333; Baldwin v. Society, 9 Sim. 393; Fothergill v. Rowland, L. R. 17 Eq. 132.

The courts in both countries have, however, receded somewhat from the latter conclusion, and it is now held that where a contract stipulates for special, unique, or extraordinary personal services or acts, or where the services to be rendered are purely intellectual, or are peculiar and individual in their character, the court will grant an injunction in aid of a specific performance. But where the services are material or mechanical, or are not peculiar or individual, the party will be left to his action for damages. The reason seems to be that services of the former class are of such a nature as to preclude the possibility of giving the injured party adequate_compensation in damages, while the loss of services of the latter class can be adequately compensated by an action for damages. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 958a; 3 Wait, Act. & Def. 754; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1343; California Bank v. Fresno Canal, etc., Co., 53 Cal. 201; Singer Sewing-Machine Co. v. Union Button-Hole Co., Holmes, 253, Fed. Cas. No. 12,904; Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 604; Railroad Co. v. Wythes, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 880; Montague v. Flockton, L. R. 16 Eq. 189.

The contract between the defendant and the plaintiffs is made a part of the complaint. The services which the defendant was to perform for the plaintiffs are not specified therein, otherwise than that they were to be such as should be devolved upon him by the general manager; "it being understood that such duties may include traveling for said companies whenever, in the judgment of said general agent, the interests of the business will be thereby promoted;" and also "including such duties as traveling for said companies as said general agent may devolve upon him, including also any duties as secretary or other officer of either or both of said companies as said companies may desire to have him perform." These services, while they may not be material and mechanical, are certainly not purely intellectual, nor are they special, or unique, or extraordinary; nor are they so peculiar or individual that they could not be performed by any person of ordinary intelligence and fair learning. If this was all there was in the contract it would be almost too plain for argument that the plaintiffs should not have an injunction.

The plaintiffs, however, insist that the negative part of the contract, by which the defendant stipulated and agreed that he would not be engaged in or allow his name to be employed in any manner in any other hardware, cutlery, flatware or hollow-ware business, either as a manufacturer or seller, fully entitles them to an injunction against its violation. They aver in the complaint, on information and belief, that the defendant is planning with certain of their competitors to engage with them in business, with the intent and

purpose of allowing his name to be used or employed in connection with such business as a stamp on the ware manufactured; and they say such use would do them great and irreparable injury. If the plaintiffs owned the name of the defendant as a trade-mark, they could have no difficulty in protecting their ownership; but they make no such claim, and all arguments or analogies drawn from the law of trade-marks may be laid wholly out of the case.

There is no averment in the complaint that the plaintiffs are entitled to use, or that in fact they do use, the name of the defendant as a stamp on the goods of their own manufacture, nor any averment that such use, if it exists, is of any value to them. So far as the court is informed, the defendant's name on such goods as the plaintiffs manufacture is of no more value than the names of Smith or Stiles or John Doe. There is nothing from which the court can see that the use of the defendant's name by the plaintiffs is of any value to them, or that its use as a stamp by their competitors would do them any injury other than such as might grow out of a lawful business rivalry. If by reason of extraneous facts the name of the defendant does have some special and peculiar value as a stamp on their goods, or its use as a stamp on goods manufactured by their rivals would do them some special injury, such facts ought to have been set out so that the court might pass upon them. In the absence of any allegation of such facts we must assume that none exist.

The plaintiffs also aver that the defendant intends to make known to their rivals the knowledge of their business, of their customers, etc., which he has obtained while in their employ. But here they have not shown facts which bring the case within any rule that would require an employé to be enjoined from disclosing business secrets which he has learned in the course of his employment, and which he has contracted not to divulge. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 96 Am. Dec. 664.

There is no error in the judgment of the superior court. The other judges concurred.

(Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, 1889. 58 Conn. 12, 18 Atl. 979, 7 L. R. A. 87.)

Suit by P, H. Hodges against E. W. Kowing and wife for specific performance of a contract for sale of land. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

BEARDSLEY, J. On the 17th day of August, 1887, the defendants entered into the following contract with the plaintiff: "Stratford, August 17th, 1887. We agree to purchase of P. H. Hodges his place in Stratford, Conn., containing fifteen acres, more or less, for the sum of nine thousand five hundred dollars; to pay six thousand cash, and three thousand five hundred on bond and mortgage for one year; to take title immediately, and possession on the first of January, 1888, and have paid him one hundred dollars on account. Edwin W. Kowing. Eliza Kowing." No writing relating to the contract was signed by the plaintiff.

The court below, upon the petition of the plaintiff, decreed that the defendants should specifically perform the contract, from which decree they appeal to this court. They claim that under the statute of frauds the plaintiff was not bound by the contract, not having signed any memorandum of it, and hence that it should not, in equity at least, be enforced against them, and make this claim the ground of one of their reasons.of appeal. The statute requires only that the written agreement shall be "signed by the party to be charged therewith." The defendants rely upon certain cases as authority for their claim, and among others upon the cases of Benedict v. Lynch, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 370, 7 Am. Dec. 484, and Lawrenson v. Butler, 1 Schoales & L. 13.

