111. NAMES-Idems Sonans.-Where interrogatories were propounded to "Selia," and plaintiff took the deposition of "Cella," the court properly refused to suppress the deposition.-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Sanchez, Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 893.

112. NEGLIGENCE-Jumping from Elevator.-Where an elevator which plaintiff was engaged in repairing was suddenly started, causing him to jump and receive injuries, when he would not have been injured if he had remained in the elevator, a verdict for defendant will not be set aside.-Ford v. Robinson-Pettett Co., Ky., 65 S. W. Rep. 793.

113. NEGLIGENCE — Liability of Manufacturer for Defects.-A manufacturer is not liable for the breaking of a drop press sold by him, whereby the purchaser's employee was injured, where it merely appears that the manufacturer was negligent in its manufacture.-McCaffrey v. Mossberg & Granville Mfg. Co., R. 1., 50 Atl. Rep. 651.

114. PARTITION-Necessity of Commissioners.-In an action under Civ. Code Prac. § 499, for partition, the court had no power, without the aid of commissioners, to make partition or to adjudge to defendant a specific portion of the land purchased by him from a part of the co-defendants.-Eakins v. Eakins, Ky., 65 S. W. Rep. 811.

115. PAYMENT - Payment Under Mistake. - Money cannot be recovered, on the ground that it was paid under mistake, where there was a consideration for the payment.-Mitchell v. Stoddard County Bank, Ky., 65 S. W. Rep. 839.

116. PERJURY-Proof.-On a prosecution for subor. nation of perjury, held error to charge that matter alleged in the indictment as inducement need not be proved.-Miller v. State, Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 908.

117. PERPETUITIES-Extent of Limitation.-A will providing that, 25 years from testator's death, his estate should be divided among his children then living and the heirs of such as may be dead, and that during the 25 years none of the children should have power to dispose of his interest is void.-Coleman v. Coleman, Ky., 65 S. W. Rep. 832.

118. PLEADING-Curing Omission by Verdict.-Where the declaration and the issues joined thereon did not require the plaintiff to prove omitted matter of substance, the omission was not cured by verdict.Schueler v. Mueller, Ill., 61 N. E. Rep. 1044.

119. PLEADING-Subsequent Demurrers.-A defend. ant who answers over after his demurrer is overruled is not thereby precluded from demurring to amended petition filed after his answer is filled.Beattle Mfg. Co. v. Gerardi, Mo., 65 S. W. Rep. 1035.

an

120. PLEADING-Waiving Objection by Going to Trial. -Where a defendant pleads to a count and goes to trial on the issue, he waives his right to object to it.Baker v. Sherman, Vt., 50 Atl. Rep. 633.

121. PLEDGES-Subjecting Real Estate as Security.In an action to subject stock pledged to secure a debt, the court properly refused to require plaintiff to subject real estate held by him as security for the same debt.-Welscopt v. Newman, Ky., 65 S. W. Rep. 808.

122. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Knowledge of Agent's Authority. The purchaser of a piano from an agent was bound to know that the agent had no authority to take notes payable to himself, in the absence of any. thing to show that he did have such authority.- Bald. win v. Tucker, Ky., 65 8. W. Rep. 841.

passer, to use all reasonable efforts to avoid injuring him.-Vanarsdell's Admr. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., Ky., 65 S. W. Rep. 858.

125. RAILROADS-Failing to Keep Fence in Repair.Under Batts' Ann. Civ. St. art. 4528, a railroad com. pany, having fenced its track, held liable for stock injured only when such injury results from want of ordinary care or failing to keep fence in repair.-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Reitz, Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 1088.

126. RAILROADS-Failure to Signal at Crossings.— The failure of a train to signal its approach to a street crossing in a small town and to keep a lookout for persons on the street was negligence.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Cooper, Ky., 65 S. W. Rep. 795.

127. RAILROADS - Fright of Horse from Steam Emis. sion.-Railroad company held not liable for injuries occasioned by the fright of a horse from the emission of steam, unless the noise was unusual and unneces sary. Coleman v. Wrightsville & T. R. Co., Ga., 40 S. E. Rep. 247.

