JUDGMENT. with the reversal of the second. N. Y. Common Pleas, Gen. T., 1855, Pierce a. Thomas, 4 E. D. Smith's C. P. R., 354. 10. The validity of a decree and sale in foreclosure is not affected by the fact, that pending the suit one of the parties defendant became bankrupt, and had an assignee appointed under the act of 1841, who was not brought in as defendant. Persons acquiring new interests in the subject of the action, after its commencement, must assert their interest themselves, or forfeit it. Supreme Ct., Gen. T., 1858, Cleveland a. Boerum, 27 Barb., 252. 11. At most, the assignee in such case might move within the year after decree, for irregularity. [2 Rev. Stats., 359; Johnson a. Fitzhugh, 3 Barb. Ch. R., 371.] Ib. 12. In an action here upon a judgment of a circuit court, in and for the county of Adams, in the State of Mississippi, the plaintiff offered a copy of the record, attested by the clerk, and the attestation and official character of the clerk certified by a magistrate. The magistrate, in his certificate, described himself as presiding judge of the "first judicial district," &c., "which said district includes the county of Adams." The record showed that the county of Adams was, at the time of recovery of judgment, in the third judicial district. Held, that the record, as certified, was admissible, and that the plaintiff was not bound to prove, in the first instance, that Adams county was in the first district at the time of the giving of the certificate. By the constitution of Mississippi, the legislature is authorized to change the districts, and the court would presume a change to have been made which would render the certificate and record consistent. It is for the defence to show affirmatively that the judgment was coram non judice. Court of Appeals, 1858, Hatcher a. Rocheleau, 4 E. P. Smith's (18 N. Y.) R., 86. 13. The certificate of the magistrate that the clerk's "attestation is in due form of law," is conclusive that the attestation is in proper form for the purpose of the admissibility of the copy of the record in evidence. It is made by the act of Congress the only evidence on that subject. [1 Greenl. Ev., § 506; Drummond a. Magruder, 9 Cranch, 122; Craig a. Brown, 1 Pet. C. C. R., 852; Smith a. Blagge, 1 John. Cas., 238; Ferguson a. Harwood, 7 Cranch, 408; Edmiston a. Schwartz, 13 S. & R., 135; 2 Cow. & Hill's Notes, 860, 861, 1130, 1132, 1133.] Ib. 14. The certificate itself is presumptive proof of the official character of the certifying magistrate, in case of the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of a sister State. [Const. of U. S.; Kimmersley a. Orpe, 1 Doug., 56; Clement a. Durgins, 1 Greenl., 9; Cow. & Hill's JUDGMENT. Notes, 628, 1165, 1247; United States a. Amedy, 11 Wheat., 392; Thomas a. Tanner, 6 Monr. R., 52, 53, 54; Kirkland a. Smith, 2 Mart. Louis. R., 497, 498; Stephenson a. Bannister, 3 Bibb, 369, 370; 2 Cow. & Hill's Notes, 1131.] Ib. 15. The record showed that an alias summons was returned executed, and also that the defendant appeared by attorney. Held, sufficient to show jurisdiction. [2 Cow. & H. Notes, 909.] Ib. 16. It seems, that the court being one of general jurisdiction, such proof is unnecessary, as jurisdiction of the person would be presumed. [2 Cow. & H. Notes, 905, 906; Moulin a. Trenton, 4 Zabr., 222.] Ib. 17. A statement that the plea filed, if any, had been lost or mislaid, or withdrawn, so that it could not be recorded, was inserted in the judgment. This appeared to have been a part of the record, and not a memorandum of the clerk in preparing the copy. It purported to have been inserted when the record was made up. Held, that the omission of the plea was mere matter of practice of the court, whose judgment was recorded, and did not in any way affect, collaterally, the validity of the record or judgment. Ib. 18. In such action, no evidence to impeach the judgment on the merits, is receivable. [Shumway a. Stillman, 6 Wend., 447; 4 Cow., 292; Spencer a. Brockway, 1 Ohio, 260.] Ib. 19. That defendant has the same name with the person against whom the judgment was recovered, is presumptive evidence (and sufficient, no suspicious circumstances appearing), of his identity, and the judge at the trial may assume that fact without submitting it to the jury. [Jackson a. Cody, 9 Cow., 140, and cases cited; 2 Cow. & H. Notes, 1301.] Ib. 20. A debtor owning real property agreed to secure his debt and new advances made to him, by a confession of judgment. In pursuance of the agreement the advances were made, and judgment to secure the whole debt was entered, but upon an insufficient statement. Held, that the court would not relieve the creditor against the claims of subsequent bona fide purchasers and incumbrancers, although they had notice of the existence of the judgment when they became such. Hammond a. Bush, Ante, 152. 