the law calls falsitas cum corruptione. be pleaded in exception to the character Evans v. Evans, 1 Hagg. (Cons.), 100, in of a witness. Sergeant v. Sergeant, 1 Curteis, 3. note. 21. Exceptive allegations must show that witnesses have wilfully sworn falsely. Verelst v. Verelst, 2 Phill. 147. 22. An allegation exceptive to the testimony of a witness; to be admissible, must plead matter not pleadable before publication, and it must be such as, if proved, will materially discredit the witness. It must be pleaded too with all possibie specification as to times, places, persons, and so on. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 2 Add. 484. 23. Where there is ground for making exception to the character of a witness, the rule is universally laid down that the exception taken must not be of an ambiguous nature; and the party excepted to, if on the ground of general bad character, must be attacked in such terms as plainly assert that imputation. Baileyv.Bradburn, note to Evans v. Evans, 1 Hagg. (Cons.) 99. And see antè, Nos. 14, 15. and 18. 3. What matters are pleadable in - et contra.* 24. Matter pleadable in the principal cause cannot be pleaded after publication in exception to evidence. Kenrick v. Kenrick, 4 Hagg. (Eccl.), 127. 25. It is the admitted practice in all courts to receive declarations in opposition to evidence on oath. They may be confirmed by other circumstances, and no one can say that they are of light and slender importance. They go in abatement of credit, and although declarations coming after publication are weakened, yet they are not on that account to be excluded. An exceptive allegation given after publication, and pleading an affidavit made by a witness in contradiction of his previous examination, admitted to proof. Brisco v. Brisco, cited in The Centurion, Wills, 1 Hagg. 162. 26. An exceptive allegation pleading, declarations and admissions of adverse witnesses that they had deposed falsely, and an affidavit of one of such persons that his deposition was false, &c., admitted to proof. The Centurion, Wills, 1 Hagg. 162., note. 27. Facts collateral to the issue cannot 28. Facts collateral to the issue cannot be pleaded in support of the character of a witness. Ibid. 6. 29. Articles of an allegation pleading facts irrelevant to the issue in contradiction to the answers of a witness to interrogatories irrelevant to the issue rejected. Trevanion v. Trevanion, 1 Curteis, 443. Affirmed on appeal, 486. 30. The credit of a witness may be impeached by showing him to have made statements out of Court contrary to what he has sworn. Lock v. Denner, 1 Add. 360. 31. A party cannot except to a witness by contradicting answers to interrogatories which go to incidental collateral matter, and are not relevant to the issue. Whish and Woollatt v. Hesse, 3 Hagg. (Eccl.), 680. 32. Upon the conviction of certain witnesses in a cause on an indictment for perjury preferred against them, the Court will permit such conviction to be pleaded in exception to the testimony of such witnesses. Westmeath v. Westmeath, 2 Add. 380. 33. The Court will not admit an exceptive plea that an indictment of witnesses for perjury in their depositions in the cause pending has been preferred and a true bill found, nor delay the hearing till the indictment is tried. Maclean v. Maclean, 2 Hagg. (Eccl.), 601. And see antè, No. 14. 4. When admissible · - et contra. 34. In the Ecclesiastical Courts, the general rule is, that the general character of a witness may be gone into before publication, but not afterwards; where, therefore, the general character of a witness is objected to, such objections should be pleaded when the responsive allegation is given in, unless he can show that the facts have only lately come to his knowledge. Chapman v. Whitby and Parson, 3 Phill. 372. 35. Where a witness is designed (à fortiori vouched) by the one party to precise facts, it is open to the other side to plead before publication declarations of the wit 3. The declarations of a witness, to which he has not been interrogated, cannot be pleaded in exception to his evidence. A general interrogatory is not sufficient. Keating v. Brooks and others, January, 1845. Prerog. (not reported). 1. The general rule is, that whoever purchases under an illegal title does so at his own peril, and must take the consequences, both in his purchase and in his own subsequent expenditure upon it, of his inattention to his own security. The Perseverance, Pittor, 2 C. Rob. 239. 2. In this case, however, which was that of a prize purchased by a neutral under a sentence of condemnation, found to be illegal; it appearing to the Court that the purchase had not been made under circumstances requiring the application of the rule without any alleviation, the money laid out was taken into consideration, making some deduction for wear and tear, and the use of the vessel while in possession of the party making the repairs, and thus getting at the benefit which the original owners were likely to receive from the amelioration. Ibid. 3. A purchaser of a vessel which, having been condemned in a neutral port, had been restored to the former owner on the ground of the illegality of such condemnation, decreed to be reimbursed for his actual amelioration of the ship, there being some circumstances in the case indicating a probability that the purchaser might have been 1. If the Court should decree a sale by the master invalid, where the transaction was free from fraud, it would compel a proper allowance for the deceived as to the legality of the title; but the Court indicated that such an allowance would not be continued to be permitted. after the illegality of such titles should be more generally made known. The Nostra de Conceicas, Cunha, 5 C. Rob. 294. 