extent of his services in reducing existing rules to systematic form and in adapting principles to new situations. The fourth and fifth chapters deal specifically with some of Stowell's most important judgments, while the sixth is a consideration of the relation between Stowell's decisions and the rules of the Declaration of London. The seventh chapter describes the use made of Stowell's decisions by the British prize courts in the present war, while the last chapter is devoted to Stowell's work in the Admiralty Court on the civil side.

In derogation of an excellent piece of work, it must be said that as a biography the book is entitled to scant consideration, but as an essay on Stowell's work as a prize judge it is worthy of its author's position and high repute. Nowhere will the beginner in prize law find a better introduction to the intricacies of the organization of the British Court of Admiralty than is furnished by Mr. Roscoe's third chapter. The condition of British prize law when Stowell came to the bench and the contrast between its present certainty and systematic form and the amas de textes si variés, which even now make up French prize law, are well described. In the consideration of some of the most important of Stowell's decisions a clear conception is given of the quality of Stowell's mind and of the processes by which he reached his conclusions. In short, Mr. Roscoe's book amply explains the authoritative position which Lord Stowell occupies in all British and American prize courts. LAWRENCE B. EVANS.

International Realities. By Philip Marshall Brown. Charles Scribner's Sons: New York. 1917. pp. xvi, 233.

This is a collection of articles written by Professor Brown since the outbreak of the war, dealing in a constructive way with the general principles of international organization and law. The style is simple and forceful. The subjects considered are of the most vital and profound significance. They are treated in a way to interest equally the student and the average reader.

The first article has the title of the book. He holds that the old conception, still fostered by many publicists, "that international law [is] mainly, if not primarily, concerned with the regulation of war," is an unreality at present, and that "the idea that international law shall regulate war is essentially paradoxical and unsound." He asserts that "the true function of international law is not to govern war, it is to avert

war." This statement is further amplified in a subsequent article (p. 127) by the assertion that "war is the negation of law," and that war and neutrality are "essentially abnormal in character." This proposition, that war and neutrality are abnormal, worked out in its logical ramifications, Professor Brown makes the basis of all the "international realities.' In the preface he asserts that the real function of international law is that of "regulating the peaceful relations of states." In this view of international law, he regards the Golden Rule as "in reality, the only safe fundamental principle for international relations." The development of international organization and law, in his opinion, requires the determining of "the specific mutual interests which the nations are prepared to recognize"; the endeavoring, "in a spirit of toleration, friendly concern, and scientific open-mindedness, to formulate the legal rights and obligations which these interests entail;" and the "securing of the most effective agencies for [the] interpretation and enforcement" of the law so formulated.

The next article on "Nationalism" is a plea for the recognition of nationality in the fundamental dispositive arrangements of soil and jurisdiction which shall be agreed upon by the nations as the status quo. By nationality he means "community of interests." In order to utilize nationality as a scientific basis in the creation of new states so as to secure the highest degree of stability possible, he considers it necessary that the new state should have "a population bound together with common sympathies, and adequate to render the state vigorous and self-sufficient; territory including varied resources, with rivers, ports and all natural facilities for economic organization; and a government so representative of the people as to enable them to deal effectively with other nations and fulfil their just obligations." A state so organized, that is, a state in the true and real sense, has, in Professor Brown's opinion, a personality of its own differing in nature from those of the individuals composing it and having different duties and different rights; its function being to secure the individuals composing it in the enjoyment of their rights and in the performance of their duties.

In the article on "The Rights of States" it is asserted that all states are unequal, and that they have no fundamental and equal rights and duties inherent in the mere fact of international personality. That states are unequal no one will dispute. That they have certain fundamental rights and duties as respects which they are all equal is, in the opinion of the reviewer, equally indisputable. Men and nations are

unequal in certain respects when measured by certain standards, and equal in certain other respects when measured by certain other standards. It is necessary in national and international organization to recognize, and to equalize, through artificial rights and duties legislatively determined, the inequalities of men and states, in those respects in which they are in reality unequal. It is also necessary, as the Declaration of Independence and the platform of the American Institute of International Law assert, in national and international organization, to recognize, and to maintain through a declaration of inherent rights, the equality of men and states in those respects in which they are, in reality, equal.

The article on "The Limitations of Arbitration" expresses the conclusion concerning arbitration with which most scholars will doubtless agree, that arbitration is "to be considered chiefly as an adjunct, or auxiliary of diplomacy," and that it is not "a general panacea for all international ills."

