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requisite of a city council's right to allow railroad tracks to be laid in the city streets, applies as well to Individuals seeking franchise as to corporations.--McGann v. People, Ill., 62 N. E. Rep. 941.

137. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Scattering Paper.An ordinance prohibiting the casting of circulars and waste paper in vestibules of houses held within the legislative power of the city as to streets.-City of Philadelphia v. Brabender, Pa., 51 Atl. Rep. 374.

138. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Service of Process.Service of summons on the clerk and three members of the council held sufficient service on a city.Cooper v. Borough of Cape May Point, N. J., 51 Atl. Rep. 511.

139. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Special Assessment. -Invalidity of an ordinance requiring that only members of labor unions sha'l be hired on work for the city held, no defense to an action to recover on a special assessment; it not appearing that such invalid ordinance was connected with the contract or proceedings. Treat v. People, Ill., 62 N. E. Rep. 891.

140. NAMES-Tax Sale.-Where there is evidence in proceedings involving the validity of a tax sale of real estate that the owner was as well known by the name of "Maria Lancy" as "Maria S. Lancy," the tax proceedings will not be set aside because the owner is described therein by the former name.-Lancy v. Snow, Mass., 62 N. E. Rep. 735.

141. NAVIGABLE WATERS-Release of Public Rights. -A grant made by the riparian commissioners under authority of Act April 6, 1871 (Gen. St. p. 2796), and preceding acts, held to extinguish any highway rights which the public may have acquired in the land granted.-Morris & E. R. Co. v. City of Jersey City, N. J., 51 Atl. Rep. 387.

142. NEGLIGENCE -Care Required of Owner.-The owner of standing walls of a building destroyed by fire held, after the expiration of a reasonable time in which to take proper precautions, to be liable for the failure to use care sufficient to absolutely prevent injury, except from vis major, acts of public enemies, etc. -Ainsworth v. Lakin, Mass., 62 N. E. Rep. 746.

143. NEGLIGENCE Sufficiency of Complaint.-The complaint in an action for injuries resulting from defendant's negligence is not required to contain an express averment of defendant's negligence; but the allegation of facts showing a duty and a failure to per. form such duty is sufficient.-Illinois Steel Co. v. Ostrowski, Ill., 62 N. E. Rep. 822.

144. NEW TRIAL-Jurors.-It is no ground for a new trial that a jurɔr had become a bankrupt, and so was disqualified to serve.-Guckian v. Newbold, R. I., 51 Atl. Rep. 210.

145. PARTIES Intervention.-Where one claiming title adversely to the mortgagor intervenes in an ac. tion to foreclose the mortgage, it is error to include in the decree dismissing the bill a finding that intervener had no title.-Ennis v. Wolff, Ill., 62 N. E. Rep. 842.

146. PARTNERSHIP - Assumption of Debt.-Partner, sued by firm creditors, who does not notify his copart. ner, cannot recover counsel fees against the latter, though he had assumed the firm debts.-Fairfield v. Day, N. H., 51 Atl. Rep. 263.

147. PAYMENT Detached Coupons.-A pledge of bonds as security held not to be with presumption that the detached matured coupons were paid or can. celed. Rhawn v. Edge Hill Furnace Co., Pa., 51 Atl. Rep. 360.

148. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS - Damages. - Where a patient is injured by a physician's negligent and un. skillful treatment, the loss or injury directly and nat. urally resulting from his fault or negligence is the measure of damages.-Challis v. Lake, N. H., 51 Atl. Rep. 260.

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133, prescribing the conditions on which he may prac tice medicine, and the complaint need not allege a compliance.-Webster v. Lamb, S. Dak., 89 N. W. Rep.

473.

150. PLEADINGS-Declaration Sufficient After Verdict. -A declaration which failed to allege the servant's ignorance of the defect in appliances which caused his injury held, in the absence of demurrer, to be sufficient after verdict.-Ide v. Fratcher, Ill., 62 N. E. Rep. 814.

151. PLEADING-Set Off.- Defendant held not entitled to set off claim due him from plaintiff, because not pleaded.- Harrison v. State Banking & Trust Co., 8. Dak., 89 N. W. Rep. 477.

152. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY – Demand of Payment.Till there is a demand for payment, evidencing an in. tent to require payment forthwith, of surety on a bond conditioned for completion of building, the surety is not liable for interest.-Folz v. Tradesmen's Trust & Saving Fund Co., Pa., 51 Atl. Rep. 379.

153. PROCESS- Publication of Summonɛ.- An objec tion that a complaint was not made a part of the affidavit for publication of summons, and that therefore the affidavit failed to show a cause of action against defendants, held untenable under the facts.Wiley v. Carson, S. Dak., 89 N. W. Rep. 475.

154. RAILROADS-Contributory Negligence.-There is no such difference between an electric railway in the country and a steam railway as to render what would be contributory negligence as respects crossing a steam railway due care as respects crossing an elec. tric railway.- McNab v. United Railways & Electric Co., Md., 51 Atl. Rep. 421.

155. RAILROADS - Negligence.-Assumption of em ployees of railroad company, in shunting cars onto a coal company's wharf, that wharf was clear, based on notification by wharf owners that ears were wanted, held not to conclusively defeat the right of an employee of the coal company, working on the wharf, to recover for injuries.-Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Charvat, Md., 51 Atl. Rep. 413.

156. REPLEVIN Damages.-Where defendant in an action in replevin obtains a judgment for return of the property, he is entitled to reasonable damages occa. sioned by the replevin, but not to the cost of new property purchased by him to take the place of the old.Adams v. Wright, Conn., 51 Atl. Rep. 537.

157. REPLEVIN - Judgment.-In replevin, where defendant retains possession by giving bond, and plaintiff recovers in whole or in part, a general judgment for so much money is invalid.-Tumulty v. Jordan, N. J., 51 Atl. Rep. 466.

158. SALES-Burden of Proof.-In an action for goods sold, where defendant alleges that he acted merely as a commission merchant, the burden of proof as to such defense is not on him.-Alpert v. Bright, Conn., 51 Atl. Rep. 521.

159. SALES-Replevin.-The fact that one has sold certain coat linings, which have been put into completed garments, will not entitle him to replevin the completed garments from under the levy of an execu. tion creditor of the purchaser, on the theory that the sale of the linings was induced by the purchaser's fraud.-Bennet v. Gilbert, Ill., 62 N. E. Rep. 847.

160. SALES-Waiver of Lien for Custody.-Where sel. ler in an executed contract for sale of cattle refuses delivery at the time agreed on, he waives his lien for keeping the cattle after the time for delivery.-Crug v. Gorham, Conn., 51 Atl. Rep. 519.

161. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-Advertisement for Bids.-A board of education, not required to ad. vertise for proposals for doing work, may enter into any contract it deems best without reference to any advertisement made.-Coward v. City of Bayonne, N. J., 51 Atl. Rep. 490.

162. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-Awarding Con. tracts.-A board of education organized under Revision of 1900 (P. L. 1900, p. 192), in seeking proposals

for a contract for supplies, may delegate to a commit tee the negotiations for the contract, provided the result of the negotiations is considered by the board before the award of the contract.- Kraft v. Board of Ed. ucation, N. J., 51 Atl. Rep. 483.

Compensation.

163. SHERIFfs and ConsTABLES Under Rev. St. 1898, § 731, subd. 27, the sheriff is not en. titled to compensation for unsuccessful trips to serve criminal warrants, except under subdivision 34 of said section, authorizing in the discretion of the county board a reasonable allowance for the time employed and expenses incurred.-Northern Trust Co. V. Snyder, Wis., 89 N. W. Rep. 460.

164. STATUTES-Construction.-Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, p. 1143, regulating the practice of medicine, held not unconstitutional, as including more than is expressed In its title.-People v. Gordon, Ill., 62 N. E. Rep. 858.

165. STATUTES - Extraterritorial Effect.-Penal stat. utes of one state can have no operátion in another, being strictly local in their effect.-Kennealy v. Leary, N. J., 51 Atl. Rep. 475.

166. STATUTES-Municipal Corporation.-A judgment in mandamus, requiring a city to disconnect certain ter. ritory, under Laws 1879, p. 77, reversed by the supreme court, under Laws 1901, p. 96, though the latter act was passed after the judgment was affirmed by the appellate court.-Vance v. Rankin, Ill., 62 N. E. Rep. 807.

