Opinion. 1:otes were executed by the makers with full knowledge that Scott Crowder had abandoned his wife and left the State, and that their notes were to be discounted.. The testimony shows that W. A. Crowder had actual knowledge of all the circumstances of the marriage and abandonment, and the reasons therefor, and the attending circumstances plainly indicate that this knowledge was communicated to J. N. Crowder before the notes were executed. W. Scott Crowder left Victoria on Saturday morning, April 15, 1916, just one week after his marriage, having first withdrawn all the money he had in bank, to-wit, five hundred dollars. When he received his brothers' notes, executed under the circumstances hereinbefore stated, he had in his pocket his entire estate. Nothing was left for his wife and child. Upon this state of facts, the conclusion seems irresistible, not only that W. Scott Crowder committed a fraud upon the rights of his wife and child, but that his brothers participated therein and aided and abetted him in the accomplishment of his purpose. [3,4] While fraud must be clearly proved by him who alleges it, it is not necessary that it should be expressly shown. It is rare that it can be. The participants are not apt to discuss it, but actions speak louder than words, and the transaction itself often furnishes proof of the fraud that is entirely satisfactory. Hazlewood v. Forrer, 94 Va. 703, 27 S. E. 507; Todd v. Sykes, 97 Va. 143, 33 S. E. 517. Where the fraud of a grantor in a deed, or of a seller of personal property, has been clearly shown, and it is sought to charge the grantee or purchaser with guilty knowledge, it is not necessary to prove that the latter had positive knowledge of such fraudulent intent. It is sufficient if he has knowledge of such facts and circumstances as would have excited the suspicion of a man of ordinary care and prudence. and put him upon such inquiry as to the bona fides of the transaction as would necessarily have led to Opinion. the discovery of the fraud of the grantor or seller. American Net, etc., Co. v. Mayo, 97 Va. 182, 33 S. E. 523; Anderson v. Mossy Creek Co., 100 Va. 420, 41 S. E. 854; Flook v. Armentrout, 100 Va. 638, 42 S. E. 686. If the notes given by W. A. Crowder and J. N. Crowder had not been negotiable, they might have protected themselves against the payment thereof in the event the complainant attached the property sold, and if they have lost that right in their efforts to aid their brother in his fraudulent scheme, they have no one to blame but themselves. We are of opinion that W. A. Crowder and J. N. Crowder, each "had notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor," and hence is not such a purchaser as is protected by section 2458 of the Code (1904). [5] It is held in some jurisdictions that a wife becomes a creditor or a quasi-creditor of her husband immediately upon his desertion. DeRuiter v. DeRuiter, 28 Ind. App. 9, 62 N. E. 103, 91 Am. St. Rep. 107; Hall v. Harrington, 7 Colo. App. 474, 44 Pac. 365; Bouslough v. Bouslough, 68 Pa. 495. It is not necessary for us to pass upon that subject. It is enough to say that immediately upon desertion entitling the wife to a divorce and to alimony as incident thereto, there has been a breach of duty on the part of the husband for the enforcement of which the law gives her a remedy against him and his property, and if he transfers his property to another with intent to hinder, delay or defraud her in the enforcement of her right, such transfer is void. She comes within the classification of "other persons" mentioned in section 2458 of the Code (1904), who are protected against being defrauded by such transfer, of "what they are or may be entitled to." It is not necessary that she should be a creditor in a technical sense. This conclusion accords with Goff v. Goff, 60 W. Va. 9, 53 S. E. 769. 9 Ann. Cas. 1082 and with expressions of this court in Waller v. Armstead, 2 Leigh (29 Va.) 11, 21 Am. Dec. 594, and Gregory v. Winston, 23 Gratt. (64 Va.) 102. Opinion. [6] The bill in this cause, which was filed August 2, 1916, after setting out the facts, prayed for a divorce, and that W. A. and J. N. Crowder be enjoined from disposing of the property, or paying the notes given therefor to W. Scott Crowder, or any one else, and also for suit money, counsel fees, alimony and permanent support for the complainant and their child. The bill also prayed for general relief. An injunction was granted in accordance with the prayer of the bill on August 4, 1916, enjoining and restraining W. A. Crowder and J. N. Crowder from paying to W. Scott Crowder or any other person any sum or sums of money on account of the purchase price of the stock of goods and real estate sold them by W. Scott Crowder. This injunction was thereafter continued in force by subsequent orders made in the cause. Depositions for the complainant were taken in December, 1916, and thereafter, and before any claim had been asserted to