date of his decease, but from the date when her inchoate right had its origin.

Counsel argues that this conclusion renders possible the existence of two or more dower estates in the same land because in the time between the years 1853 and 1900 several different persons may each have successively acquired an independent title to the land by adverse possession, and, if all die leaving widows, each relict, under the doctrine here approved, may be dowable in the same premises. But the spectacle of two dowers in the same estate is by no means unknown. McLeery v. McLeery, 65 Me. 173, 20 Am. Rep. 683. Such complications may easily exist even without the intervention of adverse possession or the statute of limitations. Instead of counsel's illustration of five successive owners by adverse possession, let us assume five successive owners by deed of the same land in five successive days, each of the owners being a married man, whose wife does not join in the conveyance. If then on the sixth day these five men perish in some calamitous accident, each of the five widows will have an undoubted right to dower in the land which has been the subject of the transfers of title. This does not cast upon the court, as the counsel seems to think, the problem of finding "five thirds" in a single item of property, for each of the subsequent grantees took the title subject to the unreleased inchoate dower rights already existing in the land; and the right of his widow to dower is not to the one-third of the whole but the one-third of whatever remains after setting off the share or shares of those who are prior in order of time.

The question whether the plaintiff's dower is to be measured and governed by the law as it existed in 1855 or by the present statute, and of the rights of the parties in respect to improvements on the land, is not presented by the record, and need not be considered.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. NOTE.-Time When the Statute of Limitations Begins to Run Against the Widow's Right of Dower.-It is well settled, at least by the great weight of authority that the statute of limitations does not begin to run against the claim of dower until the death of the husband. Steele v. Gellatly, 4 Ill. 39;* Durham v. Angier, 20 Me. 242; Moore v. Frost, 3 N. H. 126; Smith v. Wehrle, 41 W. Va. 270, 23 S. E. Rep. 912; Stedham v. Matthews, 29 Ark. 650; Thompson v. McCorkle, 136 Ind, 484, 34 N. E. Rep. 813, 43 Am. St. Rep. 334; Smith v. Myers, 7 Ky. Law Rep. 443; Robinson v. Ware, 94 Mo. 678, 8 S. W. Rep. 153; Winters v. De Turk, 133 Pa. St. 359, 19 Atl. Rep. 354, 7 L. R. A. 658; Taylor v. Lawrence (Ill.), 36 N. E. Rep. 74; Williams v. Williams, 89 Ky. 381, 12 S. W. Rep. 760; Hart v. McCollum, 28 Ga. 478; Long v. Stock Yards Co., 107 Mo. 298.

Where land in which a widow has dower is sold after the death of the husband, whether by written contract with the husband before his death or by order of court or otherwise after his death, the statute begins to run against the widow's claim of dower only from the time of the purchaser's taking possession. Rickard v. Talbird, Rice, Eq. (S. C. 1839) 158;

Care v. Keller, 77 Pa. St. 487. In Arkansas it is held that the statute does not begin to run against a suit by a widow for dower, in favor of a purchaser of the deceased husband's land at judicial sale, until the date of the purchase. Webb v. Smith, 40 Ark. 17. It is here essential to note the distinction between a right of dower and the right to maintain an action jor dower. The right of dower accrues or is perfect at the death of her husband, but the right of the widow to maintain an action for dower is not perfect generally, until, using the language of some of the statutes, the defendant has either denied the plaintiff's right, or done some act amounting to such denial. In that case therefore the mere lapse of time without a proceeding or action to have dower assigned will not bar the right of dower. There must be a denial of the right of dower or a holding adverse thereto. Therefore the statute does not begin to run as against the dowress or her assignee, and in favor of the heir or his assignee, until he either denies the right of dower or does some act equivalent thereto. Rice v. Nelson, 27 Iowa, 148. In this case the widow's right of dower became consummate on the death of her husband in 1850. No action for the assignment of dower was made. In 1862 the property was sold for taxes. In 1864 an assignee of the widow's unassigned right of dower attempted to redeem the property. The purchaser at the tax sale contested his right because the ten-year statute of limitations had run against the widow's right to sue for assignment of her dower. Judge Dillon in a well written opinion, held that the widow had an interest which gave her the right to redeem. There was nothing in the record to show adverse possession in anyone during the ten years,-just a mere lapse of time. This case was reaffirmed in Sully v. Nebergall, 30 Iowa, 339. The doctrine was further explained in the case of Felch v. Finch, 52 Iowa, 563, where the court holds that the statute does not commence to run against the widow's right of action to recover a dower interest in lands until there is an adverse possession by the heirs or grantees of the husband

