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marshal to make a list thereof from the assessment rolls or from such other sources of information as he may obtain; report the same to the court, where any objections should be heard; that the amount of the debt should be apportioned upon the several pieces of property owned by individual citizens; that the marshal should be directed to collect such apportioned amount from such persons, or in default thereof to sell the property.

As a part of this theory, the plaintiff argues that the court has authority to direct the amount of the judgment to be wholly made from the property belonging to any inhabitant of the city, leaving the citizens to settle the equities between themselves.

This theory has many difficulties to encounter. In seeking to obtain for the plaintiff his just rights we must be careful not to invade the rights of others. If an inhabitant of the city of Watertown should own a block of buildings of the value of $20,000, upon no principle of law could the whole of the plaintiff's debt be collected from that property. Upon the assumption that individual property is liable for the payment of the corporate debts of the municipality, it is only so liable for its proportionate amount. The inhabitants are not joint and several debtors with the corporation, nor does their property stand in that relation to the corporation or to the creditor. This is not the theory of law, even in regard to taxation. The block of buildings we have supposed is liable to taxation only upon its value in proportion to the value of the entire property, to be ascertained by assessment, and when the proportion is ascertained and paid, it is no longer or further liable. It is discharged. The residue of the tax is to be obtained from other sources. There may be repeated taxes and assessments to make up delinquencies, but the principle and the general rule of law are as we have stated.

In relation to the corporation before us, this objection to the liability of individual property for the payment of a corporate debt is presented in a specific form. It is of a statutory character.

The remedies for the collection of a debt are essential parts of the contract of indebtedness, and those in existence at the time it is incurred must be substantially preserved to the creditor. Thus a statute prohibiting the exercise of its taxing power by the city to raise money for the payment of these bonds would be void. Van Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 18 L. Ed. 403. But it is otherwise of statutes which are in existence at the time the debt is contracted. Of these the creditor must take notice, and if all the remedies are preserved to him which were in existence when his debt was contracted he has no cause of complaint. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 285, 287.

By section nine of the defendant's charter it is enacted as follows: "Nor shall any real or personal property of any inhabitant of said city, or any individual or corporation, be levied upon or sold by virtue of

any execution issued to satisfy or collect any debt, obligation, or contract of said city."

If the power of taxation is conceded not to be applicable, and the power of the court is invoked to collect the money as upon an execution to satisfy a contract or obligation of the city, this section is directly applicable and forbids the proceeding. The process or order asked for is in the nature of an execution; the property proposed to be sold is that of an inhabitant of the city; the purpose to which it is to be applied is the satisfaction of a debt of the city. The proposed remedy is in direct violation of a statute in existence when the debt was incurred, and made known to the creditor with the same solemnity as the statute which gave power to contract the debt. All laws in existence when the contract is made are necessarily referred to in it and form a part of the measure of the obligation of the one party, and of the right acquired by the other. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 285.

But independently of this statute, upon the general principles of law and of equity jurisprudence, we are of opinion that we cannot grant the relief asked for. The plaintiff invokes the aid of the principle that all legal remedies having failed, the court of chancery must give him a remedy; that there is a wrong which cannot be righted elsewhere, and hence the right must be sustained in chancery. The difficulty arises from too broad an application of a general principle. The great advantage possessed by the court of chancery is not so much in its enlarged jurisdiction as in the extent and adaptability of its remedial powers. Generally its jurisdiction is as well defined and limited as is that of a court of law. It cannot exercise jurisdiction when there is an adequate and complete remedy at law. It cannot assume control over that large class of obligations called imperfect obligations, resting upon conscience and moral duty only, unconnected with legal obligations. Judge Story says, 1 Equity Jurisprudence, § 61: "There are cases of fraud, of accident, and of trust which neither courts of law nor of equity presume to relieve or to mitigate," of which he cites many instances. Lord Talbot says, Heard v. Stanford, Cases Tempore Talbot, 174: "There are cases, indeed, in which a court of equity gives remedy where the law gives none, but where a particular remedy is given by law, and that remedy bounded and circumscribed by particular rules, it would be very improper for this court to take it up where the law leaves it, and extend it further than the law allows."

Generally its jurisdiction depends upon legal obligations, and its decrees can only enforce remedies to the extent and in the mode by law established. With the subjects of fraud, trust, or accident, when properly before it, it can deal more completely than can a court of law. These subjects, however, may arise in courts of law, and there be well disposed of. 1 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, § 60.

A court of equity cannot, by avowing that there is a right but no

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remedy known to the law, create a remedy in violation of law, or even without the authority of law. It acts upon established principles not only, but through established channels. Thus, assume that the plaintiff is entitled to the payment of his judgment, and that the defendant neglects its duty in refusing to raise the amount by taxation, it does not follow that this court may order the amount to be made from the private estate of one of its citizens. This summary proceeding would involve a violation of the rights of the latter. He has never been heard in court. He has had no opportunity to establish a defence to the debt itself, or if the judgment is valid, to show that his property is not liable to its payment. It is well settled that legislative exemptions from taxation are valid, that such exemptions may be perpetual in their duration, and that they are in some cases beyond legislative interference. The proceeding supposed would violate that fundamental principle contained in chapter twenty-ninth of Magna Charta, and embodied in the Constitution of the United States, that no man shall be deprived of his property without due process of law-that is, he must be served with notice of the proceeding, and have a day in court to make his defence. Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 209, 62 Am. Dec. 160.

