great body; but the people as composing thirteen sovereignties. Were it, as the gentleman asserts, a consolidated government, the assent of the majority of the people would be sufficient for its establishment; and as a majority has adopted it already, the remaining States would be bound by the act of the majority, even if they unanimously reprobated it. Were it such a government as suggested, it would now be binding upon the people of this State, without their having had the privilege of deliberating upon it 131 But, sir, no State is bound by it, as it is without its own consent. Should all the States adopt it, it will then be a government established by the thirteen States of America, not through the intervention of the legislature, but by the people at large. In this particular respect the distinction between the existing and proposed governments is very material. The existing system has been derived from the dependent derivative authority of the legislatures of the States; whereas this is derived from the superior power of the people. If we look at the manner in which alterations are to be made in it, the same idea is in some degree attended to. By the new system a majority of the States cannot introduce amendments; nor are all the States required for that purpose. Three-fourths of them must concur in alterations; in this there is a departure from the federal idea. The members to the national House of Representatives are to be chosen by the people at large, in proportion to the numbers in the respective districts. When we come to the Senate, its members are elected by the States in their equal and political capacity. But had the Government been completely consolidated, the Senate would have been chosen by the people in their individual capacity, in the same manner as the members of the other house. Thus it is of a complicated nature, and this complication will, I trust, be found to exclude the evils of absolute consolidation, as well as of a mere confederacy. If Virginia was separated from all the States, her power and authority would extend to all cases; in like manner, were all powers vested in the general Government it would be a consolidated government; but the powers of the Federal Government are enumerated; it can

131 This is an obvious sophism. Each State is called upon in the usual mode to say whether a particular system, be that system what it may, shall be henceforth its plan of government. Its mode of assent dissent from the scheme cannot be called a part of the scheme itself.

only operate in certain cases; it has legislative powers on defined and limited objects, beyond which it cannot extend its jurisdiction."

This reasoning of Madison, in seeking to establish the nature of a government from the mode of conducting elections prescribed by the rule creating it, is sophistical and unjust, and wars at once with sound philosophy and simple truth. Had William the Third been elected under the declaration of right by the people of Great Britain, assembled at the polls, instead of a convention of both houses of Parliament, the nature of the government which he was invited to administer would not have been altered by the change. He would still have been the King of England, the occupant of a hereditary throne, bound to rule according to the instrument which contained his right to the crown. Nor is the case altered by the frequent recurrence of elections under a particular system. The mode of electing the agents of that system cannot affect the nature of the system itself, which is fixed and unalterable except in the way agreed upon by its framers. It is evident that Madison believed the new government to be a consolidated system. The favorite term of a complete consolidation is a mere play upon words. A government must be either integral or federal. In can no more be both than an individual can-like the fabulous centaur of antiquity, be at one and the same time half a man and half a brute. If he is human at all he is human all over; if he is a brute at all he is a brute all over. So with a collection of human beings united in a political system. If that system is integral at all it is wholly integral; if federal at all it is wholly federal. Details may complicate and disguise, but cannot alter the nature of the thing.

Thus the new constitution was the chart of a strictly federal system. Had not Madison been swayed by early prepossessions, his admirable powers of analysis and his unrivalled stores of historic lore would have enabled him to furnish a conclusive answer to the arguments of Mason and of Henry, and to force those able men from their strongest ground to a contest on the ere details of the constitution-à ground peculiarly his own. en years later the true argument would instantly have risen to his lips. He would have said that compacts between States, like mpacts between private persons, might be as various as the necessities or interests of the parties should require; that a com

pact which should embrace an infinite variety of details bearing directly or indirectly on persons and things, however voluminous, was as strictly a federal alliance as an ordinary treaty of a few sections. Under the Confederation, he might have said, the legislative, judicial and executive powers were vested in a single body which might exercise them in the manner most conducive to the public welfare; that revenue was obtained by requisitions on the States; and that all control over the customs was denied to Congress; that the same parties which made these arrangements could abolish them and substitute others in their place; might decree that the legislative, judicial and executive powers should be exercised by separate bodies under certain limitations; that money should be obtained by levying a tax on persons and things in any given mode; that the entire revenue accruing from customs should be appropriated by the central agency; that these and other changes might be made, and that the nature of the federal alliance, however changed in outward form, would be no more changed in reality than an individual would be changed by throwing off the clothing of one season and putting on the clothing of another.