128. RAILROADS-Non User of Right to Use Land.Where a railroad company purchased land for right of way to hold so long as used for the railroad, it did not lose its right to any part of its purchase by permitting the vendor to use it until needed.- Graham v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., Ark., 65 S. W. Rep. 1048.

129. RAILROADS-Running Train in Excess of Speed. -Under Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, p. 1332, ch. 114, par. 87, held, that running a train within city limits in excess of the speed permitted by ordinance is negligence per se.-Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Mochell, Ill., 61 N. E. Rep.

1023.

130. REFERENCE Amendment by Court.-The court may amend and correct the findings of a referee in a cause which a compulsory reference is authorized. -Lack v. Brecht, Mo., 65 S. W. Rep. 976.

131. REFERENCE-Where Calculation of Account is Simple.-Where, in an action to set aside a void tax deed, the account of the purchaser, consisting of taxes paid by him and interest, is simple, it is not error to refuse to refer it to a master to ascertain the amount due him.-Glos v. Boettcher, 11., 61 N. E. Rep. 1017.

132. REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS — Where Deed is a Gratuity.-Error in the description of the property conveyed in a deed of gift cannot be corrected; the deed being a gratuity, and not enforceable in equity. -Mudd v. Dillon, Mo., 65 S. W. Rep. 973.

133. RELEASE-Failure of Injured Party to Read.-A railroad company cannot avail itself of an employee's negligence in signing a release of his claim for damages without reading it, where he relied on a positive representation of fact that it was a different paper.International & G. N. R. Co. v. Harris, Tex., 65 8. W. Rep. 885.

134. RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES-Title to Property in Corporate Name.-Although a religious corporation was known under several names, and paid bills under a name other than its corporate name, the title to property being involved, the true corporate name held to control.-Church of Christ v. Christian Church, Ill., 61 N. E. Rep. 1119.

135. REPLEVIN-Attorney's Fees.-In replevin, the district court may allow attorney's fees, not to exceed $10.-Hunton v. Palmer, N. J., 50 Atl. Rep. 599.

136. ROBBERY

Proof of Ownership.-In a prosecution for robbery, the possession by the party robbed of the property taken from him is sufficient to support the allegation of the indictment that it was his prop. erty. Howard v. People, Ill., 61 N. E. Rep. 1016.

137. ROBBERY-Proving Charge.-Where Indictment for robbery charges that the property belongs to a third person, the state must prove the charge as laid. -Staples v. State, Ga., 40 S. E. Rep. 264.

138. SALES-Damages for Breach of Warranty.-The measure of damages for a breach of warranty of a machine is the difference between the purchase price

and its value when delivered.-Huyett-Smith Mfg. Co v. Gray, N. Car., 40 8. E. Rep. 178.

139. SALES-Damages for Failure to Deliver.-The measure of damages for failure to deliver cattle is their market value at the time and place of their delivery.-Daugherty v. Herndon, Tex., 65 S. W. Rep.

891.

140. STATUTES-Recitals of Fact in Statute.-Recitals of fact in a public statute held not conclusive on courts, but may be disproved by evidence.-Mitchell V. Lasseter, Ga., 40 S. E. Rep. 287.

141. TAXATION-Burden of Proving Non-Liability.Where the objectors to a tax on a mining right claim that their interest is a mere easement, the burden is on them to show it.-Sholl v. People, Ill., 61 N. E. Rep. 1122.

142. TAXATION - Commercial Fertilizers.-Commer. cial fertilizers owned on March 15, 1901, held subject to taxation, though applied to land which was also taxed.-Joiner v. Adams, Ga., 40 S. E. Rep. 281.

143. TAXATION-Failure to Fill Out Blanks.-An assessment held not invalidated because the taxpayer failed to fill out blanks calling for each particular class of property, but merely entered the total valua. tion of his property at the foot of the column.-City of Lexington v. Lafayette County Bank, Mo., 65 S. W. Rep. 943.

144. TAXATION-Income Bearing Property of Religious Society.-A provision of the charter of a theological seminary, exempting its property from taxa. tion, held not to include vacant and improved lands, yielding rents used for the support of the school.Board of Directors of Chicago Theological Seminary v. People, Ill., 61 N. E. Rep. 1022.

