danger been known; but whether it used that degree of care and prudence which very cautious, competent persons would have used under the apparent circumstances of the case, to have prevented the accident, without reasonable knowledge that it was likely to have occurred. Shearm. & Redf. on Neg., § 266; Bowen v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 408.

A railroad company is required to so construct its road-bed and track as to avoid such damages as could have been reasonably foreseen by competent and skillful engineers, from the ordinary rainfalls and freshets incident to the particular section of the country through which they are constructed, but would not have been guilty of such culpable negligence as to make it liable in damages, if it failed to provide against such extraordinary floods or other inevitable casualties, caused by some hidden force of nature, unknown to common experience, and which could not have been reasonably anticipated by the ordinary engineering skill and experience required in the prudent construction of such railroads. If an accident should happen from such cause on a road-bed and track which had been properly constructed and kept in good repair, when the agents and employees in charge of the train were in the due exercise of that degree of caution and prudence necessary at all times; and when they did not have, from information conveyed to them, or from their own personal observation, reasonable grounds to anticipate impending danger, and consequently did not use such extraordinary precaution as might have otherwise averted it, then the law characterizes it as an act of God, or such inevitable accident as is incidental to all human works, and which would relieve the company from liability. Even under the rigid rules of the common law, which made common carriers insurers of the safe delivery of all articles committed to their care, such cause would have excused them. Shearm. & Redf. on Neg., § 290; Withers v. North Kent R. R. Co., 27 L. J. Exch. 417; Railroad Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 176; Livezey v. Philadelphia, 64 Penn. St. 106.

The undisputed facts in this case show, substantially:

1. That defendant's road was of first-class, only three years old, and in good order at the place of the accident; that the ties and iron were sound and good.

2. That in the latter part of the day, and about the dark of the day of the accident, an unprecedentedly heavy rain fell in that locality, which was not general, but which caused the embankment to give way under the train as it passed over the place, and thus caused the disaster.

3. That the track at that place was sound and in good condition as far as could be seen only 125 minutes prior to the occurrence, when the north bound train passed over it.

4. That between that time and the occurrence of the accident, that section of the road embracing the place of the accident was inspected, and found and left in good condition, and was still in good condition at the time the wrecked train ran on it, as far as could be seen; had its usual appearance to an engineer who had been running over it ever since the road was built.

5. That the train and engine were in good condition, having been so found on examination only one hour before the accident, and were properly manned.

6. That the accident occurred seventy minutes after leaving Palestine, and sixteen miles from that place, when the train was running at about half speed, on a track which was apparently safe at all times for that rate.

7. That it had rained during the day at Palestine, but not so hard as to make it necessary to give orders in reference to the track.

The evidence, as thus disclosed by the record, shows

that the defendant company had used a commendable degree of skill, prudence and vigilance in the construction and management of its road, and that the misfortune to the plaintiff was the result of one of those inevitable accidents of which passengers assume the risk, and for which the law does not hold the company responsible in damages. Angell on Carriers, § 523.

We are of opinion that the court erred in the charge as above shown, and also in refusing a new trial, because the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence, for which errors the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT AB

STRACT.*

HUSBAND AND WIFE-ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT NOT MAINTAINABLE BETWEEN.-An action of assumpsit on account annexed to writ cannot be maintained by a wife against her husband while the counubial relation remains in full force. Neither party to the marriage contract can sue the other at common law while the marriage relation subsists, and this rule is not allowed by a statute providing that "she may prosecute and defend suits at law or in equity either in tort or contract in her own name without the joinder of her husband for the preservation and protection of her property and personal rights, or for the redress of her injuries as if unmarried." See Crowther v. Crowther, 55 Me. 358. Hobbs v. Hobbs. Opinion by Appleton, C. J.

MORTGAGE RENT OF MORTGAGED PREMISES MORTGAGEE NOT ENTITLED TO.- A mortgagee is not entitled to the rent of the mortgaged premises from the tenant of the mortgagor till he takes possession, or requires the tenant to attorn to him. Prior thereto the mortgagor is entitled to the rent. The mortgagor, so long as he remains in possession, or until entry by the mortgagee, may receive the rents and profits to his own use and is not liable to answer for them to the mortgagee. Boston Bank v. Reed, 8 Pick. 459. He is not even liable for those accruing between the comniencement of action to foreclose and the time of taking possession upon execution. Mayo v. Fletcher, 14 Pick. 525. The purchaser of the equity stands in the place of the mortgagor, with a right to take the rents and profits to his own use until the mortgagee shall enter or do some equivalent act. Field v. Swan, 10 Metc. 112. Long v. Wade. Opinion by Appleton, C. J.