"Due process of law (it is said) undoubtedly means in the due course of legal proceedings, according to those rules and forms which have been established for the protection of private rights." Id. In the New England States it is held that a judgment obtained against a town may be levied upon and made out of the property of any inhabitant of the town. The suit in those States is brought in form against the inhabitants of the town, naming it; the individual inhabitants, it is said, may and do appear and defend the suit, and hence it is held that the individual inhabitants have their day in court, are each bound by the judgment, and that it may be collected from the property of any one of them. See the cases collected in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 240-245. This is local law peculiar to New England. It is not the law of this country generally, or of England. Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 Term R. 667. It has never been held to be the law in New York, in New Jersey, in Pennsylvania, nor, as stated by Mr. Cooley, in any of the Western States. See Emeric v. Gilman, 10 Cal. 408, 70 Am. Dec. 742, where all the cases are collected. So far as it rests upon the rule that these municipalities have no common fund, and that no other mode exists by which demands against them can be enforced, he says that it cannot be considered as applicable to those States where provision is made for compulsory taxation to satisfy judgments against a town or city. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 246.

The general principle of law to which we have adverted is not disturbed by these references. It is applicable to the case before us. Whether, in fact, the individual has a defence to the debt, or by way

of exemption, or is without defence, is not important. To assume that he has none, and therefore, that he is entitled to no day in court, is to assume against him the very point he may wish to contest.

* * *

Again, in the case of Emeric v. Gilman, before cited, it is said: "The inhabitants of a county are constantly changing; those who contributed to the debt may be non-residents upon the recovery of the judgment or the levy of the execution. Those who opposed the creation of the liability may be subjected to its payment, while those, by whose fault the burden has been imposed, may be entirely relieved of responsibility. To enforce this right against the inhabitants of a county would lead to such a multiplicity of suits as to render the right valueless." We do not perceive, if the doctrine contended for is correct, why the money might not be entirely made from property owned by the creditor himself, if he should happen to own property .within the limits of the corporation, of sufficient value for that purpose.

The difficulty and the embarrassment arising from an apportionment or contribution among those bound to make the payment we do not regard as a serious objection. Contribution and apportionment are recognized heads of equity jurisdiction, and if it be assumed that process could issue directly against the citizens to collect the debt of the city, a court of equity could make the apportionment more conveniently than could a court of law. 1 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, § 470 and onwards.

We apprehend, also, that there is some confusion in the plaintiff's proposition, upon which the present jurisdiction is claimed. It is conceded, and the authorities are too abundant to admit a question, that there is no chancery jurisdiction where there is an adequate remedy at law. The writ of mandamus is, no doubt, the regular remedy in a case like the present, and ordinarily it is adequate and its results are satisfactory. The plaintiff alleges, however, in the present case, that he has issued such a writ on three different occasions; that, by means of the aid afforded by the legislature and by the devices and contrivances set forth in the bill, the writs have been fruitless; that, in fact, they afford him no remedy. The remedy is in law and in theory adequate and perfect. The difficulty is in its execution only. The want of a remedy and the inability to obtain the fruits of a remedy are quite distinct, and yet they are confounded in the present proceeding. To illustrate the writ of habere facias possessionem is the established remedy to obtain the fruits of a judgment for the plaintiff in ejectment. It is a full, adequate, and complete remedy. Not many years since there existed in Central New York combinations of settlers and tenants disguised as Indians, and calling themselves as such, who resisted the execution of this process in their counties, and so effectually that for some years no landlord could gain possession of his land. There was a perfect remedy at law, but through fraud, violence, or

crime its execution was prevented. It will hardly be argued that this state of things gave authority to invoke the extraordinary aid of a court of chancery. The enforcement of the legal remedies was temporarily suspended by means of illegal violence, but the remedies remained as before. It was the case of a miniature revolution. The courts of law lost no power, the court of chancery gained none. The present case stands upon the same principle. The legal remedy is adequate and complete, and time and the law must perfect its execution.

Entertaining the opinion that the plaintiff has been unreasonably obstructed in the pursuit of his legal remedies, we should be quite willing to give him the aid requested if the law permitted it. We cannot, however, find authority for so doing, and we acquiesce in the conclusion of the court below that the bill must be dismissed. Judgment affirmed.

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རྒྱ་ང་ག

DIBRELL v. CARLISLE.

(Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1873. 48 Miss. 691.)

PEYTON, J. This was an injunction bill brought by the appellant in the chancery court of Chickasaw county to restrain the appellees, E. K. Carlisle and H. G. Humphries, from executing a power of sale contained in a mortgage given to them by William F. Walker and Eliza R. Walker, his wife.

The material facts of the case are these: William F. Walker, being indebted to his wife, Eliza R., in a large amount of money, on the 4th day of December, 1866, conveyed to one Thomas J. Denton certain real and personal estate situated in the said county of Chickasaw, in this state, in trust for the use of the said Eliza R. Walker and the heirs of her body forever, which deed of conveyance was duly acknowledged and recorded.

That on the 20th day of March, A. D. 1867, the said William F. Walker and Eliza R., his wife, made and executed their deed of mortgage of six hundred and seventy acres of the land, covered by the said deed of trust, to said Carlisle & Humphries, to secure the payment of a promissory note for $7,337.64, made by said Walker and wife, dated the 19th day of January, 1867, and payable to said Carlisle & Humphries on the 19th day of December, 1867. The said mortgage deed, which was duly acknowledged and recorded, gives to the mortgagees a power of sale of the mortgaged property in default of payment of the note at maturity.

3 For discussion of principles, see Eaton on Equity (2d Ed.) § 14.
The statement of the case is omitted.

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