as a part of his stock in trade, and had some on hand when the insurance was effected. Evidence was also given, on the part of the plaintiff, tending to show that similar dealers usually kept fire-works as a part of their stock in trade. Evidence on the part of the defendant was given tending to show the contrary, but it was not very conclusive. If, therefore, as a matter of fact, the keeping of fire-works was in the line of the plaintiff's business, the cases are quite too numerous and familiar to need citation, that 'fire-works' were embraced in

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the written description of the property covered by the policy."

Johnson, C., said: "Under the condition in the policy, suspending its operation so long as the premises should be used for the purpose of carrying on therein any trade or occupation, or for storing or keeping therein, any articles, goods or merchandise, denominated hazardous or extra hazardous or specially hazardous, in the second class of the classes of hazards annexed to the policy, except as therein specially provided for or thereafter agreed to by the corporation in writing upon the policy, it is the settled law of this State, that any such article is specially provided for, if it, as matter of fact, enters into and forms a part of the kind or line of business specified in the written part of the policy in the description of the risk assumed. The insurers being bound to know the nature and kind of articles belonging to the business and occupations against the risks of which they undertake to insure, the specification of the business is a sufficient special provision for all the articles belonging to it under the condition in the policy, even though some of those articles belong to the second class of hazards mentioned in the condition. Harper v. Albany M. Ins. Co., 17 N. Y. 194; Harper v. N. Y. City Ins. Co., 22 id. 441."

"In conclusion it is proper to advert to the decision in Steinbach v. Insurance Co., 13 Wall. 183, in which a different construction was placed upon similar terms in another policy in favor of the plaintiff here. The New York cases do not seem to have been adverted to, nor the case itself much considered. We should not be justified under these circumstances, in abandoning a settled line of decision in our own State in order to conform to it." The doctrine of this case is reiterated in Hall v. Insurance Co. of North America, 58 N. Y. 292.

The facts in Steinbach v. Insurance Co., above cited, were the same as in the New York case, and the decision was exactly the reverse. The court simply said: "It is not pretended that fire-works are included under the name of fire-crackers. But the plaintiff contends that they are included in the description of 'other articles in his line of business.' The answer to this is that the policy itself requires that fire-works shall be specially written in it. They are among the goods described as specially hazardous, and add 50 cents on the $100 to the ordinary rate of insurance. It is impossible to think that they are described by the general terms used in the policy. The insurance was at the ordinary rates. There can be no doubt that the evidence was properly rejected." No authorities were cited. Mr. Wood says this is in conflict with all the better class of cases. Fire Ins., 370, note.

In Whitmarsh v. Conway Fire Ins. Co., 16 Gray, 359, the insurance was on a "stock in trade, consisting of the usual variety of a country store, except dry goods," with "permission to keep and sell burning fluid and gunpowder," and provided that if certain enumerated articles, denominated hazardous, extra hazardous, and risks prohibited, were kept on the premises, the policy should be void, un

less they were specially provided for. Held, that the keeping of some of such enumerated articles did not avoid the policy, they being such as are usually kept in a country store, and that parol evidence was admissible to prove that fact. The articles in question were oil, friction matches, glass and earthenware. This followed Elliott v. Hamilton Mutual Insurance Co., 13 Gray, 139, where the insurance was on "goods usually kept in a country store," and the prohibition was of "cotton or woolen waste or rags." Held, not to cover clean, white cotton rags, if usually forming part of the stock of a country store. (The mere description of the premises as "a provision and grocery store," would not, however, outweigh an express prohibition. Whitmarsh v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 2 Allen, 581.)

In Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. De Graff, 12 Mich. 124, the insurance was on a stock of "groceries," with an exception of alcoholic liquors, unless specially provided or agreed to in writing on the policy. Held, that the liquors were covered if the jury should find them to be "groceries.' "" The court said: "By the use of a term including them they are 'specially provided for in writing on the policy.' Insuring a class of goods includes what is usually contained in it, whether extra hazardous or not." Citing the New York Bryant and Harper cases.

