question. To make assurance doubly sure, the Secretary of War, in promulgating that executive order, made this one: "Upon the occupation of any ports or places in the Philippine Islands by the forces of the United States, the foregoing order shall be proclaimed and enforced." (45 C. Cls., 343.) The act of the Secretary was the act of the President. Evidently, it was the purpose of the President to have the order promulgated and enforced in the ports and places in the Philippines when and as occupied or possessed by the forces of the United States. The language is not susceptible of any other construction. That course was not only the usual one in emergencies of the kind the world over, but it was the reasonable course when we consider that our government was engaged in taking possession of ports and places in a distant part of the world, inhabited by a strange mixture of people, many of them owing fealty to other nations. To such people public proclamation would be of great force and effect, and it was apparent, therefore, that it should be made before obedience ought to be required.

A parallel in principle is found in a "notified blockade," which is a notification accompanied by the fact of blockade. Wharton's Int. Law (3rd ed.), secs. 511, 519; Hall's Int. Law (4th ed.), secs. 257, 258.

This now well established doctrine of occupation and possession was clearly recognized and enforced during our Civil War as occasion offered. The Act of July 13, 1861 (12 Stat. 255, sec. 5), authorized the President to declare the inhabitants of a State, or any section or part thereof, where the insurrection existed, to be in a state of insurrection against the United States, and thereupon all commercial intercourse by and with its citizens should cease and be unlawful so long as hostilities existed. President Lincoln, August 16, 1862 (12 Stat. 1262), issued a proclamation on the subject, but excepted therefrom the inhabitants of such States "as may maintain a legal adhesion to the Union and to the Constitution, or may be from time to time occupied and controlled by forces of the United States engaged in the dispersion of the said insurgents." The statute and the excepting clause of the proclamation were considered by the Supreme Court in The Venice, 2 Wall., 259, 265, 270, and the court said that "Military occupation and control, to work this exception, must be actual; that is to say, not illusory, not imperfect, not transient; but substantial, complete, and permanent." That case was approved in The Reform, 3 Wall., 617, 632; The Grapeshot, 9 Wall., 129, 131; Levy v. Stewart, 11 Wall., 244, 253.

The Ratification Act of June 30, 1906, should not be so construed as

to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains. International law is a part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S., 113, 163; The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S., 677, 700. "It has also been observed," said Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch, 64, 118, "that an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and, consequently, can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country. These principles are believed to be correct and they ought to be kept in view in construing the act now under consideration."

When the Ratification Act was passed, Congress could not have been disregardful of the Hague Convention. The language of Mr. Justice Harlan in Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S., 536, 590, seems to be particularly applicable. "When the Act of 1882 was passed," said that learned justice, "Congress was aware of the obligation this government had recently assumed, by solemn treaty, to accord to a certain class of Chinese laborers the privilege of going from and coming to this country at their pleasure. Did it intend, within less than a year after the ratification of the treaty, and without so declaring in unmistakable terms, to withdraw that privilege by the general words of the first and second sections of that act? Did it intend to do what would be inconsistent with the inviolable fidelity with which, according to the established rules of international law, the stipulations of treaties should be observed? These questions must receive a negative answer." This utterance of that great judge and patriot are commended to those of our citizens whose interests impel them to endeavor to avoid or evade the treaty obligations of their government.

ANOTHER SANCTION FOR INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

Under the title of "Higher Nationality: A study in law and ethics," Viscount Haldane, Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, delivered a notable address before the American Bar Association at Montreal on September 1, 1913. The public remarks of a Lord Chancellor of Great Britain are always, on account of the important office he holds, entitled to more than passing notice. But the Lord Chancellor is ordinarily

quite circumscribed in his travels, because he is the Keeper of the Great Seal, an instrument which he must neither quit without special authority nor carry out of the realm, and the audiences before which he may appear are necessarily limited to that extent. His must be more than a personal purpose, therefore, which would induce him to seek and obtain the permission of his sovereign to cross the seas in order to make an address at Montreal; and if the departure of the Lord Chancellor required the approval of the sovereign, it is not at all unlikely that what the Lord Chancellor was to say upon his arrival at his destination received also the approval of the sovereign, and perhaps of his ministers as well. Indeed, in the course of his remarks the Lord Chancellor delivered a personal message of esteem and good will from the King of Great Britain to the people of the United States and of Canada, and he expressly stated that the King's message formed the text for what he had to say.

Following the example of another distinguished Englishman, Lord Russell of Killowen, Chief Justice of England, who, in 1896, addressed the same association at Saratoga, New York, on the subject of international law and arbitration, the Lord Chancellor chose as his subject a question of international interest, namely, a suggestion of a sanction for international obligations which he thought had not previously attracted attention in connection with international law.

