of Pennsylvania, now with our four millions of people, and our immense interests of all kinds, ought to have a couple of confidential advisers to advise him, men that are selected with a view to his own convenience and the proper discharge of his official duties. If that was a good rule in 1837, it is a much better rule now in 1873. Therefore, sir, I move, if I am in order, to amend the motion of the gentleman from Chester, by striking out all those words that impose any limitation or restriction upon the Governor in the appointment of the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Commonwealth. My motion will be to strike out all the words in the first part of this section, except the word "appoint," so as to read: "He shall appoint a Secretary of the Commonwealth and an Attorney General, during pleasure," &c.

Mr. DARLINGTON. I accept that as a modification of my amendment.

The PRESIDENT. The amendment will be so modified, and the question is on the amendment as modified, which is to strike out the words, "nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of two-thirds of all the members of the Senate."

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President: This question received very grave and deliberate consideration, not only from the Committee on the Executive Department, but when it was under consideration in Committee of the whole

The PRESIDENT. The Chair would ob serve that it is not in order to refer to the debates in committee of the whole.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I am referring to a fact si nply within the knowledge of the Convention.

The PRESIDENT. The Chair begs the gentleman's pardon. He stated that this had received careful consideration. That refers to proceedings in committee of the whole, to refer to which is a breach of the order of the House.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Then, sir, I will state that I suppose it is the intention of the Convention to provide reasonable safeguards which shall lift all the officers of the Commonwealth, so far as practicable, out of merely political influence. I believe that this State suffers, in common with every other State, very greatly from the degradation of politics. One of the difficult problems which meets this Convention,as it will every Convention in any of the States, is the mode of elevating the officers in whom the trusts of the Commonwealth are reposed from the deg

radation which, to a greater or less extent. now hangs around political office. It is not, I think, much to the purpose to refer to what occurred twenty or thirty years ago, for politics have advanced as rapidly if not more rapidly than other departments of the government, and it has come to pass that confessedly the officers of the government of this State and of other States are under political influence from which they ought to be exempt, and that subordinate officers are very largely ap pointed purely by reason of their political affinities and not by reason of their fitness for office.

Now, if we are to have a government in this State which is to exercise its functions for the best interests of all its people, it should be lifted so far as it can be out of the mere influence of politicians. If the Senate is composed of a mere majority of either party, and the Executive is of the same party, he could scarcely make a nomination which would not be confirmed by a majority of the Senate. The purpose of this provision is that men shall be selected for these positions upon their merit and not as a reward merely of political services. The Senate of our State is at present composed of thirtythree members. A majority would be seventeen. It would require twenty-two members in a Senate of thirty-three to concur in approving a nominee suggested by the Governor. Is it too much to suppose that five members of an opposing party would give their assent to a nomination which was eminently fitting and proper to be made? And if it be said that they might refuse their assent to a person who is merely to be rewarded for political services, I say it is right, and it is the very thing and purpose which this section is intended to advance. I think there is no danger in it. It would compel the Governor to recommend for office persons of admitted ability and fitness, and if such persons are recommended I cannot conceive that there would not be found five members of the opposition party willing to concede such an appointment to the majority of the Senate and to the Executive of the State. But it would be conservative and would prevent these offices from being made the inere reward of political service; not but what persons of political influence and political service ought to be in many instances appointed, but they ought to be persons whose fitness would commend them in some degree to the approbation of the

I believe that this section is right as it stands, that it can work no injury to the Commonwealth, but will greatly improve the quality and the fitness of the officers by whom these functions are to be exercised.

Mr. J. N. PURVIANCE. I move to further amend, in the third line, by striking out the words, "and an attorney general." It will then read:

"He shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, appoint a Secretary of the Commonwealth during pleasure."

The PRESIDENT. That amendment is not in order at this time. The question is on the amendment of the gentleman from Chester, to strike out all requiring the concurrence of the Senate in the appointment of the Attorney General and Secretary of the Commonwealth.

Mr. J. N. PURVIANCE. When it is in order, I will make the motion I have indicated.

Mr. HARRY WHITE. Mr. President: I shall cheerfully vote for the amendment offered by the delegate from Philadelphia (Mr. Woodward.) There are some things which we have a right to assume, one of which is that the people of this Commonwealth will not elect a man to the office of Governor in whom they have no confidence. We may differ in opinion on this subject; we may think the people have made a mistake; and yet under our theory of government we are bound to assume that the majority of the people of the Commonwealth will only elect persons for the chief executive office in whom they have confidence, and when the forms of the election have been gone through with and the selection is recognized and the individual selected is inaugurated as the chief executive officer of the Commonwealth, he should be clothed with all the prerogatives of his great office; he is responsible only to his God and to his constituents; and since that responsibility is expected of him, why not give him the privileges that will enable him properly to discharge his duties? No divided responsibility should rest there.

