Costs are not to be imposed as a condition to grant of new trial for error of the court.-Maxon v. Gates, Wis., 88 N. W. Rep. 54.

167. PARTITION - Liability for Rents.-Defendant in partition held liable to plaintiff for rents accruing pending appeal and before sale on the basis of the rental value of the property.-Kalteyer v. Wipff, Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 207.

168. PARTNERSHIP-Application of Firm Property to Individual Liability.-A partner cannot apply partnership property to his individual liability without consent of partner.-Ulrich v. McConaughey, Neb., 88 N. W. Rep. 150.

169. PATENTS - Accounting for Infringement of Dormant Patent.-Where a patent has lain dormant for 15 years, and has been infringed by defendant for 7 years with the knowledge of complainant, and without a word of protest, a decree for an accounting should not be granted.-Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v. New York Air Brake Co., U. S. C. C., N. D. N. Y., 111 Fed. Rep. 741.

170. PERJURY-False Statements Under Oath Which is Illegally Required.-Under Rev. St. § 4321, recorder held not authorized to swear an applicant for a marriage license and to receive his testimony as to the consent of the girl's parents; and hence false testimony under such circumstances is not perjury, within section 2033.-State v. Carpenter, Mo., 65 S. W. Rep. 255.

171. PERJURY-Inducing Another to Commit Perjury. -The alleged fact that a person was induced to commit perjury by accused may be established by his uncorroborated evidence.-State v. Renswick, Minn., 88 N. W. Rep. 22.

172. PERJURY- - Proving Record of Testimony.-On a prosecution for perjury in falsely testifying on a certain prosecution, held essential that the existence of such prosecution be proved by the record, and not by oral testimony of the clerk of the court.-Whittle v. State, Miss., 30 South. Rep. 722.

173. PLEADING-Inconsistent Pleas.-A general denial and a plea of justification held inconsistent in an action for damages for personal abuse and personal injury.-Turnbow v. Wimberly, La., 30 South. Rep. 747. 174. PLEDGES-Parties on Foreclosure.-On foreclosure of pledged stock, an assignee of the pledgor is a necessary party.-Brown v. Hotel Assn. of Omaha, Neb., 88 N. W. Rep. 175.

175. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT Repudiating Agent's Agreement.-A principal cannot retain fruits of agent's contract and repudiate agreement. - Plano Mfg. Co. v. Nordstrom, Neb., 88 N. W. Rep. 164.

176. PROCESS-Service of Summons Against City.-A summons against the city was properly served on the mayor and on the secretary of the board of aldermen. -Loughran v. City of Hickory, N. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 46. 177. PUBLIC LANDS - Jurisdiction of State Courts.State court will assume jurisdiction of disputes to right of possession of government lands.-Mathews v. O'Brien, Minn., 88 N. W. Rep. 12.

178. RAILROADS-Failure to Construct Plank Crossings. Failure of a railroad company to construct certain plank crossings held not to work a forfeiture of the right of way under the terms of the grant.-Gratz v. Highland Scenic R. Co., Mo., 65 S. W. Rep. 223.

179. RAILROADS-Use of Track as Walkway.-In an action against a railroad company for the killing of a person on the track, evidence that the track is used by the public as a walkway is admissible.-Hord v. Southern Ry. Co., N. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 69.

180. RAILROADS - Using Track as Walkway. -In an action against a railroad company for injuries to a person on the track, evidence that the track at the place in question was much used as a walkway by the public was properly received. -McCall v. Southern Ry. Co., N. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 67.

181. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS-Proof of Similarity.

-In a prosecution for receiving stolen money, money found in the defendant's possession at the time of his arrest held admissible in evidence against him, where corresponding with that lost by the prosecuting witness.-Polin v. State, Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 183.

182. REFERENCE Conclusiveness of Findings.Where a case is tried by referees, and no exceptions are filed to their report, the findings stand as the unchallenged verdict of a jury.-State v. Standard Onl Co., Neb., 88 N. W. Rep. 175.

183. RELEASE-Terminating Obligor's Liability. Release of bond by obligee held not to terminate obligor's liability for the payment of a sum of money required by the bond to be paid a third person.Eitscheid v. Baker, Wis., 88 N. W. Rep. 52.

184. REMOVAL OF CAUSES - Foreign and Domestic Corporations as Plaintiff.-An action against a railroad company cannot be removed to the federal court, where part of the plaintiffs are foreign corporations and part domestie.-Dobson v. Southern Ry. Co., N. Car., 40 S.E. Rep. 42.

