not warrant the interference of equity. The judgment must appear to give the winning party the advantage which a court of equity would not permit him to hold, in order to warrant the extraordinary interference with the proceeding at law. It grants relief against judgments in aid of justice, not as a recompense for the accident; and although the law court may have committed error upon the trial, if the judgment is not against conscience, it will not meddle with it. The accident, or some other ground of equitable interposition, and the injustice of the judgment must concur.'

Again, in Whitehill v. Butler, 51 Ark. 342, 11 S. W. 477, when there was a loss of remedy at law without any negligence on the part of the complainant, as well as some inaccurate statements of the law in the charge to the jury, coupled with the objection to the admission of certain evidence, but the merits of the controversy were not disclosed, Cockrill, C. J., said: “But it is not enough to warrant the extraordinary interference of equity with a judgment at law that an accident has prevented the losing party from pressing a motion for a new trial based upon technical errors occurring at the trial, even though they may be sufficient to warrant a reversal of the judgment on appeal. A party who has obtained a judgment, after a full investigation of the controversy by a competent tribunal, will not be forced by a court of equity to submit to a new trial, unless justice imperatively demands it. It must clearly appear to the court that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to allow the judgment to be enforced, else it declines to impose terms upon the prevailing party." Crim v. Handley, 94 U, S. 652, 24 L. Ed. 216; Harkey v. Tillman, 40 Ark. 553.

It is thus seen when, by accident from unforeseen circumstances, the term of a court has lapsed, or a special adjourned term was never held, or the adjourned session could not be held, and the term closed by operation of law, so that the judgment became irrevocable at law, and the party lost the benefit of his motion, and was precluded or cut off from his right of appeal, the failure to obtain a new trial or appeal, alone, was not sufficient to warrant the interference of equity with the judgment, nor mere errors or irregularities of the court of law, but injustice or hardship must be made to appear, or some other equitable consideration, so that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to allow the judgment to be enforced. "A judgment," says Mr. High, "regular on its face, will not be enjoined when it is not shown to be unjust or oppressive, and when it does not appear that the party asking the aid of equity against the enforcement of the judgment has a good defense to the claim upon which it was founded." High, Inj. § 126.

The complainant alleges no facts, arising out of or connected with the trial, which show that any injustice has been done, or that the winning party has obtained any improper advantage, or any fraud or mistake, or any failure of justice from the trial by accident, or that THROCKM.EQ.JUR. (2D ED.)-15

he has any defense thereto, other than, if he is granted another opportunity, he will prove that the heifer is his property. His reliance for relief rests solely upon the ground that, by accident arising out of the resignation of the justice, he has been cut off or lost his right of appeal, which would have secured a trial de novo, and that he would have been able to prove what, it seems, he failed to establish to the satisfaction of the jury at the first trial. In such case it is plain that the jurisdiction of equity cannot be imperatively demanded; the accident and the injustice of the judgment must concur and appear, or its jurisdiction will be denied.

Nor is this all. In the case at bar, the plaintiff was not cut off absolutely, as in the other cases cited, from his right of appeal. He had plenty of time to perfect his appeal, and could have done so easily, if he had so desired, so far as this record discloses. Of the 30 days within which an appeal may be taken, 18 of them were allowed to pass before the signature of the justice was sought to perfect the appeal. While the statute fixes the limit at 30 days within which an appeal may be taken, yet there were 18 days in which the opportunity was present for the plaintiff to exercise his right to appeal and secure a retrial, which was not availed, so that he was not absolutely precluded or cut off from his right of appeal.

In view of these considerations, and the general doctrine that an injunction will not lie to restrain a judgment unless it affirmatively appears that the judgment itself was wrong, and that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to have it enforced, there was no error in dismissing the bill for injunction, and the decree thereof is affirmed.

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I. Mistake of Law 1

1. WHEN RELIEF WILL BE GRANTED

JORDAN v. STEVENS.

(Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1863. 51 Me. 78, 81 Am. Dec. 556.) Suit in equity submitted on bill, answers and proofs.

DAVIS, J. Jonathan Stevens, the father of the parties to this suit, died in November, 1857, leaving personal property valued at about $3,000, and real estate worth nearly $5,000. The plaintiff, being a widow, had worked in his family for many years, receiving therefor one dollar a week. A short time before his death he gave her a life lease of his homestead in Portland, worth about $2,000, to take effect upon his decease. Whether he did this for the reason that he thought that he had not paid her enough for her services, or because she needed a larger share of the property than the other heirs, does not appear, and is immaterial. He died intestate, leaving seven children, and the issue of another not living.

The property leased to the plaintiff was described as situated "on Chestnut street." After the death of her father, the plaintiff had the lease altered so as to read "Wilmot street." This was done at the suggestion of some of the defendants; and besides, as the property was otherwise sufficiently described, the mistake of the street did not affect the lease, and the alteration was immaterial.

It is contended that the lease was void because it was not to take effect until a future day; but, whatever may have been supposed to be the law in regard to the validity of deeds to take effect in futuro, it is now well settled in this state that such deeds are not for that reason void. Wyman v. Brown, 50 Me. 139.

