Hubbard vs. Haley and another. above and foregoing contract so far as the sale and delivery of its goods, as in said contract specified, is concerned only, and agrees to deliver said goods at the times, to the persons, and under the circumstances specified in said contract, and to look to F. H. Haley solely for the payment of the same. "Dated this 11th day of March, 1890. "Executed in duplicate. "Manitowoc Manufacturing Company. [Seal.] "F. H. Haley, President. [Seal.]" (7) Shove, on the instrument, prior to such delivery, executed the following: "In consideration of one dollar ($1) to me in hand paid by the said F. H. Haley, and on account of other valuable considerations, I do hereby guarantee the fulfillment of the above foregoing contract, in so far as the payment of $1,000 is concerned by the said F. H. Haley, and by the said Manitowoc Manufacturing Company in so far as the delivery of the goods is concerned only; and it is intended to include in this guarantee the payment of the three notes to be given by the said Haley, aggregating the sum of $1,000, as specified in the foregoing guarantee only. "Witness my hand and seal, this 11th day of March, 1890. "Executed in duplicate. T. C. SHOVE. [Seal.]" (S) At the time of making the contract, a price list of goods being sold to the American Desk & Seating Company was on file in the office of the manufacturing company, and there has been no substantial change in such prices, or change in the cost of producing such goods, or in the jobbing prices for such goods, and such goods were worth the money prices fixed therefor by contract. The failure to deliver the goods was equivalent to withholding the amount of money represented thereby. (9) The notes have not been paid, though due demand therefor was made, and defendant Shove had due notice thereof, and of Haley's default. The amount due is $1,384. Hubbard vs. Haley and another. (10) The officers and directors of the manufacturing company knew of the aforesaid contract when made, and such company delivered thereon $2,405.73 worth of goods during the two years following its execution. (11) Plaintiff ceased to be an officer in such company after the making of the contract, but remained in its employ. The stock sold to Haley was surrendered by him to the company, and re-issued, part to Shove, and part to other persons, who gave notes therefor to the bank, or to Shove, for debts of the manufacturing company; so that Shove and such company had the full benefit of such stock. (12) February 1, 1892, plaintiff demanded of the manufacturing company goods under the contract, of which a large amount was then due. It refused to comply with such demand. About April 8, 1892, plaintiff renewed such demand, and the company refused to recognize any liability whatever under the contract. (13) The property of the manufacturing company, after the last demand aforesaid, was destroyed by fire. It thereafter made an assignment for the benefit of its creditors, and is wholly insolvent. At the time of such assignment, the banking company was a principal creditor, and Shove knew of the assignment, and of the assignee's refusal to deliver goods under the contract. Haley left the county before, and his residence was not known to plaintiff when, this action was commenced. (14) No false representations were made to induce defendant Shove to sign the contract. (15) Plaintiff complied with all the conditions of the contract requisite to entitle him to receive the goods of the manufacturing company. (16) Shove and such company were parties to the contract between plaintiff and Huley as original promisors, although in form as guarantors. (17) Shove's liability on the contract is not affected by the question of whether such company was bound or not. Hubbard vs. Haley and another. (18) Shove's knowledge of the business of such company was such that no formal notice of its default was necessary in order to charge him in this action. (19) Plaintiff cannot recover the last $2,000 of the instalment of $4,000, because it was not due when the action was commenced. (20) Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against defendant Shove for $8,213.27, with costs and disbursements. Appropriate exceptions were filed to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, to raise the questions discussed in the opinion. Judgment was entered upon the findings. Plaintiff appealed from that part of the judgment which refused a recovery of the last instalment of $2,000, and Shove appealed from all of the judgment except for the amount due upon the three notes aggregating $1,000, with the accrued interest thereon. J. S. Anderson, attorney, and W. H. Timlin, of counsel, for the plaintiff, argued, among other things, that no notice to the guarantor on a guaranty of this kind was necessary. Mallory v. Lyman, 3 Pin. 443; Day v. Elmore, 4 Wis. 190; Heyman v. Dooley, 77 Md. 162; Clay v. Edgerton, 2 Am. Rep. 