145. TAXATION-Judicata of Judgment on Taxes for Former Year.-A judgment for defendant in an action to recover taxes for one year is not a bar to a subsequent action under the same law to recover taxes for another year.-Louisville Bridge Co. v. City of Louis. ville, Ky., 65 S. W. Rep. 814.

146. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES-Action of Interested Third Party for Misdelivery.-A father has cause of action against telegraph company for failure to deliver telegram sent by his son to a third party for his benefit.-Butler v. Western Union Tel. Co., S. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 162.

147. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES — Delivery of Messages.-A telegraph company is not relieved from duty to transmit message promptly by an agreement with the sender induced by false statements of its servants.-Seffel v. Western Union Tel. Co., Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 897.

148. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES - Liability for Defects in Poles.-Where an unprecedented storm broke a telephone pole, which Injured plaintiff's building, à finding that defects caused the pole to break held to authorize a verdict for the plaintiff.Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Ingrando, Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 1085.

149. TRESPASS-Cutting Down Trees.-In a prosecu. tion under Sand. & H. Dig. § 1774, for feloniously cutting down trees valued at over $10, held, that defend. ant was not prejudiced by the fact that the verdict failed to state the value of the property, as required by section 1778.-Simpson v. State, Ark., 65 S. W. Rep. 932.

150. TRIAL-Allowing Leading Questions.-Allowing leading questions is within the discretion of the court. -Latimer v. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World, S. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 155.

151. TRIAL-Credibility of Witnesses.-The credibility of a witness is a matter pecularily within the province of the jury, and depends, not only on his desire to tell the truth, but also on his insensible bias, his intelligence, his means of knowledge, and his powers of observation.-Cogdell v. Southern Ry. Co., N. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 202.

152. TRIAL-Directing Verdict for Want of Evidence.— In an action to recover land, where defendant admits it was conveyed to plaintiff and pleads a forfeiture, but the evidence does not sustain such defense, it is not error to direct a verdict for plaintiff.-Graham v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., Ark., 65 S. W. Rep. 1048.

153. USURY- Recovery.- Penal action to recover usury cannot be maintained against personal representative of creditor.-Butler v. Butler, S. Car., 40 S. E. Rep. 138.

154. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Liability for Interest for Failing to Give Good Title.-A vendee, who keeps on hand money to pay for land when the vendor furnishes a good title, is entitled to interest, where the latter fails to give a good title.-Kennedy v. Koopman, Mo., 65 S. W. Rep. 1020.

155. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Lien of Parol Pur chaser for Purchase Money.-A parol purchaser of land, who has never been placed in possession, is not entitled to a lien for the purchase money paid.— Bishop v. Martin, Ky., 65 8. W. Rep. 807.

156. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Right of Assignee of Vendor's Lien Note.-The fact that an assignee of a vendor's lien note was in possession of the land on which the note was a lien did not give him a right to hold the land against the vendee.-Garner v. Black, Tex., 65 8. W. Rep. 876.

157. WATER AND WATER COURSES-Diversion of Wa tor.-Vendor of a half interest in a water power mill held not entitled to divert water from a stream above. the mill, so as to interfere with the operation thereof. -Cox v. Howell, Tenn., 65 8. W. Rep. 868.

158. WATER AND WATER COURSES-Sprinkling Contractor's Liability for Flooding Property.-One opera. ting a sprinkling wagon under contract with the city held not liable for damages owing to flooding of plaintiff's premises by reason of a defect in a fire plug -Rice v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 65 S. W. Rep. 1002.

159. WEAPONS-Carrying Weapons Under Mistake.A person carrying a pistol under the erroneous, but honest, belief that he is a deputy sheriff, cannot be convicted of the crime of carrying a pistol.-Shannon v. State, Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 1065.

160. WEAPONS-Offense of Pointing a Gun.-It is not a necessary element of the offense of intentionally pointing or aiming a gun or pistol at another, prohibited by Pen. Code, § 343, that the act was done with intent to shoot.-Winkles v. State, Ga., 40 8. E. Rep. 259.

161. WILLS-Estate of Limitation.-Wills giving land to devisee so long as he should pay the taxes, and on his failure to his children creates an estate of limitation.-Hoselton v. Hoselton, Mo., 65 8. W. Ber. 1005.