There has been some discussion whether the statutes of limitation applied to the widow's right of action for the assignment of her dower, on the ground that such statutes presuppose a previous seisin of possession, from the expiration of which the limitations must commence; that dower can have no limitations from the disseisin of the husband, nor from the widow's own seisin, because she has no right of entry or of action for possession until dower is assigned. It was so held in Johns v. Fenton, 88 Mo. 64; Spencer v. Weston's Heirs, 18 N. Car. 213. In the subsequent case of Robinson v. Ware, 94 Mo. 678, Justice Black in a splendid argument shows the fallacy of this reasoning and holds that the widow's right of action for assignment of dower was in itself a real action based on her right of possession which became consummate on the death of her husband. To same effect: Beard v. Hale, 95 Mo. 16; Long v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 107 Mo. 298, 17 S. W. Rep. 656, 28 Am. St. Rep. 413. In New Hampshire, however, it is held under a little different statute, that the statute begins to run against a widow's claim of dower from the time when her right accrues to a writ of dower after demand, and not not from the time when she became entitled to dower upon the death of her husband. Robie v. Flanders, 33 N. H. 524.

Under a statute allowing a married woman to bring her action within three years after discovertrre, notwithstanding the period prescribed by the statute

of limitations, and a provision that "where two or more disabilities shall co-exist at the time the right of action accrues, the limitation shall not attach until they all be removed," when an infant married woman joins with her husband in a deed, and before her arrival at age, enters into a second marriage, time is not counted against her right to dower in the lands conveyed until the removal of the latter disability. Epps v. Flowers, 101 N. Car. 158, 7 S. E. Rep. 680. See also Harding v. Presbyterian Church, 20 Ind. 71.

Since a widow's right to sue for dower does not accrue until the death of her husband, adverse possession does not begin to run against the widow of one who has been long absent and unheard of until seven years after the husband was last heard from. Whiting v. Nicoll, 46 Ill. 230, 92 Am. Dec. 248.

Under Code Civ. Proc. § 6, limiting the time within which actions for the recovery of realty may be brought, to ten years, an action for dower must be brought within ten years from the time it accrued. Beall v. McMenemy, 63 Neb. 70, 88 N. W. Rep. 134.

In a recent case it appeared that a bill was filed in August, 1901, alleging that complainant's husband conveyed property in 1866 by a deed purporting to contain a release of complainant's dower, and complainant knew nothing of the deed until long after its date, and never signed it or released her dower in the land, and that the husband died in March, 1901, is not demurrable as showing laches on the part of the complainant. Hunt v. Reilly (R. I. 1902), 50 Atl. Rep. 833.

The right of a widow to sue for dower accrues on her husband's death, so that her right of action under the statute is barred in ten years after his death. Morris v. Roseberry (W. Va. 1899), 32 S. E. Rep. 1019.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