PARTNERSHIP — PARTNERS SIGNING NOTES IN INDIVIDUAL NAMES-WHEN CREDITOR MAY ELECT BETWEEN FIRM AND INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY — INSOLVENCY.-Two persons, partners, not having adopted any firm namie, made notes in their individual names, one as maker and the other as payee and indorser, and got the notes discounted at a bank, for the purpose of using the money obtained thereon and using it in their partnership business. They are in insolvency and have estates both as partners and as individuals. It was known to the bank, when the notes were discounted, that they were partnership paper or given for partnership purposes. Held, that the bank had an election to prove its claim either against the partnership estate, or against the estates of the individual members of the firm; but was not entitled to prove them against both the joint and the several estates. The bank having filed the claims against all the estates before the rule affecting its interests had been established by statute or judicial decision, a reasonable time is allowed to reconstruct the proofs in accordance with the principles of the decision given. In re Warren, Davies, 327; Ex parte Foster, 2 Story, 131; In re Holbrook, 2 Low. 362; Paine v. Dwinel, 53 Me. 52;

* To appear in 70 Maine Reports.

Palmer v. Elliott, 1 Cliff. 63; Ex parte First National Bank of Portland; In re Thompson. Opinion by Peters, J.

JOINT AND SEVERAL NOTE GIVEN BY PARTNERS -WHEN CREDITOR MAY HOLD BOTH FIRM AND INDIVIDUAL PARTNERS-INSOLVENCY.-The holder of a joint and several note given by partners in their partnership name, they being in insolvency as partners and individuals, is entitled to prove his note against the joint estate of the firm and also against the several estates of the individual members of the firm, and to receive dividends from all the estates. In re Farnum, 6 Bost. L. Rep. 21, an important case upon this question not reported elsewhere. See, also, In re Weston, 12 Metc. 1; Borden v. Cuyler, 10 Cush. 476; Ex parte Farnsworth, 1 Low. 497; In re Holbrook, 2 id. 259; Mead v. National Bank, 6 Blatchf. 180; In re Cram, 1 B. R. 132; In re Bigelow, 2 id. 374; In re Tesson, 9 id. 378; Emery v. Canal Bank, 7 id. 217; In re Dow, 14 id. 307; Simpson v. Henning, L. R., 10 Q. B. 406; Ex parte Honey, L. R., 7 Ch. 178; Ex parte Stone, L.R., 8 Ch. 914; In re Plummer, 1 Phil. 56. The holder is entitled to receive dividends upon the whole claim, provided he does not receive in all more than his full due, unless he has received a dividend on one estate before making proof against another. Where a dividend has been paid, and generally when declared, on one estate before proof is made against another, the amount thereof should be deducted, and a dividend from the balance only allowed from the other. Sohier v. Loring, 6 Cush. 537; Ex parte Wildman, 1 Atk. 109; Ex parte Taylor, 1 De Gex and J. 302; Ex parte Talcott, 2 Low. 320; Ex parte Harris, id. 568. When the members of a firm, having no firm name and no joint estate other than that of the firm, give a joint note in their individual names for money borrowed for and used in their partnership business, such note is provable in insolvency against their partnership estate. This mode of signing partnership paper is as effectual as any other mode. Agawam Bank v. Morris, 4 Cush. 99; Trowbridge v. Cushman, 24 Pick. 310; In re Thomas, 17 B. R. 54; Richardson v. Higgins, 23 N. H. 106; Tucker v. Peaslee, 36 id. 167; Maynard v. Fellows, 43 id. 255; Kendrick v. Tarbell, 26 Vt. 512; Turner v. Jaycox, 40 N. Y. 470; Norton v. Seymour, 3 Man. G. & S. 792; Brackett v. Stokes, 58 Tenn. 442; Tilley v. Phelps, 18 Conn. 295; In re Warren, Davies, 324; Forsythe v. Woods, 11 Wall. 486; Hoare v. Oriental Bank, L. R., 2 Ch. 589; Waite v. Foster, 33 Me. 424; Paine v. Dwinel, 53 id. 52; 1 Pars. on Cont. 214. Berkshire Woolen Co. v. Julliard, 75 N. Y. 535. When partners make covenants under seal, the true mode of signing is individually. Ex parte Nason, In re Thompson. Opinion by Peters, J.

