Opinion.

quest, and the time taken by the passenger to recant was much less than would have been required to make one of these stops. Aggravating as the situation was, the conductor should have accepted the fare when tendered, and not have put the passenger off. There was some evidence on behalf of the plaintiff tending to show that the passenger did not make his tender of payment till after the conductor had "pulled it down" and the train was slowing up, but Mangum testifies distinctly to the contrary, and his statement must be accepted as true, because on a demurrer to the evidence, "if several inferences may be drawn from the evidence, differing in degrees of probability, the court must adopt those most favorable to the demurree, providing they be not forced, strained or manifestly repugnant to reason." Horner v. Speed, 2 Pat. & H. 616.

[4] After Mangum was arrested and carried into the baggage car, it was explained to him that the serial number of his ticket and the space between the figures of the date stamped on it, as well as the erasure, showed the invalidity of his ticket, and he again offered to pay his fare, but it was refused. It required but a little time to give this explanation, and doubtless if it had been given in the first instance the fare would have been paid, but it was not given. If Mangum was acting in good faith, and honestly believed that his ticket was good and entitled him to passage, he was entitled to a reasonable parley with the conductor, or reasonable time in which to determine upon his course of action. There was evidence in the case from which the jury might have found that Mangum was acting in good faith and honestly believed that his ticket was good and that the conductor did not give him a reasonable time within which to determine upon his course of action, and consequently we must so hold. [5] The decided cases on the right of the carrier to eject a passenger for refusal to pay his fare are very numerous, and not altogether in harmony. It will not be nec

Opinion.

essary to discuss the nice distinctions drawn in some of them, but confining ourselves to the facts of the case in judgment, the following propositions of law applicable thereto seem to be well sustained by the authorities. As between the passenger and the conductor, the conductor is the sole judge of the validity of the ticket tendered in payment of the fare. If he decides that the ticket is invalid, he has the right, upon so notifying the passenger, to require the passenger to pay his fare, and if he refuses to do so to eject him from the train. If the passenger is acting in good faith and honestly believes his ticket is good and that he is entitled to ride thereon, he is entitled to a reasonable time and a fair opportunity to decide whether or not he will pay his fare. After he has had such time and opportunity, if he refuses to pay his fare, the conductor may eject him, and when once lawfully ejected at a point at which that train would not otherwise have stopped, he has no right to reenter that train upon tender of fare. The passenger's right to tender his fare and continue his journey, after having refused payment, continues until the conductor has rightfully given the engineer the signal to stop the train, no longer. A tender after the signal to stop has been rightfully given comes too late to revive the right of the passenger which he lost by refusal to pay his fare. He may not thus interfere with the proper conduct of the carrier's business, and the convenience and safety of the traveling public. Huffold v. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co., 53 Mich. 118, 18 N. W. 580; Frederick v. Marquette R. Co., 37 Mich. 342, 26 Am. Rep. 531; Va. & S. W. R. Co. v. Hill, 105 Va. 729, 54 S. E. 872, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 899; Pease v. Railroad Co., 101 N. Y. 367; Pickens v. Railroad Co., 104 N. C. 312, 10 S. E. 556; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Harris, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 180, 42 Am. Rep. 668; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Bond, 62 Tex. 442, 50 Am. Rep. 532; Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Smith, 152 Fed. 608, 81 C. C. A. 598, 10 Ann. Cas. 939; Hoffbauer v. Delaware, etc.,

Opinion.

R. Co., 52 Iowa 342, 3 N. W. 121, 35 Am. Rep. 278; Kirk v. Seattle Electric Co., 58 Wash. 283, 108 Pac. 604, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991, and note; Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Asmore, 88 Ga. 529, 15 S. E. 13, 16 L. R. A. 53; 2 Hutchinson on Carriers (3d ed.), sec. 1085; 5 R. C. L., p. 119, sec. 749.

Upon the defendant's demurrer to the evidence, we must hold that the plaintiff in error acted in good faith, and honestly believed that his ticket was good and entitled him to passage; that the plaintiff in error offered to pay his fare while the conductor was pulling the bell-cord for the first time and before the stop signal had been completed; that the signal could easily have been stopped at this time, without inconvenience to any one, and that the conductor wrongfully refused to accept the fare when so tendered and wrongfully ejected the plaintiff in error from the train.