185. REPLEVIN-Judgment for Value Against Plaintff.-Plaintiff in replevin, who has disposed of the property, cannot complain that judgment is for the value of the property only. -Ulrich v. McConaughey, Neb., 88 N. W. Rep. 150.

186. REVENUE-Construction of Revenue Law. -The rule requiring a strict construction of criminal statutes is inapplicable to revenue law. -State v. Carter, N. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 11.

187. ROBBERY-Bad Allegation of Ownership.-An indictment for robbery, which alleges that R is the owner of the property stolen, is bad, where the property actually belonged to R's employers.-State v. Morledge, Mo., 65 S. W. Rep. 226.

188. SCHOOL AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS Liability of Superintendent.-A county school superintendent held not liable for mistaken performance of official duty involving the exercise of discretion.-Gridley School Dist. of Butte County v. Stout, Cal., 66 Pac. Rep. 785. 189. SEAMEN - Imprisonment to Coerce Service.Since the passage of Act Dec. 21, 1898, 2 Supp. Rev. St., p. 897, the imprisonment of a seaman in a port to coerce him to perform a contract for service on a ship, is illegal, and a violation of his personal rights, which entitles him to damages. -The South Portland, U. S. D. C., D. Wash. 111 Fed. Rep. 767.

190. SHERIFFS AND CCNSTABLES-Failure to Return an Execution.-Under Ky. St. § 1716, an action against a sheriff for failing to return within 30 days from the return day an execution issued from another county was properly brought in the county whence the execution issued.--Adams v. Simmons, Ky., 65 S. W. Rep.

152.

191. SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES-Releasing Levy on Untrue Statements of Debtor.-In an action for conversion by releasing levy on exempt property, it is no defense that the inventory and oath of debtor were untrue.-McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Dunn, Neb., 88 N. W. Rep. 159.

192. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Offer of Performance.Equity will not compel parties to sign contracts, nor compel specific performance of contracts, unless plaintiff shows full performance or offer to perform.Kulberg v. Georgia, N. Dak., 88 N. W. Rep. 87.

193. STATUTES-Journal Entries as to Vote on Bill.As the constitution requires that on the voting on a bill before the legislature the ayes and noes shall be entered on the journals, either the noes must be on the journal, or it must affirmatively appear that there were none.-Commissioners of New Hanover Co. v. De Rosset, N. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 43.

194. STATUTES-Passing Act Under Different Titles.Pub. Acts 1901, No. 235, relating to the examination and licensing of barbers held invalid, because passed in the two houses under different titles.-Fillmore v. Van Horn, Mich., 88 N. W. Rep. 69.

195. STATUTES-Subject Not Properly Stated in Title. -Comp. St. ch. 13, art. 2, § 11, relating to the election of county assessor, in cities of more than 25,000 and less than 40,000 inhabitants, held unconstitutional be. cause not contained in the title.-Haverly v. State, Neb., 88 N. W. Rep. 171.

196. STIPULATION-Validity of Admitted Judgment.-A stipulation admitting the rendition of a judgment the basis of a suit does not preclude the introduction of the whole record to determine its validity.-Rosenberger v. Gibson, Mo., 65 S. W. Rep. 237.

197. STREET RAILROADS-Consent of Abutting Owners to Railroads.-Before a city can consent to an ordinance authorizing railway in a street, the consent of a majority in interest of abutting owners must have been filed.-Currie v. City of Atlantic City, N. J., 50 Atl. Rep. 504.

198. TAXATION-Contesting Tax Title.-As a condition precedent to contesting the title to land pur chased at a tax sale, the claimants must pay the taxes due thereon. -McMillan v. Hogan, N. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 63.

199. TAXATION-Different Entries of Assessment.The validity of the taxes on personalty is not affected by the fact that part of the defendant's property is entered on one page of the assessor's book and part on another page.-State v. Stamm, Mo., 65 S. W. Rep. 242.

200. TAXATION- Franchises. The franchises of a street railroad appurtenant to the use of its property held not subject to a separate tax.-Dallas Consol. Electric St. Ry. Co. v. City of Dallas, Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 201.

201. TAXATION-Notice to Delinquent Before Sale.Where notice to delinquent taxpayer is not given as required by the constitution, a sale for taxes there. under will be null.-Foreman v. Hinchcliffe, La., 30 South. Rep. 762.