AGES. While a railroad company may, when licensed by the proper authorities, occupy a street or alley with its track, yet if in laying down such track it so changes the established grade, or in any other manner so lays its track as to permanently obstruct access to an adjoining lot, or if it unnecessarily and unreasonably leaves its cars standing on the track so as to interfere with approach to the lot, the lot-owner may recover damages therefor, and a petition which in general terms charges such wrongs is good as against attack made simply by objecting to the admission of testimony. A. & N. R. R. Co. v. Garside, 10 Kans. 552; To appear in 23 Kansas Reports.

Venard v. Cross, 8 id. 248. A railroad company has no higher rights in a highway than an individual - it may share in its use, but cannot monopolize it; and the owner of a lot abutting on the highway, and who has special need thereof for ingress to and egress from his lot, is specially damaged by any monopolizing of the use of the highway by a railroad company. Where the appropriation charged is in the manner of construction, and in leaving its cars constantly standing upon the track, either is a wrong, giving plaintiff a cause of action. Haynes v. Thomas, 7 Ind. 38; E., etc., R. R. Co. v. Combs, 10 Bush, 382; J. M. & I. R. R. Co. v. Esterle, 13 Bush, 667; Stetson v. C., etc., R. R. Co., 75 Ill. 74; Street Railway v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St. 523. Where the wrong done by the railroad company is temporary in its nature, as in leaving cars unnecessarily on its track, or while engaged in the work of laying down its track, something existing to-day and not to-morrow, fluctuating in extent and depending on the ever-repeated action of the company, only such damages as have fully accrued prior to the commencement of the suit are recoverable, and none based upon any presumed continuance or repetition of the wrong. But where the wrong is of a permanent nature, and springs from the manner in which the track as fully completed affects approach to the lot, then, notwithstanding the right which the State retains to control the manner of use of a highway by a railroad company,even if deemed necessary to compel an entire removal of its track, the lot-owner may treat the act of the company as a permanent appropriation of the right of access to his lot, and recover as damages the consequent depreciation in value of the lot; and in such cases the recovery of damages is a consent on the part of the lot-owner to such manner of occupying the street, and concludes both him and any subsequent owner of the property. L., etc., R. R. v. Applegate, 8 Dana, 294; LeClercq v. Gallipolis, 7 Ohio, 217; Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet. 431; Mix v. L. B. & M. Ry. Co., 67 Ill. 319; Stone v. F. P. & N. W. R. R. Co., 68 id. 394. Pacific Railroad Co. v. Twine.

-

Central Branch Union Opinion by Brewer, J.

HOMESTEAD MAY BE IN BUILDING UPON LEASED GROUND-USE OF PART OF PREMISES FOR BUSINESS PURPOSES. A party may acquire a homestead in a building occupied as a residence by his family, although the building is erected upon ground in which he has but a leasehold interest. Although a building upon leased ground is taxable by statute as personal property, and although the lessee has the right to remove the building at the termination of his lease, and although he mortgages it as personal property, yet the homestead character remains as long as the building is not removed and is occupied as a residence by his family; and such mortgage is of no validity unless his wife joins therein or consents thereto. In Sears v. Hanks, 14 Ohio St. 301, the court, speaking of the homestead law, says: "We think its provisions protect the debtor's family as against his creditor to the enjoyment of an actual homestead, irrespective of the title or tenure by which it is held." In Spencer v. Geissman, 37 Cal. 99, it was held that one having a mere naked possession, the title being in a stranger, may acquire a homestead right as against everybody but the true owner. See, further, on the general principle: Deere v. Chapman, 25 Ill. 612; Bartholomew v. West, 2 Dill. 293; McKee v. Wilcox, 11 Mich. 358; Thorn v. Thorn, 14 Iowa, 49; Pelan v. De Bevard 13 id. 53; Conklin v. Foster, 57 Ill. 104; Johnson v. Richardson, 33 Miss. 462. Where it is shown that a building is occupied as a residence by the family of the owner, and neither the size nor the number of rooms appears, further than that it is a one-and-one-half story frame building, the homestead character is not destroyed by proof that one or two rooms therein are used by himself and wife for business purposes. In re