167. STATUTES-Representation on County Board.— The provisions Act of June 8, 1901, amended the charter of the city of Saginaw as to the city's representatives on the board of county supervisors, held not separable, so as to make any of such provisions valid. -Attorney General v. Gramlich, Mich., 89 N. W. Rep. 446.

168. STATUTES-Taxing Building and Loan Associations.-Laws 1895, p. 300, in reference to the taxation of building and loan associations and the stock thereof, held not invalid as including subject-matter with. in the title of the act.-In re St. Louis Loan & Investment Co. of East St. Louis, Ill., 62 N. E. Rep. 810.

169. STREET RAILROADS- Contributory Negligence. -One who negligently goes on street railway track may nevertheless recover, it motorman could have avoided injuring him by due care, and he himself could not have escaped after discovering approaching car.-Parkinson v. Concord St. Ry., N. H., 51 Atl. Rep. 268.

170. TAXATION- Building and Loan Association. Laws 1901, p. 265, amending Laws 1895, p. 300, § 29a, re lating to the taxation of the stock of building and loan corporations, is invalid as an attempt to exempt certain stock from taxation.-In re St. Louis Loan & Investment Co. of East St. Louis, Ill., 62 N. E. Rep.

810.

171. TAXATION- Omitted Property.- Under Revenue Act, §§ 41, 46, 47, 49, 77, where a railroad company re turns a sheep pen as "railroad track," the assessor is not bound to follow the copy schedule furnished him by the county clerk, but should assess such tract as omitted property.-Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. People, Ill., 62 N. E. Rep. 869.

172. TAXATION-Right of Purchaser.-A purchaser of realty from a tenant in common after sale of the property for assessments held not entitled to partition as against the purchaser under the sale.-Windmiller v. Leach, Ill., 62 N. E. Rep. 789.

173. TAXATION - Tax Deed.. A certificate of error purporting to set aside a tax deed for taxes for several years, might annul the deed in part only, if the error did not affect all of the titles covered.-Vetterly v. McNeal, Mich., 89 N. W. Rep. 441.

174. TAXATION-Tax Sale.-A tax sale of real estate for taxes for two years, for an integral price, at one sale and on one bid, is valid; but the statement of taxes in the posted and advert sed notices of the sale must state the tax for each year separately.-Lancy v. Snow, Mass., 62 N. E. Rep. 735.

175. TRIAL-Instruction.-In giving a requested instruction as to the things to be taken into considera. tion in determining the weight to be given to the testimony of a witness, it is not error to modify the instruction by adding other proper matters for consid. eration in the subject, where the instruction given covers all that was asked.-Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Pollock, Ill., 62 N. E. Rep. 831.

176. TRIAL-Instruction.-Where it would be proper to instruct on the questson of fellow servants, omis. sion of this subject in plaintiff's Instructions would be cured by subsequent instructions for defendant fully covering it.-Ide v. Fratcher, Ill., 62 N. E. Rep. 814. 177. TRIAL Reservation of Question of Law. "Whether there is any evidence in this case that K's death was caused solely by external, violent, and accidental causes" is a good reservation of a question of law. Keefer v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., Pa., 51 Atl. Rep. 366.

178. TRIAL-Special Verdict.-Special verdict will not sustain a judgment, unless it contains all the essential facts, those admitted, as well as those disputed. — Standard Sewing Mach. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., Pa., 51 Atl. Rep. 354.

179. TRIAL-Trespass.-In trespass quare clausum, an Instruction that plaintiff could not recover unless he was found to have been in actual possession covered a requested instruction that title alone, if found in plaintiff, would not entitle him to recover.-Vetterly v. McNeal, Mich., 89 N. W. Rep. 441.

180. TROVER AND CONVERSION License. Where there was on defendant's land certain wood, which had been cut and which plaintiff was entitled to remove, and defendant forbade such removal, it con stituted a conversion.-Erskin v. Savage, Me., 51 Atl. Кер. 242.

181. Trusts-Appointment.-The share of a trustee, as cestui que trust, he having exercised his power of testamentary appointment, held not applicable to ward deficiency caused by his default as trustee.-In re Dunglison's Estate, Pa., 51 Atl. Rep. 356.