4. On re-capture of a neutral (American) ship from the enemy, restitution on salvage decreed to the former owners, and refused to a party claiming under an asserted purchase from the master in Ireland; but, without prejudice to the rights of such party, to be prosecuted in the American courts. Claim of such party for amelioration refused. The Fanny and Elmira, Hicks, 1 Edwards, 117. 120. 5. Where the master, in consequence of damage sustained and of the ship becoming unseaworthy, and of no advances on loan or bottomry being obtainable to repair her, sold her to the plaintiffs, who repaired and sent her with a cargo to her registered port in England; but the owners, refusing to ratify the sale or consent to the registry of the ship in the plaintiffs' names, put men on board to take possession of her and the cargo; the Court of Chancery, considering it a question of purely legal title, and the taking possession a mere trespass, refused expenditure of the original purchasers in getting off and repairing the vessel. The brig Sarah Ann, 2 Sumner's (AMERICAN) Rep. 206. I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS WITH 1. In answers, a party is bound only to answer to facts, not to his own motives nor to his belief of the motives of another person: where the plea avers ignorance of the real nature of a transaction by a party to such transaction and to the suit, the other party is, in his answers to such plea, allowed to state facts inferring full knowledge thereof and acquiescence therein. A party is not bound to answer when his answer would criminate himself, nor (semble) when it would tend to degrade him. Swift v. Swift, 4 Hagg. (Cons.) 139. 2. Quare whether a party can refuse to answer to matter not criminatory, but tending to degrade him. Dysart v. Dysart, 3 Curteis, 545. 6. Answers should not be redundant ; the true meaning of which is, that the respondent is not to insert in his answer any matter foreign to the articles he is called upon to answer, although such matter may be admissible in plea, but he may in his answer plead matter by way of explanation pertinent to the articles, even if such matter should be solely in his own knowledge, and to such extent incapable of proof, or he may state matter which can be substantiated by witnesses; but in this latter instance, if such matter be introduced into the answer, and not afterwards put in plea or proved, the Court will give no weight or credence to such part of the answer. Ibid. 7. The use of answers is to save the neClutton v. cessity of taking evidence. Cherry, 2 Phill. 385. Ibid. 3. Where the answers would subject the 8. Where answers are not read by the party making them to a prosecution for party calling for them, the Court will prefelony, they cannot be insisted upon. Ro-sume that they do not prove the allegation. bins v. Sir William Wolseley, 1 Lee, 620. 9. The Court will, under some circum4. Answers are not confined to being mere echoes of the plea, accompanied with stances, look into the sworn answers of the simple affirmances or denials; but the re- parties, though not read by the opposite spondents are further at liberty to enter party. Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. into all such matter as may be fairly deemed (Cons.) 127.; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 2 Hagg. not more than sufficient to place the trans-(Cons.) 259.; Best v. Best, 2 Phill. 168. actions as to which their answers are taken, in what they insist to be the true and 5. Every averment of a plea must be distinctly and specifically answered (except where the answer might tend to criminate the party), by admission or denial, if the facts pleaded are within the knowledge of the respondent; if not, by his declaring his belief or disbelief, or stating that he cannot form a belief or disbelief on the subject. Dysart v. Dysart, 3 Curteis, 544. II. OF PROCEEDINGS TO ENFORCE 10. In a cause of collision, the owners of the vessel proceeded against being resident in Ireland; decree, for their answers directed to issue in the usual form, and not by letters of request. The Manchester, Macleod, 1 W. Rob. 94. 11. The service of a decree for answers upon the proctor will not justify the Court in putting the principal in contempt if those answers are not brought in. Durant v. Durant, 1 Add. 114. 12. A party not giving in his answers on the day of the return of the decree, personally served, will be pronounced contumacious. Wyllie v. Mott and French, 1 Hagg. (Eccl.), 33., and notes. 13. A party cannot be pronounced in contempt at the same time that his answers are held to be insufficient. Morgan v. Hopkins, 2 Phill. 582. III. OF OBJECTIONS TO 1. Generally. 14. The ancient practice was to give acts on petition exceptive to answers, but never an allegation. Morgan v. Hopkins, 2 Phill. 585. 15. When a certificate to a decree for answers has been discontinued, it is still competent to the proctor having discontinued it to object to the answers. Raymond v. Baron de Watteville, 2 Lee, 495. 16. Answers objected to on the ground of abusive matter being therein set forth, directed to be reformed. Ibid. 499. 17. On objections to answers, it is not open to the counsel for the respondent to contend that the parts of the plea not answered are immaterial or not properly admissible. Dysart v. Dysart, 3 Curteis, 546. 2. After publication. 18. Further answers decreed after publication and when the cause stood for hearing on the second assignation; because, as the cause stood, si non, the adverse party might have pleaded on that day, and consequently the cause was open to all purposes. Smith v. Smithson, 2 Lee, 505.; Heath v. Heath, Ibid. 562. IV. MISCELLANEA. 