P., who resides in Kansas, commences an action before a justice of the peace in Kansas against G., who resides in Indiana, and P. also at the same time institutes attachment and garnishment proceedings in such action, and P. procures service of summons by publication in a newspaper only, and P. obtains a judgment against G. for the amount claimed, and also obtains an order against the garnishee, who is a debtor of G., requiring him to pay the amount of such judgment, which the garnishee does, and P. accepts such amount in satisfaction of said judgment, but G. did not at any time owe P. any thing nor did P. at any time have any cause of action against G., and G. did not in fact have any notice of said suit, or attachment, or garnishment proceedings until long after they occurred, held, that nothing in said action, except the disposal of the money or property obtained by virtue of said attachment and garnishment proceedings, and the title thereto, is res adjudicata, and that G. may maintain an action against P. for the damages occasioned by the wrongful obtaining of said money. See Hoshaw v. Hoshaw, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 258; Melhop v. Doane, 31 Iowa, 399-407; Alexander v. Hutchison, 9 Ala. 825; 1 Greenleaf on Ev., § 542; Story on Confl. of Law, § 549. Starr v. Hinshaw. Opinion by Valentine, J.

MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT ABSTRACT.

CONVERSION

OTHER

-OF BUILDINGS BELONGING TO ANBY LAND-OWNER -WHEN BUILDINGS PER

SONAL PROPERTY. — A., in possession of lands belonging to defendant, with an agreement for a deed, erected buildings thereon under a verbal agreement that the buildings were not to become the property of defendant. Thereafter A., while in possession by bill of sale, under seal conveyed the buildings to plaintiff's intestate. Subsequent to this defendant, by request of A., conveyed the lands to K. with warranty, A. at the same time gave up the agreement for the deed and a release of the lands with the privileges and appurtenances belonging. Neither defendant nor K. knew of the conveyance to plaintiff's intestate. The deed to K. made no mention of the buildings, but conveyed by metes and bounds with the privileges and appurtenances. Held, that defendant was liable to plaintiff for the conversion of the buildings. If a man puts a house or other building upon land of another, under an agreement with the owner of the land that he may remove it, the building becomes his personal property. He may lose his right to it if the land is sold to an innocent purchaser without notice of the agreement. He cannot set up his title against such innocent purchaser whom he has misled by permitting the building to be attached to and apparently a part of the realty bought by him. But as against the original owner of the land and all persons taking under him with notice, the building never becomes a part of the realty, but remains personal property, and he or a purchaser from him may maintain replevin or trover to recover it, or its value, even while it remains npon the land and apparently a part of the realty. Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279; Brooks v. Prescott, 114 id. 392; Hartwell v. Kelly, 117 id. 235. In this case by virtue of the agreement between A. and the defendant, the buildings never became a part of the defendant's real

estate, but remained the personal property of A. He had the right to sell them to the plaintiff's intestate. Defendant knew that by virtue of the agreement he had made the buildings remained personal property, and he is presumed in law to have known that the effect of his sale of the land to K. would be to give him a title to the buildings, and thus deprive the owner of all right to them. His sale to K. was the exercise of dominion over the property inconsistent with the right of the plaintiff's intestate, who was the owner. Doliver v. Ela. Opinion by Morton, J. [Decided June, 1880.]

