on the Congressionalist man of war Blanco Encalada, killing and wounding a number of persons on board. The attack "was not returned for reasons of humanity toward the people and the town." February 16, 1891, a report having reached Iquique that the gov ernment troops had been defeated on the pampas near that place, the intendente surrendered the town to the Congressionalists, who occupied it with their naval forces. Early in the morning of February 19 government troops, about 250 strong, surprised the city, and the marines retired into the custom-house, where they were supported by the squadron. Firing continued all day, and two fires broke out. Late in the afternoon a British naval officer, at the request of the revolutionary leaders on the Blanco Encalada, went ashore under a flag of truce, and arranged a suspension of arms to enable foreigners and noncombatants to leave the town. But for this, said the British Admiral, Hotham, “Iquique would have disappeared, and with 250 drunken Chilean soldiers, no discipline nor police, and supplemented by roughs, the sufferings, and worse, of noncombatants, especially women and children, may be imagined." March 26, 1891, Mr. Tracy, Secretary of Navy, addressed to RearAdmiral Brown instructions in relation to the protection of American interests in Chile during the revolution then going on. With reference to the fleet of the Congressional party, whose belligerency had not been recognized by the United States, Mr. Tracy said: "Should the bombardment of any place, by which the lives or property of Americans may be endangered, be attempted or threatened by such ships, you will, if and when your force is sufficient for the purpose, require them to refrain from bombarding the place until sufficient time has been allowed for placing American life and property in safety. You will enforce this demand if it is refused, and if it is granted, proceed to give effect to the measures necessary for the security of such life or property." e July 7, 1891, Mr. Kennedy, British minister at Santiago, inclosed to Lord Salisbury a correspondence relating to the then recent bombardment of the town of Pisagua without provocation or notice of any kind by the Chilean Government ships Almirante Condell and Imperial, on June 8, 1891. Among the inclosures there was a protest of the consular body at Pisagua, which stated that the vessels came close into the port about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and without notice of any kind began to fire their guns into the town, causing much damage. On July 7th Mr. Kennedy addressed a protest to a Blue Book, Chile, No. 1 (1892), 24. This abstention on the part of the Congressionalists is said to have been due to the influence of Captain St. Clair, of H. M. S. Champion. (Id. 83.) Blue Book, Chile, No. 1 (1892), 82–83. See, also, id. 237, 244. the Chilean Government charwrenzing the perseling is belg "opposed to the recognized print purs of innemati dal av e favi warfare." He also reservej al rents of Brist splits as to prope erty destroyed. August 25, 1891, Mr. Kettely's prost vas apge vel by Lei Salisbury. & RULES OF INSTITUTE OF INTERNAtional Law 384 The question of the bonbar Itent of get towns by naval forms was considered by the Institte of Intrati nal Law at Cardellze in 1895, and at Venice in 15e. At the latter ele re were adopted which were designel to supputant, in renal to this ques tion, the Manual of the Laws of War prevy pt at the session at Oxford. The ris, which were a logred September 2 1896, were as follows: "ART. 1. There is no difference letween, the r les of the law of war as to bombardment by military foros o lard and that by Laval forces. "ART. 2. Consequently there apply to the latter the general prineiples enunciated in art. 32 of the Manual of the Institute-i, e., it is forbidden (a) to destroy public or private property, if such destruetion is not commanded by the imperious necessity of war; (5) to attack and bombard localities which are not defended. "ART. 3. The rules enunciated in art. 33 and 34 of the Manual are equally applicable to naval bombardments. “ART. 4. In virtue of the foregoing principles, the bombardment by a naval force of an open town-i. e., one not defended by fortifications or other means of attack or of resistance for immediate defense, or by detached forts situated in proximity to it, for example, at the maximum distance of from 4 to 10 kil., is inadmissible, except in the following cases: « Blue Book, Chile, No. 1 (1892), 198, 218. See Calvo, Droit Int. (5th ed.) VI. § 428 et seq. Annuaire, XV. 313. € 33. The commander of the attacking troops ought, except in case of assault, before beginning a bombardment, to do all he can to advise the local authorities, 34. In case of bombardment all needful measures shall be taken to spare, if it be possible to do so, buildings devoted to religion and charity, to the arts and sciences, hospitals, and depots of sick and wounded. This on condition, how ever, that such places be not made use of, directly or indirectly, for purposes of defense. It is the duty of the besieged to designate such buildings by suitable marks or signs, indicated in advance to the besieger. "(1) In order to obtain by means of requisitions or of contributions what is necessary for the fleet. "Nevertheless, such requisitions and contributions must remain within the bounds prescribed by arts. 56 and 58a of the Manual of the Institute. "(2) In order to destroy dockyards, military establishments, depots of munitions of war, or vessels of war found in a port. "Moreover, an open town which is defended against the entrance of troops or of disembarked marines may be bombarded in order to protect the landing of soldiers and of marines if the open town attempts to prevent it, and as an auxiliary measure of war in order to facilitate an assault made by the troops and disembarked marines, if the town defends itself. "There are specially forbidden bombardments whose sole object is to exact a ransom (Brandschatz), and, with greater reason, those destined only to induce the submission of the country by the destruction, without other motive, of peaceable inhabitants or their property. "ART. 5. An open town may not be exposed to bombardment by the sole fact: "(1) That it is the capital of a state or the seat of government (but, naturally, these circumstances give it no guarantee against bombardment). "(2) That it is actually occupied by troops, or that it is ordinarily garrisoned by troops of various arms, destined to rejoin the army in time of war." 9. DISCUSSIONS IN THE HAGUE CONFERENCE. § 1174. By Article XXV. of the "Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land," adopted at The Hague July 29, 1899," the attack or bombardment of towns, villages, habitations, or buildings which are not defended is prohibited.” In the deliberations of the second committee, the delegate from Italy proposed that this article should be made applicable to bombardments by naval forces. Objections were made to this proposal (1) @ 56. Impositions in kind (requisitions), levied upon communes, or the residents of invaded districts, should bear direct relation to the generally recognized necessities of war, and should be in proportion to the resources of the district. Requisitions can only be made, or levied, with the authority of the commanding officer of the occupied district. 