Слике страница

This court had held that the President had no authority to order the imposition of duties subsequent to the ratification of the treaty, with reference to Porto Rico (Dooley v. United States, supra), and with reference to the Philippine Islands (Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U. S. 176). The Act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. 691), was then passed by Congress, ratifying the action of the President in making the order of July 12, 1898, whereby duties had been collected at "all ports and places in the Philippine Islands upon passing into the occupation and possession of the forces of the United States," and amendments of that order, and ratifying such action of the authorities in the Philippines as was done in accordance with the orders of the President. In Lincoln v. United States, and Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., v. United States, 197 U.S. 419, affirmed on rehearing in 202 U.S. 484, the act of July 1, 1902, was construed to apply only to duties collected prior to April 11, 1899 (when the treaty became effective). In this situation, the month following the decision of this court in 202 U. S. 484, supra, (affirming the Lincoln and Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., cases) Congress passed the ratifying act now in question. United States v. Heinszen & Co., supra, 381.

Conceding that the act is broad enough in terms to cover tariff duties exacted under the authority of the President's orders before the ratification of the treaty, it is expressly limited to tariff duties, import and export, imposed by the authorities of the United States and of the provisional government of the islands prior to March 8, 1902 (the date of the act of Congress temporarily providing revenue for the Philippine Islands, 32 Stat. 54); and there is no expression of purpose in the statute to enlarge the executive orders of the President, which limited the collection of duties during our military occupation to ports and places actually held and occupied by the forces of the United States, or to ratify collections made where goods had been entered at a port not under American control and in possession of a de facto insurrectionary government, as is here shown.

The statute should be construed in the light of the purpose of the government to act within the limitation of the principles of international law, the observance of which is so essential to the peace and harmony of nations, and it should not be assumed that Congress proposed to violate the obligations of this country to other nations, which it was the manifest purpose of the President to scrupulously observe and which were founded upon the principles of international law.

The act has the scope given to it in the case of United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370, namely, to ratify "the collection of the duties levied under the order of the President," which, as we have seen, were tariff duties imposed at ports in the occupation and possession of the United States. The tariff duties upon the cargo of rice here in question were paid to the de facto authorities at Cebu, where the cargo was entered, and the payment made at Manila was not a tariff duty but an illegal and unwarranted exaction in the nature of a penalty, covered by neither the orders of the President nor the ratifying acts of Congress.

We think the Court of Claims was in error in holding the duties collectible at Manila under the circumstances related, and in adjudging that the Act of June 30, 1906, ratified the conduct of the military authorities at Manila in compelling such payment. Its judgment will therefore be reversed and the case remanded to the Court of Claims with instructions to enter judgment for the claimant.




Das Werk vom Haag. Vol. I. Der Staatenverband der Haager Kon

ferenzen. By Walther Schücking. pp. xii, 328. Vol. II. Problem eines internationalen Staatengerichtshofes. By Dr. Hans Wehberg. pp. xx, 243. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. 1912.

Professor Schücking has had the happy thought to edit a series of volumes or monographs dealing with The Hague Conferences. They are to be prepared by the most eminent publicists of the German-speaking world. A volume or monograph is to be devoted to each subject considered by the Conferences and each volume, written in German, is to be issued as it is ready for publication. He has associated with him as collaborators distinguished teachers and authorities on international law, who are interested in the popularization of the Conferences and who will, it is hoped, not only advise Professor Schücking, but will themselves contribute volumes or monographs on subjects about which they may claim to speak as experts. Professor Schücking's idea is to have these volumes appear at irregular intervals, forming a part of a series which he hopes will be as permanent as the Conferences they are to describe and popularize. His fundamental purpose, however, was not to enrich international law with a series of volumes, however admirable, but, by means of the series, to make the work of The Hague better known and, if possible, appreciated at its true value in Germany. Two volumes have already appeared. The first, entitled Der Staatenverband der Haager Konferenzen, is by Professor Schücking. The second, entitled Das Problem eines internationalen Staatengerichtshofes, is by Dr. Hans Wehberg. If we may judge by the initial volumes, it is more than probable that Professor Schücking will accomplish his purpose, and every friend of the Conferences must wish him well.