21. A complaint stating only such facts, and seeking to have the judgment by confession amended, and the debt declared a lien prior to the intervening claimants, should be dismissed, with costs to all the defendants who resist the action. Ib. 22. Judgment was entered upon a statement in the following form: "The above indebtedness arose on a promissory note made by the defendants to the plaintiff, dated, &c., in the sum of $700, with interest, JUDICIAL SALE. that amount of money being had by the derendants of the plaintiff, and upon which there is this day due the sum of $782.07, together with $80.41, now due the plaintiff from the defendants as costs in an action brought against the defendants by the plaintiff on said promissory note, in the Supreme Court, which suit is now discontinued by the plaintiff upon this confession of judgment to him by the defendants." Held, on motion of other judgment creditors, insufficient. [Chappell a. Chappell, 2 Kern., 215; Dunham a. Waterman, 6 Abbotts' Pr. R., 357.] To say: "that amount of money being had by the defendants of the plaintiff," without saying when, and in what sums had, or under what circumstances, and for what objects or purposes,whether as a gift or a loan, or for money collected and misapplied, or in payment of property not delivered, or upon any other contract which the defendants failed to execute, is to withhold and conceal from the other creditors of the defendants the most material facts out of which the debt arose. Supreme Ct., Sp. T., 1858, Freligh a. Brink, 16 How. Pr. R., 272. 23. A statement for judgment upon confession to secure a contingent liability, must show the facts out of which the indebtedness arises as fully as if it were to secure an absolute indebtedness. Winnebrenner a. Edgerton, Ante, 419. 24. A judgment confession to secure a contingent liability on a guaranty, should be set aside on motion of a subsequent judgment-creditor, if the statement in which it is entered does not show the particulars of the contract on which the liability rests; e. g., in case of a promissory note, who are the parties to it, and the facts which impose a liability thereon on the plaintiff, and in behalf of the defendant, and such a liability as the defendant is bound to protect. Ib. ACTION FOR CHATTELS, 2; AMENDMENT, 5, 6, 8; APPEAL, 1, 19; ARREST, 2; ASSIGNMENT OF CAUSE OF ACTION, 6, 7; CORPORATION, 1, 2; DEFENCES, 10, 11; JUDICIAL SALE, 3; JUSTICE'S COURT; MARINE COURT; OFFER TO ALLOW JUDgment. JUDICIAL SALE. 1. Although the lands to be sold were such as, under other circumstances, should be sold in parcels; yet it appearing that there was no adequate demand for it in parcels, that only a small portion of the mortgage debt was yet due, and that the mortgagors were insolvent, and the lands inadequate security; and the plaintiff tendered a stipulation to bid on a sale in one parcel up to the amount of the judgment. JUDICIAL SALE. Held, that the court should order a sale in one parcel. [1 Paige, 450.] Supreme Ct., Sp. T., 1858, Gregory a. Campbell, 16 How. Pr. R., 417. 2. The defendant moved to set aside a sale in foreclosure on the ground of inadequacy of price. His efforts tended to show that the property sold at one-fifth its value. Of the several purchasers, only one objected to vacating the sale, and he admitted that what he bought was at half its value. Held, 1. That as to those who did not oppose, the motion to vacate must be granted by default. 2. The purchaser opposing should receive $250, as a fair indemnity for his costs and counsel fees, and as some allowance for the loss of a bargain. 3. The defendant should pay the plaintiff $10 costs of motion, and all the costs of the former advertisement of sale. Supreme Ct., I. Dist., Gen. T., 1857, March a. Lowry, 16 How. Pr. R., 41. 