202. TAXES-Sale at Low Figure.-A sale for taxes for 96 cents in excess of taxes, with interest and penalty, held to render the entire sale void.-Lee v. Crawford, N. Dak., 88 N. W. Rep. 97.

203. TAXATION - Stocks in Hand of Executors. Stocks and bonds of a testator, in the hands of executors as trustees after termination of their duties as executors, should be assessed for municipal taxes at the respective domiciles of the executors.-Millsaps ▼. City of Jackson, Miss., 30 South. Rep. 756.

204. TAXATION-Validity of Proceedings.-The fact that the pleadings show that two contiguous lots were Issessed, taxed, and sold together held not to render the tax proceedings illegal.-Pettibone v. Fitzgerald, ieb., 88 N. W. Rep. 143.

205. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES-Right of Rival ompanies to Occupy Same Street.-A telephone comany occupies the streets in a city with its lines, subect to the equal privilege of others subsequently granted the same rights, unless serious injury will be caused thereby to the operation of its own line.Louisville Home Tel. Co. v. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 111 Fed. Rep. 663.

206. TENANCY IN COMMON-Entry by the Tenant.Entry by one tenant in common is not an entry at all, where there is an actual ouster.-Beall v. McMenemy, Neb., 88 N. W. Rep. 134.

207. TRESPASS-Homestead Entryman.-A homestead entryman in possession may sue a subsequent trespasser to recover damages in cropping the land.Mathews v. O'Brien, Minn., 88 N. W. Rep. 12.

208. TRIAL-Defendant Testifying on Behalf of Plaint. iff. Where defendant has testified on behalf of plaintiff, plaintiff is not bound by his testimony, though unfavorable.-Town of Denver v. Myers, Neb., 88 N. W. Rep. 191.

209. TRIAL-Informing Jury as to Special Questions. -Giving of general instructions calculated to inform

jury how to answer questions in a special verdict in order to enable party to recover held reversible error. -Byington v. City of Merrill, Wis., 88 N. W. Rep. 26.

210. TRIAL-Proper Instruction.-An insrtuction in substance embraced in the main charge is properly refused.-San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Skidmore, Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 215.

211. TRIAL-Ruling in Nonsuit.-Under Acts 1901, ch. 594, a defendant who introduces evidence after moving for a nonsuit cannot, on appeal, assign as error the court's ruling thereon.-McCall v. Southern Ry. Co., N. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 67.

212. USURY-Defense.-Where defense of usury is set up as originating in one of two contracts sought to be enforced, it is error to treat both contracts as usuri ous.-Harn v. American Mut. Bldg. & Sav. Assn.,Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 176.

213. VENDOR and

PURCHASER-Bond for Title.-A vendee, holding a bond for title, is the equitable owner of the land, and on his death it descends to his heirs. -Love v. Butler, Ala., 30 South. Rep. 735.

214. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Compensation for Im provements After Forfeiture.-Where defendant went into possession under a contract to purchase, he is not entitled to compensation for improvements after he forfeits his contract.-Coleman v. Stalnacke, S. Dak., 88 N. W. Rep. 107.

215. WAREHOUSEMEN - Transfer of, Warehouse Receipt. The transfer of a warehouse receipt issued under Hill's Ann. Laws, § 4201 et seq., leaves no at tachable interest in the assignor. — Adamson v. Frazier, Oreg., 66 Pac. Rep. 810.

216. WATERS AND WATER Courses-Cutting off Percolating Waters.-Where a landowner dug a ditch on his own land, and thereby cut off percolating waters, which formed a spring on adjoining land, the damage occasioned to the adjoining proprietor was damnnm absque injuria -Miller v. Black Rock Springs Imp. Co., Va., 40 S. E. Rep. 27.

217. WATERS and Water COURSES-Extending Right of Water Company.-An ordinance extending right of water company to exercise its franchise free from city's option to purchase, without compensation, with out submission of question to a popular vote, is forbidden by Comp. St. 1897, ch. 128, § 19.-Popiston v. Moores, Neb., 88 N. W. Rep. 128.

218. WILLS-Contract for Testamentary Provision.Where a person contracts to make provision in his will in settlement of a claim against him,'and does so, there is no ground on which to base a subsequent claim under the agreement against his estate.-Drinkhouse v. Merritt, Cal., 66 Pac. Rep. 785.