Pennsylvania stands more prominent in this respect than any of the other States of the Union. In our sister State of New York they elect a Secretary of the Commonwealth and an Attorney General. The recent commission to remodel

change and the adoption of the system which obtains in Pennsylvania. So some other States that have had the experience of a number of years are now seeking to have that change made so as to come to the system we hitherto have had in Pennsylvania.

Mr. President, the Attorney General and Secretary of the Commonwealth are the two advisory officers of the Execu cutive, and if he has any privileges at all, if he is to be held responsible for the policy of his administration, give him the means by which he can exercise his choice and exercise his discretion in selecting his confidential avdisers.

Mr. President, I am in favor, with all my heart, of the amendment offered by the delegate from Philadelphia, and I point with pride to the experience of the Commonwealth for the last half century in vindication of the policy of this amendment. I hope it will prevail.

Mr. CURTIN. Mr. President: I trust the Convention will give this amendment full consideration before they agree to it. I should be very sorry indeed to take away any of the dignity of the office of Governor of the Commonwealth, or to change its responsibility either to the people or to God, in the language of the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Harry White;) but I would put around the Governor of this State precisely the same restraints that you put around other officials; and while he is enjoying the full dignity of his office, I think it is proper that the people should understand that they have something to do with the appointment of high official functionaries. The Governor of Pennsylvania has no cabinet as a cabinet. He is supposed to consult the Attorney General, and at his pleasure the Secretary of the Commonwealth; but it must be remembered there are other partics to the relation of these officials, the Governor, the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Commonwealth, who have important interests. The Attorney General and the Secretary of the Commonwealth have both very important official powers entirely disconnected with the Governor. You will find your statute book full of laws giving increased power to the Secretary as well as to the Attorney Goneral. The Attorney General has in his hands, entirely independent of the Governor of the State-by virtue of an act of Assembly-the entire prosecution of the claims of the Commonwealth: he has

the collection of the public money; he pursues the defaulters. The Attorney General and the Secretary of the Commonwealth, under our laws, are both members of the sinking fund commission, the most important commission in reference to the taxation of the State and the payment of the public debt and the maintenance of the faith and honor of this State that we have. Throughout, the action of the board of sinking fund commissioners is entirely independent of the Governor of the State. In the exercise of these powers the people of the State have more interest than the Governor; but he is given in this section, as reported by the committee, the full power to appoint at his pleasure a Secretary of the Commonwealth and an Attorney General; but as in other States the people elect the Secretary of the Commonwealth and the Attorney General, or officers having similar powers, in this State we continue to give the Governor the power to appoint, but we say to your Governor when he appoints his Attorney General and his Secretary of the Commonwealth at his pleasure and removes them at his will, that as they exercise very important official functions over which the Governor has no control and for which he is not responsible, the people shall have some interest in the appointment; and we therefore interpose the Senate, representing the body of the people, confirming the appointment, precisely as all officers are appointed under the Constitution of the United States.

We do not go back to elect these officers by the people. We give the Governor the appointment of these two men who are to a large extent his confidential advisers, but at the same time we provide in this article of the Constitution that he shall submit the names of these officers to the Senate of the State, representing the body of the people and that if he appoints unfit men, the representatives of the people shall have the power to reject his nominations and compel him, while he seeks confidential advisers and appoints his friends, to appoint men fit for the place; and we provide that the people shall have some voice in declaring who are fit and who are not fit.

It is true, as has been said, that it is not likely that the people of Pennsylvaniaand there is great consolation in the fact

are to elevate to this high position men who will not be careful that they discharge the duties faithfully. That may

be true in the past; we take it for granted it is so; but I suppose I am in a position to say here that the people of Pennsylvania do not always choose the wisest or the best man for Governor. Sometimes it is possible they may make a mistake. Nor may they always choose a man who will hold the heavy responsibility so eloquently described by the gentleman from Indiana as feeling his allegiance to his God and his responsibitity to his constituents; and if ever it should turn out that such a man by a mistake of the people should get into this most important office in the State, and select for his constitutional advisers an Attorney General and a Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of his own kind who might be connected with him, it would be proper, as the committee thought, that the people should have some voice; and we therefore referred to the Senate the confirmation or rejection of such appoint

ments.

