man of the greatest of all crimes, is a sufficient force to constitute the crime of robbery, by putting in fear. Also, a fear of loss of character and service upon a charge of sodomitical practices, is sufficient to constitute robbery, though the party has no fear of being taken into custody, or of punishment.1

The last two decisions were at common law, and it has been supposed that our statute, embracing only fear of injury to person or property, did not include those cases in which the fear was of injury to the character of the person robbed. There are a large number of English cases reported, where the property was taken by threats, inducing a fear of injury to the character, which will be found treated of in Russell on Crimes (vol. 1, 877, et seq).

In the People v. McDaniels (1 Park. Cr. R., 198), it was held that a robbery may be committed by extorting personal property from the person, or in the presence of the owner, by means of threats of an unfounded criminal charge, where such property is obtained through fear produced by such threats.

In the above case, by means of a threat to arrest the prose cutor on a charge of having been guilty of the crime against nature (the charge being groundless and known to be so by the defendant), the prosecutor, through fear of such threatened arrest, was induced to deliver to the defendant twenty dollars and a receipt for thirteen dollars, owed by the defendant to the prosecutor, and to promise to pay to the defendant twenty dollars more. Held, that the defendant was guilty of robbery in the second degree. It is not necessary to constitute such offence that the charge against the prosecutor should be direct or should be made in unequivocal language. It is enough if the language used was intended to communicate such a charge, and was so understood at the time by the prisoner.

The cases of robbery in which the property has been obtained by means of a fear being excited of injury to the character of the party robbed, appear to be all of one description. Indeed, it has been said that the terror which leads a party to apprehend an injury to his character, has never been deemed sufficient to support an indictment for robbery, except in the particular instance of its being excited by means of insinuations against or

threats to destroy the character of the party pillaged by accusing him of sodomitical practices.1

If thieves meet a person and by menaces of death make him swear to bring them money, and he, under continuing influence of fear of his life, complies, this is robbery in them, though it would not be so if he had no personal fear, and acted merely from a superstitious regard to an oath so extorted.2

To constitute robbery where an actual violence is relied upon, and no putting in fear can be expressly shown, there must be a struggle or at least a personal outrage. So that to snatch property suddenly from the hand, to seize a parcel carried on the head, to carry away a hat and wig without force, and to take an umbrella of a sudden, have been respectively holden to be mere larcenies.3

In a case tried in this State it was said that the mere snatching of a thing from the hand or person of another, without any struggle or resistance by the owner, or any force or violence on the part of the thief, will not constitute robbery. Where the court instructed the jury that feloniously taking another's property, with violence sufficient to constitute an assault and battery, would make out the crime of robbery, it was held to be erroneous, and the prisoner having been convicted under such a charge, the judgment was reversed. Where the property is not obtained by putting the person in fear of immediate injury to the person, the violence necessary to make the offence amount to robbery must be sufficient to force the person to part with his property, not only against his will, but in spite of his resistance.*

In the absence of force to constitute robbery the fear must arise before and at the time of the property being taken. It is not enough that it arise afterwards. And where the prisoner by stealth took some money out of the prosecutor's pocket, who turned round, saw the prisoner and demanded the money, but the prisoner threatening him, he desisted, through fear, from making any further demand, it was held no robbery. But snatching an article from a man will constitute robbery if it is

attached to his person or clothes so as to afford resistance, and where the prosecutor's watch was fastened to a steel chain which went around his neck, and the seal and chain hung from his fob, and the prisoner laid hold of the seal and chain and pulled the watch from the fob, but the steel chain still secured it, but by two jerks the prisoner broke the steel chain and made off with the watch, it was held a robbery, for the prisoner did not get the watch at once, but had to overcome the resistance the steel chain made, and actual force was used for that purpose. So, also, where a man tore an ear ring from the ear, and in so doing larcerated the flesh. And where a heavy diamond pin with a corkscrew stock, and which was twisted and strongly fastened in a lady's hair, the judges came to the same decision.3

Where a man snatched at the sword of a gentleman hanging by his side, and the latter, perceiving his design, laid. hold of the scabbard, on which a contest ensued, and the thief succeeded in wresting the weapon from its owner, his offence was holden to be robbery.1

