suming it should make out a strong case, and that he would owe it to himself and the country to place his relations and conduct towards the ad ministration of him whom he had elected above all suspicion. His advice induced his friends to wait the development of events; but when Mr. Clay afterward took office, and Mr. Adams adopted, in its full extent, Mr. Clay's American System, opposition to the administration from himself and his friends followed as a matter of course.

CHAPTER IV.

Including the Period during which he was Vice-president.

MR. CALHOUN took his seat in the Senate as Vice-president on the 4th of March, 1825, having remained in the war department a few months more than seven years. There never was a department left in more perfect order. It literally almost moved of itself. When he took charge of the department, it was difficult to discharge its duties with less than fourteen or fifteen hours of severe daily labour; but when he left it, the secretary had little to do beyond signing his name and deciding on such cases as were brought up by the subordinate officers, and were not embraced in the numerous and comprehensive rules provided for their government. He had not, indeed, been long in office before those who doubted his executive talents were disposed to place them even above his parliamentary, great as they were acknowledged to be. He united, in a remarkable degree, quickness with precision, firmness with patience and courtesy, and industry with the higher capacity for arrangement and organization; and to these he added exemption from favouritism, a high sense of justice and inflexible devotion to duty. Taken together, they formed a combination so fortunate, that General Bernard, who had been a favourite aid-de-camp of the Emperor Napoleon, and saw and knew much of him, and who was chief of the board of engineers while Mr. Calhoun was secretary, and had an equal opportunity of observing him, not unfrequently, it is said, compared his administrative talents to those of that extraordinary man.

The duties of the office of Vice-president, though it is one of high dignity, are limited, except giving a casting vote when the body is equally divided, to presiding in the Senate, which, in a body so small and courteous, and having so few and simple rules, affords but little opportunity for the display even of the peculiar talents necessary for Presidency in a deliberative body. The most eminent in filling such an office cannot 1ave much behind worth remembering. It is sufficient to say of him, that, as a presiding officer, he was impartial, prompt, methodical, and attentive to his duties. He always appeared and took his seat early in the session, and continued to preside till within a short time of its close; contrary to the practice of some of his immediate predecessors, who, by their long and frequent absence from their seat, had permitted the office to fall into some discredit. He was careful in preserving the dignity of the Senate, and raising its influence and weight in the action of the government. In putting questions, he changed the form of address from "Gentlemen" to the more simple and dignified address of "Senators," which has since been preserved, and adopted by the senators themselves in alluding to each other in debate. But the most important and memorable incident connected with the discharge of his duty as the presiding officer, and the most characteristic of the man, was the stand he took in favour of the rights of the body itself, and against his own power. He

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decided, during a period of great excitement on the Panama Question, when party spirit ran high, and the debate was very warm and personal, that he had no right to call a senator to order for words spoken in debate. He rested his decision on the broad ground that, as the presiding officer, he had no power but to carry into effect the rules adopted by the body, either expressly or by usage, and that there was neither rule nor usage to authorize him to exercise the power in question. On the contrary, the rules of the Senate, by strong implication, limited the power of calling to order for words spoken in debate to the members themselves, to the exclusion of the presiding officer. And yet this decision, resting on so solid a foundation, subjected Mr. Calhoun to the fiercest attacks and the grossest abuse; and, what is more extraordinary, he was opposed by the members themselves, whose rights he maintained, with the exception of Mr. Macon, Mr. Tazewell, and a few others of the elder and more experienced, and his immediate personal friends. To understand how this should happen, it is necessary to advert to the existing state of the parties, and the circumstances under which the decision was made.

The circumstances under which Mr. Adams was elected, the part which Mr. Clay took in his election, and the prominent position to which he was appointed in his cabinet, laid the foundation of the opposition which finally overthrew his administration. This opposition was greatly strengthened by the bold Federal and consolidation doctrines avowed by Mr. Adams in his inaugural address, and by the wild measures of policy which he recommended. Among these was the project of sending commissioners to the Congress proposed to be convened at Panama of all the states that had grown up on the overthrow of the Spanish dominions on this Continent. This was a favourite measure of the administration. Mr. Calhoun was understood to be decidedly opposed to it, both on the ground of unconstitutionality and inexpediency; and it was on that question that the first attack was made on the administration. It commenced in the Senate; and, as he had not disguised his disapprobation, he was regarded in a great measure as the adviser and author of the attack, which, of course, subjected him to the fierce and united assaults of the administration and its friends. At the same time, the opposition in the Senate, though united against the administration, and its doctrines and policy, consisted of individuals who had but a short time before held political relations with men far from being friendly. They consisted of the friends of Mr. Crawford, General Jackson, Mr. Calhoun, and such portion of Mr. Clay's as disapproved of his connexion with Mr. Adams. With the exception of his own friends, and those of General Jackson, there was no indisposition, on the part of a large portion of the rest of the opposition, to see him sacrificed by the party in power. But as difficult and critical as was his position, it could not prevent him from a manly avowal of his opinion on a novel, and what he believed to be an important question, or from exposing himself to hazard when principle and duty required him to assert the rights of the body, though against his own power. But what added greatly to the excitement and abuse was the particular occasion. upon which the decision was made. Mr. Randolph was then a member of the Senate, and gave full vent to his inimitably sarcastic power against the administration, and especially against the President and the Secretary of State, and their supporters in the body. It was too keenly felt by the last to permit them to do justice to the grounds on which Mr. Calhoun placed his decision, and the occasion was too favourable to be permitted to pass without a formal attack on him. A writer of great power (supposed to be the President himself) attacked his decision with much acrimony, under the signature of Patrick Henry. Finding it impossible