182. USURY-Profits in Lieu of Interest.-A sale for a judgment note on agreement to receive in lieu of interest a share of the profits equal to $150 a month, held not usurious, under Act April 6, 1870.-Scott v. Kennedy, Pa., 51 Atl. Rep. 384.

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184. WILLS- Intention of Testator. A legacy to a testator's wife held not to have been given in lieu of dower.-Thompson v. Betts, Conn., 51 Atl. Rep. 564.

185. WILLS-Power of Disposition.-A will providing, "I desire the remainder of my estate to be disposed of in accordance with the judgment and advice of my executor," gives him an unlimited power of disposi tion. In re Watt's Estate, Pa., 51 Atl. Rep. 588.

186. WITNESSES-Admissibility of Evidence.-Where plaintiff, in an action for injuries sustained while at tempting to alight from a street car, testified that the car stopped long enough for him to alight, and that he gave no signal to the conductor of his intention, held not error to refuse to allow him to state his recollection of the length of time the car stopped.— Ackerstadt v. Chicago City Ry. Co., Ill., 62 N. E. Rep.

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Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., JUNE 20, 1902.

THE "SWEAT BOX” AS A MEANS OF EXTORTING CONFESSIONS FROM SUSPECTED CRIMINALS.

The word "liberty" represents one of the highest and most cherished rights of man. Notwithstanding, a most dangerous most dangerous and insidious tendency is observable, to infringe and impair it, especially in the large municipalities. A characteristic illustration of this tendency-the sweat box -has been justified as a police regulation, and in every large city the police department have one of these "modern improvements" by which they can "sweat out" confessions from suspected criminals. Such "improvements" are in line with many other questionable methods made use of by sheriffs, police officers and prosecuting attorneys, who imagine that the most important business of their offices is to secure the conviction of every person who is so unfortunate as to become an object of their suspicion. The surroundings and manner of making use of the "sweat-box" rest on a presumption that the prisoner is guilty, and that his denial of the offense charged against him is untrue. The purpose of it is therefore utterly contrary to the spirit of the law: first, because the law presumes everything in favor of the innocence of the party charged with crime; second, because a confession to be admissible against a prisoner must be voluntary, and not made under fear or unnecessary restraint.

Courts of last resort ave had very little opportunity to express hemselves on the use of this means in the detection and prosecution of crime and criminals, so that it was with more than usual interest we were attracted to the opinion of Supreme Court of Mississippi handed down May 19, 1902, in the recent case of Ammons v. State, 32 South. Rep. 9, holding that a "sweat-box" confession is absolutely inadmissible against the prisoner.

"under which the accused made the confession were these: There was what was known as a 'sweat box' in the place of confinement. This was an appartment about five or six feet one way and about eight feet another. It was kept entirely dark. For fear that some stray ray of light or breath of air might enter without special invitation, the small cracks were carefully blanketed. The prisoner was allowed no communication whatever with human beings. Occasionally the officer who had him put there would appear and interrogate him about the crime charged against him. To the credit of our advanced civilization and humanity it must be said that neither the thumbscrew nor the wooden boot was used to extort a confession. The efficacy of the sweat box was the sole reliance. This, with the hot weather of summer, and the fact that the prisoner was not provided with sole leather lungs, finally, after several days of obstinate denial, accomplished the purpose of eliciting a 'free and voluntary' confession. The officer, to his credit, says he did not threaten his prisoner, that he held out no reward to him, and did not coerce him. Everything was 'free and voluntary.' He was perfectly honest and frank in his testimony, this officer was. He was intelligent, and well up in the law as applied to such cases, and nothing would have tempted him, we assume, to violate any technical requirement of a valid confession, no threats, no hope of reward, no assurance that it would be better for the prisoner to confess. He did tell him, however, 'that it would be best for him to do what was right,' and that it 'would be better for him to tell the truth.' In fact, this was the general custom in the moral treatment of these sweat-box patients, since this officer says, 'I always tell them it would be better for them to tell the truth, but never hold out any inducement to them.' This sweat box seems to be a permanent institution, invented and used to gently persuade all accused persons to voluntarily tell the truth. Whenever they do tell the truth,that is, confess guilt of the crime, they are let out of the sweat box. Defendant, unless demented, understood that the statement wanted was confession, and that this only meant release from this 'black hole of Cal

The character of the sweat-box in this case and the circumstances under which the confession was made are described in an exceedingly interesting but rather caustic style by Calhoon, J., who wrote the opinion. "The ircumstances' says this learned judge, cutta.