the notes aforesaid, towit, on April 17, 1917, the court entered a decree which, so far as need be here recited, is as follows: "And without at this time passing on any other question in this case, for the purpose of protecting the rights of both the plaintiff and the defendants, W. A. Crowder and J. N. Crowder, and conserving the amount agreed to be paid by the said defendants to W. Scott Crowder, their co-defendant, it is adjudged, ordered and decreed that said W. A. Crowder and J. N. Crowder do, upon the maturity of the notes (or sooner if they desire), executed by them to W. Scott Crowder, pay the amount of the same to N. S. Turnbull, Jr., who is hereby appointed receiver for the purpose of collecting said notes." Application was made to this court for an appeal from this decree, but it was refused. In June, 1917, W. A. and J. N. Crowder filed an amended answer to the complainant's bill, in which they set up the fact that they had been notified by Jas. J. McFeeley, of Opinion. Denver, Col., that he is the holder for value, in good faith of said notes, which he acquired in due course before maturity, and threatening to sue on them if not paid. The respondents prayed that their answer might be treated as a cross-bill, and that complainant be required to give a bond to save them harmless against the claim of McFeeley, and that then they would gladly pay over the proceeds of said notes to the receiver in the cause. During the same term, the court, without granting the request for an indemnifying bond, decreed that the respondents should within ten days pay over to said receiver the amount represented by said notes. They paid the amount of this decree to the receiver of the court July 10, 1917. On October 8, 1917, W. A. and J. N. Crowder filed a supplemental answer, in which, amongst other things, they prayed that no disbursements of the sums already paid into the hands of the receiver in the cause be made until the claims of said McFeeley had been passed upon, or some action had been taken in the premises that would protect them from further liability on said notes. On June 20, 1918, the depositions of W. A. Crowder and wife were taken on behalf of the complainant. On June 26, 1918, the decree appealed from was entered, in which it is recited that ample opportunity had been given McFeeley to litigate his rights to the fund in controversy, and it was stated that unless he did come in and litigate his rights in the cause, the court would decree the payment of the money to the complainant. Thereupon he appeared generally, asked that he be admitted as party defendant and permitted to file his petition in the case and to demur and plead to the cross-bill of W. A. and J. N. Crowder. He thereupon filed his petition, and the case was continued to allow him to introduce proof to establish his claim. W. A. and J. N. Crowder had attempted in a suit which had been brought on one of the notes in the U. S. district Opinion. court, and on another in the Circuit Court of Lunenburg county by McFeeley to have Lavonia Ruth Crowder admitted as a party in each case and litigate the respective rights of McFeeley and herself to the proceeds of the notes; but the right to have such interpleader in the federal court was declined, and in the State court had not been passed upon at the time of the rendition of the decree appealed froin. It will be observed from what has already been said that the complainant laid no claim to the notes in controversy or the proceeds thereof unless they were still held and owned as the property of her husband. What was sought by the bill was to set aside the sales of real and personal property made by Scott Crowder, and to subject the property of her husband to the claim asserted in her bill. The notes which had been given for the purchase price of the property represented the agreed value of W. Scott Crowder's interest therein, and she was entirely willing to take its value in lieu of pursuing the property itself. At the time that the money was paid into court, it was intended to protect as far as possible the right not only of the complainant, but of the purchasers themselves, and if this could be done it was entirely proper, but if it could not be done and the transaction was shown to be fraudulent, there was no reason why she could not subject the property itself to the payment of her claim and to have personal decrees against W. A. and J. N. Crowder for such part of the shoes they had purchased as had been disposed of by them. In other words, her claim was against the property, though she was entirely willing to accept the valuation represented by the notes, and if possible to protect the makers of the notes against further payment. The claim of McFeeley, on the other hand, was the personal liability of W. A. and J. N. Crowder on the notes executed by them to W. Scott Crowder. He had no lien of any kind on the property sold. and it was immaterial to him what was the consideration |