fabric. It includes all the social institutions in and by which the individual life is influenced-such as are the family, the school, the church, the legislature, and the executive. None of these can subsist in isolation from the rest; together they and other institutions of the kind form a single organic whole, the whole which is known as the Nation. The spirit and habit of life which this organic entirety inspires and compels are what, for my present purpose, I mean by 'Sittlichkeit.' 'Sitte' is the German for custom, and 'Sittlichkeit' implies custom and a habit of mind and action. It also implies a little more. Fichte1 defines it in words which are worth quoting, and which I will put into English: 'What, to begin with,' he says, 'does Sitte signify, and in what sense do we use the word? It means for us, and means in every accurate reference we make to it, those principles of conduct which regulate people in their relations to each other, and which have become matter of habit and second nature at the stage of culture reached, and of which, therefore, we are not explicitly conscious. Principles, we call them, because we do not refer to the sort of conduct that is casual or is determined on casual grounds, but to the hidden and uniform ground of action which we assume to be present in the man whose action is not deflected and from which we can pretty certainly predict what he will do. Principles, we say, which have become a second nature and of which we are not explicitly conscious. We thus exclude all impulses and motives based on free individual choice, the inward aspect of Sittlichkeit, that is to say morality, and also the outward side, or law, alike. For what a man has first to reflect over and then freely to resolve is not for him a habit in conduct; and in so far as habit in conduct is associated with a particular age, it is regarded as the unconscious instrument of the Time Spirit.'

"The system of ethical habit in a community is of a dominating character, for the decision and influence of the whole community is embodied in that social habit. Because such conduct is systematic and covers the whole of the field of society, the individual will is closely related by it to the will and spirit of the community. And out of this relation arises the power of adequately controlling the conduct of the individual. If this power fails or becomes weak the community degenerates and may fall to pieces. Different nations excel in their 'Sittlichkeit' in different fashions. The spirit of the community and its ideals may vary greatly. There may be a low level of 'Sittlichkeit'; and we have the spectacle of 1 Grundzüge des Gegenwärtigen Zeitalters, Werke, Band vii., p. 214.

nations which have even degenerated in this respect. It may possibly conflict with law and morality, as in the case of the duel. But when its level is high in a nation we admire the system, for we see it not only guiding a people and binding them together for national effort, but affording the greatest freedom of thought and action for those who in daily life habitually act in harmony with the General Will."

After citing several examples to illustrate his meaning and to distinguish what he called the General Will from a collection of individual wills, he said, "Thus we find within the single state the evidence of a sanction which is less than legal but more than merely moral, and which is sufficient, in the vast majority of the events of daily life, to secure observance of general standards of conduct without any question of resort to force." He then asked: "If this is so within a nation, can it be so as between nations? * * * Can nations form a group or community among themselves within which a habit of looking to common ideals may grow up sufficiently strong to develop a General Will, and to make the binding power of these ideals a reliable sanction for their obligations to each other?"

"There is," he said, "nothing in the real nature of nationality that precludes such a possibility;" but, referring to the prayer of Grotius in concluding his work on War and Peace that God may "write these lessons on the hearts of all those who have the affairs of Christendom in their hands," and give to them "a mind fitted to understand and to respect rights, human and divine, and lead them to recollect always that the ministration committed to them is no less than this, that they are the Governors of Man, a creature most dear to God," the Lord Chancellor concludes:

"The prayer of Grotius has not yet been fulfilled, nor do recent events point to the fulfilment being near. The world is probably a long way off from the abolition of armaments and the peril of war. For habits of mind which can be sufficiently strong with a single people can hardly be as strong between nations. There does not exist the same extent of common interest, of common purpose, and of common tradition. And yet the tendency, even as between nations that stand in no special relation to each other, to develop such a habit of mind is in our time becoming recognisable. There are signs that the best people in the best nations are ceasing to wish to live in a world of mere claims, and to proclaim on every occasion, 'Our country, right or wrong.' There is growing up a disposition to believe that it is good, not only for all men

but for all nations, to consider their neighbours' point of view as well as their own. There is apparent at least a tendency to seek for a higher standard of ideals in international relations. The barbarism which once looked to conquest and the waging of successful war as the main object of statesmanship, seems as though it were passing away. There have been established rules of International Law which already govern the conduct of war itself, and are generally observed as binding by all civilized people, with the result that the cruelties of war have been lessened. If practice falls short of theory, at least there is to-day little effective challenge of the broad principle that a nation has as regards its neighbours' duties as well as rights. It is this spirit that may develop as time goes on into a full international 'Sittlichkeit.'

FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES

The society with the expressive but unpronounceable name, as Mr. Choate facetiously calls it, held its fourth annual meeting under his presidency at Washington, December 4-6, 1913. It was well-attended, the papers at the different sessions were of unusual excellence, and the addresses at the formal dinner, which closed the meeting, were so apt and instructive that they will be preserved and printed in the volume of Proceedings which the Society issues after each annual meeting.