To develop his idea, the speaker began by recurring to the system of rules by which the daily conduct of the citizens of a state is regulated. "Of this system," he said, "the law forms only a small part," for "law, properly so called, whether civil or criminal, means essentially those rules of conduct which are expressly and publicly laid down by the sovereign will of the state, and are enforced by the sanction of compulsion." Besides the rules and sanctions of law, there were also, he said, the rules of morality. "But the tribunal of conscience is a private one, and its jurisdiction is limited to the individual whose conscience it is. The moral rules enjoined by the private conscience may be the very highest of all. But they are enforced only by an inward and private tribunal. Their sanction is subjective and not binding in the same way on all men."

"The field of daily conduct," he continued, "is covered, in the case of the citizen, only to a small extent by law and legality on the one hand, and by the dictates of the individual conscience on the other. There is a more extensive system of guidance which regulates conduct and

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which differs from both in its character and sanction. It applies, like law, to all the members of a society alike, without distinction of persons. It resembles the morality of conscience in that it is enforced by no legal compulsion. In the English language we have no name for it. German writers have, however, marked out the system to which I refer and have given it the name of 'Sittlichkeit.' 'Sittlichkeit' is the system of habitual or customary conduct, ethical rather than legal, which embraces all those obligations of the citizen which it is 'bad form' or 'not the thing' to disregard. Indeed regard for these obligations is frequently enjoined merely by the social penalty of being 'cut' or looked on askance. And yet the system is so generally accepted and is held in so high regard, that no one can venture to disregard it without in some way suffering at the hands of his neighbors for so doing. If a man maltreats his wife and children, or habitually jostles his fellowcitizens in the street, or does things flagrantly selfish or in bad taste, he is pretty sure to find himself in a minority and the worse off in the end. But not only does it not pay to do these things, but the decent man does not wish to do them. A feeling analogous to what arises from the dictates of his more private and individual conscience restrains him. He finds himself so restrained in the ordinary affairs of daily life. But he is guided in his conduct by no mere inward feeling, as in the case of conscience. Conscience, and for that matter, law overlap parts of the sphere of social obligation about which I am speaking. A rule of conduct may, indeed, appear in more than one sphere, and may consequently have a twofold sanction. But the guide to which the citizen mostly looks is just the standard recognized by the community, a community made up mainly of those fellow-citizens whose good opinion he respects and desires to have. He has everywhere round him an objectlesson in the conduct of decent people towards each other and towards the community to which they belong. Without such conduct and the restraints which it imposes there could be no tolerable social life, and real freedom from interference would not be enjoyed. It is the instinctive sense of what to do and what not to do in daily life and behaviour that is the source of liberty and ease. And it is this instinctive sense of obligation that is the chief foundation of society. Its reality takes objective shape and displays itself in family life and in our other civic and social institutions. It is not limited to any one form, and it is capable of manifesting itself in new forms and of developing and changing old forms. Indeed, the civic community is more than a political

fabric. It includes all the social institutions in and by which the individual life is influenced-such as are the family, the school, the church, the legislature, and the executive. None of these can subsist in isolation from the rest; together they and other institutions of the kind form a single organic whole, the whole which is known as the Nation. The spirit and habit of life which this organic entirety inspires and compels are what, for my present purpose, I mean by 'Sittlichkeit.' 'Sitte' is the German for custom, and 'Sittlichkeit' implies custom and a habit of mind and action. It also implies a little more. Fichte defines it in words which are worth quoting, and which I will put into English: 'What, to begin with,' he says, 'does Sitte signify, and in what sense do we use the word? It means for us, and means in every accurate reference we make to it, those principles of conduct which regulate people in their relations to each other, and which have become matter of habit and second nature at the stage of culture reached, and of which, therefore, we are not explicitly conscious. Principles, we call them, because we do not refer to the sort of conduct that is casual or is determined on casual grounds, but to the hidden and uniform ground of action which we assume to be present in the man whose action is not deflected and from which we can pretty certainly predict what he will do. Principles, we say, which have become a second nature and of which we are not explicitly conscious. We thus exclude all impulses and motives based on free individual choice, the inward aspect of Sittlichkeit, that is to say morality, and also the outward side, or law, alike. For what a man has first to reflect over and then freely to resolve is not for him a habit in conduct; and in so far as habit in conduct is associated with a particular age, it is regarded as the unconscious instrument of the Time. Spirit.'

"The system of ethical habit in a community is of a dominating character, for the decision and influence of the whole community is embodied in that social habit. Because such conduct is systematic and covers the whole of the field of society, the individual will is closely related by it to the will and spirit of the community. And out of this relation arises the power of adequately controlling the conduct of the individual. If this power fails or becomes weak the community degenerates and may fall to pieces. Different nations excel in their 'Sittlichkeit' in different fashions. The spirit of the community and its ideals may vary greatly. There may be a low level of 'Sittlichkeit'; and we have the spectacle of 1 Grundzüge des Gegenwärtigen Zeitalters, Werke, Band vii., p. 214.