219. WILLS-Presumption of Widow's Election to take Under Will. A widow, suing to enforce pro visions of the foreign will of her husband in her favor, will be presumed to have elected to take under such will.-Waterfield v. Rice, U. S. C. C. of App,, Sixth Circuit, 111 Fed. Rep. 625.

220. WILLS-Remainder Unaffected by Power of Ap pointment.-A devise to testator's wife for life, "and then to be divided among my children, or otherwise, as she may deem best," creates a vested remainder in the children living at testator's death, unaffected by the power of appointment.-Lantz v. Massie, Va., 40 S. E. Rep. 50.

221. WITNESSES-Declaration of Testator. — Under Civ. Code Prac. § 606, subsee. 1, a widow who is contesting the will of her decased husband may testify as to declarations made by him during the marriage.Murphy's Exr. v. Murphy, Ky., 65 S. W. Rep. 165.

222. WITNESSES-Impeachment by Evidence at For. mer Trial. That a party testified otherwise in a for. mer action held to go only to his credibility.-Hahn v. Bettingen, Minn., 88 N. W. Rep. 10.

223. WITNESSES-Incompetency.-A judgment of con viction renders a witness incompetent.-Chambers v. State, Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 192.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., MARCH 7, 1902.

NATION

POWER OF STATE TO REGULATE SHIPMENTS WITHIN THE STATE WHEN ULTIMATE DESTIIS BEYOND ITS BOUNDARIES. A very important decision on the power of a state to regulate charges on shipments within the state where intended ultimately to be transferred to another state, was recently handed down by the railroad and warehouse commission of Minnesota in what is known as the Iron Ore Rate Case. The question presented involved the power of the commission to require certain railroad companies of that state to post a tariff of the charges for the transportation of iron ore from points on their lines in Minnesota to their respective terminals at the docks upon the shore of Lake Superior at Two Harbors and Duluth. The general object of this proceeding was the reduction of rates for the transportation of iron ore within the state. The respondent railroad insisted that all ore shipped to such docks on their roads was destined either immediately or ultimately to points outside of the state of Minnesota, and on that ground denied the jurisdiction or power of the commission to regulate or in any manner control the rates for such shipments.

It appeared from the evidence that there' was no market for iron ore in Minnesota, and certainly not any to which the ore could be shipped profitably, after consigned to the ore docks of the harbors mentioned, and that every shipment of iron to those docks was loaded on the cars at the mines with the intention that it should ultimately pass through the ore docks into vessels bound for ports outside the jurisdiction of this state. The commission, however, held that all shipments directly consigned to points without the state were interstate commerce and over such they disclaimed jurisdiction. But as to all shipments to the ore docks at Two Harbors without any further definite destination, the commission claimed the right to regulate the tariff. The respondents relied on the doctrine laid down in the case of The Daniel Ball, 10

WaH. 557, that the fact that several different and independent agencies are employed in the transportation of the commodity, some acting only in one state and some acting through two or more states, does in no respect affect the character of the transaction. They insisted, therefore, that the ore shipped from the mine over the roads in question, destined for lower lake ports, was interstate commerce, notwithstanding the fact that one of the instrumentalities of that

shipment was an independent railroad company, whose railroad was wholly within the state, and that as to all such traffic the state commission of that state was without jurisdiction to fix a rate.

The Daniel Ball case was decided in 1870. In this case action was instituted against the steamer Daniel Ball for doing business without a federal license. The boat was engaged in navigating the Grand river between Grand Rapids and Grand Haven, a port on Lake Michigan, carrying goods destined for other states and transporting up the river goods brought within the state from without its limits. The court held that the mere fact that her agency in the transportation was entirely within the limits of the state did not prevent her from being an interstate carrier as to goods destined for other states. Justice Field makes a strong argument in voicing the opinion of the court in this case :

"It is stated that, if the position here assumed be sustained, there is no such thing as the domestic trade of the state; that congress may take the entire control of the commerce of a country, extend its regulations to the railway within a state on which grain or freight is transported to a distant market. We answer that we are unable to draw any clear and definite line between the authority of congress to regulate an agency employed in commerce between the states when that agency extends through two or more states, and when it is completed entirely within the limits of a single state. If its authority does not extend to an agency in such commerce, when that agency is confined within the limits of the state itself, its entire authority over interstate commerce may be defeated. Several agencies combining, each taking up the commodity transported at the boundary line at one end of each state, and

leaving it at the boundary line at the other end, the federal jurisdiction would be entirely ousted, and the constitutional provision would become a dead letter."