When Madison had concluded his review of the nature of the proposed Government, he adverted to the argument of Henry against the large powers which had been conferred by the Constitution on Congress. "I conceive," he said, "that the first ques tion on this subject is whether these powers be necessary; if they be, we are reduced to the dilemma of either submitting to the inconvenience or of losing the Union. Let us consider the most important of these reprobated powers; that of direct taxation is most generally objected to. With respect to the exigencies of government, there is no question but the most easy mode for providing for them will be adopted. When, therefore, direct taxes are not necessary they will not be recurred to. It can be of little advantage to those in power to raise money in a manner oppressive to the people. To consult the conveniences of the people will cost them nothing, and in many respects will be advantageous to them. Direct taxes will only be recurred to for great purposes. What has brought on other nations those immense debts, under the pressure of which many of them labor? Not the expenses of their governments, but war. If this country should be engaged in war-and I conceive we ought to provide

for the possibility of such a case-how would it be carried on? By the usual means provided from year to year? As our imports will be necessary for the expenses of government and other common exigencies, how are we to carry on the means of defense? How is it possible a war could be supported without money or credit? And would it be possible for a government to have credit without having the power of raising money? No; it would be impossible for any government in such a case to defend itself. Then, I say, sir, that it is necessary to establish funds for extraordinary exigencies, and to give this power to the general Government; for the utter inutility of previous requisi tions upon the States is too well known. Would it be possible for those countries, whose finances and revenues are carried to the highest perfection, to carry on the operations of government on great emergencies, such as the maintenance of a war, without an uncontrolled power of raising money? Has it not been necessary for Great Britain, notwithstanding the facility of the collection of her taxes, to have recourse very often to this and other extraordinary methods of procuring money? Would not her public credit have been ruined if it was known that her power to raise money was limited? Has not France been obliged on great occasions to use unusual means to raise funds? It has been the case in many countries, and no government can exist unless its powers extend to make provisions for every contingency. If we were actually attacked by a powerful nation, and our general Government had not the power of raising money, but depended solely on requisitions, our condition would be truly deplorable; if the revenue of this Commonwealth were to depend on twenty distinct authorities, it would be impossible for it to carry on its operations. This must be obvious to every member here; I think, therefore, that it is necessary, for the preservation of the Union, that this power shall be given to the general Government."

It had been urged by Henry and Mason that the consolidated nature of the Government, combined with the power of direct taxation, would eventually destroy all subordinate authority, and result in the absorption of the State governments. Madison thought that this would not be the case. "If the general Government," he said, "were wholly independent of the governments of the particular States, then indeed, usurpation might be

expected to the fullest extent. But, sir, on whom does this general Government depend? It derives its authority from these governments, and from the same sources from which their authority is derived. The members of the Federal Government are taken from the same men from whom those of the State legislatures are taken. If we consider the mode in which the federal representatives will be chosen, we shall be convinced that the general will never destroy the individual governments; and this conviction must be strengthened by an attention to the construction of the Senate. The representatives will be chosen probably under the influence of the members of the State legislatures; but there is not the least probability that the election of the latter will be influenced by the former. One hundred and sixty members represent this Commonwealth in one branch of the legislature, are drawn from the people at large, and must ever possess more influence than the few men who will be elected to the general legislature."

He concluded by showing that the members of Congress would depend for their election on the popular men in the different counties, and the members of the Senate, appointed by the legislatures, would not be likely to forget or defy the source of their existence; that the biennial exclusion of one-third of the number of Federal senators would lessen the facility of combinations; that the members of Congress had hitherto "signalized themselves by their attachment to their seats," and were not likely to neglect the interests of their constituents closing this remarkable speech in these words: "I wish this Government may answer the expectation of its friends, and foil the apprehensions of its enemies. I hope the patriotism of the people will continue, and be a sufficient guard to their liberties. I believe its tendency will be that the State governments will counteract the general interest and ultimately prevail. The number of representatives is yet sufficient for our safety and will gradually increase; and if we consider their different sources of information, the number will not appear too small."

It must ever be a source of regret to the student of history that a more extended report of this speech, revised by its author, has not been preserved. With all the faithful care of Robertson the existing report is hardly more than an outline of the original. The beautiful philosophy with which he illustrated the various