In Viele v. Germania Insurance Co., 26 Iowa, 9, the company consented to the use of the insured premises as a manufactory of window shades, in the conduct of which business benzine was necessarily used. The policy prohibited the keeping of benzine. But it was held that the policy was not avoided. The court said: "The consent to the manufacture of the window shades implied a consent to the use of benzine if it was necessary or commonly used in making those articles; otherwise a direct permission to continue the manufactory would be defeated by the prohibition in the policy." This is founded on the Harper and McLaughlin

cases.

therefore, applicable to such instruments, which gives to the written portion of them controlling force, when there is any conflict or want of harmony between it and the printed stipulations. Ang. on Ins., §§ 14, 15." "All such articles are just as clearly embraced in the policy as if each article thus necessarily used was enumerated at length. Insurance companies must be deemed to be familiar with the materials necessary to the carrying on any trade or business, the 'stock in trade' of which they insure, and in issuing the policy they must be deemed to have intended to include all such materials in the risk." Citing the Harper case.

In Archer v. Merchants and Manufacturers' Ins. Co., 43 Mo. 434, the insurance was on a wagonmaker's shop and materials, with a printed prohibition of benzine. The insured kept benzine in a paint shop in the same building. The same doctrine was held as in the last case, following the New York cases. There is a dictum to the same effect in Leggett v. Ins. Co., 10 Rich. 202.

In Collins v. Farmville Ins. and Banking Co., 79 N. C. 279; S. C., 28 Am. Rep. 322, the insurance was on a stock of "drugs and medicines," with a prohibition of gunpowder, fire-works, saltpetre, etc. Held, that this did not extend to saltpetre kept as a drug.

It therefore seems that the principal case is utterly opposed to the decisions in all the other States, and that it is quite difficult to reconcile it with previous decisions in the same State. We think the matter can be tested thus: suppose the written clause had insured all the usual articles of the stock of a country store, specifically naming them all, and including turpentine and benzine, and then in the printed portion had excepted and prohibited turpentine and benzine; would it be contended that the insurance did not cover turpentine and benzine? In the policy in question turpentine and benzine were as effectually included in the written clause, if they form part of the usual stock of a country store, as if they had been specifically named.

THE LEGAL OPERATION OF TREATIES.

BY SAMUEL T. SPEAR, D. D.

REATIES of the United States are a part of “the

TREA

supreme law of the land," and, as such, binding upon the judges in the several States. All cases in law

In Phonix Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 5 Minn. 492, the insurance was on a stock of goods consisting of a general assortment of dry goods, groceries, crockery, boots and shoes, and such goods as are usually kept in a general retail store." By a printed clause, the keeping of gunpowder was prohibited unless especially consented to in writing on the policy. It was held that the written portion prevailed over the printed, and that the written words would authorize the keeping of gunpowder, it being proved and equity arising under these treaties come within that it was usually kept in general retail stores. the cognizance of the National judiciary. Such cases, The court said: "In the interpretation of such in- arising in State courts, are among those that may by struments it is always to be kept in sight, that the writ of error be transferred to the Supreme Court of main portion of the policy, with all its conditions the United States for final settlement. Treaties arc and restrictions, is in a printed form, intended to hence rules for guiding the action of courts, both State and National, in determining rights growing out of or be sufficiently general to meet all cases, and prevent protected by them. In this respect they have the the necessity for drawing a policy for each risk character and authority of supreme municipal laws taken, which would very much retard and embarrass within the territory and among the people of the the transaction of such business, and that the writ- United States. The courts of this country, both State ten part, inserted by the parties, is more immedi- and National, have on numerous occasions expounded and applied them as laws. And thus a body of prinately expressive of their meaning and intention conciples, or legal propositions relating to treaties, has cerning the contract they are entering into, than the been gradually established by judicial authority, esprinted portion. There is a rule of construction,pecially by the highest tribunal of the land. A brief

statement of some of these principles will constitute the object of this article.

1. Courts take judicial notice of treaties as public laws, equal in rank to the laws of Congress. They are a part or the whole of the law in every case to which they are applicable; and courts are presumed to know what the law is, as thus established, and where it is to be found. Treaties are preserved in the archives of the government, and are, moreover, published by its authority as rules for courts of justice, and that, too whether they are reminded of them or not in the pleadings. It is their business to understand this branch of the law. Mr. Justice Story, in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, referring to a treaty of the United States, said that it "was not necessary to have been stated, for it was the supreme law of the land, of which all courts must take notice."

And, as to their rank, treaties stand on the same footing as the acts of Congress, and are to be so regarded by courts. Chief Justice Marshall, in The United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch, 103, said that "the Constitution of the United States declares a treaty to be the supreme law of the land. Of consequence, its obligation on the Courts of the United States must be admitted. *** Where a treaty affects the rights of parties litigating in court, that treaty as much binds those rights, and is as much to be regarded by the court as an act of Congress."