19. One of the parties in a suit of joint capture having waived the answers of the adverse party, relying upon the evidence of a ship's log-book which proved to be inad missible, the conclusion of the cause was, on his application, rescinded, for the purpose of taking the answers, but not for the admission of further pleading and evidence. Le Niemen, Dupotet, 1 Dodson, 10. 20. In a proceeding by plea and proof, by the strict rule of practice the answers to the libel should be given in before the responsive allegation is admitted. The Court cannot relax this rule without the consent of both parties in the cause. The admission of a responsive allegation opposed on such ground, directed to stand over until such answers were given in. The Manchester, Macleod, 1 W. Rob. 94. APPEALS. I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS WITH REFERENCE V. OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT BELOW but the suit still continues. Loveden v. | diction of such Court of Appeal overruled. Loveden, 1 Phill. 208. 3. An appeal only suspends the sentence appealed from, does not render it a nullity. Blyth v. Blyth, 1 Add. 312. II. OF THE COURTS OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1. Generally.* 4. By the 2 & 3 W. 4. c. 92. s. 3. the powers of the High Court of Delegates (the Court of Appeal from the Instance Court of Admiralty) are transferred to the King in Council, and no Commission of Review is thenceforward to be granted. 5. By 3 & 4 W. 4. c. 41. the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is constituted, and all appeals to the King in Council are to be referred by his Majesty to the Committee to report thereon. † 6. By the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65. s. 17. the provisions of the 2 & 3 W. 4. c. 92., transferring the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Delegates in Ecclesiastical and Admiralty causes to the Queen in Council, and of the 3 & 4 W. 4. c. 41., regulating the practice of the Privy Council in such appeals, are extended to all appeals from proceedings instituted in the Court of Admiralty by virtue of the provisions of this act. 7. Semble, that the Privy Council will not exercise jurisdiction as a Court of Appeal from the decisions of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury as to grants by the Crown of property accruing to it by virtue of its prerogative. Army of the Deccan, 2 Knapp. 103. 8. On an appeal (prior to the 2 & 3 W. 4. c. 92.) from a decision of the Vice-Admiralty Court of Sierra Leone (condemning a Swedish vessel engaged in the slave trade as prize) to the Admiralty Instance Court, in which Court, as of appeal, the proceedings had been commenced and carried on by both partics; objections to the juris 1. See the provisions with respect to appeals in prize causes, contained in sect. 37. to 44. of 55 G. 3. c. 160. (the latest prize act, which, however, expired with the last war), and see post, No. 19. 2. The 3 & 4 W. 4. c. 41., above referred to, is amended by the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 38. and 7 & 8 Vict. c. 69. (see these Acts in the Appendix). With reference to the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and the practice in proceedings therein, see 2 Chitty's Gen. Practice, 573., Palmer's Held, that the captors having given issue in such Court, could not object to its competency to entertain the cause, and that a Court of civil jurisdiction may take cognizance of and exclude a claim asserted to be founded on principles contrary to general justice on that ground alone. The Diana, Berthé, 1 Dodson, 100. 9. On an appeal (prior to the 2 & 3 W. 4. c. 92.) from the Vice-Admiralty Court of St. Croix to the High Court of Admiralty, from a condemnation of an American vessel for a breach of the navigation laws, an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court by the claimants of the vessel and cargo, the appellants, on the ground that by the terms of the capitulation of St. Croix the inhabitants thereof were entitled to a hearing before his Majesty, overruled. Tortola, Mc Kie, 1 Dodson, 124. See COURTS, cap. I., and post, No. 10. The 2. From Vice-Admiralty Courts.‡ 10. By 3 & 4 W. 4. c. 41. s. 2. all appeals or applications in prize suits, and in all other suits or proceedings in the Courts of Admiralty or in Vice-Admiralty Courts, or any other Court in his Majesty's dominions abroad, which may now be made to the High Court of Admiralty of England, or to the Lords Commissioners in prize cases, shall be made to his Majesty in Council, and not to the High Court of Admiralty or to such Commissioners; and by s. 3. such appeals shall be referred by his Majesty to the Judicial Committee to report thereon. 11. Prior to the 3 & 4 W. 4. c. 41. an appeal would lie to the High Court of Admiralty from a sentence of a Vice-Admiralty Court regularly constituted, and having authority to entertain the suit, though such sentence is, and is afterwards declared to be, a nullity. The John, Buchanan, 1 Dodson, 381. But it would not lie if such Vice-Admiralty Court were not duly ap Practice on Appeals to the Privy Council (anno 1831), and Palmer's Supplement thereto (anno 1834), and Macqueen's Practical Treatise on the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords and Privy Council (anno 1842). 3. Before the stat. 3 & 4 W. 4. c. 41. appeals from Vice-Admiralty Courts in the West Indies lay to the High Court of Admiralty, and not to the Delegates or Privy Council direct. The Fabius, Cowper, 2 C. Rob. 248. |