Opinion. witness-Alonzo Grizzle, ten years old-who stated, among other things, that a short while before the shooting Frank Skeen said: "You boys get away from here;" and another witness, Hodges McCoy, a boy eight years old, who stated that Skeen said to him shortly before the shooting: "You boys go to the house." These statements were not objected to when offered, because the defendant had expected that the Commonwealth would in some way connect Frank Skeen with the alleged offense. No connection was subsequently shown, and no evidence offered to show that the defendant heard Frank Skeen, or in any way assented to or acquiesced in the alleged statements of Skeen, and after the evidence was concluded the defendant moved to strike out the statements alleged to have been made by Skeen to the two witnesses aforesaid. It is true that under these circumstances the statements testified to were wholly irrelevant to the issue before the jury, and should have been excluded; but we have been unable to discover how the defendant could have been in any way prejudiced by them, as it appears that he was in no way connected with them. The error, there fore, was harmless. [7] The next assignment of error is to the action of the trial court in permitting counsel representing the Commonwealth, in his closing argument to the jury, to give his opinion and theory as to how a certain blackjack got into the case. It appears from the evidence offered by the defendant that immediately preceding the shooting the deceased had drawn a blackjack on the accused, and was holding it in a threatening attitude, ready to strike, at the time the defendant shot him, and the testimony on behalf of the Commonwealth shows that immediately after the deceased was shot, the blackjack was found lying by his side and about a foot from his hand. The theory of the defense was that the deceased was in the act of striking the defendant with the blackjack when the defendant shot him in self Opinion. defense. During the argument of the case, counsel representing the Commonwealth said: "Gentlemen, I will show you later on how the blackjack got into the case," and just before concluding his argument he said to the jury: "Now, gentlemen of the jury, I will give you my theory of how the blackjack got into this case. Just as soon as the defendant shot the deceased and he fell, Frank Skeen came up and threw the blackjack down beside the deceased." Counsel for defendant promptly objected to this statement, on the ground that it was not supported by the evidence, and that there was no evidence in the case on which to base the statement, and moved the court to tell the jury not to consider this statement, "and the court stated that it did not remember such evidence as to the blackjack (the attorney contending there was such evidence), and that the jury should not consider any statement of counsel not supported by evidence, and stated to counsel that it was dangerous to make a statement to the jury not supported by the evidence, and the jury would remember the evidence. This occurred at the close of the argument, to which action of the court in permitting the attorney representing the Commonwealth to argue to the jury that Frank Skeen threw down the blackjack by the side of the deceased, and in not telling the jury not to consider the same, the defendant, by counsel, excepted. * * We have been unable to find from the record that Frank Skeen was in the barn either before the shooting or thereafter before the finding of the blackjack by the side of the deceased. The statement of counsel is unsupported by any evidence in the case and was highly prejudicial to the accused. It was made in the closing argument on behalf of the Commonwealth, and counsel for defendant had no opportunity to reply to it. Such statements are prejudicial to the accused, and if not promptly corrected and the jury instructed to disregard them are ground for reversal. Jessee Opinion. v. Commonwealth, 112 Va. 887, 71 S. E. 612; Mullins v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. 787, 75 S. E. 193. The statement of the trial judge that he did not remember such evidence as to the blackjack, and that the jury should not consider any statements of counsel not supported by the evidence, furnished no protection to the defendant against the improper remarks of counsel. It is also assigned as error that the trial court refused to set aside the verdict as contrary to the evidence. The evidence was conflicting on some important points in the case, and as the case has to be reversed for the errors hereinbefore pointed out, we deem it improper to indulge in any discussion of it. For the errors hereinbefore mentioned, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Dickenson county will be reversed. Reversed. INDEX ABANDONMENT. See DIVORCE. ABANDONMENT OF CANAL. See CAnals. ABATEMENT, REVIVAL AND SURVIVAL. Divorce.-Plea in Abatement to the Jurisdiction.—Blankenship v. Misjoinder of Parties.-Misjoinder of parties cannot be reached ABUTTING OWNERS. Canals. See CANALS. ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING. Executors and Administrators.- See EXECUTORS AND ADMINIS- TRATORS. Guardian and Ward. See GUARDIAN AND WARD. Mechanics' Liens.-See MECHANICS' LIENS. Partnership. See PARTNERSHIP. ACTIONS. Consolidation of Actions.-See CONSOLIDATION OF ACTIONS. Joinder of Causes of Action. It was claimed that a special Limitation of Actions.-See LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. ACTIONS-Continued. Parties. See PARTIES. Venue. See VENUE. ADMISSIONS. See DECLARATIONS AND ADMISSIONS. ADVERSE POSSESSION. Color of Title.- Failure of Description.—A failure in description Minerals. In the instant case the grantor's successors in Void Writing as Color of Title.—There can be no construc- Constructive Possession.-There can be no constructive posses- |