COON SKIN CAP LAW-JUDGE CALDWELL ON PREFEREN TIAL CLAIMS AGAINST RAILROADS. Justice Henry C. Caldwell's toast before the Colorado Bar Association, entitled "Coon Skin Cap Law," has aroused considerable interest. Commenting on this address the Kansas City Bar Monthly said: "Besides tracing the development of decisions on preferential claims against railroads, for labor and equipment, it tells a pathetic story of hardship before such claims were recognized, the like of which we are not apt to find in reports. It shows the heart and conscience back of the judge's effort to follow the law and the decisions, and how, in following the law, he was awakened to its injustice in such a way as to start a line of decisions which have completely changed the rule as it then stood. As told in the judge's address, the rule which allowed a claim against a steamboat for labor, supplies and equipment, in preference to prior liens, under a receivership in foreclosure proceedings, did not apply as against railroads. Judge Caldwell was the first to hold that it did apply, and though his decision at first met with great opposition, it is now almost universally recognized. In his address his reference to the supreme court and circuit court was called forth by decisions in all of which Justice Brewer wrote the opinions. In one of these opinions, he says: "There is no difference between a mortgage on a railroad and a mortgage on a farm." Justice Brewer was present when this address was delivered and heard Judge Caldwell say: "There is not a raccoon in the United States that does not know the difference between a

cornfield and a railroad." Justice Caldwell spoke as follows:

Mr. Toastmaster, I am persuaded that you are possessed of some occult power. In no other way could you have knowledge of the legend of the "Coon Skin Cap Law." Seeing that you are in possession of the secret, I may as well impart it to all present. To those not blest with the occult power of the toastmaster the toast implies a comedy, but in fact it relates to a tragedy, and to the saddest of all tragedies -a tragedy directly traceable to judicial ignorance, and error, and which "revives the memory of a rooted sorrow, which weighs upon the heart." Mr. Ruskin says, "The greatest thing a human soul ever does is to see something and tell what it saw in a plain way." I will essay that task.

A man entered into a contract with a railroad company whose road ran through two or more states, to furnish wood and ties to the company, to be taken from timber lands in the Mississippi river bottom, which at that point was fifty miles wide and annually overflowed from five to twenty feet in depth. In this bottom perched upon stilts, he built a log cabin, and with his wife and an old negro man who assisted him in his work, lived there, except during the periods of overflow, when they were driven to the hills. He was engaged in this work about four years, during which time the company, which was in a chronic state of impecuniosity, only paid him on account a sum barely sufficient to buy enough meal and bacon to subsist upon. The annual overflow drove him out of his cabin to the hills; sickness ensued, and it was nearly a year before he was ready to resume his work; and just as he was ready to do so, the railroad went into the hands of a receiver, upon a bill filed to foreclose a mortgage upon it. All this happened more than a quarter of a century ago. When the bill was filed the timid and callow judge found some authority for treating as preferential, claims for labor and materials that had accrued within three or four months; and he stretched this to six months and made an order accordingly.

Presently a petition of intervention was filed in the case and when it came on for hearing, the intervenor appeared in person to represent his claim. He wore a coon-skin cap, with the tail hanging down the back, coarse cotton shirt, and pants and shoes to correspond. He was long past the meridian of life, his hands were calloused by toil and his face wore the "shadowed livery of the burnished sun." But the wrinkles, the sunburn and the unkempt beard could not conceal from view that ineffaceable and unfading charm that always marks the face of the man of honest good will. The poet took no liberty with truth when he said, "Honest labor bears a lovely face." It was evident that he had earned his bread according to the divine decree, "in the sweat of his face." In a plain modest manner he told how he had worked getting out wood and ties for the road, and how the company had made small payments from time to time, always promising payment in the near future. The balance due him for wood and ties amounted to over seven hundred dollars, a sum which to him was a fortune, and all his fortune.

At the close of his testimony, with deference and modesty, he said: "When I sold wood to steamboats on the Mississippi river, I had a lien for its price, on the boat, ahead of mortgages, and I suppose there is no difference between wood sold to run a steamboat and wood and ties sold to run a railroad." But the supreme court had said they could not find that the rule which has obtained in admiralty from the dawn

of commerce which prefers such claims over mortgages, bad ever been applied to railroads; and this, of course, was true, for there had been no railroads to call for its application; they were a modern invention. The court might have fortified its opinion by citing a case in point: A suit was brought before a justice of the peace in Vermont by one farmer against another for breaking his churn. The justice took time to consider and then said that he had looked through the statutes carefully, and could not find that any action had ever been brought before for breaking a churn, and gave judgment for the defendant.