It

Mr. MACVEAGH. Mr. President: seems to me quite clear that the result of this provision will be very much as the gentleman from Lycoming (Mr. Armstrong) has stated; the only difficulty is whether that is a desirable result-that is, that whoever is Governor shall be required to select, for his confidential advisers, such members of his own party as are not obnoxious to his political opponents. That is the proposition; it goes just that far. In times of great political excitement it is asking a great deal of Senators of one political party to vote to confirm in places of high trust and power obnoxious political opponents. Think of the political divisions through which this country has passed, and think of gentlemen who would have been nominated by any Governor of this State with great credit as his Attorney General or as his Secretary of the Commonwealth, and how many gentlemen of the opposite political party would have thought of voting for them? Are there not lawyers in this body to whose legal opinions we all listen almost with reverence, whom gentlemen of one political party never could have voted to confirm as Attorneys General if their vote was necessary to their confirmation; not that we had any doubt of their capacity; not that we had any doubt of their integrity; but because we differed so radically upon fundamental questions, vital, radical questions, upon their legal interpretation, that we ought not to be asked to take the responsibility of

voting against them or for them? And yet this puts it in the power of a minority in the Senate to dictate positively the appointees of the Governor. That is what it amounts to; and instead of the danger which the gentleman from Centre, the delegate at large (Mr. Curtin) foresaw, just the other danger would arise, and that is that the Governor would be driven to form a "ring" with his political opponents, or a small section of them, for their votes to confirm his appointees. I submit we have never gone so far as this to prevent the Governor from having confidential officers of his own selection unless they were acceptable to a considerable section of his political opponents.

Mr. BIDDLE. Mr. President: It strikes me that the remarks of the gentleman from Dauphin who spoke last are not strictly applicable to the amendment. The amendment is to strike out the concurrence of the Senate or of any body at all and to allow the Governor to appoint the Secretary of the Commonwealth and the Attorney General without any restriction upon his selection. I, for one, am opposed to lodging any such power in the hands of the Executive. This subject has been treated a little as if the Governor's responsibilities were altogether to look to the future and indeed to look to the next world. Now, responsibility to the Governor's God may be an excellent thing for him; but it is of very little value to the people of this Commonwealth; and responsibility to constituents where you have just decided that he shall be ineligible to a second term, does not amount to a great deal. I think that in regard to officers so vastly important as these two functionaries, and who in many of the States of this Union are elected directly by the people, the stamp of approval of the representatives of the people should be upon them. I hope, therefore, that the amendment will not prevail.

In regard to the particular form in which the concurrence is to be given, that may be discussed hereafter. I prefer the form in which the section stands at present; but I concede that is not precisely the point that is before the House now. The question is directly, by this amendment, whether you shall allow the Governor at pleasure, without any control, to select these two officers, or whether you will have the check of a body of the people's representatives upon him. I hope the amendment will-not prevail.

Mr. BIGLER. I have only a word or two to add to what has been said on this subject. I am very sure, sir, that any one who has served in the office of Governor would not insist that the entire power should be given to the Executive as a matter of courtesy; and what has been said by the distinguished delegate from Centre (Mr. Curtin) on that point covers the whole case, as also what has been said by the delegate from the city (Mr. Biddle.) The Secretary of the Commonwealth and the Attorney General have very important duties which are not at all connected with the Governor, and ho would feel it a grave responsibility to select, without consulting the Senate, officers to places so important. It would not be entirely consistent with what we do on other subjects. In appointments less inportant the advice of the Senate is taken, and I should say that the report as it stands before us is very much better than it will be if amended. I can remember very well a condition of things when the proposition of the distinguished gentleman from the city (Mr. Woodward) would have been entirely proper, when the duties of the Attorney General and those of the Secretary of the Commonwealth were connected almost exclusively with those of the Executive Department. But it is otherwise now, and I think in view of the important duties devolving upon these officers by the law alone and not by the Executive, it would be very proper to consult the Senate, and I cannot see any great objection to requiring the two-thirds vote. Occasions may arise when that would be an important and valuable restriction.