to assail the decision with effect, or through the rules of the Senate or its usage, he was forced to assume the position that the Vice-president, in virtue of his office, derived the power of calling a senator to order for words spoken in debate, not from the body itself, but directly from the Constitution, and that, in exercising the power, he was wholly independent of its will. This gave the whole subject a new and highly important aspect; for if it could be successfully maintained, it would give the Vice-president supreme control over the freedom of debate in the Senate. To this a reply followed (supposed to be from Mr. Calhoun), in two numbers, under the signature of Onslow, that so completely demolished the argument of Patrick Henry as to turn the tide in his favour. The Senate itself became so well satisfied of the injustice done him, that on the revisal of the rules a year or two afterward, they gave him the power in question, with an almost unanimous approval of his decision. It was thus, by his fairness under these trying circumstances, that he preserved a right of the body, which he might have usurped, not only with safety, but with increased popularity for the time; but of which the Senate could not be divested without a surrender of the freedom of debate, and the right of making their own rules, secured to them by the Constitution itself.

So vigorous was this first onset of the opposition, that the administration reeled under the force of the blow, and it became apparent that nothing but some bold step could save them from defeat, by the election of General Jackson, under whom the opposition, with the hearty concurrence of Mr. Calhoun and his friends, had unanimously rallied. The great strength of the administration lay in the various powerful interests rallied under the plausible name of Home Industry and the American System, of which the Secretary of State was the acknowledged head, and to which the President had given his adhesion. Their hope of holding power rested on a unanimous and zealous rally of that powerful combination in favour of the administration. The tariff was the great central interest, around which all the others revolved. The whole party, without schism, were united in its favour, while the opposition was greatly divided in reference to it; a great portion of the party, North and West, being in its favour, while the South and Southwest were united almost to a man against it. In fact, the portion of the Union at that time most attached to a high protective tariff was the Middle and Western States, and yet its union with the South and Southwestern portion was indispensable to the election of General Jackson. The advantage this state of things afforded was perceived by those in power, and was not permitted to remain without an attempt to turn it to account.

For that purpose, a general. convention was called to meet at Harrisburg, the seat of government in Pennsylvania, and the friends of the tariff everywhere were invited to take into consideration the state of the manufacturing interest, and to devise measures for its farther promotion. The place was well chosen. Pennsylvania, though a thorough tariff state, was favourable to General Jackson's election, and its support was regard. ed as indispensable to his success. It met, and attempted to rally the whole interest by an elaborate report in favour of the protective system, accompanied by a scheme of high duties, to be presented to Congress at the next session for its action. It was thought, if the friends of General Jackson in the tariff states should oppose it, his defeat in those states would be certain; but if, on the contrary, they should support it, a schism between his Northern and Southern supporters would be equally certain, and with not less certainty would be followed by his defeat. But, as plausible as the calculation was, the tariff friends of General Jackson in New-York, Pennsylvania, New-Jersey, and the West, succeeded, as far as politics were concerned, in turning it against its projectors.

They succeeded in electing the speaker, and in obtaining the majority of the Committee of Manufactures in the House. Instead of adopting the Harrisburg scheme, this committee reported a thorough protective tariff, such as suited the states they represented, imposing duties even higher and more indiscriminately than those of the Harrisburg plan. They laid their duties without the slightest regard to the navigating and commercial interests of New-England, and so managed it as to induce the Southern members to resist all the amendments offered to render it acceptable to those who represented that interest, in the expectation of defeating the bill, either on its passage through the House or in the Senate, by the united votes of the members from those states and the South and Southwest. The expectation proved fallacious. The bill passed the House by a small majority, a large portion of the New-England members voting against it; but when it came to the Senate, where the relative united strength of the Southern and New-England States is much greater than in the House, it was ascertained that the bill could not pass unless it was modified so as to be acceptable to the senators from New-England favourable to the administration. It was so modified by the votes of the senators opposed to the administration from the Middle and Western States, contrary to the expectation of the South; for the bill, as modified, received the votes of the New-England senators in favour of the administration, which, added to those in favour of General Jackson from New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Northwest, made a majority. It passed, accordingly, and became a law; but under such circumstances as not only to deprive the administration of the advantage they anticipated from the scheme, but to turn it directly against them.