It is but natural that Professor Schücking, as the founder and editor of the series, should himself contribute the first volume, and it is as proper as it is natural that this volume should attempt to define the nature and scope of The Hague Conference, as such, the place it occupies among other conferences, and the probable form which it may assume.

It is not the intention of the present reviewer to examine at length Professor Schücking's views, or to subject them to a detailed criticism, but, rather, to state his fundamental conceptions, and to advise the reader who understands German to master the book, and to inform the reader who is unfamiliar with German that an English translation of the first two volumes of the series will shortly be issued by the Division of International Law of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Professor Schücking's views may be briefly stated: He believes that a definite political union of the states of the world has been created by the First and Second Conferences, that the various agencies created by the Conferences are not merely agents or organs to carry out the purposes for which they were created, but that they are agents or organs of the union; that is to say, the so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration is not merely the agency of the two or more parties constituting the special or temporary tribunal for the trial of an individual case, but that the court and its tribunal are in fact the organ of the union and administer justice not merely in the name of the parties constituting the tribunal, but in the name of the states forming the union. This is indeed a radical conception, but it is a logical deduction on the assumption that the union of the states, of which The Hague Conferences are the evidence, is a political and organic union. The writer of this review prefers to consider the union, in so far as the administration of justice is concerned, as a public union, of the type, for example, of the Universal Postal Union. After a careful discussion of the nature of the Conference, the services which it has rendered and will undoubtedly render, if it be held at regular stated intervals—ten years, in his opinion, would be often enough-the author proposes that the Third Conference adopt a convention defining the aim and purpose of the Conference, the period at which it shall meet, the procedure to be followed by it in the conduct of its business, and the details necessary to perfect its organization. The provisions of the draft convention which he proposes are in the nature of a codification of the practice of the nations, in so far as The Hague Conferences are concerned, and do not express the author's views concerning the probable or desirable development of international organization. His personal views are contained in Chapter 5 and, while entitled to great respect and consideration, they will undoubtedly be considered as somewhat radical. The present reviewer has no desire to match his views against those of Professor Schücking, and the purpose

of this review is, as stated, to call attention to Professor Schücking's very able volume, to express the hope that it may be widely circulated in German, as it will stimulate thought and provoke discussion, and that it may be even more widely read in its English translation. For whatever may be thought of the correctness of Professor Schücking's point of approach and the conclusions which he reaches, there can be no doubt that the Staatenverband der Haager Konferenzen is not only an admirable introduction to the series of volumes and monographs to be devoted to the work of The Hague, but also a distinct contribution to one of the most important and hopeful phases of international life.

Dr. Wehberg's monograph on the problem of an international court of justice is a very remarkable performance, and can not be read by any person to whom the German language is familiar without admiration for the skillful manner in which he has discussed the various problems connected with an international court and without a feeling of gratitude for the balanced judgment and the spirit of fairness which he has displayed in the attempt to solve the problems connected with the proposed court, which are both many and difficult.

Dr. Wehberg approached the question of an international court of justice with considerable misgivings and, in a previous publication, he declared himself to be a partisan of the so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration and opposed to the establishment of a truly permanent court composed of professional judges acting under a sense of judicial responsibility. Study and reflection, however, have convinced him of the necessity of the latter court, and the volume under review is calculated to strengthen the faith of those who believe in the proposed court and to persuade many doubters and waiverers who are open to argument.

Dr. Wehberg believes that international law must be developed in order more adequately to meet the world's needs, that the conflicts inevitably arising between nations in so far as they are of a legal character can best be decided by a court of justice composed of permanent and professional judges, whose duty it will be both to find and to apply the principle of justice decisive of the conflicts submitted to the court, and that such a tribunal can safely be entrusted to develop the system of law, as is the wont of courts, which it applies to the decision of concrete cases. He believes, and rightly, that the nations appearing before the

« ПретходнаНастави »