It is not necessary that actual fear should be strictly and precisely proved, as the law in odium spoliatoris will presume fear where there appears to be a just ground for it.5

The cases in which the crime of robbery has been committed by means of fear of injury to the property of the party are principally those in which the terror excited was of the probable outrages of a mob. The prisoner, who was a ringleader in some riots among the tinners in Cornwall, came, with about seventy of his companions, to the house of the prosecutor and said that they would have from him the same as they had from his neighbors, namely, a guinea, or else they would tear his row of corn and level his house. He gave them a crown to appease them, when the prisoner swore that he would have five shillings more, which the prosecutor, being terrified, gave them. They then opened a cask of cider by force, drank part of it, and eat the prosecutor's bread and cheese, and the prisoner carried away a piece. The indictment contained two counts-one for robbing the prosecutor

R. & R. C. C., 419.

. 1 Leach, 320.

' Id., 335.

Id., 290, and notes.

⚫ 1 Fost., 128.

of ten shillings in his dwelling house, by assault and putting him in fear, and the other for putting the prosecutor in fear and taking from him, in his dwelling house, a quantity of cider, pork and bread. It was holden robbery in the dwelling house.1

The words of the definition of robbery are in the alternative "violence or putting in fear;" and if it appears that the property be taken by either of these means, against the will of the party, such taking will be sufficient to constitute robbery.2

Under the common law it seems to have sometimes been considered that fear is a necessary ingredient in all cases of robbery, even in.those effected by actual violence,3 but if so it will be presumed. There are cases of this description in which fear can hardly be supposed to have existed, as if a thief take a man by the cravat, squeeze him against a wall, and in the meantime abstract his watch from his fob, without his knowledge. This is • a robbery, though the plaintiff was not afraid nor aware of the robber's intent. So, also, if a man be knocked down, without previous warning, and stripped of his property while senseless, he cannot with propriety be said to be put in fear, and yet that would undoubtedly be robbery. Though the violence be used for a different purpose than that of obtaining the property of the party assaulted, yet, if the property be obtained by it, the offence will, under some circumstances, at least, amount to robbery, as where money was offered to a party endeavoring to commit a rape and taken by him."

The fear of injury to the person is that which is commonly excited on the commission of this offence; and where property is obtained by this means, it will amount to robbery, though there be no great degree of terror or affright in the party robbed. It is enough if the fact be attended with such circumstances of terror, such threatening, by word or gesture, as in common experience are likely to create an apprehension of danger, and induce a man to part with his property for the safety of his person."

12 East. P. C., 731.

' Id., 708.

• Fost., 128.

• Com. v. Snelling, 4 Binn. Rep., 379.

• Fost., 128.

• Blackman's Case, 2 East. P. C., 711. ' 4 Black. Com., 243; 1 Leach, 197.

Violence or threats, reasonably calculated to put a man in fear, are essential to constitute robbery.1

6. Of the Value of the Property.

It is immaterial of what value the thing taken is. It is the nature of the circumstances attending the commission of the offence that constitutes robbery. The trifling value of the property taken does not qualify the offence.

In 5 Carr & P., 602, Rex v. Bingley, the property taken was a slip of paper containing a memorandum of a debt due to the person robbed. It was held that the offence was robbery, notwithstanding the small value of the paper. That the prosecutor showed, by carrying the memorandum in his pocket, that he considered it of some value.

But something must be taken and it must be of some value, otherwise the offence will be only that of an assault with intent to rob, but it need not be of the value of any known coin, even of a farthing.3

7. Attempts to Rob by Means of Threatening Letters.

Every person who shall knowingly send or deliver, or shall make, and for the purpose of being delivered or sent, shall part with the possession of any letter or writing, with or without a name subscribed thereto, or signed with a fictitious name, or with any letter, mark or other designation, threatening therein to accuse any person of any crime, or to do any injury to the person or property of any one, with a view or intent to extort or gain any money or property of any description belonging to another, shall, upon conviction, be adjudged guilty of an attempt to rob.*

Where threatening letters are written and mailed in one county, and directed to and received by the person to whom they are addressed in another county, the indictment for sending such letters should be found in the latter county.5

The statute against sending threatening letters, with the view of extorting, etc., was intended to embrace only cases where the