The last item in the account was eleven months old when the road went into the hands of the receiver. The judge decided that this was fatal to his claim, according to the then decisions which restricted the payment of such claims to those which had accrued within six months; that although his wood and his ties kept the railroad running and from being utterly valueless, either as an instrument of commerce or as a security, he had no equity to be paid in preference to the mortgagees, whose security he had preserved.

The decision was a thunderbolt to that old man. He looked like a man sentenced to death. With a trembling hand he reached for his coon-skin cap, with difficulty rose from his seat, and tottered rather than walked out of the court room. He took the train for home and was let off at his cabin. His aged wife and the old negro man were awaiting his return with eager expectation. He entered the cabin, and in anguish said: "Oh, wife! Oh, Ned! We are ruined! The judge will not pay us anything for our wood and ties." While his wife and the old negro man gave way to tears and sobs, the coon-skin cap man sat silent and dejected. Presently he rose up and went out of the cabin. His wife prepared their frugal meal and called her husband. There was no answer. No answer coming to repeated calls, his wife and the old negro went out to search for him. They found him-hanging to the limb of a tree, dead. The coonskin cap was lying at the root of the tree.

No lesson is lost to us if it doesn't come too late. The spectre of that man of honest toil hanging from that tree, the vision of that cap, and an uneasy and alarmed conscience, imposed upon that judge the burden of prayerfully inquiring whether the judgment that produced this awful tragedy was just, and upon making that inquiry he found that there was a close analogy between ships and railroads; that both were instruments of commerce; that neither could perform their functions or be of any utility to the public, or of any value as a security, unless they were kept running, and that they could not be kept running without labor, materials and supplies, that were not and could not be paid for at the time they were procured or purchased; and that every one taking a mortgage on such property knew this, and must therefore be held to have impliedly consented that such claims should have preference over his mortgage. He found that there was just as much law for saying that such claims were valid if they accrued within six years, as there was for saying that they must have accrued within six months; that the length of time depended on the length of the chancellor's foot; in a word, that all the law on the subject was judge-made law; and that judge thereupon determined to measure out equity according to the length of his own foot-not a small one-instead of that of some other judge, and to make a little judge-made law himseif, and he then and there made it a rule of his own court that no railroad receiver would

be appointed except upon the condition that all claims for labor, supplies and materials necessary to keep the road in operation, and all claims for damage resulting from its operation that were not barred by the statute of limitations, should have preference over mortgages. And this rule is what the toastmaster has been pleased to call the "Coon-skin Cap Law." This rule was without any precedent to support it, but it was sublimely just. It was its own precedent, and it would be happy for mankind, if all judicial precedents had the same everlasting and impregnable foundation. Since the adoption of that rule no citizen of Arkansas has had occasion to commit suicide for the same reason the "coon-skin cap man" did. But this rule came too late to save the life of the man with the coon-skin cap. To be wise too late is the exact definition of a fool; and that judge bows his head in sorrow and humiliation, and confesses he is in that category. After all, the human skull is but the temple of human errors, and judicial clay, if you analyze it well, will be found to be like all other human clay.

At first the "Coon-skin Cap Law" was not in favor with most judges, but its author consoled himself with the reflection that great truths commonly dwell a long time with minorities. It is a gratifying fact that the sun sets every night on an increased number of supporters of the "Coon-skin Cap Law." Through legislation in some states, and by judicial decisions in others, it is fast becoming the law everywhere.