Unfortunately, however, in this political manoeuvring in the presidential contest, equity, justice, the Constitution, and the public welfare were overlooked. The interests of the great body of the consumers and of nine tenths of the producing interests, including especially the growers of the great agricultural staples, rice, cotton, and tobacco, with those engaged in commerce, ship-building, and navigation, and all their connected interests, were sacrificed to promote the prosperity of a single interest, and that constituting but a small portion of the community. But the evil ended not with their sacrifice, as immense as it was. As bad as was the effect in its pecuniary bearing, it was far worse in its financial, political, and moral operation. Never, in that respect, was a measure of the kind passed under more adverse circumstances. Viewed in its financial aspect, it was worse than folly-it was madness itself. The public debt was nearly extinguished, under the wise policy adopted after the war. After its final discharge, one half nearly of the annual revenue applied to the payment of its principal and interest would be liberated, which, if a wise and just policy had been adopted, would have enabled the government to reduce the duties one half, and still leave a sufficient revenue to provide amply for all the public wants. Instead of that, and in the face of these consequences, the duties were greatly increased, so much so as to be, on an average, nearly fifty per cent. on the value of the imports. This led to a corresponding increase of the revenue, which, in turn, hastened proportionally the final discharge of the debt, when, by necessity, one of three consequences must follow: a vast increase of expenditures; a sudden reduction of the duties, to the ruin of the manufacturers; or else an immense surplus in the treasury, with all its corrupting influence. These obvious results were either not seen or disregarded by those who were governed by cupidity, or too intensely engaged in the presidential contest to look to consequences.

It is regarded as necessary to understand the history of the origin and passage of that disastrous measure, in order to have a just conception of the events which have since occurred, and the motives which governed Mr. Calhoun's

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course in reference to them. To it may be traced almost every important incident in our political history since that time, as far as our internal affairs are concerned. To it, too, may be ascribed the division in the Republican party, which separated Mr. Calhoun and the States' Rights portion from the other, and the disasters which have impaired the credit and standing of the country, and deranged and interrupted its currency, finances, commerce, and industrial operations. Mr. Calhoun, although not an actor at the time, was not an inattentive observer of what passed. His position as President of the Senate afforded great advantages for observation and reflection, of which he did not fail to avail himself from the time he first took his seat. Questions relating to the protective policy were constantly occurring in one form or another, and especially at'tracted his attention and excited reflection. He was not long in making himself master of that policy in all its bearings, economical and political, and in becoming thoroughly satisfied that it was unconstitutional, unjust, unequal, and oppressive in its character and tendency, and that it must, in the end, if it became the established and permanent policy, lead to the overthrow of our free and popular system of government. With this impression of the system, he watched with vigilance the progress of the tariff of 1828, from its incipient state at Harrisburg to the passage of the bill through the Senate. The results of his observation confirmed him in all his previous objections to the system, and strengthened his conviction of the dangers to which it exposed our institutions. For the first time he began to fear, from the part taken in the passage of the bill in the Senate by a considerable and influential portion of the party, that the leading object which he and his friends had in view in the presidential contest (a gradual and cautious reduction of the duties to the revenue standard prepar atory to the discharge of the debt) might not be realized by a change of administration. He saw that the passage of the bill opposed great and almost insuperable difficulties to effecting what they desired; but neither he nor they permitted these misgivings to abate their zeal in support of General Jackson's election. They still hoped for the best from him; and how strongly Mr. C. desired his election, an occurrence at the time will best illustrate.

The Senate was so nearly equally divided at one time, that it was believed that the friends of the administration would intentionally so arrange it as to make a tie, and throw the casting vote on the Vice-president, in order to defeat General Jackson's election. His friends became alarmed, and some of them intimated a desire that Mr. Calhoun should leave his seat to avoid the effect, stating as an inducement that, in the event of a tie, the bill would be defeated without his vote. He promptly refused, and replied that no consideration could prevent him from remaining and doing his duty by voting against it; but added, it should not hurt General Jackson's election, for in that event his name should be withdrawn from the ticket as Vice-president. Such was the interest he took in his success, and so strong, and, at the same time, so patriotic, was his opposition to the bill of abominations; and yet many have been so unjust as to attribute his after opposition to the bill to disappointed ambition. On the contrary, he was ready to sacrifice every object of ambition, at a time when not a cloud darkened his prospects, to defeat a measure he believed to be so fraught with mischief. He was then the second officer in the government, and stood, without opposition, for re-election to the same place, on the ticket of General Jackson, whose success was then certain; nor was there any other man in the party of equal prominence and popularity, except the general himself. Nothing was wanting on his part but to accommodate himself to the course of events, without regard to their effects on the country, to have attained the highest office, which lay within a single step from the place where he then stood. This he could not but plainly see; but his resisting temptation on this occasion is but one instance of self-sacrifice among many in a long life, the whole course of which abundantly proves that office, even the highest, has ever been with him subordinate to his sense of duty and the public welfare.