58. The invader can not levy extraordinary contributions of money, save as an equivalent for fines or imposts not paid or for payments not made in kind. Contributions in money can only be imposed by the order, and upon the responsibility, of the general in chief, or that of the superior civil authority established in the occupied territory; and then, as nearly as possible, in accordance with the rule of apportionment and assessment of existing imposts. because of the incompatibility of an absolute prohibition with the possible necessities of a naval force in regard to obtaining supplies, and (2) because of the inopportuneness of the proposal. The committee, on motion of its president, then expressed the opinion that the matter should be examined by a future conference. The British delegate, however, adverted to the fact that his Government had refused to take part in the Brussels Conference (1874) except on condition that naval questions should remain outside the deliberations. He added that he did not desire to touch the merits of the question, but to declare that for the reason indicated it was impossible for him to associate himself with the committee's expression of opinion; and at his request the fact that he abstained from voting on it was entered on the record. The conference, in its final act, July 29, 1899, voted certain wishes, among which was the following: The conference expresses the wish that the proposal to settle the question of the bombardment of ports, towns, and villages by a naval force may be referred to a subsequent conference for consideration." This wish formed one of five which "were voted unanimously, saving some abstentions," the English delegates having abstained from voting. Conférence Internationale de la Paix, III. 27-28; Blue Book, Misc. No. 1 (1899), 289; For. Rel. 1899, 513, 520. II. MINES AND TORPEDOES. § 1175. In February, 1866, Admiral Nuñez, then in command of the Spanish fleet before Valparaiso, Chile, on hearing that an attempt would be made from the town to destroy his vessels with torpedoes, caused the Chilean Government to be informed that if such an attempt was made he would instantly open fire on the town. March 3, 1866, Admiral Denman wrote to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that he intended to use two of his ships to enforce twenty-four hours' delay before the Spanish squadron should open fire on Valparaiso, in the event of the use of torpedoes against the Spanish ships. This intention the lords considered "not to be justified by any rule of international law." April 16, 1866, Lord Clarendon instructed the British minister in Chile that he had consulted the law officers of the Crown on the subject, and that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government the course which the Spanish admiral had declared he would pursue would, under the circumstances stated," be justifiable by international law." "Her Majesty's Government," said Lord Clarendon, "think it impossible to deny the belligerent right of Chile to employ torpedoes against the Spanish squadron; and equally impossible to deny the belligerent right of Spain to bombard the town which those instruments are employed to protect. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, however, it would be highly impolitic on the part of the Chilean Government to give cause to the Spanish commodore to put his threat into execution." 56 Brit. & For. State Papers (1865-1866), 937, 939. "The employment of torpedoes is so recent a belligerent device that it is believed the powers as yet have had no opportunity to consider the general regulations, if any, to which they should be subjected. For this reason I now forbear to express any opinion upon the proceeding to which you advert,” i. e., the indiscriminate placing by order of Turkey of torpedoes in the bed of the Danube during the war with Russia. Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mr. Shishkin, Russian min., June 12, 1877, In 1880 the British minister at Lima reported to his Government that the Peruvians had, during the then pending war with Chile, made use of boats containing explosive materials, with the object of destroying the enemy's ships, and that in some instances these boats had been set adrift on the chance of their being fallen in with by some of the Chilean blockading squadron. The British minister was instructed by Lord Granville "to protest in the strongest manner against a practice which is fraught with so much danger to the vessels of neutral powers in the free navigation of the high seas, and to state that Her Majesty's Government will hold the Peruvian Government responsible for any damage which may be caused to British vessels by the practice in question." Sir Edward Thornton, British min., to Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, Jan. 17, 1881, MS. Notes from Great Britain. With reference to the report that Peru had made use of "boats containing explosive materials," which had "in some instances been sent adrift on the chance of their being fallen in with by some of the Chilean blockading squadron," the American minister at Lima. was instructed, should he find on inquiry the report to be well founded, to make a "strong representation" to the Peruvian Government, and to say that the United States must hold Peru responsible for any damage done to American vessels. A means of warfare so dangerous to neutrals, if it had been adopted, should, it was said, "be at once checked, not only for the benefit of Peru, but in the |