MASTER AND SERVANT-ONE

ASSISTING SERVANT

AT REQUEST OF MASTER NOT CO-SERVANT-NEGLIGENCE.-Plaintiff was in the employ of one Winchester as a machinist. Winchester had built an engine which defendant, a teamster, had been employed to take to the railroad station and load it on the car. Plaintiff and another employee of Winchester assisted defendant's servants in loading the engine on defendant's wagon. Defendant, who was present, told plaintiff and the others (what was denied by Winchester), that it was a part of his agreement with Winchester that two of the latter's men should be sent to the station to assist in unloading the engine to the car. Believing this, plaintiff and one other of Winchester's men went to the station and assisted in unloading, during which plaintiff was injured by the negligence of one of defendant's servants, for which he brought action. Defendant set up that at the time of the injury plaintiff was his servant, and a co-servant of the one through whose negligence he was injured. Held, that plaintiff was not defendant's servant. A servant cannot recover of his master for an injury caused by the negligence of a fellow-serant, because when he enters into the service he by implication agrees that he will take the ordinary risks of the service, including the risk of the negligence of fellow-servants. But the plaintiff did not enter into the service of the defendant. There was no contract of service between them. The plaintiff could not recover any wages of the defendant. He was in the service of Winchester, and believed and understood that he was doing the work of Winchester. He was induced to assist the defendant by his false representations, but the defendant cannot thus impose upon him the incidental and implied obligations of a contract of service into which he has not entered. Kelly v. JohnOpinion by Morton, J. [Decided April, 1880.]

son.

CRIMINAL LAW.

EVIDENCE- CONVERSATIONS ACCOMPANYING ACTS PROVED ADMISSIBLE.-Where acts and transactions in which the accused person took part previous to a murder were given in evidence by the prosecution, held, that the exclusion of conversations accompanying such acts and transactions offered to be shown by the defense was erroneous. If the acts of the accused done before the commission of the crime with which she is charged are competent evidence tending to show that she committed such crime, then what was said at the time the act was done is also admissible, as explanatory of the same, and as indicative of the intent or object of the act. The reason for this rule is very forcibly stated in Wiggins v. Plumer, 11 Fost. (N. H.) 251-267: "When evidence of an act done by a party is admissible, his declarations made at the time having a tendency to elucidate or give character to the act, and which may derive a great degree of credit from the act itself, are also admissible as part of the res gesta." And the rule is substantially stated in the same way in Gordon v. Shurtliff, 8 N. H. 260; Plumer v. French, 2 Fost. 454; and Hersom v. Henderson, 3 id. 498. "When a

fact is offered in evidence, the whole transaction of it consists of many particulars, which may and ought to be proved. Every additional circumstance proved may vary the effect of the evidence - may neutralize it or give it point. What is then said by the parties, and what was said by others to them, relative to the subject of the transaction, is a part of the transaction itself. It is admissible on the same principle that every other part of it is, that the whole matter may be seen by the jury- upon the same principle which disallowS extracts or written papers, that their effects may be materially varied by the part omitted. Contemporaneous but otherwise unconnected conversation is rejected on the same ground as other unconnected facts. If the statement offered in evidence does not tend to elucidate or give character to the acts proved, it is to be rejected. If it is upon the same subject and relative to the act in proof, it should be received." The case of Wiggins v. Plumer, supra, was referred to by the late learned Justice Paine in Ranger v. Goodrich, 17 Wis. 78-85, and approved as stating the true rule in cases of this kind. The same rule is stated in Lund v. Tyngsborough, 9 Cush. 36–41. This court, in the case of Bates v. Ableman, 13 Wis. 644-650, admits the justice of the rule as stated in the latter part of the above quotation in the following language: "It is undoubtedly true that where the intent of a party to a sale is in issue, his statements at the time, and so connected with the transaction as to be a part of the res gestæ, are competent evidence to show such intent, even though the person is not a party to the suit." In the case of Sorenson v. Dundas, 42 Wis. 642, the rule is stated very briefly: "Declarations are verbal parts of the res gestœ only when they are contemporaneous." Felt v. Amidon, 43 Wis. 467. In Hamilton v. State, 36 Ind. 280, it is said: "It is well established by the authorities that in all cases, civil or criminal, where evidence of an act done by a party is admissible, his declarations made at the time, having a tendency to elucidate, explain, or give character to the act, are admissible. They are a part of the transaction, and for that reason are admissible, and it makes no difference, so far as the admissibility of the declaration is concerned, whether it be in favor of or against the party making it. If the act was one of alleged criminality, and the accompanying declaration tends to show it to be innocent, it is equally admissible as when the tendency is to show the criminality of the act; and it may be given in evidence by the defendant as well as by the State." See, also, Parsons v. State, 43 Ga. 197; Comfort v. Heople, 5 Ill. 404; Head v. State, 44 Miss. 731; McKee v. People, 36 N. Y. 113; Russell v. Frisbie, 19 Conn. 216. Wisconsin Sup. Ct., Feb. 3, 1880. Mack v. State of Wisconsin. Opinion by Taylor, J.