So, also, in Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, the same eminent jurist said that a treaty of the United States is "to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the Legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision." Whether therefore a law be established by the action of Congress, or by an exercise of the treaty power, is an immaterial circumstance in the judicial notice to be taken of it, and in the rank to be assigned to it.

2. This judicial notice extends to treaties which preceded the adoption of the Constitution, as well as to those made since its adoption, and also to treaties with the Indian tribes, as well as to those with foreign nations. The Constitution expressly specifies "all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States," as a part of "the supreme law of the land." The attribute of supremacy hence attaches to them, whether made by the United States under the Articles of Confederation, or by the President, with the approval of the Senate, under the authority of the Constitution. Mr. Justice Chase, in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, referring to a particular article in the treaty of peace with Great Britain, made in 1783, said that it is "retrospective and is to be considered in the same light as if the Constitution had been established before the making of the treaty of 1783." Force was given to this treaty in its relation to a law enacted by the Legislature of Virginia in 1777. The priority of the treaty to the Constitution was held not to impair its efficacy as a supreme law.

So, also, treaties with the Indian tribes, whether made before or after the adoption of the Constitution, have the same legal character as those made with foreign nations, and are to be so regarded by courts of justice. Chief Justice Marshall, in Worcester v. The State of Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, declared certain laws of Georgia to be unconstitutional, and, among other reasons, assigned the fact that "they were in direct hostility with treaties repeated in a succession of years, which mark out the boundary that separates the Cherokee country from Georgia, guaranty to them all the land within their boundary, solemnly pledge the faith of the United States to restrain their citizens from trespassing on it, and recognize the pre-existing power of the nation to govern itself." He also said: "The Constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the

Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties." As to the words "treaty" and "nation," he added: "We have applied them to Indians as we have applied them to other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense.'

In Turner v. The American Baptist Missionary Union, 5 McLean, 344, Mr. Justice McLean said: "It is contended that a treaty with Indian tribes has not the same dignity and effect as a treaty with a foreign and independent nation. This distinction is not authorized by the Constitution. Since the commencement of the Government treaties have been made with the Indians, and the treaty-making power has been exercised in making them. They are treaties within the meaning of the Constitution, and as such are the supreme law of the laud."

It is sadly true that the political department of the Government has in numerous instances most shamefully disregarded its treaties with the Indian tribes. The National judiciary, however, has uniformly asserted and maintained the sacredness of their obligation and their authority as a part of "the supreme law of the land."

3. The "cases in law and equity" arising under treaties of the United States are such, and such only, as involve rights that directly grow out of or are directly protected by these treaties. On this point Chief Justice Marshall, in Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 344, remarked: "The words of the Constitution are 'cases arising under treaties.' Each treaty stipulates something respecting the citizens of the two nations, and gives them rights. Whenever a right grows out of or is protected by a treaty, it is sanctioned against all the laws and judicial decisions of the States; and whoever may have this right, it is to be protected. But if the person's title is not affected by the treaty, if he claims nothing under a treaty, his title cannot be protected by that treaty."

It was accordingly held that the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, providing for a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States to the highest State courts, in cases in which the validity of a treaty is drawn in question, etc., must be so restrained as to make it conformable to the Constitution, and limit the judicial power to cases actually arising under treaties. The Constitution itself fixes this limit. If the right does not so arise, then it cannot make a case under a treaty. Henderson v. Tennessee, 10 How. 311; Gill v. Oliver's Executors, 11 id. 529; and Verden v. Coleman, 1 Black, 472.

4. The construction of treaties, considered as laws affecting rights as between individuals, is exclusively a judicial function. Mr. Justice Grier, in Wilson v. Wall, 6 Wall. 83, observed: "Congress has no constitutional power to settle the rights under treaties, except in cases purely political. The construction of them is the peculiar province of the judiciary when a case shall arise between individuals." Congress may legislate for the execution of treaties by establishing courts and defining their jurisdiction; but the work of expounding them and applying them as laws, and by them determining the rights and obligations of individuals interested in or affected by them as laws, belongs to the courts of the land. In this respect there is no distinction between a treaty and a law enacted by Congress. The province of the judiciary is the same in both cases.

This function of construction is simply one of interpretation, rigidly applied to all parts of the treaty. Mr. Justice Story, in The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat. 1, thus stated this doctrine: "We are to find out the intention of the parties by just rules of interpretation applied to the subject-matter, and having found that our duty is to follow it as far as it goes, and to stop where that stops, whatever may be the imperfections

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