422; Wise v. Miller, 45 Ohio St. 388. The authorities cited by the defendant go no farther than to hold that failure to give notice to the guarantor is available as a defense when he is damaged thereby, and to the extent to which he is so damaged. Furst & Bradley Mfg. Co. v. Black, 111 Ind. 308; Burrow v. Zapp, 69 Tex. 474; Voltz v. IIarris, 40 Ill. 155; 1 Brandt, Suretyship & G. § 202. For the defendant Shove there were briefs by Felker, Goldberg & Felker, attorneys, and F. A. Gilman, of counsel, and oral argument by Mr. Gilman. They contended, inter alia, that the guaranty in this case was collateral. Virden v. Ellsworth, 15 Ind. 144; Milroy v. Quinn, 69 id. 410; Gaff v. Sims, 45 id. 264; Dwight v. Williams, 4 McLean, 582; White v. Case, 13 Wend. 543; Eddy v. Stantons, 21 id. 255; Howe v. Nickels, 22 Me. 175; Smith v. Loomis, 72 id. 53, 57; Swift v. Beers, Hubbard vs. Haley and another. 3 Denio, 70; Nellis v. Clark, 20 Wend. 27; Dedham Bank v. Chickering, 4 Pick. 314. Shove was entitled to notice of the default both of the Manitowoc Mfg. Co. and of Haley. Sandford v. Norton, 14 Vt. 228; Train v. Jones, 11 id. 446; Knapp v. Parker, 6 id. 642; Peck v. Barney, 13 id. 96; Noyes & Co. v. Nichols, 28 id. 175; Sylvester v. Downer, 18 id. 35; Bull v. Bliss, 30 id. 130, 133; Beebe v. Dudley, 26 N. H. 249, 253; Brandt, Suretyship & G. §§ 92, 97, 98; Baylies, Sureties & G. 198, 200, 202, 203; Clark v. Remington, 11 Met. 364, 375; Jordan v. Dobbins, 122 Mass. 168; Taussig v. Reid, 145 Ill. 488. MARSHALL, J. The motion to quash the writ of attachment was properly denied. True, sec. 2731, R. S., provides that a writ of attachment may issue for a debt not due, upon an affidavit stating the facts in that regard; but there is no controversy here that the debt in question was not due, except $2,000; hence, at most, the writ was improperly issued only as to that amount. In any event, it was not wholly void. While it is the law that if a writ of attachment be issued and an action commenced for a debt no part of which is due, and the statutory requisites are not complied with, the writ should be quashed on motion and the action dismissed (Gowan v. Hanson, 55 Wis. 341), where a part of the debt is due, and part not due, the writ must stand as to the former, and be dismissed or modified, on proper motion, as to the latter. Levy v. Millman, 7 Ga. 167; Danforth v. Carter, 1 Iowa, 546; Drake, Attachment, § 33. As intimated in Danforth v. Carter, the motion to quash is in the nature of a general demurrer, and the rule is that where the pleader attempts to state two causes of action and fails as to one, a general demurrer to the whole complaint must be overruled. So here, treating the facts set forth in the complaint as part of the proceedings on the attachment, the motion did not distinguish between that part of the debt which was due Hubbard vs. Haley and another. and the part not due; and, as the writ was sufficient as to the former, the motion as to the whole was properly denied. The foundation for a writ of attachment under the statute is a proper affidavit; that being sufficient on its face, the right to the writ is absolute. Davidson v. Hackett, 49 Wis. 186. The giving of the bond is not essential to the issuance of the writ, but is to its execution and to the maintenance of the proceedings. R. S. sec. 2732. So, at most, the remedy of the defendant here, on its appearing that a part of the debt was not due, if such were the fact, was confined to a motion for a modification of the writ, under sec. 2744, R. S., on that ground, and a release of the property from the attachment as to the debt not due, because of the failure to give a proper bond. Under the familiar rule that the findings of the trial court as to questions of fact cannot be disturbed unless contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence, we are unable to see any justification for disturbing the findings of fact in this case, either as to the issue formed by the affidavit for the writ of attachment and the traverse thereto, or the issues formed by the complaint and answer. Much time might be spent referring in detail to the evidence found in the record bearing on the findings of fact excepted to by appellant Shove, but it is not deemed necessary or advisable so to do; hence we rest the case on this subject by stating the conclusions to which we have arrived; that we have carefully examined the evidence as to each particular fact; that it is quite clear from such examination that the trial court had a legitimate basis for its conclusions as to each such fact; and, keeping in mind that the circuit judge had a far better opportunity for drawing the correct inferences from the evidence than is possessed by the appellate court, that we cannot say there is a clear preponderance of the evidence against his findings of fact, or any of them. Several questions are discussed in appellant's brief in a |