I had made up my mind, in view of what little I know of this subject, in the way of experience, that it would be better to put this restrtction in. Indeed I can see that it is the spirit of the Convention in reference to all the departments of the government. We propose to give them large powers it is true, but at the same time we are endeavoring to throw around the legislative department as well as the executive, unusual restraint. We are endeavoring to avoid the errors of the past, and considered in that spirit I cannot see any objection to this restriction upon the executive department. I am confident that if any gentleman in the sound of my voice entertains aspirations in that direction, and if he should at any future time find them gratified, he will be delighted to see this restriction upon

Messrs. Achenbach, Ainey, Alricks, Andrews, Armstrong, Bailey, (Huntingdon,) Baker, Bannan, Biddle, Bigler, Black, Charles A., Black, J. S., Bowman, Boyd, Broomall, Buckalew, Calvin, Campbell, Church, Corbett, Cronmiller, Curry, Curtin, Davis, De France, Dunning, Edwards, Ellis, Fell, Fulton, Gilpin, Hay, Hazzard, Horton, Howard, Hunsicker, Lamberton, Landis, Lawrence, Lilly, Long, MacConnell, M'Clean, M'Culloch, M'Murray, Mann, Mantor, Metzger, Mott, Newlin, Palmer, G. W., Palmer, H. W., Parsons, Patterson, T. H. B., Patton, Porter, Purman, Purviance, John N., Read, John R., Reed, Andrew, Rooke, Runk, Sharpe, Simpson, Smith, Henry W., Smith, Wm. H., Struthers, Turroll, Walker, Wetherill, Jno. Price, White, J. W. F. and Worrell.-72.

So the amendment was rejected.

ABSENT.-Messrs. Addicks, Baer, Barclay, Bardsley, Beebe, Brodhead, Brown, Carter, Cassidy, Ciark, Collins, Cuyler, Dallas, Dodd, Elliott, Ewing, Finney, Funck, Gibson, Green, Hall, Hanna, Harvey, Hemphill, Heverin, Kaine, Lear, Littleton, M'Camant, Minor, Mitchell, Niles, Puzhe, Purviance, Sam'l A., Reynolds, Ross, Russell, Stewart, Temple, Van Reed, Wetherill, J. M., Wherry, White, David N. and Wright--44.

Mr. NEWLIN. I move to amend by striking out, in the second line, the words, "two-thirds," and inserting the words, "a majority."

On the question of agreeing to the amendment, the yeas and nays were required by Mr. Harry White and Mr. Newlin, and were as follow, viz:

YEAS.

Messrs. Ainey, Alricks, Andrews, Baily, (Perry,) Baker, Bartholomew, Broomall, Calvin, Cochran, Corson, Darlington, Davis, Fulton, Green, Guthrie, Hanna, Knight, MacVeagh, M'Culloch, Newlin, Palmer, H. W., Patterson, D. W., Rooke, Simpson, Struthers, Wetherill, John Price, White, Harry and White, J. W. F.-28.

NAYS.

Messrs. Achenbach, Armstrong, Bailey, (Huntingdon,) Bannan, Biddle, Bigler, Black, Charles A., Black, J. S., Bowman, Boyd, Brodhead, Buckalew, Campbell, Church, Corbett, Craig, Curry, Curtin, De France, Dunning, Edwards, Ellis, Fell, Gilpin, Hay, Hazzard, Hunsicker, Lamberton, Landis, Lear, Lilly. Long, MacConnell, M'Clean, M'Murray, Mann, Mantor, Metzger, Minor, Palmer, G. W., Parsons, Patterson, T. H. B., Patton, Porter, Purman, Purviance, John N., Read, John R., Reed, Andrew, Ross, Sharpe, Smith, Henry W., Smith, Wm. H., Stanton, Turrell, Walker, Wherry, Woodward, Worrell and Meredith, President-59. So the amendment was rejected.

ABSENT.-Messrs. Addicks, Baer, Barclay, Bardsley, Beebe, Brown, Carey, Carter, Cassidy, Clark, Collins, Cronmiller, Cuyler, Dallas, Dodd, Elliott, Ewing, Finney, Funck, Gibson, Hall, Harvey, Hemphill, Heverin, Horton, Howard, Kaine, Lawrence, Littleton, M'Camant, Mitchell, Mott, Niles, Pughe, Purviance, Samuel A., Reynolds, Runk, Russell, Smith, H. G., Stewart, Temple, Van Reed, Wetherill, J. M., White, David N. and Wright-45.

Mr. J. N. PURVIANCE. I now move to

strike out in the third line the words,

"and an Attorney General."

The PRESIDENT. The question is on the amendment of the delegate from Butler.

On the question of agreeing to the amendment, the yeas and nays were required by Mr. Harry White and Mr. J. N. Purviance, and were as follow, viz:

YEAS.

Messrs. Andrews, Baker, Broomall, Calvin, Campbell, Cochran, Corson, Craig, Darlington, Edwards, Hanna, Knight, M'Clean, M'Murray, Mantor, Purviance, John N., Sharpe, Simpson, Struthers and Meredith, President-20.