In relation to the limit of time and the character of supplies to entitle to a preference, there is a total want of uniformity in the decisions of the courts and even in the decisions of the same court. Claims six years old have been allowed by the supreme court, and at another time it has said that only claims which aecrued "some short time" before the receiver was appointed could be paid, which is exactly as definite as to say that a certain thing is as big as a piece of chalk. The equity is admitted by allowing any debt to be preferential for ever so short a time. The principle being established the equity should be complete. There is no difference in principle whether such a debt is six days or six months or six years old-if it was a preferential debt in its inception that equity inheres in it until it is barred by the statute of limitations. There is no rule of law or equity to the contrary there is only the varying and conflicting opinions of judges as to what rule the judges ought to make. It is a legislative function to make a statute of limitations, and every state has such a statute, which is as applicable to preferential debts as to any others. It has also been said that there is no difference between a mortgage on a farm, and a mortgage on a railroad. Before a mortgage on a railroad, can be likened to a mortgage on a farm, the farm must be put on wheels, and-propelled by steam or other motive power-be under obligations to the public to carry passengers from the Atlantic to the Pacific and enjoy the high privilege of running over every other farm on the line of its route between the two oceans, whether their owners will or no, and from the nature of its business be compelled to obtain on credit the labor and materials essential to keep it moving, and enable it to discharge the duties it owes to the public. The Seven Wonders of the World would be nothing compared to such a farm. Even a supreme court decision can not give birth to such a wonder. The whole doctrine is bottomed on the essential difference between a railroad and all other kinds of property except a ship, between a ship and a

railroad the analogy is perfect. But argument to overthrow the fallacy is not necessary. It is opposed alike to the reason of man and the instinct of animals. There is not a raccoon in the United States that does not know the difference between a cornfield and a railroad; and if the distinguished member of the supreme court, who is your guest on this occasion, will accompany me some night on a coon hunt in - Arkansas, I will demonstrate this fact to him. But recent decisions of that court give the promise of better things. It may be said of that court, as the Nevada miner said of the Chinese-"It is becoming civilized and Christianized." A Chinaman in Nevada discovered a valuable mine. A miner with exalted notions of the right of a free-born American citizen, drove the Chinaman out of his mine, and took possession of it. The Chinaman returned the next day with a Winchester rifle, and sent a ball through a vital part of the claim jumper's anatomy. The friends of the dead man assembled to bury him. Their leader turned the body over, examined the track of the bullet which had plowed its way through the heart, and then with a deep sigh and in regretful tones said: "Boys, these damned Mongolians are becoming civilized and Christianized." There is hope for the supreme court yet.

The law on this subject should be known, but all that is known about it outside of the jurisdictions where the coon-skin cap law prevails is that it is consistent in its inconsistency, certain in its uncertainty and uniform in its want of uniformity. On this subject "confusion now hath made his masterpiece."

The fine distinctions drawn by some courts between preferential and non-preferential debts are simply bewildering. In one case a claim for fuel was preferred and a claim for headlight and lubricating oil rejected, presumably upon the ground that the red hot boxes resulting from the non-use of lubricating oil would perform the office of the headlight, and that the pungent odor emitted from the hot boxes would advise all animal creation having nasal organs of the approach of the train. Such a microscopic administration of equity requires a much keener vision than ordinary men possess, or according to Pope, were ever intended to possess:

"Why has not man a microscopic eye? For this plain reason, man is not a fly."

In time of war it is permissible to send out a column of cavalry with orders to "subsist on the country," but courts of justice ought not to decree that railroads can either in peace or in war "subsist on the country" through which they run for the profit of their bondholders, who are always practically their

owners.

CORRESPONDENCE.

APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUI TO UNAVOIDABLE AND INEXPLICABLE ACCIDENTS.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

I have read with pleasure and profit Mr. Wood's article in your number of July 24th last upon the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Will you pardon me for submitting that a perusal of that article suggets the value and importance of an equally well-considered consideration of a question connected directly with the application of the doctrine, namely, the effect, where the doctrine is applied, of a complete showing on the part of the defendant of all the facts attending the event, which would be held, if unexplained, to be some evidence of negligence.