In dealing with "International Administration" Professor Brown would seem to be unduly pessimistic. He asserts that agreement concerning the mutual interests which nations are prepared to recognize must precede organization. As matter of fact, history shows that development of organization and continuous agreement concerning mutual interests go on everywhere simultaneously, and act and react on each other. The only step forward in international organization which he regards as possible is the establishment of a clearing house for the existing international public unions. This ultra-conservative position seems out of harmony with the progressive ideas which pervade the book. The society of nations already is organized to a considerable extent on conciliative and coöperative principles, and there is a growing appreciation of the vast possibilities of effective international direction by the more complete application of these principles. The reviewer would certainly include among the international realities of the present day the widespread perception of these possibilities and the growing purpose of people everywhere to give to the society of nations after the war a real constitution, in which provision shall be made scientifically for coöperative processes and organs capable of exercising efficient advisory direction over those matters which are common to all nations, or are beyond the competency of any one.

In the article on "Ignominious Neutrality," neutrality is regarded as an abnormal condition growing out of the abnormal condition of war.

The conclusion reached by Professor Brown, that it is the duty of each neutral to judge between the belligerents and intervene on the side which to it appears to be just, will doubtless not meet with general approval. Such a view of neutrality would involve any neutral nation adopting it in the balance-of-power system of international control, which Professor Brown very properly deprecates as opposed to any real international organization or law; for probably no neutral ever intervened so as to throw the balance of power in a certain direction except on the alleged ground that it was intervening on the side of "justice." All intervention of individual states is apt to confuse justice with self-interest, and to lead to future wars "to redress the balance of power." Neutrality and intervention are antagonistic ideas. An international law which should require each non-belligerent nation to assume the attitude of a judge, with a view to intervention, would in fact abolish neutrality and substitute for it prospective belligerency. Moreover, the facts leading to wars are so complicated that it is impossible for any nation to form an opinion concerning the rights and wrongs as between belligerents, which can be called, in any true sense, a judgment. After war begins, war-censorship and war-necessity result in the concealment and distortion of facts. The reviewer differs from Professor Brown in the conclusions to be drawn from his premises. The proper conclusion, as it appears to the reviewer, is that, upon the outbreak of war, it is the right and duty of all neutrals, collectively as well as individually, to protect and preserve themselves and to conserve the society of nations. This involves, not forcible intervention, but collective and individual protective action and collective mediation. The experience of the world with intervention has not been sufficiently encouraging to warrant the belief that the international law of the future will impose upon nations not engaged in war, either individually or collectively, the duty of extending the war by forcible intervention. It is more probable that that law, instead of abolishing neutrality, will safeguard and magnify it; recognizing that the first duty of each nation is to its own nationals, and that its only other duty is to the whole society of nations.

In the essay on "The Dangers of Pacifism," the true pacifism is rightly defined as that which holds that peace is attainable through effort directed towards the establishment of an efficient international organization and an international law based on those principles which are the permanent realities of individual and social life. True pacifism, as Professor Brown well says, does not imply inertness; on the contrary,

it involves thorough preparedness on the part of each nation and its citizens to perform their just international, national and individual duties, and to secure their just international, national and individual rights.

"Pan-Americanism" is studied as typical of real internationalism. It is through the wholly voluntary and coöperative system of organization that the nations of the world are, in Professor Brown's opinion, to be brought into unity.

The final article on "The Substitution of Law for War," like that on "Ignominious Neutrality," frankly accepts war as an abnormal condition, justifiable in some cases only by the same course of reasoning by which organized communities justify self-redress by individuals. The underlying principles of self-redress by individuals are that it is justifiable when the circumstances of the particular case are such that the community could not possibly furnish a means of redress, or when the community could have provided a means of redress and has neglected to do so.

The last article leaves us heavily weighed down under the burden of the "international realities," but with hope of a result from great and long-continued labors. Peace, as Professor Brown shows, means the slow and gradual substitution of facilities for community redress of national injuries, instead of the existing facilities for self-redress by war. The task is "stupendous," but within the limits of human capacity.

The book is, in the opinion of the reviewer, one of the most notable which the Great War has produced. Its teaching reminds one of the conscientious and reasonable abolitionist argument against slavery which finally prevailed. It sweeps away the unstable compromises of the text-writers who usually devote the greater part of their attention to "the laws of war," by asserting that war is incapable of regulation in the ordinary sense, and is to be "regulated" only as disease is "treated" — that is, with a view to its abolition at the earliest possible

moment.

It is a fact of consequence that a professor of international law in Princeton University, a diplomat of wide experience, should thus commit himself to the war-abolitionist party. If it be true that it is an international reality that war is abnormal, it means that the war-abolitionist party of the world, whose platform is that war is an unnecessary evil, has already acquired supremacy over the combined forces of the war