162. WILLS-Proof of Undue Influence.-That testator, while surrounded by the influence which induced him to execute will, expressed satisfaction therewith, held insufficient to prove the absence of undue influence. In re Sickles' Will, N. J., 50 Atl. Rep. 577.

163. WITNESSES-Competency.-Under Code, § 590, a principal debtor who was a party to an action to fore. close a mortgage given by his sureties was not a com. petent witness.-Benedict v. Jones, N. Car., 40 8. E. Rep. 223.

164. WITNESSES-Impeachment by Record of Evi dence Before Grand Jury.-Where witness denied that his statements before the grand jury were contradictory to his testimony, the district attorney having shown the statement to have been taken down in writing, held proper to allow the writing to be introduced in evidence.-Parker v. State, Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 1066.

165. WITNESSES-Pardon as Affecting Competency.Where a witness was convicted of the theft of a calf, that pardon granted stated that the conviction had been for the theft of a colt did not render him incom. petent to testify.-Petty v. State, Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 917.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., MARCH 14, 1902.

WHAT CHARACTER OF ADVERTISING CONSTITUTES A BREACH OF LEGAL ETHICS.-The Kansas City Bar Monthly informs us of an ordinance recently introduced into the Kansas City Council to require what they term "snitches" to pay a license of five hundred dollars per year. By a "snitch" is meant one who for a consideration offers his services to attorneys to bring them business, generally of the damage suit kind. Our contemporary takes a very pessimistic view of the proposed ordinance: "We do not wish to point out to the 'snitches' and the lawyers employing them how this ordinance may be evaded, but we do not think this ordinance will put the 'snitch' out of business. He has only to be admitted to the bar and then claim that soliciting damage suits is an incident to the practice of the law, as, in fact, it has become with too many lawyers." This discouraging reflection naturally leads to a more dismal conclusion:

With the prac

tice of law as it is conducted in an office well equipped with runners and bicyclists, it seems to be only a question of time when the practice of the law will become a necessary evil which the state may be called not only to mitigate but to wholly suppress. The public certainly needs to be protected from such lawyers." While we deplore as deeply as our contemporary the practice of employing "runners" and "snitches,' we do not share its gloomy forebodings for the future. A profession which dates its birth from the dawn of civilization and does not expect to die until man returns again to the savage, is not worried over the presence of a few parasites in its midst. The "snitches' and "runners" will continue their farious practice until the millenium, and the only severe punishment that can ever be expected to deter them is the supreme contempt of the profession itself.

ne

The consideration of this subject naturally leads to the question how far the ethics of the profession permit the employment of advertising methods to make known the lawyer to his friends, acquaintances, and the public

in general. This is an exceedingly delicate question which we prefer as a general rule to leave to the lawyer's own sense of propriety. There is no doubt that in regard to advertising and the use of business methods, a great change has come over the profession during the last fifty years. In a recent address before the University of Oregon, Judge Stephen A. Lowell remarked that the lawyer of the old school, who maintains the ideals of his profession, was "being slowly crushed between centralization of commercial interests on the one hand, and the sharp practice of his competitors on the other." In commenting on this statement the Kansas City Star says: "If this were really true, or, in any sense, a necessary result of the present conditions, nothing could be more deplorable." That the statement of Judge Lowell is true no lawyer acquainted with the conditions existing in the profession at the present day can deny, but that such conditions deserve the comment which the Star makes cannot be so readily accepted. It must be kept in mind that the character of litigation has changed. Whereas, in former years, the great mass of the law business was personal, it is to-day more largely commercial; and indeed, to this very exposure of the profession to commercial influences may be attributed the reason for the subversion of the ideal to the practical and financial side of professional practice. James B. Dill, the great corporation lawyer, says, "The great bulk of the work of the profession has been turned into industrial creation and adjustment. Specialism has split it up into a half dozen or more divisions, and a lawyer who is now able to master more than one sort of practice is a genius. The profession has lost nearly all of its old, æsthetic, ostentatious. attractions." These changes, which have been operating on the practice of the law and have resulted almost in making it a business rather than a profession, must be taken into account in answering the question of what are proper and what improper methods of advertising. Certainly the business features of the law permit of a wider range in advertising than formerly, so long as it does not go beyond a modest announcement. Anything that goes beyond this is vulgar and approximates too closely the ways of the quack "who crieth

out with a loud voice and is heard afar off in the market place."