Or, to put it differently: A plaintiff having shown an injury under circumstances from which negligence on the part of defendant may be implied under the doctrine referred to, the defendant proceeds to show exactly how the accident happened and that it happened in spite of his exercise of proper care; it might appear, for example, that the cause of the unusual event was inexplicable, or that no one would have anticipated or imagined the happening of such an accident. Is such a case still a question for the jury? If so, then isn't the jury left to speculate upon the matter; and if the conclusion is adverse to the defendant, is it not necessarily based, not upon facts, but upon a presumption which the facts in evidence have really removed?

Another phase of this subject is presented by the question applicable to the supposition last made: Is there anything left to the presumption which is based upon an unexplained accident, when all the facts surrounding the accident, so far as anybody cognizant therewith knows them, show that it was unavoidable? Yours very truly,

Kansas City, Mo.

J. P. DANA.

[ d or sent the above letter to Mr. Cyrus J. Wood, the writer of the article referred to, and received the reply as follows:]

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

Your favor of the 11th inst. was duly received and should have been answered earlier, but I have been very busy on account of the opening of our courts. You forwarded a letter written by J. P. Dana, of Kansas City, and I return the same herewith.

Mr. Dana, in his letter, discusses the doctrine res ipsa loquitur, a subject that was discussed by me in a recent article that you published. I would say that the topic Mr. Dana suggests does not seem to me to be suitable as the basis of an article.

It is evident that his ideas and mine are not in exact harmony.

Take the first case he supposes, and in which he says that the defendant "proceeds to show exactly how the accident happened, and that it happened in spite of his exercise of proper care." In such a case as this, in my opinion the defendant has won its It has met the presumption of negligence that arose against it.

case.

Mr. Dana uses the word "accident," which, in my opinion, is not proper in this connection, and he speaks of an "unavoidable accident" and an "unexplained accident." If a common carrier, an employer or any other defendant, performs fully the duty required of it by law under the circumstances, and this is clearly shown, or, in other words, if no negligence on its part is shown, then the case is not even oue for the jury. All of which is respectfully submitted. Yours truly,

CYRUS J. WOOD.

BOOK REVIEWS.

KINKEAD ON TORTS.

If a multiplication of text books on the subject of torts indicates an increasing degeneracy of the human race we might have some reason to regret the appearance of a new commentary on the law of torts which is now before us for review, said to be a "philosophic discussion of the general principles underlying civil wrongs ex delicto," by Edgar B. Kinkead, of the Col

umbus (Ohio) bar, and professor of law in the Ohio State University.

The subject of torts is one of the great general subdivisions of the law. In a treatment of this subject we expect to find, not a digest of the cases, nor even a statement of every shade or variation of meaning of the legal principles involved but a full discussion of the principles themselves. That Mr. Kinkead has thoroughly appreciated this expectation of the profession, we have but to glance at the following paragraph in his preface: "In writing upon a subject of such extent and magnitude as this, the general principles only have received attention, the various applications to circumstances and conditions as shown by the numerous adjudications have not been pursued to great extent. We found plenty to do in covering the general principles and pursuing the great outlines of the subject. As lawyers become better educated in their profession, the more they learn to depend upon a knowledge of general principles and less upon cases, the more they will appreciate and prefer a scientific treatise to a case-digested text-book."