TRIAL PRIVY VERDICT NOT ALLOWABLE. - Upon a trial for felony the verdict of the jury was received by the judge about eleven o'clock at night, after the court had duly adjourned until another day and the jury were discharged. The statute of Nebraska, where the trial took place, provides that "when the jury have agreed upon their verdict they must be conducted into court by the officer having them in charge. Before the verdict is accepted, the jury may be polled at the request of either the prosecuting attorney or the defendant." Held, that the verdict was a privy one and erroneous. A verdict to be of any validity must be delivered in open court. This was the rule of common law. Chitty says: "When the jury have come to an unanimous determination with respect to their verdict they return to the box to deliver it. The clerk then calls them over by their names, and asks them whether they agree on their verdict, to which they reply in the affirmative. He then demands who shall say for them, to which they answer their foreman. This being done, he desires the prisoner to hold up his

hand, and addresses them: 'Look upon the prisoner, you that are sworn; how say you, is he guilty of the felony (or treason, etc.), whereof he stands indicted, or not guilty? The foreman then answers 'guilty,' or 'not guilty,' according to the conclusion to which the jury have arrived in their consultations. The officer then writes the word guilty,' or 'not guilty,' as the verdict is, after the words 'pro se' on the record, and again addresses the jury: 'Hearken to your verdict, as the court hath recorded it: You say that A B is guilty (or not guilty) of the felony whereof he stands indicted, and so say you all.'" 1 Chitty on Crim. Law, 635-6; 1 Bishop on Crim Pro., § 1001. Nebraska Sup. Ct., Feb. 10, 1880. Longfellow v. State of Nebraska. Opinion by Maxwell, C. J.

FINANCIAL LAW.

BANK-LIABILITY FOR MISTAKE-PROTESTING NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT FOR CUSTOMER CUSTOMCURRENT FUNDS — GRACE. A certificate of deposit, payable to order one year after date, "in current funds, was placed in the hands of a bank at D. for collection. It was issued by a banker at D. It was protested on the day it was due, without grace. By a custom among bankers, "current funds" meant money, and by a custom among the banks of D., in relation to certificates of deposit issued by any bank there, they were payable without grace. Held, that the certificate being payable in money, the indorser was discharged by a failure to present, etc., with grace, but that the bank was not guilty of negligence in its action so as to make it liable to the owner of the certificate for any loss resulting from such discharge. The certificate on its face was not negotiable, and the demand and protest was well made on the day it was, but for the custom that "current funds" meant money or National bank notes, and because of this it became a negotiable instrument, entitled to grace. The fact of negotiability was therefore a mixed question of law and fact. Admitting the bank was bound to know the law, this is not true as to the matter of fact. If it was the duty of the bank to make inquiry, such inquiry being made, it would have been developed that current funds meant legal tenders and National bank notes. Regarding the certificate as being payable in National bank notes, the bank must determine at its peril whether it was negotiable. This being determined in the affirmative, inquiry would have shown another custom to the effect that the certificate was payable without grace. The bank must then determine which of these customs it would follow. Suppose it adopts the latter, and upon the trial the jury should find, according to the weight of evidence, no such custom existed, would it follow that the bank was guilty of negligence? It would not, because the true question is not as to whether it was true in fact as to such custom, but whether the bank had good reason to so believe, and acted in good faith, upon such belief, as a careful and prudent person engaged in the same business would ordinarily have done. Iowa Supreme Ct., April 26, 1880. Haddock v. Citizens' National Bank of Des Moines. Opinion by Seevers, J.

ULTRA VIRES-SAVINGS BANK MAY BORROW MONEY AND MORTGAGE SECURITIES-ESTOPPEL BY LAW DOES NOT BIND PUBLIC. -A savings bank, by its charter, had express power to receive money on deposit; to receive and execute trusts committed to the corporation by any person or persons, or by order of any court in this State; to grant and purchase annuities; to issue letters of credit and other commercial obligations, other than notes designed to circulate as money; to loan money; to receive money on deposit and pay interest therefor; to discount according to bank usage; to take stock in other corporations; to buy and sell