[6] The ejection of the plaintiff in error being wrongful, all of the subsequent acts of the conductor and other employees of the company hereinbefore detailed were likewise wrongful, and for these wrongs the defendant company is liable. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Perdue, 117 Va. 111, 83 S. E. 1058; Railroad Co. v. Henry, 55 Kan. 716, 41 Pac. 952, 29 L. R. A. 465; Railway Co. v. Conder, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 488, 58 S. W. 58.

[7] The verdict of the jury was not excessive. The plaintiff was unlawfully subjected to such humiliation, discomfort and disgrace as entitled him to recover substantial damages. Bolton v. Vellines, 94 Va. 393, 26 S. E. 847, 64 Am. St. Rep. 737.

The judgment of the circuit court will be reversed, and this court will enter such judgment as the said circuit court ought to have entered, overruling the demurrer to the evidence and giving judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $2,000, with legal interest thereon from June 1, 1917, until payment, and for the costs.

Reversed.

Syllabus.

Wytheville.

MILLER MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., V. LOVING.

June 12, 1919.

1. MASTER AND SERVANT-Child Labor Law-Proximate Cause of Injury.-Acts 1914, ch. 339, section 3, declares that it shall be unlawful for the master to employ a boy over fourteen and under sixteen years of age without first procuring and keeping on hand what the statute denominates a certificate of employment. The employment of a boy over fourteen and under sixteen years of age without having procured such a certificate is a tort, and an injury to the child occurring in the performance of duties under such employment must be referred to the unlawful employment as the proximate cause of such injury. 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-Child Labor Law-Contributory Negligence. Where a child over fourteen and under sixteen years of age is wrongfully employed without obtaining the certificate required by section 3, ch. 339, acts 1914, the doctrine in Virginia as to contributory negligence is applicable in an action for injuries sustained by the child in the course of the performance by him of the duties for which he was employed. 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-Child Labor Law-Injuries to Child Case. at Bar.-The foreman of the defendant employed the plaintiff and permitted him to be put to work at a dangerous machine, with knowledge of the fact that he was between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years, and without having obtained the employment certificate required by section 3 of the act (Acts 1914, ch. 339, sec. 3). Such hiring, therefore, was in contravention of the act and unlawful, and by its terms constituted an offense for which the defendant was liable to a fine, and, under section 2900 of the Code of 1904 and the decisions, to damages for any injury suffered by the plaintiff in the course of his employment, unless his right of action was barred by his own contributory negligence.

Error to a judgment of the Law and Equity Court of city of Richmond in an action of trespass on the case. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant assigns error.

Affirmed.

Opinion.

The opinion states the case.

R. L. Montague, Daniel Grinnan and C. V. Meredith, for the plaintiff in error.

David Meade White and G. B. White, for the defendant in error.

WHITTLE, P., delivered the opinion of the court.

This action was brought by the defendant in error, an infant under the age of sixteen years, who sued by his next friend, against the plaintiff in error, a corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of sash, blinds, doors, and a general wood manufacturing business, to recover damages for a personal injury received by the plaintiff while in the employment of the defendant, resulting in the loss of the fingers of his right hand, which were cut off by a rip-saw, or cutoff-saw, operated by the defendant and alleged to have been occasioned by its negligence. The trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $8,000, upon which the judgment under review was rendered.

In the case of the Standard Red Cedar Chest Co. v. Johnson C. Monroe, post, p. 442, 99 S. E. 589, an infant suing by his next friend, in which an opinion was handed down at the present term, a recovery was sustained in a motion under the child labor law by the plaintiff, a child under the age of fourteen years, for a similar injury. The differentiating features of the two cases arise from the inequality in the ages of the plaintiffs. Monroe was under fourteen years of age, and consequently his action was brought under the first section of the act (Laws 1914, c. 339), while Loving's Case, he being between the ages of fourteen and sixteen, is controlled by and involves the construction of the third section. If, however, we shall be of opinion that, according to the correct interpretation of section 3, as applied