Both of these cases are in accord with the claim of the defendants; but the former case is opposed to the numerous decisions in the state of New York on the same subject, and the latter case to nearly all the English decisions. In the case of Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns. 484, Chancellor Kent, after reviewing the New York decisions, says that "it is sufficient if the agreement be signed by the party to be charged." In the same opinion he reviews the English decisions up to that time, and adds: "There is nothing to disturb this strong and united current of authority but the observation of Lord Redesdale in Lawrenson

5 For discussion of principles, see Eaton on Equity (2d Ed.) §§ 268-281. A portion of the opinion is omitted.

v. Butler, 1 Schoales & L. 13, who thought that the contract ought to be mutual, and that if one party could not enforce it the other ought not." The authority of Lawrenson v. Butler seems not to have been recognized in England. The more recent decisions in that country are referred to in 1 Benj. Sales, §§ 254, 255.

There is still some conflict in the decisions in this country, but the weight of authority is that the statute of frauds is satisfied by the signature to the contract of the party sought to be charged only, whether the suit to enforce it be at law or in equity, and whether it relates to the sale of real or personal estate. Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 484; McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 460, 30 Am. Dec. 103; Richards v. Green, 23 N. J. Eq. 536; Railroad Corp. v. Evans, 6 Gray (Mass.) 33, 66 Am. Dec. 394; Sutherland v, Briggs, 1 Hare, 34. We think that there is not sufficient ground for this reason of appeal.

*

There is no error in the judgment complained of. The other Judges concurred.

2. WANT OF FAIRNESS

FALCKE v. GRAY.

(High Court of Chancery, 1859. 4 Drew. 651, 62 Eng. Reprint, 250.) See post, this page, for a report of the case.

3. HARDSHIP OF CONTRACT

FALCKE v. GRAY.

(High Court of Chancery, 1859. 4 Drew. 651, 62 Eng. Reprint, 250.) See post, this page, for a report of the case.

ved

4. INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION

FALCKE v. GRAY.

(High Court of Chancery, 1859. 4 Drew. 651, 62 Eng. Reprint, 250.) In this case the bill was filed for a specific performance of a contract entered into between the plaintiff, Mr. Falcke, and Mrs. Gray, one of the defendants, by which Mrs. Gray had agreed that, at the

expiration of a six-months lease to the plaintiff of her furnished house, he should have the option of purchasing two china jars at the price of £40.

In January, 1859, the plaintiff, being desirous of finding a furnished house, applied to Mrs. Gray, who was willing to let hers, and, on looking over it, he observed the two jars, the subject of the suit. He had for twenty-five years carried on the business of a dealer in curiosities, china, etc., and was eminent in his trade, and was well acquainted with the prices which articles of this kind would fetch.

Shortly afterwards he had an interview with Mrs. Gray at her house; and Mr. Brend, from the office of Boyle & Bryden, estatę and house agents, who were Mrs. Gray's agents in the matter, attended to advise Mrs. Gray. A discussion arose as to the terms of letting, and ultimately a rent of seven guineas per week was agreed upon, with an option to the plaintiff that he should, at the end of the term, be at liberty to purchase certain articles of furniture at a valuation, to be inserted in the agreement, including the two china jars, which were valued at £40.

With regard to the valuation of these jars at £40, it appeared from the evidence that Mr. Brend told Mrs. Gray that he did not know the value of the jars, but he should think they were worth £20 apiece; and the agreement was drawn up, putting the value of £40 on the jars, and was signed by Mrs. Gray and the plaintiff. On the 26th of January the plaintiff went to the house while his agent was taking the inventory, and then the jars had been removed; and on the same day Mrs. Gray came to Mr. Falcke's house, and informed him of the removal of the jars. During the interval between the 19th and the 26th of January Mrs. Gray, having begun to doubt whether the price placed on the jars was fair, was advised that it would be as well as take the opinion of Mr. Watson, also a dealer in curiosities; and, on the 26th, she accordingly went to Mr. Watson, and desired him to come in the evening to value the jars. This he did; and on seeing the jars he was so much struck with their beauty, etc., that he offered Mrs. Gray his check for £200 for them at once. Mrs. Gray then asked Mr. Watson if he thought she would be doing anything wrong in so selling them, and he told her it was all right; and she then took his check and Mr. Watson, took away the jars. Mr. Watson was made a defendant to the bill.

The plaintiff now insisted that he was entitled to a decree for specific performance against Mrs. Gray, and to delivery of the jars as against Mr. Watson; and on that part of the case the question was whether the transaction was a bona fide one on the part of Watson, or whether he knew of the contract between Mrs. Gray and the plaintiff. The defendant insisted that it was a contract for chattels, and could not be enforced.