Six years later the supreme court held than an act of Wisconsin "relating to railroads and telegraph companies in the state of Wisconsin" was confined to state commerce and that until congress acted in reference to the relations of such companies to interstate commerce, the regulation of their rates, so far as they were of domestic concern, was within the power of that state, notwithstanding the fact that such traffic originated in other states. Peik v. Railway Co., 94 U. S. 164. To same effect Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155. Both these cases, however, were overruled in Wabash v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, and in Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 217, which returned to the doctrine announced in The Daniel Ball case and extended it to railroad as well as to water transportation. In both of these cases last mentioned, however, the decision was reached only on a bare majority of the court. This fact, together with the suggestive language of certain expressions in the Social Circle case, 162 U. S. 184, and Lake Shore, etc. R. R. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 300, keeps the whole question still in doubt and as far away from solution as ever.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

CONSPIRACY-RIGHT OF CIVIL ACTION FOR CONSPIRACY RESULTING IN DISCHARGE OF EMPLOYEE.-Two quite important questions in the law of conspiracy are treated in the recent cases of Baker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 64 S. W. Rep. 913, and Baker v. Sun Life Insurance Co., 64 S. W. Rep. 967. It appears from these cases that three industrial life companies, the Sun, the Prudential and the Metropolitan, entered into an agreement providing that anyone who had been in the employ of either of said companies should not be employed by any of the others for a period of two years. It will be noticeable that this agreement has practically all the requisites of a "black-list." Plaintiff, who was in the employ of the Sun Life Insurance Co., sought and obtained a position with the Metropolitan. On objection, however, being made under the agreement by his former employer, plaintiff was summarily discharged. In the first action, which he brought against the Metropoltan, the court holds that the fact that plaintiff

was discharged from employment pursuant to a conspiracy between defendant and others gives him no right of action where defendant had a right to terminate the employment at any time, it being for an indefinite period. There is no doubt of the correctness of the court's decision in this case. An employer can discharge an employee on any ground or on no ground and with his reasons, neither the public nor third persons are concerned. Brewster v. Miller, 101 Ky. 368, was a similar case. Certain undertakers of Louisville entered into an agreement not to accept employment from a person who was indebted to one of them. Miller refused to serve Brewster because he was indebted to them for previous service. The other defendants refused for the reason that he had not paid Miller. Brewster sued for damages but the court denied his right to recover.

The second action was brought by the same plaintiff against the Sun Life Insurance Company for procuring his discharge. The court held that the fact that defendant under the agreement already set forth procured plaintiff's discharge, gave him no right of action, where no coercion or deception was used. The court in this case states the law correctly that "a party to a contract cannot maintain an action against a person who has maliciously advised and procured the other party to break it, unless the person procuring the breaking of the contract did so by coercion or deception, and thus caused the party to break the contract against his will, or contrary to his purpose." See Bourdier v. Macauley, 91 Ky. 135, 15 S. W. Rep. 60, 34 Am. St. Rep. 171.

TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES-RIGHTS AND PRIORITY OF OCCUPATION UNDER CONFLICTING GRANTS.-The necessity of municipal control of the telephone as of some other public utilities is emphasized by the recent case of Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Home Telephone Co., 110 Fed. Rep. 593, in which it was held that where a city has granted to each of two telephone companies the right to construct its line on the same side of the same street, neither grant being exclusive, in the absence of any statute or ordinance regulating the construction and operation of such lines the company which is prior in grant and in occupancy has the superior right, and the second company is not entitled to plant its poles within the space previously occupied by the first company, so that they will extend up through its wires, or to occupy with its own wires the space beneath them, where it will impair the safety or interfere with the efficient operation of the first line. The court sald:

"Priority in time, upon familiar principles, ordinarily gives the superior equitable right, and certainly it must be manifest that there is no equitable consideration upon which it can be justly and fairly held that the complainant shall be turned out of what it has appropriated, and of which it is in lawful possession, in order that

the defendant shall be permitted to occupy the same thing. It seems to us clear that to allow the defendant to thrust its poles up through the lines of the complainant, to have its employees pass and repass through those lines at will, and to require that the complainant's wires shall thereby be subjected, and that the complainant's employees, to say nothing of other people, shall also thereby be subjected, to any dangers that might result from the electric fluid, would be a conflict and menace to both to which no just principle would require any of them to be subjected, unless under stress of a much greater necessity or upon a much more urgent demand, based upon the public needs, than appears in this case."