Another reason for the change in the atti- | tude of the profession as to the ethics of advertising is offered by Mr. J. B. Martindale, editor of Martindale's American Law Directory: "The profession of the law," says Mr. Martindale, "in the times when such ethics obtained, was strictly an honorable one, and its followers, being gentlemen of wealth, pursued it, not as now for the purpose of making a living; nay, it was even no less dishonorable to take pay for services than it was to seek an employment. Does the modern advocate of the old honored custom attest his sincerity by scorning to accept compensation for his own services? If not, is it noble in him, having discarded half the rule himself, to disclaim the young attorney's right to discard the other half? Happily, this old rule of ethics is now obsolete, and the practice of law is becoming purely a matter of business."

Still another view is presented by Mr. Walter S. Carter, member of one of the most prominent law firms in New York City. In addressing some remarks to the Phi Delta Phi Fraternity at Columbia University, he said: "When I came to the bar, forty-three years ago, very few, if any, good lawyers, advertised. To-day all that has changed. In the English Law List, which is the official organ of the bar of that country, are to be seen the cards of Evarts, Choate & Beaman, Parsons, Shepard & Ogden, our own firm, and those of several others in New York. I think the strongest, as it is one of the largest firms in the world, having thirteen partners, is that of Blake, Lash & Cassels, of Toronto, whose card I see in all the foreign law lists, and in well nigh all our own legal and banking directories. Of course, the advertisement must be a dignified one; merely a card, nothing more. It is just as legitimate and proper for a lawyer to publish his card, preferably in a legal or banking journal, as it is for a business man to advertise his business."

*

These statements from representative men at the bar evidence the strong tendency of the profession toward the adoption of business methods. While this tendency, cannot be said to be an unmitigated evil, and that

there are many features about it that are a vast improvement over the old manner of doing business, we will be pardoned for expressing a regret that, for this improvement, we are probably forced to sacrifice one of the noblest ideals of the law-that of a place among the learned professions. The words of an eminent author in this connection are pertinent: "But there have been lawyers who were orators, philosophers and historians. There have been Bacons and Clarendons, there will be none such any more till in some better age, true ambition, or the love of fame, prevails over avarice, and until men find leisure and encouragement to prepare themselves for the exercise of this profession by climbing up the vantage ground of science, instead of grovelling all their lives below in a mean but gainful application to all the little arts of chicane." In spite of this tendency let us cherish the hope, however, that the pecuniary advantages of the profession, which are now so much greater than in former times may not prove so attractive as to lure us away from a thorough acquaintance, a constant study and an ever-ready defense of its time-honored principles.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

SHERIFFS-LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF DEPUTY. -A sheriff, of course, like every other principal, is responsible for the acts of his deputies. But he cannot be mulcted in exemplary or punitive damages. Thus, in the recent case of Nixon v. Rauer, 66 Pac. Rep. 221, the Supreme Court of California, held that a sheriff, though liable for injuries done by his deputy, cannot be charged in exemplary damages for misconduct of such deputy as though he had personally committed the acts. There is no doubt of the correctness of the court's decision in this case. Where a party does not personally participate in a trespass, he cannot be punished for a wrong which he never committed, but is liable only for the pecuniary damages which he puts in the power of another to inflict. The malice of the deputy cannot be imputed to the principal. The rule was well stated in a recent case: "Exemplary or punitive damages, being awarded, not by way of compensation to the sufferer, but by way of punishment of the offender, and as a warning to others, can only be awarded against one who has participated in the offense. A principal, therefore, though, of course, liable to make compensation for injuries done by his agent within the scope of his employment, cannot be held liable for exemplary or punitive damages merely by

reason of wanton, oppressive or malicious intent on the part of the agent." Railroad Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 107, 13 Sup.Ct. Rep. 261, 37 L. Ed. 97; Warner v. Railroad Co., 113 Cal. 105, 45 Pac. Rep. 187, 54 Am. St. Rep. 327: Trabing v. Improvement Co., 121 Cal. 143, 53 Pac. Rep. 644.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCE PENALIZING PURCHASE OF LOTTERY TICKETS.-A San Francisco city ordinance makes it unlawful for any person to have in his possession any lottery ticket. In the recent case of Ex parte McClain, 66 Pac. Rep. 69, the petitioner who was convicted of a violation of this ordinance, sought release upon the asserted ground that the ordinance in question was unreasonable. The court denied the contention and held that under the article of the constitution empowering cities and counties to make and enforce within their limits such local, police, and sanitary regulations as are not in conflict with general laws, such ordinance was not void as being an unreasonable and oppressive police regulation. The court expresses itself very convincingly:

There are, then, against all gambling devices of this kind, not only the public policy of the general government and of this state, but also the express mandate of their criminal laws, so that the avowed policy and the expressed intent is to stamp out by penal legislation the traffic in lottery tickets. It is true that the state, while declaring it to be a penal offense to sell a lottery ticket, has not made the purchaser equally culpable. But no one will question the right of the state to declare, if it see fit so to do, that the purchaser of a lottery ticket, equally with the seller, is guilty of a misdemeanor. It may be concluded, therefore, that in a reasonable exercise of its police powers a municipality may pass any ordinance in furtherance of the avowed general policy of the national and state government. In this regard our cities and counties draw their power, not from legislative permission, but from the direct grant of the constitution itself, which by article 11, § 11, empowers them to make and enforce within their limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws."

DEAD BODY-RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN MUMMIES.-The extraordinary case of Aitken v. London and Northwestern Railway Co. (Times 12th inst), before Darling, J., and a special jury this week, in which the plaintiff sued the defendant company for negligence in the custody of a mummy brought from Peru, seemed at one time to be in danger of going off upon the point that there can be no property in a dead body. That such is the ordinary rule there is no doubt, and an interesting discussion of the law upon the subject will be found in the judgment of Kay, J., in Williams v. Williams, 20 Ch. D. 659, a case which arose upon the validity of a direction

by a testator to a person not an executor to burn his body. The direction was carried out after the burial of the body by the executors, but it was held that the expense of £321 incurred in so doing was not recoverable from them. The law as to a dead body is that there is no ownership of it, but the executors have a right to the custody and possession of it until it is properly buried. The rule was exemplified in Reg. v. Fox, 2 Q. B. 246, where a gaoler had refused to deliver up to the executors the body of a person who died while a prisoner, unless they would satisfy certain claims by the debtor. This new form of lien was rejected, and the executors' right to possession was enforced by a peremptory mandamus. Much information also as to the disposal of the dead is to be found in the charge of Stephen, J., to the jury in Reg. v. Price, 12 Q. B. D. 247, where he declared the practice of cremation to be lawful, provided it was not done so as to amount to a public nuisance. But while all this is true of the body of a person who has recently died, or, though the death has not been recent, who has been buried under such circumstances that any interference with the body would be shocking to the feelings of survivors different considerations arise in the case of a corpse which, by artificial preservation and the lapse of centuries, has passed into the state of a mummy. It has then become an object of curiosity, and from being an object of curiosity it is a short step to become also an article of commerce. It is brought down to the level of common things and rights of property attach. probability of any question arising as to when a dead body ceases to be a corpse and becomes a mummy is rather remote.-Solicitors Journal.

The

PROVABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY OF A FINE IMPOSED BY THE COMMONWEATH FOR A MISDEMEANOR. The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky handed down a decision by Evans, J., onthe 21st of October last, In re Moore, reported in American Bankruptcy Reports. Vol. 6, page 590, which is the second and last adjudication of the question stated in the caption under the present bankruptcy law. Although a question of rare occurrence it is one of considerable import involving, in which ever way decided, the constiutionality of two sections of the bankruptcy act. The other decision was from the United States District Court of West Virginia by Jackson, J., In re Alderson, 98 Fed. Rep. 588, 3 Am. B. Rep. 544, in which the court came to the diametrically opposite conclusion to which the Kentucky court arrived. Besides being an original question of considerable import it is interesting to observe the divergent logic and contradictory conclusion reached by two able jurists arguing from the same premises.

In each case the conviction had been procured and the claim of the state reduced to a personal judgment against the practitioner before the filing of the petition. Section 17 of the Bank