The aim of the Society is stated in the name, which is in itself a manifesto and a program. It seeks to advance the cause of judicial settlement without questioning the right of nations to submit their disputes to arbitration, if they wish to do so. But the members of the Society advocate in season and out of season the creation of a permanent international court of justice, composed of professional judges who will, to use an expression of Mr. Root's, act under a sense of judicial responsibility, and to which court the nations may submit their disputes of a legal nature for judicial decision by the passionless and impartial application of principles of justice. Arbitration is the modern shibboleth: every dispute, no matter how great or how little, whether it be political or legal, must be referred to the single remedy of arbitration, and a belief in arbitration as a catch-all and a cure-all is popularly made the test of the man of peace as distinguished from the man of war. The Society takes no attitude on arbitration: many of its members doubtless believe in the efficacy of arbitral procedure, certainly none are op

posed to it; but many believe that for certain kinds of disputes, based upon or involving principles of law, the judicial is superior to the arbitral remedy, which often seems to be but a continuation of diplomatic procedure in which arbiters chosen, but not controlled, by the parties are substituted for diplomatic agents appointed and controlled by the nations in controversy.

There are many peace societies at home and abroad ardently devoted to the cause of arbitration; there is but one society devoted solely and exclusively to the advancement of judicial settlement a fact which lends a special interest to the activity and the proceedings of the Society. It was founded four years ago, on February 6, 1909; it has held four annual conferences, three of them at Washington; it issues a quarterly bulletin on some phase of judicial settlement, and scatters it broadcast in foreign countries as well as in the United States. It is not a popular society in the sense that it has a waiting-list, but it has more than a thousand members and it has influenced leaders of opinion both at home and abroad. A single instance of this may be cited: the writer of this comment happened to visit a distinguished Lord Justice of England and found a volume of the annual Proceedings of the Society lying on his lordship's table. In reply to a question, his lordship stated that he was profoundly interested in the judicial settlement of international disputes and that he found more interesting information on this subject in these Proceedings than in any volume with which he was acquainted, and that he always carried a volume of the Proceedings with him to read in the car or in the hotel when away from home.

The fourth meeting of the Society was devoted exclusively to the question of an international court of justice, and it was peculiarly fortunate in its speakers. In the first place, Mr. Joseph H. Choate, President of the Society, presided at the opening session and delivered an address full of ripe wisdom and kindly wit, advocating the reference of the Panama toll dispute to an international tribunal, as it is preeminently a legal question, and advocating likewise steps to be taken to secure the call of a Third Hague Conference to meet in 1915, in accordance with the recommendation of the Second Conference, at which Mr. Choate so worthily represented the United States and procured the adoption of the recommendation for the Third Conference.

At the dinner Dr. David Jayne Hill, likewise a delegate of the United States to the Second Conference, made a singularly felicitous address in which he tacitly admitted the authorship of the instructions to the

American delegation to the First Conference, during which time he was Assistant Secretary of State, and related an interesting conversation with Sir Julian Pauncefote, then British Ambassador, in which the latter stated that the arrest of armament was impossible and that the Conference was doomed to failure unless other subjects of international interest were considered. Sir Julian informed Dr. Hill that he intended, with the approval of his government, to propose the establishment of an international court of arbitration. This he did, and, through his efforts, ably seconded by the American delegation, the present so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration was created by the First Conference.

The first session of the Society had an international aspect, due to the fact that two distinguished lawyers of Canada attended and spoke; Mr. Justice Riddell, the first Canadian member of the Society, on the possibilities of judicial settlement as shown by the practice of nations; Mr. Robert C. Smith, K. C., of Montreal, on the need and advantages of an international court of justice. Different phases of this question were discussed in papers by Mr. James D. Andrews and Mr. Edwin M. Borchard, Assistant Solicitor of the Department of State, who advocated the establishment of a court for contract claims of individuals against foreign governments. Mr. Joseph R. Wheless of St. Louis pleaded for a Pan American court of justice and Professor William I. Hull spoke on the Monroe Doctrine and the international court.

The second session was devoted to the discussion of the composition of the proposed court and proceedings before it. Thus, Dr. James L. Tryon gave a general survey of proposals to establish an international court; Mr. Otto Schoenrich, President of the Nicaraguan Claims Commission, discussed "The constitution of a permanent international court of justice." Mr. George T. Porter of Washington, D. C., and Mr. Denys P. Myers, examined the important problems contained in the following question: "In composition of the court, should the following elements be considered: (a) population of states; (b) commercial importance; (c) different systems of jurisprudence; (d) languages; (e) geographical situation?" Mr. Porter forsook the beaten track, presenting a series of original views and suggestions in a paper of literary charm and feeling. Mr. Walter S. Penfield, of the Washington Bar, read an interesting and instructive paper on the manner in which the jurisdiction of the proposed court should be defined, and Mr. Ralston, who has had great practical experience in arbitration as agent of the United States in the Pious Fund case, the first to be tried before the Permanent Court of