First occupancy is, of course, the original foundation of title to all property, and this rule is applicable to a grant of public franchises to private individuals. In a recent and similar case (Paris Electric, etc. R. R. Co. v. Telephone Co., Tex. Civ. App., 27 8. W. Rep. 902,) the court said: "The telephone company's franchise being superior in point of time to that of the appellant, and having exercised its right under its franchise, appellant, in the absence of a superior right, could not interfere with the use and enjoy. ment of that privilege by stringing wires in such close proximity to those of appellee as to impair the efficiency of appellee's telephone service."

The statement of the rule in this case is well sustained by the recent authorities: Consolidated Electric Co. v. Electric Light & Gas Co., 94 Ala. 372; Ruthland Electric Light Co. v. Marble City Electric Light Co., 65 Vt. 377, 26 Atl. Rep. 635, 36 Am. St. Rep. 868; Bell Telephone Co. v. Electric Light Co., 12 Ont. 571.

CONTEMPT-RIGHT OF ATTORNEY TO COUNSEL DISOBEDIENCE OF ORder of Court.-Attorneys are officers of court sworn to support the law and its administration. A very delicate question arises therefore whenever an attorney is called upon to advise his client as to the validity of an order of court, or of a writ issued under its authority, which affects the client's interests. It is, of course, his right to advise his client if such order or writ is illegal or void; and, if such advice is given in good faith, it will not render him liable for contempt because of an error of judgment. The limitation on this right, however, is well illustrated in the case of Anderson v. Comptois, 109 Fed. Rep. 971, where the court held that an attorney is guilty of contempt if he goes beyond the right to advise in a matter of law and actuated by a spirit of resistance, counsels or conspires with his client or others to disobey an order of court and obstruct its enforcement. In this case a receiver appointed by the United States District Court at Nome, Alaska, was ordered, on appeal, by the circuit court of San Francisco, to turn over the property to appellants. The attorney of the receiver advised that the writ of supersedeas was not valid because of lack of jurisdiction, and that therefore it was not neces

sary that it be enforced or followed. The court quotes with approval the language of the court in Wells v. Commonwealth, 21 Gratt (Va.), 500: "It is unquestionably the duty of an attorney to endeavor, to the best of his ability, by his advice and counsel, and by his conduct, to secure to his client every legal right and remedy to which he may think him even probably entitled; and if he fails to do it he is faithless to his trust, and should be held morally and legally responsible. And if he acts in good faith, if he demeans himself honestly, he is not responsible for au error in judgment. But when a man

*

becomes an attorney-at-law he does not cease to be a citizen, and when he assumes the relation of attorney to a client he is not absolved from bis obligations as a man and a citizen. An attorney, then, who would corruptly conspire with his client to obstruct the due administration of the law, and to bring the authority of a court of justice into contempt by resisting and obstructing the execution of its lawful decree, by whatever contrivance, even though it should be by procuring the interference of another court which had no appellate or supervisory power or jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit, in abuse of its powers to enjoin and inhibit the officers of said court and other persons from the execution or performance of said decrees, he is at least as guilty of an offense against public justice, and of a contempt of court, as his client, and as justly liable to summary punishment."

LIQUI

DAMAGES DISTINCTION BETWEEN dated Damages and PENALTIES.—The Supreme Court of Oregon has just recovered from a severe engagement with that peculiarly difficult question as to when a sum specified in a bond or contract is to be regarded as a penalty or liquidated damages. The style of the case is City of Salem v. Anson, not yet reported. From the brief of Mr. Webster Holmes, attorney for plaintiff, to whose kiudness we are indebted for the advance copy of the court's opinion, we are made acquainted with the facts of the case. It appears that one Franklin R. Anson entered into an agreement with the city of Salem, undertaking to install within the city an electric light plant on or before a certain date. He further agreed to pay the city of Salem five thousand dollars in the event that the undertaking was not satisfactorily completed on the date specified. On breach of this ageeement, the city of Salem brought an action on the bond for the recovery of the five thousand dollars as provided in the contract. The court held the amount specified in the contract to be a provision for liquidated damages and not a penalty. The court relied on the rule that where the actual damages in case of a breach of the contract must necessarily be speculative, uncertain and incapable of definite ascertainment, the stipulated sum will be regarded as liquidated damages, and may be recovered as such without proof of actual damages, unless the