The following is the plan of the work. Part I. is Introductory, including a discussion of the general nature of torts and a classification of rights and duties violated by torts. Part II. is entitled "Liability of Persons." Here the author discusses this particular question as it is affected by status, concert of action and relation to actor. The interesting subject of contribution between wrong-doers is also here set forth. This part of the work with several chapters on the liability of corporations and the liability of persons in official relations. Part III. discusses the subject of "Specific Wrongs to Absolute Rights-By Force." Here occur the subjects of assault and battery, false imprisionment, malicous abuse of process, and restraints of persons for peace, security and health of the community. Part IV. deals with "Specific Wrongs to Absolute Rights-Without Force." Here we have discussion of injuries to the constitutional right of personal security, first, by animals wild or domestic; second, by automatic guns and other dangerous and automatic appliances. Here, also, is discussion that multitude of cases to be listed under the general head of negligence, which result in injury to the person, such as injuries from the use of dangerous agencies, from defects in highways, from unsafe condition of structures and excavations and various obstructions, from the malpractice of physicians, surgeons and apothecaries, and the negligence of common carriers of passengers. So, also, is discussed the subject of wrongs affecting the reputation, such as slander, libel and malicious prosecution. This part closes with a discussion of wrongs upon the right to health or comfort, which embraces that vast domain of the law, known as nuisances. Part V. treats of "Specific Wrongs to Relative Rights," which includes injuries to or by persons standing in various relations to the wrong-doer, such as the domestic relations, which embrace for instance, such subjects as death by wrongful act and sales of intoxicating liquors and action therefor under the civil damage statutes, the relation of master and servant, husband and wife, etc. So also the subject of wrongs in trade relations involving the great subject of conspiracies against trade. The closing chapter deals with the subject of constitutional relative rights, such as to education, to religious worship, of suffrage and against searches and seizures. Part VI. deals with "Specific Wrongs to Property Rights-By Force." First we have a

discussion of wrongs upon real property, as by trespass, forcible entry and detainer, waste, etc. Next we have a review of the authorities on the question of wrongs upon personal property. Part VII. discusses the general subject of "Specific Wrongs to Property Rights-Without Force." Here we have an interesting treatment of wrongs to intangible personal property as such patents, copyrights and trademarks, then of wrongs to tangible personal property as by conversion, confusion, negligence and common carriers. The part closes with a discussion of wrongs to real property. Here we have the interesting questions of nuisances, easements and negligent fires. Part VIII. closes the treatise with a discussion of "Fraud-Wrong to Rights in General."

The scope of this treatise, as thus outlined, shows a very logical and exhaustive arrangement. Its treatment is equally so, and its clearness of style renders the work a valuable aid to both the student and practitioner. Printed in two volumes of 1739 pages and published by Bancroft-Whitney Company, San Francisco, Cal.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Collateral Inheritance and Transfer Tax Law of the State of New York, containing original Act of 1885 with all amendments, the Revision of 1892 with all subsequent amendments prior to 1896, and the Codification of 1896 with all subsequent amendments to date, with each act separately annotated and indexed. Together with forms and table of cases. By Edward H. Fallows, of the New York Bar, Transfer Tax Attorney for the State Comptroller in New York County.. Associate Editor, George M. Judd, of the New York Bar. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Company, 1903. Sheep, pp. 320. Price, $3.50. Review will follow.

HUMOR OF THE LAW.

A certain judge, well known to the present generation of Philadelphia lawyers, was recently invited to deliver an address before the graduating class of a southern law school. As he entered the commencement hall he read on the swinging door the word "Push."

"That's a good text for my speech," he said to himself, as he related the story afterward.

He began his remarks something like this: "Gentlemen of the graduating class: As I entered this beautiful hall a word met my eye which I would wish you all to take a motto in your professional careers."

Everyone instinctively turned to glance at the door, the orator among the rest. There, on the inside, in letters only too easily read, was the inscription, "Pull."

"It was a clean give away," said the judge later; "I'd let the cat out of the bag then and there, and there wasn't a thing to do but to confess."

WEEKLY DIGEST.

Weekly Digest of ALL the Current Opinions of ALL the State and Territorial Courts of Last Resort, and of all the Federal Courts.

ALABAMA. ARKANSAS... COLORADO.. ILLINOIS.. INDIANA... IOWA.

KANSAS.

.1, 39, 60, 69, 123, 151 .103 .5, 119, 142

.77, 91, 108, 121, 133, 134, 148, 194, 198 .56, 99, 112, 114, 132, 168, 170

.3, 8, 25, 30, 37, 40, 41, 100, 102, 139, 172, 177 86, 110 .11, 35, 63, 71, 80, 81, 93, 118, 124, 135, 180, 188 LOUISIANA, 31, 42, 57, 61, 68, 84, 89, 95, 106, 111, 115, 138, 156, 158, 179, 189, 193, 195

KENTUCKY.

MAINE..

85