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Such is one of the most graphic pictures of the beauties and advantages of this latest of modern "improvements" in criminal procedure. The court's opinion of it in this case, however, is not apologetic in the least: "Such proceedings" says the court, "as this record discloses cannot be too strongly denounced. They violate every principle of law, reason, humanity and personal right. They restore the barbarity of ancient and medieval methods. They obstruct, instead of advance, the proper ascertainment of truth. It is far from the duty of an officer to extort confession by punishment. On the contrary, he should warn his prisoner that every statement he may choose to make may be used against him on his trial."

There are two phases to this question: first, as to whether accused is in legal or illegal custody; second, as to the method of extorting the confession. The principal case holds that even if the custody and confinement is legal, the "sweat box" method of extorting a confession is vicious and renders uneffectual any statements made at that time and under those circumstances. The further question as to the legality of the custody in such cases is a new one, but of growing interest. The practice seems to be becoming general in large cities for the chief of police or of detectives to order the arrest of suspected persons without warrant, for the purpose of ferreting out crime and extorting a confession. Whether confessions made while under illegal arrest are admissible in evidence against the accused is a matter on which the cases are not unanimous. Hoober v. State, 81 Ala. 51. But the weight of authority seems to be in favor of their validity. People v. Devine, 46 Cal. 46; Balbo v. People, 80 N. Y. 499; Commonwealth v. Cuffee, 108 Mass. 285. Thus in the case of People v. Devine, supra, when a person charged with the commission of a crime was arrested and held in custody more than twenty-four hours without being taken before a magistrate, it was held that a voluntary confession made by him to the officer was not to be excluded from evidence on the ground that he was illegally in custody after the twenty-four hours expired. But admitting the custody to be legal, the "sweat box" method of extorting a confession is such a violent infraction

of the spirit of the law as not to be countenanced for a moment. It presumes the prisoner to be guilty and by its methods of inquisition, which, under the peculiar circumstances surrounding the procedure, is pratically a sort of mental torture, very often enforces a confession that can very seldom, if ever, be anything but involuntary. The wonder is that such methods should be even tolerated in a free country.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

BANKS AND BANKING-LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS FOR DEFALCATION OF OFFICERS DUE TO THEIR NEGLIGENCE.-The question of law stated as the subject of this note is in quite an unsettled state, owing to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the famous case of Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 924, 35 L. Ed. 662, denying the liability of bank directors for negligence in failing to discover the defalcation of officers and servants of the bank. That decision is admitted to be indefensible on principle and has been criticised in many subsequent cases. In 50 Cent. L. J. 49, the decision is carefully analyzed and the errors of the court clearly pointed out. Four of the ablest of the Justices dissented so that it cannot be said to be improbable that on a subsequent hearing on this question, the court may decline to follow the former decision. Meanwhile the question is arising quite frequently in many of the state and lower federal courts. Thus in the recent case of Campbell v. Watson, 50 Atl. Rep. 120, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that in an action by a bank's receiver against the directors for losses caused by the cashier's abstraction during several years, which it was alleged they negligently failed to sooner discover, defendants cannot claim that to hold them responsible for failure to discover such defalcations would require of them too high a degree of care and attention, where the examination necessary to discover the frauds required merely an adjustment of accounts.

This decision is directly contrary to the decision in the case of Briggs v. Spaulding. The court in speaking of the argument of the supreme court that all the directors of the bank are not to be held liable for the misconduct or negligence of their co-directors on the notion that they are not joint feasors, says: "I am unable to adopt this ground as solid. It leaves out of view entirely the element of care and diligence in supervising the affairs of the bank. Four justices dissented, and declared in favor of holding the defendants in question liable for such losses as occurred after they had opportunity to investigate the affairs of the bank and stop the improper practices of the vice-president. I confess that I think the reasoning of the minority opinion more convincing." The United States Circuit Court of