But some of the defendants thought the lease to the plaintiff was invalid, and so informed her, Taking their testimony as true, which we do not question, they did not intentionally deceive her on this point. They actually thought there was a defect of which they could take advantage. She was unlearned in every respect, not being able to write her own name. It is evident that she put confidence in them, believing them to be better informed than herself; and supposing, from their representations, that her title to the homestead, by the lease, had failed, she was induced by them to relinquish all her interest in

1 For discussion of principles, see Eaton on Equity (2d Ed.) § 114.

227

the whole estate of her father, in consideration of a new life lease from them of the same property embraced in her first lease.

One-eighth of the estate, subject to her life interest in the homestead, must have been worth nearly or quite eight hundred dollars. This she conveyed to them. Their new lease to her was of no value whatever; for the title was already in her. Can she obtain relief in equity?

It is claimed that she has no remedy, because there was no fraud; and the mistake was not one of fact, but of law.

In this state jurisdiction in equity in cases of "mistake" is expressly conferred by statute; nor is it, in terms, limited to mistakes of fact. The legislature may be presumed to have used the word as generally understood in equity proceedings; and therefore we shall have to inquire whether courts of equity have been accustomed to grant relief in cases like the one before us.

This question has frequently arisen in this country and in England, and authorities are not wanting in both countries in support of the doctrine that no distinction should be made between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact.

It is quite true, as Judge Redfield observes (1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 130, note), "that the distinction between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact, so far as equitable relief is concerned, is one of policy rather than of principle"; and yet it may not be the less necessary to maintain and observe it. No government could be administered at all, under which ignorance of the criminal law should be held a sufficient excuse for violating it; and the same principle is applicable to the civil law. This is not on the ground that every one is presumed to know the law; for, though this is often repeated as an axiom, a presumption so variant from the truth cannot be recognized by the law. The ground on which the doctrine rests is this, that it is impossible to uphold the government, and so to maintain its administration as to protect public and private rights, except on the principle that the rights and liabilities of every one shall be the same as if he knew the law.

If all contracts made in ignorance of the law were to be held invalid, there would be no certainty in business and no security in titles. All rights of property would be endangered, and the most important encouragements for industry and enterprise would be taken away. It is indispensable, therefore, that the obligation of contracts should be maintained, unless there is some stronger reason for annulling them than a mere mistake of the law. Champlin v. Laytin, 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 407, 31 Am. Dec. 382.

This question is discussed at length by Judge Story, and nearly all. the English and American authorities are referred to, and many of them examined. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. c. 5 (Redf. Ed.). But while the weight of authority is clearly against granting relief merely on account of a mistake of the law, it seems to be conceded in nearly al the cases, and expressly decided in many of them, that there are ex

ceptions to this rule. Hunt v. Rhodes, 1 Pet. 15, 7 L. Ed. 27; Bank v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32, 9 L. Ed. 989.

Instead of saying that there are "exceptions" to the rule, it would probably be more correct to say that, while relief will never be granted merely on account of the mistake of the law, there are cases where there are other elements, not in themselves sufficient to authorize the court to interpose, but which, combined with such a mistake, will entitle the party to relief. It is important therefore to inquire what it is that, with a mistake of the law, will justify the interposition of the court, where there is no fraud, or accident, or mistake of fact.

If a party, who himself knows the law, should deceive another, by. misrepresenting the law to him, or, knowing him to be ignorant of it, should therein take advantage of him, relief would be granted on the ground of fraud. So that such a case is within neither the rule nor the exception.

It has sometimes been said that when money or other property has been obtained under a mistake of the law, which the defendant ought not in good conscience to retain, he should be compelled to restore it. Northrup v. Graves, 19 Conn. 548, 50 Am. Dec. 264; Stedwell v. Anderson, 21 Conn. 139. This is just as a principle, but entirely indefinite as a rule. It proposes nothing but the opinion of the court in each case, on a matter in regard to which there may be great differnces of opinion. It overlooks the public interests involved in maintaining the obligation of contracts. Generally as between the parties, a mistake of law has as equitable a claim to relief as a mistake of fact.

It is believed that in nearly all such cases, where relief has been granted, in addition to the intrinsic equity in favor of the plaintiff, two facts have been found, (1) that there has been a marked disparity in the position and intelligence of the parties, so that they have not been on equal terms; and (2) that the party obtaining the property persuaded or induced the other to part with it, so that there has been "undue influence" on the one side and "undue confidence" on the other. I Story's Eq. 120. When property has been obtained under such circumstances, and by such means, courts of equity have never hesitated to compel its restoration, though both the parties acted under a mistake of the law; and there would be still stronger reasons for granting relief in such a case, if the party from whom the property had been obtained had been led into his mistake of the law by the other party. Sparks v. White, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 86; Fitzgerald v. Peck, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 127.

Thus, in Pickering v. Pickering, 2 Beav. 31, Lord Langdale set aside certain agreements entered into under a mistake of the law, on the ground that "the parties were not on equal terms," and that the plaintiff acted under the influence of the defendant; and the same thing was done in Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How. 55, 13 L. Ed. 44, because the parties "did not stand on equal ground," and the plaintiff "did not act freely, and with a proper understanding of his rights."