3. The title of a bona fide purchaser, without notice, under a judicial sale regularly made, in pursuance of a judicial order valid on its face, cannot be impeached on the ground of a secret fraud in obtaining the order. N. Y. Superior Ct., Gen. T., 1857, Clarke a. Davenport, 1 Bosw., 95, 120. 4. The land of S., subject to a mortgage held by M., was sold on executions on judgments in favor of K. and in favor of M.; both judgments were subsequent to the mortgage, and M.'s judgment was subsequent to that of K. On the sale, K. bid in the land for merely the amount of his judgment. Subsequently, and before the judgment debtor's time to redeem expired, M. foreclosed his mortgage under the power of sale, and out of the surplus paid K. the amount of money necessary to redeem from the execution sale, and also retained the amount of his own junior judgment. Held, that he was entitled to retain such sum, as against a creditor by a junior judgment, on which there had been no sale. K. acquired, by the certificate of sale, only a lien upon the land, which was extinguishable by redemption. If at the expiration of fifteen months, the sale had been consummated by the usual conveyance, the lien, not only of the bank judgments, but of all junior judgments, would have been forever gone. But the sheriff's sale of itself, without reference to lapse of time and subsequent events, did not extinguish the heir of junior judgments on which the sale did not take place; nor did it divest the debtor's title. But though the debtor did not actually redeem, yet the redemption made by M. out of the surplus, was virtually a redemption by the debtor, and should have the same effect [Phyfe a. Riley, 15 Wend., JURISDICTION. 248]; no distinct affirmative act of the debtor was necessary. The same legal effect took place as if the surplus had been paid to him, and he had paid it to K. The sheriff's sale to K. was thereby vacated. [2 Rev. Stats., 370, §§ 45, 46, 49, 51, 61; 1 Cow., 501, 444; 2 Ib., 518; 7 Ib., 540; 20 Johns., 3; 15 Wend., 248; 4 Barb., 159.] The junior-judgment creditors thereupon became entitled to the remaining surplus, in the order of their liens; and M., holding the first of such judgments, was entitled to be paid. The fact that the sale to K. was partly upon his judgment, did not satisfy it, for no moneys applicable to it were raised then. At most, his lien was suspended, and was restored by the sale under the mortgage, and virtual redemption out of the proceeds. Ct. of Appeals, 1858, Bodine a. Moore, 4 E. P. Smith's (18 N. Y.) R., 347. JURISDICTION. 1. The courts of one State or country have no jurisdiction of actions between citizens of another State, for damages for purely personal torts, committed within the jurisdiction of another State. Molony a. Dows, Ante, 316. 2. An action for an assault or false imprisonment is maintainable only in the courts of the State where the wrong was done. Ib. 3. In that class of cases where facts are preliminarily to be proved as the basis of the right to employ process-e. g., in an application for an attachment to be issued under Laws of 1831, ch. 300, §§ 34 and 35, as amended by Laws of 1842, ch. 107-if the proof has a legal tendency to make out the case required by the statute, although it be so slight and inconclusive that, upon a direct proceeding to review it, the magistrate's action would be reversed, yet in a collateral action the process will be deemed valid. It will be so deemed because the justice, having proof presented to him, and being required by law to determine upon the weight of the proof, has acted judicially in making his determination. His decision may be erroneous, but is not void. [Miller a. Brinkerhoff, 4 Den., 118; Van Alstyne a. Erwin, 1 Kern., 331.] Ct. of Appeals, 1858, Skinnion a. Kelley, 4 E. P. Smith's (18 N. Y.) R., 355. 4. Where, in an action for taking the goods of plaintiff, the defendant justified, under an execution issued on a judgment in proceedings commenced by an attachment, and the proof before the justice showed in the attachment that the defendant was a farm-tenant of the plaintiff in the attachment, and indebted to him and to others; that he had frequently refused payment; had removed his crops, and disposed of them; appeared to have money, but not only refused to pay, but said he did not |