Appeals has also refused to follow the rule announced in Briggs v. Spaulding. Warner v. Pennoyer, 91 Fed. Rep. 587, 44 L. R. A. 761. See also the following important and valuable cases holding bank directors liable in such cases. Marshall v. Bank, 85 Va. 676, 8 S. E. Rep. 2 L. R. A. 534, 17 Am. St. Rep. 84; Warren v. Robinson (Utah 1899), 57 Pac. Rep. 287. The court in the last case cited uses this strong language, to which we give our hearty endorsement: "It is the right and duty of the directors to take upon themselves the management of the institution, and to exercise and maintain a supervision over all business operations, upon the skillful and wise conduct of which depend the prosperity of the institution and the safety of those dealing with it. The duties of directors are administrative, relate to supervision and direction, and when it is sought to hold them responsible for a dereliction of duty, because of which a loss occurred to stockholders and creditors, they cannot evade liability by pleading ignorance of the affairs of the institution, incompetency, or gratuitous service, or that the management of the banking business was in the hands of the cashier or other executive officer."

FEDERAL JURISDICTION-CONTROVERSY BETWEEN STATES AS TO DIVERSION OF WATER BY ONE TO THE INJURY OF THE OTHER-A controversy between sovereign states, taking the form of an ordinary civil suit, is one of the strange peculiarities of American jurisprudence. An interesting instance of this unique form of action appears in the recent case of Kansas v. Colorado, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652. In this case a bill was filed by the state of Kansas in the United States Supreme Court against the state of Colorado which presents the question whether the latter state has the power wholly to deprive the state. of Kansas of the benefit of water from the Arkansas river, which rises in Colorado and flows into and through the state of Kansas. The state of Colorado filed a demurrer to the bili of complaint denying that the United States Supreme Court had any jurisdiction either over the parties to or the subject-matter of the suit, for the reason that the question at issue did not constitute, within the meaning of the constitution, any controversy between the state of Kansas and the state of Colorado.

The frequent occurrence of suits between states of late years has demonstrated the wisdom of the framers of the constitution in providing for their exclusive cognizance by the United States Supreme Court. A state is a sovereignty and under the rules of international law might settle its disputes with other states either by treaty or an appeal to force. The states of the American union are, of right, possessed of every attribute of sovereignty, including the two just referred to. These latter, however, they have surrendered to the general government and are thus stripped of any power to settle disputes with ad

joining states. In return for this sacrifice, by the states, however, the general government assumes to act as arbitrator of all disputes between them. And these disputes include, not only controversies over boundary lines or settlement of property rights, but disputes over rights and privileges of any kind that might reasonably be the subject of treaty or the occasion of a resort to arms. This was well settled in the recent case of Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, 21 St. Sup. Ct. Rep. 331, where such jurisdiction was held to extend to a complaint by one state that the action of another state in constructing a sewage canal for the purpose of dumping the sewage of a large city into the waters of a stream which flowed through and was vitally necessary for the use of the citizens of the former state. In that case Justice Shiras, speaking for the court on the subject of jurisdiction, said: "It is true that no question of boundary is involved, nor of direct property rights belonging to the complainant state, but it must surely be conceded that if the health and comfort of the inhabitants of a state are threatened, the state is the proper party to represent and defend them. If Missouri were an independent and sovereign state, all must admit that she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and, that failing, by force. Diplomatic powers and the right to make war having been surrendered to the general government, it was to be expected that upon the latter would be devolved the duty of providing a remedy and that remedy, we think, is found in the constitutional provisions we are considering."

We pause before concluding this note to again call attention to the wonderful and unique character of this proceeding. It has no counterpart in the whole realm of jurisprudence. Many, indeed, have been the attempts to organize tribunals having cognizance of disputes between sovereign states but they invaribly broke unsuccessfully from lack of power to enforce their decrees. No such fatality attaches to the judgments of the judicial arm of the federal government of the United States. The right of a state to nullify an act of the federal government was forever settled on the field of Appomattox and Gettysburg. Within the jurisdiction and power given to the federal government by the constitution it is absolutely supreme, and in no respect is this jurisdiction more productive of desirable results than in the settlement of difficulties between the states.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF ADJOINING LANDOWNERS-LATERAL SUPPORT.

General Principles Governing the Actions of Owners of Land. - Every man is entitled to the natural and ordinary use and enjoyment of his property. The landowner has absolute dominion over the soil for an indefi

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